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
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THE HISTORY
OF
THE PROGRESS AND TERMINATION
OF THE
ROMAN REPUBLIC.

BY ADAM FERGUSON,

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THE HISTORY

OF THE

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ABOUT the time that Pompey obtained ^{u. c. 686.} his commission to command, with so extensive a power, in the suppression of the pirates, the tide began to run high against the aristocratical party at Rome. The populace, led by some of the tribunes, were ever ready to insult the authority of the senate; and the vices of particular men gave frequent advantages against the whole order of nobles. Corruption and dangerous faction prevailed at elections, and the preferments of state were generally coveted, as steps to the government of provinces, where fortunes were

amassed by every species of abuse, oppression, and violence. Envy and indignation together concurred in rousing the people against these abuses. Cornelius, one of the tribunes, proposed a severe law against bribery, by which persons convicted of this crime should be disqualified for any office whatever in the commonwealth. The senate wished to soften the rigour of this law, by limiting the penalty to a pecuniary fine; and the consul, Calpurnius Piso, moved for an edict to this purpose, in order to anticipate and to preclude, the more violent law of Cornelius. But the tribune prevailed, and obtained an act, imposing the severer penalty. He likewise, by another decree of the people, attacked the discretionary jurisdiction of the prætors,* obliged them to be more explicit in the edicts they published, and to observe them more exactly.

The crime of extortion in the provinces, however, was the great disgrace of the Romans. To have found an effectual remedy for this evil would have done more honour to the people than they had derived from all their conquests. Severe laws were accordingly enacted, complaints were willingly received, and prosecutions encouraged. Candidates for popularity and public favour generally began with endeavouring to bring some offender under this title to public justice; but the example of this state, after all, has left only this piece of instruction to mankind:—That just government, over conquered provinces, is scarcely to be hoped for; and least of all where republics are the conquerors.

Manilius, one of the tribunes of the people, in order to strengthen the inferior class of his constituents, had obtained by surprise an act,† by which the citizens of slavish extraction were to be promiscuously inrolled in all the tribes. This act, having drawn upon him the resentment of the senate, compelled him to seek for security under the protection of Gabinus and Pompey. With this view it was that he moved his famous act, in which Cicero concurred, to vest Pompey with the command in Asia. This motion had procured

* Dio. Cass. lib. xxxvi. c. 23.

† Ibid. lib. xxxvi.

him a powerful support, and, on some occasions, raised the general voice of the people in his favour: insomuch, that soon after this transaction, being prosecuted for some offence at the tribunal of Cicero, who was then prætor, and being refused the usual delays, the prætor was obliged to explain this step in a speech to the people; in which he told them, that he actually meant to favour Manilius, and that, his own term in office being about to expire, he could not serve him more effectually, than by hastening his trial, and by not leaving him in the power of a successor, who might not be equally disposed to acquit him. Such were the loose and popular notions of justice then prevailing, and the sacrifices made to party, at Rome.*

At the election of consuls for the following year, there occurred an opportunity to apply the law against bribery. Of four candidates, Publius Autronius Pætus, Publius Cornelius Sylla, L. Aurelius Cotta, and L. Manlius Torquatus, the majority had declared for the former two; but these being convicted of bribery, were set aside, and their competitors declared duly elected.

About the same time L. Sergius Catalina, who has been already branded as the murderer of his own brother, under pretence of Sylla's proscriptions, having returned from Africa, where he had served in the quality of prætor, and intending to stand for the consulate, was accused of extortion in the province, and stopped in his canvas by a prosecution raised on this account. In his rage for this disappointment, he was ripe for any project of horror; and being readily joined by Autronius and Piso, the late disappointed candidates, formed a conspiracy to assassinate their rivals,† to massacre the senate, to seize the ensigns of power, and, with the aid of their faction, to lay hold of the government.‡ Marcus Crassus and Caius Cæsar, are mentioned by Suetonius, as accessory to this plot. Crassus was to have been named dictator, and Cæsar his general of the horse.|| Cæsar was to have made a

* Plutarch, in Vit. Cicero.

† Dion. lib. xxxvi &c.

‡ Cic. in P. Sylla et in Catal. i. c. 6.

|| Sueton. in Cæsar.

signal for beginning the massacre, by uncovering his shoulders of his gown; but Crassus, having wavered, absented himself from the senate, and Cæsar, though present, having made no signal, the occasion passed without the projected attempt.

This is the conspiracy for which Publius Sylla came to be tried as an accomplice, and was defended by Cicero, in a pleading which is still extant. Whether Crassus and Cæsar, being, according to Suetonius, implicated in the first steps, afterwards broke off the connection, may be questioned. But it is certain, that the plot was carried on by the others to its full detection, in the manner which remains to be told. The times, indeed, were pregnant with the seeds of extreme evil; many of those who, from their outset and prospects, were destined to run the political course, overwhelmed with the effects of prodigality and immoderate expense, in their suit to the people, incurred a ruin, which, if successful in their pretensions to office, was to be repaired by odious expedients abroad, or, if disappointed, led them to projects of desperation and rage at home*.

The state appears to have apprehended an increase of these evils, from the number of foreigners, who, from every quarter, crowded to Rome as to the general resort of persons who wished to indulge their own extravagance, or to prey upon that of others. Under this apprehension, an edict was obtained, upon the motion of C. Papius, tribune of the people, to oblige all strangers to leave the city: but it is likely, that the state was in greater danger from natives than foreigners. Cataline, having prevailed upon Clodius, by the consideration of a sum of money, to drop the prosecution which had been commenced against him, was left to offer himself a candidate for the consulate of the following year.†

The office of censor had been revived in the persons of Catulus and Crassus; but these officers found that its authority, so powerful in former times, was now greatly reduced. They scarcely ventured to give it a trial within the city; and, hav-

* Plutarch. in Vit. Ciceronis.

† Cicero, de Auspiciis Responsis.

ing differed about the enrolment of citizens residing beyond the Po, and about some other particulars, they resigned their power.* Censors were again named in the following year, but with no greater effect. Some of the tribunes, fearing to be themselves degraded from the senate, put a negative on the usual function of these officers in revising the rolls.†

In the next consulate, that of Lucius Julius Cæsar and C. Marcius Figulus, Caius Cæsar, accused by Suetonius, as above, of hidden designs, but of whom we are from this time scarcely ever to lose sight, being now thirty-five years of age, entered on his career of popularity and ambition. It is remarked, that in his present edileship, together with Marcus Bibulus, not satisfied with the joint exhibition of public shews, which were given to the people, at a common expense with his colleague, he gave separate entertainments on his own account: and destined, it should seem, to be a thorn in the side of those who were solicitous of public order, the gladiators he had assembled on this occasion gave an alarm to the magistracy, and he was ordered not to exceed a certain number. In his present office, or in that of prætor, to which he was afterwards in course advanced, it is observed, that he took some steps that were likely to revive the animosity of the late parties of Marius and Sylla; and, notwithstanding the act of indemnity which had passed, raised prosecutions, on a charge of assassination, against all those who had put any citizen to death, in execution of Sylla's proscription.‡ From this time, Suetonius observes, that Cicero, though it may be thought premature, dated the beginning of his project to subvert the republic, and to make himself master of the state.||

What has most distinguished the present consulate of Lucius Cæsar and Marcius Figulus, however, is the competition of candidates for the succession to that office on the following year, and the consequences of the election which followed.

* Dion. lib. xxxvi.—Plutarch, in Crasso.

† Ibid.

‡ Sueton. in Vit. C. J. Cæsar.

|| Ibid. c. ix. Suetonius supposes, that Cicero alluded to the conspiracy of Autronius and Sylla, in which Crassus, as well as Cæsar, was said to be engaged.

The candidates were, M. Tullius Cicero, C. Antonius, son of the late celebrated orator, L. Sergius Catalina, P. Sulpitius and Galba, L. Cassius Longinus, Quintus Cornificius, and Licinius Sacerdos.

Cicero was the first of his family who had ever resided, or enjoyed any honours, at Rome. He was a native of Arpinum, a country-town of Italy, and was considered as an obscure person by those who were descended of ancient families; but had great consideration, on account of his eloquence, and the consequences of it, to all such as had any interests at stake before the tribunals of justice. Being solicited by Cataline to undertake his defence on a trial for malversation in Sicily, he did not at once reject the request, nor always deny his aid to the factious tribunes in support of their measures. He was, undoubtedly, like other ambitious men at Rome, disposed to court every party, or to gain individuals;* and had of late, in particular, considerably strengthened his interest with the people, by having supported the pretensions of their favourite Pompey, in having joined the popular tribunes, in what they proposed in behalf of this aspiring citizen. He was, notwithstanding, probably by his aversion to appear for so bad a client as Cataline, saved from the reproach of having espoused his cause; and by his known inclination in general to support the authority of the senate, he disposed the aristocratical party to forgive the occasional part which he took with the tribunes in particular questions, not immediately supposed to affect their ascendant in the state.

In the course of this competition for the consulship, Antonius and Cataline joined interests together, and spared no kind of degree of corruption. Cicero complained of their practices in the senate, and moved to revive the law of Calpurnius against bribery, with an additional penalty of ten years' banishment.† Cataline considered this measure as levelled against himself; and, incited by this provocation, as well as by the animosity of a rival, was then supposed to have formed a design against Cicero's life, and to have expressed himself to this purpose,

* Ep. ad Atticum, lib. i. ep. 2.

† Dio. lib. xxxvii. c. 3.

in terms that gave a general alarm to the electors, and determined great numbers against himself. He had drawn to his interests many persons of infamous character and desperate fortune; many youths of good family, whom he debauched or encouraged in their profligacy. His language, at their meetings, was all indignation at the unequal and supposed unjust distribution of fortune and power. "Riches, authority and honour," he said, "are engrossed by a few, while others of more merit are kept in poverty and obscurity, or oppressed with debts." He professed his intention, when in office, to remove these grievances, to cancel the debts of his friends, to enrich them by plentiful divisions of land, and to place them in the stations of honour to which they were entitled.

These declarations, being made to numerous companies assembled together, could not be concealed. Curius, one of the faction, boasted to Fulvia, a woman of rank, with whom he had a criminal intrigue, that a revolution must soon take place; and specified the particular hopes and designs of their party. This woman mentioned the subject to her own confidants, but concealed the author of her information. In the meantime, Cataline was considered as a person of the most dangerous designs, and was opposed in his election by all who had any regard to public order, or to the safety of the commonwealth. Cicero, at the same time, being supported by the senate, was elected, together with Caius Antonius. The latter, indeed, stood candidate upon the same interest with Cataline, and was preferred to him only by a small majority.

By this event the designs of Cataline were supposed to be frustrated; but the consuls were not likely to enter on a quiet administration. The tribunitian power, from the time of its restoration, was gradually recovering its force, and extending its operations. Every person that could give any public disturbance, that could annoy the senate, or mortify any of its leading members; every one that had views of ambition adverse to the laws, or who wished to take part in scenes of confusion and tumult; every person oppres-

U. C. 609.

The splendour of the consul's eloquence, on this occasion, appeared with great distinction; and the spirit of the times continued to furnish him with opportunities to display it.* Roscius Amerinus, having been tribune of the people a few years before, had, by the authority of his office, set apart some benches in the theatre for the equestrian order. This gave offence to the people; so that Roscius was commonly hissed when he appeared at any of the public assemblies. On some one of these occasions the consul interposed, and, in a popular harrangue, secured the attachment of the knights to himself, and even reconciled the people to the distinction which had been made in favour of that body.

There happened, under the same consulate, a business of greater difficulty; being a motion to restore the sons of the proscribed to the privilege of being chosen into the offices of state; of which they had been deprived by an ordinance of Sylla. Their fate was undoubtedly calamitous and severe.

Many of them, who had been too young to have incurred the guilt of their party, were now come of age, and found themselves stripped of their birth-right, and stigmatized with this mark of dishonour. It was proposed, in their behalf, to take away this cruel exclusion. But Cicero, apprehending that this proposal tended to arm and to strengthen persons, who, from long use, had contracted an habitual disaffection to the established government at Rome, powerfully opposed the motion, and succeeded in having it rejected.†

Though the orations, on the two subjects last mentioned, have perished, great part of that which he spoke on the trial of C. Rabirius still remains. This man, of a great age, a respectable senator, after an interval of six-and-thirty years, was brought to trial, as an accomplice in the death of Apuleius Saturninus, the factious tribune, who, as has been related, having seized the capitol, was, by the consuls Marius and Valerius Flaccus, acting under the authority of the

* It is probable that Cicero did not write in order to speak, but wrote after he had spoken, for the use of his friends. *Epist. ad Atticum*, lib. ii. c. i.

† *Plin. lib. vii. c. 30.*

senate, and attended by all the most respectable citizens in arms, forced from his strong hold, and put to death as a public enemy.

Titus Atius Labienus, one of the tribunes, was the declared prosecutor of C. Rabirius; but historians agree, that this tribune acted at the instigation, and under the direction, of C. Cæsar. The intention of the popular party was, by making an example of this respectable person, in so strong a case, where the authority of the senate, and the commands of the most popular consul, where even the prescription of so old a date should have repelled every danger, effectually, for the future, to deter every person from acting in support of the senate, or from lending any force in opposition to the designs of factious tribunes, however turbulent or dangerous.

The senate, and all the friends of established authority, were greatly alarmed, and united in defence of Rabirius. The popular party, as already described, the ambitious, the profligate, the bankrupt, who were earnest to weaken the hands of government, and in haste to bring on scenes of confusion and trouble, took the opposite side.

The prosecutor laid his charge for treason of the most heinous nature; which must have led the convicted, though a freeman, to die on the cross, the ordinary manner of executing the sentence of death on slaves. "The executioner stalks in the forum," said Cicero, "and the cross is erected for a Roman citizen in the field of Mars." The accusation was first brought before the prætor, who possessed the ordinary jurisdiction in such cases: and this magistrate empannelled two judges, who were to determine in this mighty cause. These were Caius Julius and Lucius Cæsar. At this court the defendant was condemned; and with appearances of animosity, on the part of Caius Cæsar, that greatly increased the public alarm. This rising citizen had always courted the populace, and was stongly supported by them. That he should aim at honours and power, it was said, is common; but that he wished to provide impunity for the disturbers of the commonwealth, was dreadful. The

crime of Rabirius, even if he could be convicted of it, had been committed the year before Cæsar was born. In the person of the accused, every circumstance, even on the supposition of a true charge, pleaded for compassion, and even for respect. The fact, at the same time, was denied, and a positive evidence was brought, that another had received a reward for killing Saturninus: but the policy of the faction required this victim; and the sentence must have been executed, if the condemned had not fled, by appeal, to the judgment of the people; where, indeed, his cause might be reckoned more desperate than it had been before a select court. The parties attended this trial with great ardour. Hortensius conducted the appeal and defence. Cicero pleaded in behalf of justice and government; painted the age, the infirmities, the forlorn state, of the defendant, who had survived his relations and his friends. He pointed out the danger to government and to order, from this precedent, in terms that must have melted every heart, not callous from ambition, faction, or profligacy of manners: but in vain. Even in the assembly of the centuries, the majority was hastening to affirm the sentence, when Q. Cæcilius Metellus Celer, then prætor, and one of the augurs, hastened to the Janiculum, and tore down the ensign which was planted there as a sign of peace: and a silly piece of superstition stopped the proceedings of those whom neither justice nor compassion, nor regard to government, could restrain. This form took its rise, as has been formerly mentioned,* in the first ages of Rome, when the enemy, inhabiting villages in the neighbourhood, were supposed at the gates; and the people convened in the field, on one side of the city, might be assailed on the other. When the centuries were formed, therefore, in the field of Mars, a guard was always posted on the Janiculum, and an ensign displayed. If any enemy appeared, the ensign was taken down, the assembly dismissed, and the people took to their arms. This ceremony, like many other customs, both of superstition and law, remained after the occasion had

ceased; and it was held illegal or impious in the people to proceed in any affair without the ensign in view. By this means the trial of Rabirius was put off, and the prosecutors, despairing of being able to work up the people again into an equal degree of violence, dropped the prosecution. The cause still remained undecided, and the power of the senate, to defend its own authority, continued in a state of suspense.

The tribune Labienus laid aside thoughts of renewing this invidious prosecution, in order to pursue the object of some other more popular acts; one in particular, to repeal the almost only remaining ordinance of Sylla; that which conferred on the college of priests the power of filling up vacancies in their own order. The right of election was again taken from the college; and, according to the law of Domitius, given to seventeen of the tribes, who were to be drawn by lot. This change was intended to open the way of Caius Cæsar into that office; and he was accordingly promoted to it in the following year.

Others of the tribunes likewise endeavoured to distinguish themselves by acts of turbulence and sedition. Metellus Nepos endeavoured to repeal that clause of the act against bribery and corruption, which declared the party convicted to be disqualified for any of the offices of state. This tribune, though sufficiently disposed to disorderly courses, had many connections among the most respectable citizens, and was persuaded, in this instance, to drop his design.

But, of all the cabals into which the popular faction was distributed, none was more desperate, nor supposed more dangerous than that of Cataline, the late disappointed candidate for the consulship. His rival Cicero had intimation, before the elections, of a design formed by this desperate party against his own person, and still continued to observe their motions. For this purpose he entered into a correspondence with a woman of the name of Fulvia, already mentioned, and who had given the first hints of a dangerous conspiracy. By means of this woman he procured the confidence of Curius, who gave him minute information of all the proceedings of the party.

In public, Cataline again professed himself a candidate for the office of consul, in competition with Servius Sulpicius, P. Muræna, and J. Silanus. He boasted of support from Antonius ; but Cicero, to divert his colleague from this dangerous connection, made him every concession. Having, in casting lots for the provinces of Gaul and Macedonia, drawn the latter, which was thought to be preferable, he yielded it up to Antonius ; and by this, and every other means in his power, persuaded him to rest on the secure possession of dignities and honours, lawfully obtained, in preference to expectations formed on the projects of a few desperate men.

In secret, Cataline encouraged his adherents, by pretending to have many resources, and to be supported by numbers who were ready to take arms at his command. In a formal meeting of his party, in October, a few days before the consular elections, he opened the whole of his design ; and, in the speech which he made on that occasion, is said to have used expressions to the following purport : “ The distressed can
“ rely for relief on those only who have a common cause
“ with themselves. Whoever is at ease in his own fortune,
“ will not regard the suffering of others. If you would know
“ how I stand affected to the parties which now divide the
“ republic, *rich creditors*, and *needy debtors*, please to con-
“ sider, what every one knows, that I have no safety but in
“ the destruction of the one and the relief of the other : that
“ my interest is the same with your own, and that I have cou-
“ rage to attempt what may be necessary for our common
“ relief and security.”

From the strain of this passage, the description of a party, to whom it was with propriety addressed, may be easily collected. Cicero, who had frequently taxed Cataline with dangerous designs, now determined to lay the whole of his intelligence before the public ; and for this purpose deferred the consular elections, which were to have been held on the eighteenth of October, to a future day, and assembled the senate. Cataline having, with the other members, attended, and hearing the charge, did not pretend to deny or to palliate his words. “ There are,” he said, “ in this republic, two parties ;

"one weak, both in its members and head; the other strong in its members, but wanting a head: while I have the honour of being supported by this party, it shall have a head." Upon these words, a general cry of indignation arose in the senate; but no resolution was taken. Many, who were there present, as members, were pleased to see the senate itself insulted; and Cataline, as if in condition to brave all his enemies, was, in all his expressions, equally unguarded in the streets and in the senate. To Cato, who, in the public forum, some days before this meeting, had threatened to have him impeached: "Do," he said; "but if you light a flame in my fortunes, I will extinguish it under the ruins of the commonwealth."*

A prosecution was actually raised against him, in the name of Lucius Paulus, a young man of distinction, for carrying arms against the public peace. On this occasion, however, he thought proper to soften his tone, and offered to submit to voluntary confinement, until his innocence should be made to appear. "No one," he said, "who knows my rank, my pretensions, and the interest I have in the preservation of the commonwealth, will believe that its destruction is to be apprehended from me, and that its safety is to come from a native of Arpinum."† He offered to commit himself to the custody of Cicero, of Metellus, or of any other magistrate, till this injurious aspersion were removed. To this offer the consul replied, That he who did not think himself safe within the same ramparts with Cataline, would not receive him into his house.‡

By one effect of the unparalleled licence enjoyed by citizens of Rome, persons accused of the most heinous crimes were at large, during the dependence of their trial, and might either proceed in the execution of their designs, or withdraw from justice. Such was the effect of the laws of Valerius and Porcius; which secured against violence, or the power of the magistrate, the person of every citizen, however accused, until

* Cicero Orat. pro Muræna. † The town of which Cicero was native.

‡ Cicero in Catalinam, i. c. 8.

he were finally condemned by the people. In support of this privilege, which was salutary, when the abuse of power in the magistrate was more to be dreaded than the licence of crimes in the subject, the Romans persisted, even after the depravity of manners was become too strong for the laws, and when exemption from every just restraint was fatally mistaken for liberty. The state had now been thrown, on many occasions, into the most violent convulsions, because there was not any regular method of resisting disorders, or of suppressing them on their first appearance.

Cataline, soon after the elections, at which, by the preference given to his competitors, Muræna and Silanus, he received a fresh disappointment in his hopes of the consulship, sent Mallius, or Manlius, an experienced soldier, who had served with himself under Sylla, to prepare for an insurrection in the district of Etruria. This officer, in the end of October, under pretence of giving refuge to debtors from the oppression of their creditors, had actually assembled a considerable body of men.* Suspicions at the same time arose against Publius Sylla, who was making a large purchase of gladiators at Capua; and insurrections were apprehended on the side of Campania and Apulia. In this state of affairs, continual informations being brought of Cataline's designs, the senate gave in charge to the consuls to watch over the safety of the state; and these officers accordingly put chosen bodies of men under arms, and secured all the posts of consequence in the city. Metellus, the conqueror of Crete, who still remained without the walls, in hopes of a triumph, was appointed to command on the side of Apulia. The prætor Metellus Celer was sent into the cisalpine Gaul, in order to secure the peace of that province;† and the consul Antonius was destined to suppress the insurrection of Mallius at Fæsulæ.‡

Cataline, mean while, remained in the city, and had frequent consultations for the arrangement and the execution of his plot. At a meeting of the party, held in the beginning of

* Cicero, in *Catalinam*, i. c. 3.

† Cicero, in *Cat.* i. c. 12.

‡ Now Florence.

November, in the house of M. Porcius Lecca,* a general massacre of the principal senators was projected. The conspirators severally chose their stations, and undertook their several parts. Two in particular, who were familiar in Cicero's house, undertook, in the morning, under pretence of a visit, to surprise and assassinate the consul. But he being the same night apprised of his danger by Fulvia, gave the proper orders, and the intended assassins, upon their appearance at his door, were refused admittance. He immediately after assembled the senate in the temple of Jupiter. Cataline presented himself with his usual presumption; and Cicero, as appears from an oration which he then delivered, instead of laying the matter in form before the senate, accosted Cataline in a vehement invective, urging him to be gone from the city, where all his steps were minutely observed, where his meaning was understood, and precautions taken against all his designs. "I told you," said the consul, "your emissary Mallius would be in arms by the first of November; that you intended a massacre of the senators about the same time. I now repeat the memorable words you made use of when you were told that many of the senators had withdrawn from the city. You should be satisfied, you said, with the blood of those who remained. Were you not surrounded, hemmed in, and beset on every side by the guards posted to watch you? Did your intention to surprise Præneste, on the night of the first of November, escape me? Did you not find precautions taken, that implied a knowledge of your design? There is nothing, in short, that you do, that you prepare, that you meditate, which is not heard, which is not seen, which is not felt by me, in every circumstance. What of last night? Were you not at the house of Porcius Lecca? Deny it! I have evidence, There are here present persons who were of your company. But where are we? What manner of government or republic is this? The enemies and destroyers of the commonwealth make a part in its highest councils! We know them, and yet they are suffered to live! But, be gone. The time of

* Cicero pro Pub. Sylla, c. xvi.

“enduring you is past. The world is convinced of your guilt.
“Stay only till there is not a single person that can pretend
“to doubt of it ; till your own partisans must be silent, and
“till the clamour, which they would willingly raise against
“every necessary act of government, be suppressed.”

This being the general tendency of the consul's speech, fraught with such alarming matter, and urged with so much confidence, the audience was seized with terror, and numbers, who happened to be on the same bench with Cataline, withdrew from his side. He himself arose, and attempted to vindicate his character, but was silenced with a general cry of indignation ; upon which he left the senate ; and, after concerting further measures with those of his party, not thinking that a longer stay in the city could be of any use to his affairs, he withdrew in the night, leaving letters behind him to some of the senators, in which he complained, that, by a combination of his enemies, he was driven into exile ; and that, rather than be the occasion of any disturbance in the commonwealth, he was willing to retire. While these letters were handed about in the city, he took his way, preceded by the ushers and ensigns of a Roman proconsul, straight for the camp of Mallius, and entered into a state of open war. The features of this man's portrait are possibly exaggerated by the vehement pencils and lively colourings of Cicero and of Sallust. He is represented, as able to endure hardships of any kind, and as fearless in any danger ; as, from his youth, fond of discord, assassinations, and bloodshed ; as stained with the blood of his own brother, whom he murdered to have his estate, and with the blood of his own child, whom he murdered to remove the objection made to him by a woman who refused to marry him with the prospect of being a step mother. He is represented as rapacious, prodigal, gloomy, impetuous, unquiet, dissembling, and perfidious ; a description, of which the horrors are probably amplified : but for which it cannot be doubted there was much foundation, as he far exceeded in profligacy and desperation all those who, either in this or the former age, were, by their ambition or their vices, hastening the ruin of the commonwealth.

Cicero always professed to have particular information of the progress of Cataline. This, according to Sallust, he owed to Fulvia, by whose means he obtained a correspondence with Curius ; but he himself, in none of his orations, gives any intimation of the manner in which he obtained his intelligence. It is probable that Curius desired to be concealed, that he might not be exposed to the rage of the conspirators, as an informer and a traitor. On this account the consul, although he was minutely apprised of particulars, was obliged to adopt the plan he had hitherto followed, to urge the conspirators themselves into open hostilities, and into a full declaration of their purpose. He had succeeded with respect to Cataline ; but his accomplices were yet very numerous in the city, and were taking their measures to co-operate with those who were in arms abroad.

In this state of affairs, Fabius Sanga, a Roman citizen of distinction, came to the consul, and informed him, that the ambassadors of the *Allobroges*, a people then inhabiting what is now called the territory of Geneva, and part of Savoy, whose patron he was, had made him privy to a very momentous affair, that, upon being disappointed in a suit, on which they had been employed to the senate, they had been carried by P. Umbrenus to Publius Cornelius Lentulus the prætor, who condoled with them on the subject of the wrong they had received, assured them of redress, if they would merit the favour of those who were soon to have the ascendant at Rome ; and proposed, that they should immediately, upon their return to their own country, prevail on their nation to be prepared with an army, to co-operate with their friends in Italy. Cicero immediately laid hold of this intelligence, as affording means to bring the plot to light, in a proper manner, and with sufficient evidence, to convict the conspirators. He desired Sanga to encourage this correspondence ; to advise the ambassadors to require proper credentials to be shown to their countrymen ; to procure a list of the Roman citizens who, in case they should rise in rebellion against the Romans, were to become bound to protect them ; and when they should be thus provided, and about to depart, he instructed Sanga to bring

him intimation of their motions, that they might be secured, with their writings, and other evidence of the facts to be ascertained. Sanga, having instructed the ambassadors accordingly, gave notice of their motions to the consul. In the evening before they were to depart, Cicero ordered the prætors, L. Flaccus and C. Pontinus, to march by different ways, and in small parties, after it was dark, to place a sufficient armed force to intercept the ambassadors of the Allobroges. The parties were stationed on different sides of the river, at the bridge called Milvius, without knowing of each other, and without having any suspicion of the purpose for which they were posted, further than arose from their having been told, that they were to seize any person who should attempt to pass, in either direction. About three o'clock in the morning the ambassadors from the Roman side entered on the bridge with a numerous retinue; and being challenged, and commanded to stop, by the party that was placed to intercept them, they endeavoured to force their way; and some blood was shed. But on the appearance of the prætors, with their ensigns of office, the travellers ceased to resist. Their dispatches were secured. Volturcius, a Roman citizen, who was found in their company, was taken and searched. Letters were found upon him, in different hands, and under different seals, addressed to Cataline. These, together with the prisoners, were immediately carried back to the city.

The consul being apprised of the success which attended this part of his design, sent, before any alarm could be taken by the party, messages to Gabinus, Statilius, Cethegus, and Lentulus, desiring to see them at his own house. The three former came with the messenger; but Lentulus was newly gone to bed, and, by his delay, gave some cause to suspect that he was aware of his danger. He too, however, came before it was day; and the house of Cicero was presently crowded, not only with numbers of the equestrian order, that were in arms for the defence of his person, but likewise with many senators, whom he desired to be present. The ambassadors of the Allobroges, now prisoners, were likewise conducted thither, and the letters found in their possession were

produced unopened. Cicero declared his intention to assemble the senate without delay, in order to lay the whole matter before them. Many of the company were of opinion, that the letters should be first opened, in order to see, whether they contained any matter of so much moment as to require assembling the senate, at a time when so great an alarm was likely to be taken. Cicero, however, having no doubt of the contents of the letters, and of the importance of the matter, over-ruled those scruples, and the senate was accordingly called. Meantime the Allobroges dropt some expressions, which implied, that some arms were concealed in the house of Cethegus. This occasioned a search being then made, and a considerable quantity of daggers and swords were accordingly found.

At the meeting of the senate, Volturcius was first examined ; he denied his knowledge of any treasonable designs, but appeared disconcerted ; and, upon being reminded of the reward that had been offered for the discovery of any plot against the state, and of the danger to which he himself would be exposed in prevaricating, he confessed that the letters seized in his custody were sent by the prætor Lentulus, and others : that he had, besides, a verbal message to Cataline, informing him that the plan was now ready for execution ; that the station of every person was assigned ; that some were appointed to set fire to the city in different places, and some to massacre their enemies in the midst of the confusion that was likely to be occasioned by the fire ; and desiring that Cataline, in order to support his friends, and to profit by the diversion they were to make in his favour within the walls, should issue a proclamation to arm the slaves, and that he himself should march directly to Rome.

The deputies of the Allobroges being next introduced, acknowledged, that they had been charged by Lentulus, Cethegus, Statilius, and Cassius, with assurances of support to the council of their nation, confirmed by oath, accompanied with directions to march, without delay, a body of horse into Italy, where they should be joined by a numerous infantry, and receive proper instructions in what manner they

should further proceed : that, to encourage them, Lentulus quoted a prophecy, found in the collection of the Sibyls, by which he himself was pointed out as the third of the Cornелии,* destined to arrive at the sovereignty of Rome: that the conspirators had differed about the time of executing their design. Lentulus was of opinion it should be deferred to the holidays in December; that Cethegus, notwithstanding, and the others, were impatient, and desired a nearer day.

The supposed conspirators were next called in their turns; and the letters, with the seals unbroken, were exhibited before them. Cethegus, being the first examined, persisted in denying his knowledge of any conspiracy; accounted for the arms which were found in his house, by saying, he was curious of workmanship of that nature, and always bought what he liked. He preserved his countenance undisturbed, till his own letter was produced, and then fell into great confusion, as the seal was immediately known to be his.

Lentulus next, with great confidence, denied the charge; affected not to know either Volturcius or the ambassadors; asked them upon what occasion they ever could pretend to have been admitted into his house? He, however, supposing that nothing in the contents of the letter that was now produced could convict him, acknowledged the seal. It was the head of his grandfather. But the letter being opened, was found to be unsigned, and in the following general terms: "The bearer will inform you who I am. Fear nothing. Remember where you stand; and neglect nothing. Call in every aid, even the meanest." While he persisted in his denial, some one asked him, if he had never quoted the Sibylline oracles to these Gauls? Confounded with this question, he forgot his disguise, and confessed.

Gabinus too was at last brought to own his guilt; and in this manner the conspiracy was fully laid open. Lucius Cæsar, the consul of the former year, in the presence of Lentulus, who was married to his sister, gave his opinion, that this unhappy man should be immediately put to death.

*The former two were Cinna and Sylla.

“This,” he said, “is no unprecedented measure. My grandfather, Fulvius Flaccus, taking in open rebellion, as this man is, was slain by order of the consul Gabinus. His son was taken into custody, and put to death in prison.” In the meantime Lentulus was ordered to divest himself of the office of prætor, and, together with his accomplices, was committed to close imprisonment. This Cornelius Lentulus was distinguished by the addition of Sura to his name. He had been consul about eight years before, and was afterwards, for his debaucheries, struck off the rolls of the senate. He had now again condescended to accept of the office of prætor, in order to recover, in the capacity of a magistrate, his seat in the senate.

A proclamation was issued to apprehend M. Cæparius, who had been sent to procure an insurrection in Apulia, together with P. Furius, Magius Chilo, and P. Umbrenus, who had first introduced the Gaulish ambassadors to Gabinus. The senate voted thanks to the consul Cicero for his great vigilance, and for the consummate ability he had shown in the discovery and suppression of this treasonable design; to the prætors, for the faithful execution of the consul’s orders; and to Antonius, his colleague, for having detached himself from men, with whom he was known to have been formerly connected. A public thanksgiving to the gods was likewise decreed, in honour of the consul, and in consideration of this deliverance of the city from fire, of the people from massacre, and of Italy from devastation and war.

An assembly of the people being called, Cicero gave this account of the proceedings of the senate, in a speech which is still extant,* and early on the following day assembled that body again, to deliberate on the farther resolutions to be taken with respect to the prisoners. An agent had been busy in the night to raise some disturbance in favour of Lentulus; but the design of setting fire to the city gave so great an alarm, that not only such as were possessed of considerable property, but every inhabitant, whatever might be his

* In Cat. iii.

effects, trembled for his own person, and for the safety of his house. The avenues to the senate, the capitol, the forum, all the temples in the neighbourhood, by break of day, were crowded with armed men. The consul had summoned the equestrian order in arms to support the government, and citizens of every rank came forth to have a part in what might be required for the safety of their families.

When the senate was assembled, the members differed in their judgment. Junius Silanus, one of the consuls-elect, being called up first in order, declared himself for a sentence of death. Tiberius Nero differed from him, and proposed perpetual imprisonment. The majority, however, joined Silanus, until Caius Cæsar spoke. This able advocate declared against the opinion of Silanus, not as too severe, but as contrary to law; and insisted on the danger of a precedent which might set the life of every citizen at the mercy of a vote in the senate. Death, he said, was the common destination of all men; what no one could avoid, and what the wise frequently coveted. It was not, therefore, to be used as a punishment, and he was disposed, in this case, not to mitigate, but to increase, the severity of the sentence. He proposed, therefore, that the estates of the prisoners should be confiscated; that their persons should be committed for life to the keeping of the most secure and best affected corporations in Italy; and that it should be declared treason for any one hereafter to move the senate or the people for any mitigation of their punishment.

Cæsar might be considered as appearing on the side of the popular faction, and as laying the ground upon which the proceedings of the senate, and the conduct of any particular member, might be afterwards arraigned before the people. The terrors of the Porcian and Sempronian laws, when likely to be urged by so powerful an advocate, alarmed the greater part of the senate. Silanus himself retracted his opinion. In this fluctuation the consul submitting the question to the judgment of the senate, for his own part declared his willingness to execute any decree they should form. He treated Cæsar with great respect, and with some art laid hold of the

severe terms in which this popular citizen had spoken of the conspiracy, as a pledge of his future conduct, in case the proceedings of government, with respect to the matter now before them, should hereafter be questioned or brought under review. "The senate," he observed, "had no cause to dread the imputation of cruelty. It was mercy to prevent, in the most effectual manner, a crime to be perpetrated in so much blood. If this crime were not prevented, they were to see that city, the resort of nations, and the light and ornament of empire, perish at one blow. They were to see heaps of her citizens unburied, and lying in their blood: they were to see the fury of Cethegus let loose in murder; to see Lentulus become a king, Cataline commanding an army, and every where to hear the cries of mothers, to see the flight of children, and the rape of virgins.—If the father of a family, (he continued) should spare a slave who had shed the blood of his children, who had murdered his wife, and set fire to his dwelling, how should such a farther be considered—as cruel or as void of affection?

He desired them, "not to regard what was given out, of their not being in condition to attempt any thing vigorous against these men. He himself, as first magistrate, had not neglected the necessary precautions; and the general ardour with which all ranks of men concurred in the defence of their families, their properties, and the seat of empire, rendered every resolution they could take secure of the utmost effect. The forum is full, all the temples in its neighbourhood are full, all the streets and avenues to this place of assembly are full of citizens of every denomination, armed for the defence of their country. But he requested that the senate would issue their orders before the sun went down, and seemed to apprehend dangerous consequences, if these matters were left undetermined, and the city exposed to the accidents of the following night. For himself, he professed to have taken his resolution. Although he felt the occasion full of personal danger, said, he would execute the orders of the conscript fathers;

“but, if he fell in the attempt, implored their protection for his wife and his children.”*

All this appears to have passed in debate, before Cato spoke. This virtuous citizen, then about thirty-three years of age, had, in the former part of his life, taken a very different course from the youths of his own time, and, both by his temper and education, was averse to the libertine principles which had crept into the politics and the manners of the age. He spoke chiefly in answer to Caius Cæsar, who, he observed, seemed to mistake the question. “We are not inquiring,” he said, “what is the proper punishment of a crime already committed, but how we may defend the republic from an imminent danger, with which it is threatened. It is proposed to send the prisoners to safe keeping in the country. Why into the country? Because, perhaps, the faction of profligate citizens is more numerous in Rome, and may rescue them. Is Rome the only place to which profligate men may resort, or are prisoners of state most secure where the force of government is least? This proposal is surely an idle one, if the author of it professes to entertain any fear of these men. But if, in this general alarm of all the city, he and such persons be not afraid, so much the more cause have we to be on our guard. We are beset with enemies, both within and without the walls. While Cataline, with fire and sword, is hastening to your gates, you hesitate, whether you will cut off or spare his associates, who are taken with the torch in their hands and the dagger at your breast! You must strike those who are now in your power, if you mean to intimidate those who are coming to support their designs. The remissness or the vigour which you now shew, will be felt in the camp of Cataline, and will be attended with suitable effects. I am, therefore, of opinion, that we order these men, agreeably to the practice which our ancestors have followed in all cases of treason and of open war against the commonwealth, to immediate death.”

* Cicero, in Catalinam, orat. iv.

Such is said to have been the speech of Cato, by which the senate was determined in the very momentous resolution which was taken on the present occasion; and however little we may be inclined to consider such compositions, in many parts of ancient history, as records of fact, much credit is due to this representation, as it is given by a person who himself became a partisan of Cæsar, and as the words which he ascribed to these speakers must have come, in the perusal of his work, under the inspection of many who were present to the delivery of them.* The execution of the prisoners was accordingly determined, and Cornelius Lentulus, in the beginning of the following night, was, by order of the consul, committed to a vaulted dungeon under ground, and strangled. His accomplices had the same fate; and the minds of men, though somewhat quieted of their fears, were nevertheless stunned with the scene, and beheld with amazement a patrician, of the Cornelian family, of the first rank in the commonwealth, who himself had been consul, suffering, without any formal trial, by the hands of the common executioner of justice.†

While these things were in agitation at Rome, Cataline was endeavouring to augment his force in the field. He found about two thousand men under Mallius. These he formed into two legions, and, as his party increased, he completed their numbers. He refused for some time to enrol the fugitive slaves, of whom many took refuge in his camp; thinking it would discredit and weaken his cause to rest any part of it on this support. But the freemen that joined him being ill armed, he was obliged to keep in the neighbourhood of the mountains, and frequently to change his ground, to avoid an engagement with the consul; and he endeavoured

* The more credit is due to this account of Cæsar's and Cato's speech, that the speech which is ascribed to Cicero, by the same historian, is a faithful extract, or contains the purport of the oration which still remains among his works.

† Sallust. Bell. Catal. Cur ergo in sententiam Catonis? quia verbis luculentioribus et pluribus, rem eandem comprehenderat. Cicer. ad Atticum, lib. xii. epist. 21.

to gain time, in hopes that, the intended blow being struck at Rome, a general defection of the opposite party would ensue. But when accounts came, that his design had failed in the city, and that his principal associates were no more, those who were inclined to his cause were discouraged, and numbers who had already joined him began to fall off; he determined to remove to a distance from his enemies; and for this purpose directed his march to a pass in the Apennines, by which he might escape into Gaul. This design the prætor Metellus had foreseen, made a forced march to prevent the effect of it, and Cataline, at last, finding himself beset on every quarter, determined to hazard a battle. Of the armies that were in the field against him, he chose to face that of Antonius; either because it lay on his route to Rome, and, if defeated or removed, might open his way to the city; or because he hoped to meet in the commander of it some remains of inclination in his favour. In whatever degree these hopes were at first reasonably conceived, they ceased to have any foundation; as Antonius, being taken ill, had left the army under the command of Petreius. With this commander Cataline engaged in battle, and, after many efforts of valour and of conduct, fell, with the greater part of his followers, and thus delivered the state from a desperate enemy, whose power was happily not equal to his designs, and who has owed much of his celebrity to the orator and the historian, who have made him the subject of their eloquent compositions. Sallust appears to have been so intent on raising and finishing particular parts of his work, that he neglected the general order of his narrative. I have, therefore, in most parts of the relation, preferred the authority of Cicero to his. This great man was undoubtedly best informed, and he rested so much of his reputation on this transaction, that he loses no opportunity of returning to it, and, in different parts of his writings, when collected, has furnished a pretty full narration of circumstances respecting the origin and termination of this wild and profligate attempt to subvert the government of the republic.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Character of the Times.—Philosophy.—Opposite Tenets and Votaries.—Proceedings of the Senate.—Tribunate of Metellus, Nepos, and of Cato.—Proposal to recall Pompey, at the Head of his Army, frustrated.—His arrival in Italy.—And Triumph.

IT may appear strange, that any age or nation should have furnished the example of a project conceived in so much guilt, or of characters so atrocious, as those under which the accomplices of Cataline are described by the eloquent orator and historian,* from whose writings the circumstances of the late conspiracy are collected. The scene, however, in this republic was such as to have no parallel, either in the past or in the subsequent history of mankind. There was less government, and more to be governed, than has been exhibited in any other instance. The inhabitants of Italy, as citizens of Rome, were become masters of the known world. They pretended to govern in a body; but it was impossible they ever could meet in a fair and adequate convention. They were represented, therefore, by partial meetings or occasional tumults in the capital; and to take the sense of the people, on many a subject, was little better than to occasion a riot. Individuals were vested with powers almost discretionary in the provinces, or continually aspired to such situations. At home they were impatient of government, and in haste to govern; ruined in their fortunes by private prodigality, or by the public expense in soliciting honours; tempted to repair their ruins by oppression and extortion, where they were intrusted with command, or by desperate attempts against the government of their country, if disappointed in their hopes of sharing its profits. Not only were many of the prevailing practices disorderly, but the law it-

* Cicero, in Sallust.

self was erroneous;* adopted, indeed, at first by a virtuous people, because it secured the persons and the rights of individuals against the possibility of injustice, but now anxiously preserved by their posterity, because it gave a licence to their crimes.

The provinces were to be retained by the forces of Italy; the Italians themselves by the ascendant of the capital; and in this capital all was confusion and anarchy, except where the senate, by its authority, and the wisdom of its councils, prevailed. It was no doubt expedient for the people to restrain abuses of the aristocratical power; but when they assumed the government into their own hands, or when the sovereignty was exercised in the name of the collective body, abuses were multiplied, and the confusion or anarchy, which prevailed at Rome, spread from one extremity of her dominion to the other. The provinces were oppressed, not upon a regular plan to aggrandise the state, but at the pleasure of individuals, to enrich a few of the most outrageous and profligate citizens. The people, under pretence of exerting their own powers, were perpetually violating the laws which had been made to restrain usurpations; and the public interests and the order of the state were in perpetual struggle with the pretensions of demagogues, or of single and profligate men. In such a situation there were many temptations to be wicked; and in such a situation, likewise, minds that were turned to integrity and honour, had a proportionate spring and scope to their exertions and pursuits. The range of the human character was great and extensive, and men were not likely to trifle within narrow bounds; they were destined to be good or to be wicked in the highest measure, and, by their struggles, to exhibit a scene interesting and instructive, beyond any other in the history of mankind.

* *Lex Valeria et Porcia de tergo civium lata.* Liv. lib. ii. c. 8. lib. iii. c. 55. lib. x. c. 9. By these laws a Roman citizen could not be imprisoned any more than suffer punishment, before conviction; he might stop any proceeding against himself, by an appeal to the people; and, being at large during his trial, might withdraw whenever he perceived the sentence likely to be given against him.

Among the causes that helped to carry the characters of men in this age to such distant extremes, may be reckoned the philosophy of the Greeks, which was lately come into fashion, and which was much affected by the higher ranks of men in the state.* Literature, by the difficulty and expense of multiplying copies of books,† being confined to persons having wealth and power, it was considered as a distinction of rank, and had its vogue, not only as an useful, but as a fashionable, accomplishment. The lessons of the school were admitted as the elements of every liberal and active profession, and they were quoted at the bar, in the field, in the senate, and every where in the conduct of real affairs. Philosophy was considered as an ornament, as well as a real foundation of strength, ability and wisdom, in the practice of life. Men of the world, instead of being ashamed of their sect, affected to employ its language on every important occasion, and to be governed by its rules so much as to assume, in compliance with particular systems, distinctions of manners, and even of dress. They embraced their forms in philosophy, as the sectaries in modern times have embraced theirs in religion; and probably in the one case honoured their choice by the sincerity of their faith, and the regularity of their practice, much in the same degree as they have done in the other.

In these latter times of the Roman republic the sect of Epicurus appears to have prevailed; and what Fabricius, on hearing rehearsed the tenets of this philosophy, wished for the enemies of Rome, had now befallen her citizens.‡ Men were gluttoned with national prosperity; they thought that they were born to enjoy what their fathers had won, and saw not the use of those austere and arduous virtues by which the

* Vide Cicero's Philosophical Works.

† The 'grandees had their slaves sometimes educated to serve as secretaries to themselves, or as preceptors to their children.

‡ See Plutarch. in Pyrr. The philosopher Cyneas, in the hearing of Fabricius, entertained his prince with an argument, to prove that pleasure was the chief good. Fabricius wished that the enemies of Rome might long entertain such tenets.

state had increased to its present greatness. The votaries of this sect ascribed the formation of the world to chance, and denied the existence of Providence. They resolved the distinctions of right and wrong, of honour and dishonour, into mere appellations of pleasure and pain. Every man's pleasure was to himself the supreme rule of estimation and of action. All good was private. The public was a mere imposture, that might be successfully employed, perhaps to defraud the ignorant of their private enjoyments, while it furnished the conveniences of the wise*. By persons so instructed, the care of families and of states, with whatever else broke in upon the enjoyments of pleasure and ease, were classed among the follies of human life: and a sect under these imputations might be considered as patrons of licentiousness, both in morality and religion, and declared enemies to mankind. Yet the Epicureans, when urged in argument by their opponents, made some concessions in religion, and many more in morality. They admitted the existence of gods; but supposed those beings of too exalted a nature to have any concern in the affairs of men. They owned that, although good and pleasure were synonymous terms, yet, among the varieties of pleasure, those of virtue were the chief. A concession after which they ought to have said that virtue, or the chief pleasure, was also the chief good; yet they still returned to the general appellation of pleasure, at the hazard of misleading the vulgar, and even themselves, in their choice;† and while they contended that their difference with other sects consisted in a mere dispute about words,

* Cicero, in Pisenem.

† Even the leader of this sect himself, though more pure in the choice of his pleasure than many of his followers, yet was far from being regulated in the choice he made by the more important occasions of human life. To him the rearing of a family, without which the human race must speedily perish; the offices of state, without which society cannot exist; were not only superfluous, but expressly precluded from the choice of a wise man. His virtue was to be found in the peaceful retirement of a garden, in exemption from pain or trouble, in contemplation and serenity of mind, in the society of a few select friends, with sobriety and moderation of diet, and other sensualities.

those they were pleased to employ, served to suppress the specific sentiments of conscience and elevation of mind, and to change the reproaches of criminality, profligacy, or villainess, by which even bad men are restrained from iniquity, into mere imputations of mistake, or variations of taste.

Other sects, particularly that of the Stoics, maintained, almost in every particular, the reverse of these tenets. They maintained the reality of Providence, and of a common interest of goodness and of justice, for which Providence was exerted, and in which all rational creatures were deeply concerned. They maintained, that although it be evident that happiness or the chief good is pleasant, yet it were absurd conversely to say that every pleasure is happiness, or the chief good. In the application of these terms we must attend to the exemption from suffering, as well as the measure of enjoyment; and as our understanding cannot reach every possible effect, upon which to estimate the least measure of pain, and the greatest of pleasure, Providence has not left us to the effect of such a discussion: we are taught to choose, on the first inspection of things, the part of the innocent, of the praise-worthy and just: of this choice the pleasure is most delightful, and the sense of having failed in it the most grievous, pain; insomuch, that although in the nature of things there are many grounds upon which we prefer or reject the objects that present themselves to us, yet the choice which we make, and our own actions, not the event of our efforts, decide our happiness or our misery; that right and wrong are the most important and the only grounds upon which we can at all times safely proceed in our choice; and that, in comparison to this difference, every thing else is of no account; that a just man will ever act as if there was nothing good but what is right, and nothing evil but what is wrong; that the Epicureans mistook human nature, when they supposed all its principles resolvable into appetites for pleasure, or aversions to pain; that honour and dishonour, excellence and defect, were considerations which not only led to much nobler ends, but which were of much greater power in commanding the human will; the love of pleasure was groveling

and vile, was the source of dissipation and of sloth ; the love of excellence and honour was aspiring and noble, and led to the greatest exertions and the highest attainments of our nature. They maintained that there is no private good separate from the public ; that the same qualities of the understanding and the heart, wisdom, benevolence, and courage, which are good for the individual, are so likewise for the public ; that these blessings every man may possess, independent of fortune or the will of other men ; and that whoever does possess them has nothing to hope, and nothing to fear, and can have but one sort of emotion, that of satisfaction and joy ; that his affections, and the maxims of his station, as a creature of God, and as a member of society, lead him to act for the good of mankind ; and that for himself he has nothing more to desire, than the happiness of acting this part. These, they said, were the tenets of reason, leading to a perfection which ought to be the aim of every person who means to preserve his integrity, or to consult his happiness, and towards which every one may advance, although no one has actually reached it.

In these disputes the celebrated fable of Prodicus seemed to be realized ; and as virtue and pleasure there contended for the ear of youth, integrity and corruption now strove for acceptance with a pampered and restless people.

Among those, on whom the public fortune seemed to depend, Cæsar is said to have embraced the doctrines of Epicurus ; Cato those of Zeno. The first, from indifference to moral distinctions, in compliance with fashion, or from the bias of an original temper. The other, from the force of conviction, as well as from the predilection of a warm and ingenuous mind. When such characters occur together, it is impossible not to see them in contrast : and Sallust, in relating what passed in the senate, on the subject of the Cataline conspiracy, seems to overlook every other character, to dwell upon these alone. Cæsar, at the time when this historian flourished, had many claims to his notice ;* but Cato

* Sallust attached himself to Cæsar, and was employed by him in the civil wars.

could owe it to nothing but the force of truth. He was distinguished, from his infancy, by an ardent and affectionate disposition. This part of his character is mentioned on occasion of his attachment to his brother Cæpio, and the vehement sorrow with which he was seized at his death. It is mentioned, on occasion of his visit to the dictator Sylla, when he was with difficulty restrained, by the discretion of his tutor, from some act or expression of indignation against this real or apparent violator of public justice. He had, from his infancy, according to Plutarch, a resolution, a steadiness, and a composure of mind, not to be moved by flattery, nor to be shaken by threats. Without fawning or insinuation, he was the favourite of his companions, and had, by his unaffected generosity and courage, the principal place in their confidence. Though in appearance stern and inflexible, he was warm in his affections, and zealous in the cause of innocence and justice. Such are the marks of an original temper, affixed by historians as the characters of his infancy and early youth. So fitted by nature, he imbibed with ease an opinion, that profligacy, cowardice, and malice, were the only evils to be feared; courage, integrity, and benevolence, the only good to be coveted; and that the proper care of a man, on every occasion, is, not what is to happen to him, but what he himself is to do. With this profession he became a striking contrast to many of his contemporaries; and to Cæsar in particular, not only a contrast, but a resolute opponent; and although in these times he could not furnish a sufficient counterpoise, yet he afforded always much weight to be thrown into the opposite scale. They were both of undaunted courage, and of great penetration; the one to distinguish what was best; the other to avail himself of the most effectual means for the attainment of any end, on which he was bent. It were to mistake entirely the scene in which they were engaged, to judge of their abilities from the event of their different pursuits. Those of Cato, were by their nature, in direct opposition to the current of manners; and they were a series of struggles, with almost insurmountable difficulties: those of Cæsar went with the stream, and, except when he was jostled

in the competition with others, who ran the same course with himself, he had only to seize the advantages of which the vices and weaknesses of the times gave him an easy possession. Cato endeavoured to preserve the order of civil government, however desperate, because this was the part it became him to act, and in which he chose to live and to die. Cæsar hastened its ruin; because he was eager for power, and wished to dispose of all the wealth and honours of the state, at his own discretion.

Cæsar, as versatile in his genius as Cato was steady and inflexible, could personate any character, and support any cause: in debate he could derive his arguments from any topic; from topics of pity, of which he was insensible; from topics of justice and public good, for which he had no regard. His vigour, in resisting personal insults or attacks, appeared in his early youth, when he withstood the imperious commands of Sylla to part with his wife, the daughter of Cinna, and when he revenged the violence done by the pirates to himself; but while his temper might be supposed the most animated and warm, he was not involved in business by a predilection for any of the interests on which the people were divided. So long as the appetites of youth were sufficient to occupy him, he saw every object of state, or of faction, with indifference, and took no part in public affairs. But even in this period, by his application and genius, in both of which he was eminent, he made a distinguished progress in letters and eloquence. When he turned his mind to objects of ambition, the same personal vigour, which appeared in his youth, became still more conspicuous; but, unfortunately, this passion, the most energetic and powerful in the human mind, instead of urging to genuine greatness, and elevation of nature, was in him a mere principle of competition, among the leaders of faction at Rome. He had attained to seven-and-thirty years of age before he took any considerable part as a member of the commonwealth. He then courted the populace, in preference to the senate or better sort of the people, and made his first appearance in support of the profligate, against the forms and authority of government. With

persons of desperate fortune and abandoned manners, he early bore the character of liberality and friendship; was received among them as a generous spirit, come to explode the morose severity of those who would restrain the freedom of youth within the limits of sobriety and public order. Though himself a person of the greatest abilities, and the most accomplished talents, having an opportunity to live on terms of equality with the greatest men that have yet appeared in the world, he chose to start up as the chief among those who, being abandoned to every vice, saw the remains of virtue in their country with distaste and aversion. In proportion as he emerged from the avocations of pleasure, or from the sloth which accompanies the languor of dissipation, his desire to counteract the established government of his country, and to make himself master of the commonwealth, became more and more evident. To this passion he sacrificed every sentiment of friendship or animosity, of honour, interest, resentment, or hatred. The philosophy which taught men to look for enjoyment, indiscriminately, wherever it pleased them most, found a ready acceptance in such a disposition. But while he possibly availed himself of the speculations of Epicurus, to justify his choice of an object, he was not inferior to the followers of Zeno, in vigorous efforts and active exertions, for the attainment of his ends. Being about seven years younger than Pompey, and three years older than Cato, the first he occasionally employed as a prop to his own ambition, or, at least, in the early part of his career, did not seem to perceive him as a rival; the other, from a fixed animosity of opposite natures, and from having felt him as a continual opponent in all his designs, he sincerely hated.

Cato began his military service in the army which was employed against the gladiators, and concluded it as a legionary tribune, under the prætor Rubrius, in Macedonia, while Pompey remained in Syria. He was about three-and-thirty years of age when he made his speech in the senate, relating to the accomplices of Cataline; and by the decisive and resolute spirit he had shown on this occasion, came to be consi-

dered as a principal support of the government and the authority of the senate.* To this body, as usual, every flagrant disorder, repressed, brought an accession of power; and the discovery of a design, so odious as that of Cataline, covered under popular pretences, greatly served to discredit the supposed popular cause. One of the first uses the senate proposed to make of their advantage, was to have Cato elected among the tribunes of the subsequent year. His services were likely to be wanted, in opposition to the schemes of Metellus Nepos, who was then arrived from the army in Syria, with recommendations to public favour as a candidate for the office of tribune; and if he should prevail in the election by the influence of Pompey, it was not doubted, he came charged with some measure to gratify the ambition or vanity of this insatiable suitor for personal consideration and honour. It had not yet appeared, what part he was to take in the disputes which were likely to arise on the legality or expedience of the late summary executions; but it is not to be doubted, that he wished to hold the balance of parties, and that he would come prepared for the part that was most likely to promote his own importance. Metellus was sent on before him, to be supported by his friends in the competition which was expected, and with his instructions to take such measures as were likely to favour his pretensions.

The leading men of the senate were now, for some time, aware of the intrigues of Pompey, and bore, with impatience, the personal superiority which he affected even to the first and most respected men of their order. They took occasion, in the present crisis, to mortify him, by admitting Lucullus and Metellus Creticus to the triumphs to which, by their respective victories in Pontus and in Crete, they were long entitled. Hitherto the claims of these officers had been over-ruled by the popular faction, either to annoy the senatorian party, to which they were attached, or to flatter Pompey, who was supposed to be equally averse to the honours of both. They had waited in Italy about three years, and,

* Plutarch. in Caton. edit. Lond. p. 238.

in the manner of those who sue for a triumph, still retaining the fasces or ensigns of their late command,* had refrained from entering the city.

Lucullus having obtained the honor that was due to him, seemed to be satisfied with the acknowledgment of his right; and, as if merely to show with what sort of enemy he had fought, he entered the city with a few of the Armenian horsemen cased in armour, a few of the armed chariots winged with scythes, and about sixty of the officers and courtiers of Mithridates, who were his captives. He ordered the spoils he had gained, the arms and ensigns of war, the prows of the galleys he had taken, to be displayed in the great circus; and concluded the solemnity with giving a feast to the people. The senate hoped for his support, against the ambition of Pompey, and the factious designs of the popular leaders; but he was disgusted, and from thenceforward scarcely ever took a part in the affairs of state.

The triumph of Metellus Creticus did not take place till after the accession of P. Junius Silanus and Lucius Muræna, consuls of the following year; after whose election, Cicero, before he had vacated the office, or laid down the fasces, had occasion to defend his intended successor Muræna, against a charge of corruption brought upon the statute of Calpurnius, by Servius Sulpicius, one of his late competitors, supported by Cato and others. The oration of Cicero, on this occasion, is still extant, and is a curious example of the topics which, under popular governments, are recurred to, even in judicial pleadings. Great part of it consists in a ridicule of law-terms; because Sulpicius, one of the prosecutors, used to give counsel to his friends who consulted him in matters of law; and in a ridicule of the Stoic philosophy, because Cato, another prosecutor, was supposed to have embraced the doctrines of that sect. Cato made no other remark, on this pleading, but that the republic was provided with a merry consul. The argument, however, appeared sufficiently strong on the side of Muræna, and he was acquitted.

* Cicero, in Luculle.

At the close of this trial, Cicero, about to abdicate his power, and being to make the usual asseveration, upon oath; that he had faithfully, and to the best of his abilities, discharged his trust, proposed to introduce this solemnity with a speech to the people; but was ordered by Metellus, already elected, and acting in the capacity of tribune, to confine himself to the simple terms of his oath. He accordingly refrained from speaking; but instead of swearing simply, that he had been faithful to his trust, he took an oath, that he had preserved the republic.* It was on this occasion, probably, that Cato, now another of the tribunes, addressing himself to the people, and alluding to the suppression of the late conspiracy, called Cicero the father of his country;† and from this time entered upon an opposition to his colleague Metellus, which was not likely to drop while they continued in office.

Soon after the accession of the new magistrates, a storm began to gather, which, though still aimed at the party of the senate, burst at last in a personal attack upon the late consul, who had been the prompter or instrument of the senate, in the late summary proceedings against the accomplices of Cataline. Metellus Nepos seems to have come from Asia, and to have entered on the office of tribune, with a particular design to bring about the reception of Pompey, with his army, into Rome; and in this project he was joined by Caius Cæsar,‡ now in the office of prætor, who chose to support the tribune in this measure, as an act of hostility to the senate, if not as the means of obtaining a precedent, of which he might in his turn avail himself.

In consequence of a plan concerted with Cæsar, the tribune Metellus moved in the senate, as had been usual in the times of its highest authority, for leave to propose a decree in the assembly of the people, recalling Pompey from Asia, at the head of his forces, in order to restore the constitution of the commonwealth, which, in the term he afterwards em-

* Plutarch. in Cicerone.

† Cicer. in Pisonem, c. 3.

‡ Sueton. in Jul. Cæs. c. 16.

ployed to the people, had been violated by the arbitrary administration of Cicero. This was the first attempt of the party to inflame the minds of the people, on the subject of the late executions; and Pompey was, in this manner, offered to the popular party, as their leader, to avenge the supposed wrongs they had received. Cato, when the matter was proposed in the senate, endeavoured to persuade Metellus to withdraw his motion, reminding him of the dignity of his family, which had been always a principal ornament and support of the state. This treatment served only to raise the presumption of Metellus, and brought on a violent altercation between the tribunes. The senate applauded Cato, but had not authority enough to prevent the motion, which was proposed, from being made to the people.

Metellus, apprehending an obstinate resistance from his colleague, endeavoured to fill the place of assembly with his own partisans; and, on the evening before the meeting, in order to intimidate his opponents, paraded in the streets, with a numerous attendance of men, in arms. The friends and relations of the other tribunes earnestly beseeched them not to expose themselves to the dangers with which they were threatened. But, on the following day, the other party being already assembled by Metellus, at the temple of Castor, and the place having been in the night occupied by persons under his direction, armed with clubs, swords, and other offensive weapons,* Cato went forth, attended only by Minucius Thermus, another of the tribunes, and a few friends. They were joined by numbers in the streets, who could not accompany them to their place; being prevented by the multitude of armed men, who already crowded the avenues and the steps of the temple. But they themselves, from respect to their office, being suffered to pass, dragged along with them, through the crowd, as an aid, in case any violence were offered, Munatius, a citizen much attached to Cato. When they came to the bench of tribunes, they found that Metellus, with the prætor Julius Cæsar, had taken their places

* Plutarch. in Catone, edit. Lond. p. 241, &c.

there; and that, in order to concert their operations in the conduct of this affair, they were closely seated together. Cato, to disappoint this intention, forced himself in betwixt them, and, when the ordinary officer began to read the intended decree, interposed his negative, or forbade him to proceed. Metellus himself seized the writing, and began to read; but Cato snatched it out of his hands. Metellus endeavoured to repeat the substance of it, from his memory. Thermus clapped a hand to his mouth. A general silence remained in the assembly, till Metellus, having made a signal, concerted with his party, to clear the comitium of their enemies, a great tumult and confusion arose; and the tribunes, who opposed Metellus, were in imminent danger. The senators had met in mourning, to mark their sense of the evils which threatened the commonwealth: and now, under the apprehension of some signal calamity, gave a charge to the consuls, to watch over the safety of the state, and empowered them to take such measures as might be necessary to preserve or to restore the peace.*

In consequence of this charge, the consul Muræna appeared with a body of men, in arms, had the good fortune to rescue Cato and Minucius Thermus, and, probably, by this seasonable interposition, effaced any remains of misunderstanding which might have subsisted between Cato and himself, on account of the prosecution for bribery, which followed the late elections.†

Metellus, after the tumult was composed, having again obtained silence, began to read the proposed decree; but the senatorian party, headed by the consuls, being then in the comitium, he found it impossible to proceed; and, together with the prætor Caius Cæsar, retired from the assembly. From this time, these officers made no attempt to resume their motion, but complained that the government was usurped by a violent faction, under whom even the persons of the tribunes were unsafe; and Metellus, as if forced to break through the rules, which obliged the tribunes to constant

* Plutarch. in Catone, edit. Lond. p. 241, &c. † Plutarch. *ibid.*

residence at Rome, abandoned the city, even left Italy, and fled to the camp of Pompey, in Asia, from which he had but lately set out, on his journey to Rome.* He had already threatened his opponents in the city with the resentment and military power of his general, and now endeavoured to excite the army and their commander to follow the example which had been set to them by Sylla and his legions, when oppressed citizens (a description which he now assumed to himself) fled to them for protection and revenge.

It may well be supposed, that Cæsar, remembering his own escape from the ruin of the Marian faction, and considering Pompey as the head of an opposite interest, and a principal obstacle to his own ambition, must look upon him with some degree of personal dislike and animosity; but his conduct, on this occasion, sufficiently shewed how little he was the dupe of any passion or sentiment, which had a tendency to check his pursuits. Meaning for the present only to weaken the senate, and to partake in the favour which Pompey enjoyed with the people, he undertook the cause even of a rival, and would have joined the populacé, in delivering the commonwealth into his hands, rather than remain under a government which he considered as the principal bar to his own elevation. But if he really meant to overthrow the senate by force, he mistook his instrument. Pompey, no doubt, aspired to be the first among citizens, and wished for the ostentation of military power at Rome; but even this he desired to receive as the fruit of consideration and personal respect; and he ever hoped to make the people bestow it, and even force him to accept of it as their gift. For this purpose, he encouraged so many agents and retainers to sound his own praise; and for this purpose, he had recently sent Metellus Nepos, from his camp in Asia, to take upon him the functions of a popular tribune at Rome; but having failed in the project of vanity, his mind misgave him in the project of force. No one ever courted distinction with a more incessant emulation to his rivals; but he was entirely dependent

* Dio. Cass. lib. xxxvii. c. 3

on the public opinion for any satisfaction he enjoyed in the possession of power. Trusting, perhaps, to this part of his character, Cæsar, though no way remiss as a rival, was not yet alarmed at the elevation of Pompey, and thought that he was safe in admitting him to govern with the sword at Rome. Pompey was, at this conjuncture, with his army, moving towards Italy, and his approach was matter of great apprehension to the friends of the commonwealth, who feared that, in return to the affront of his not being invited, upon the motion of Metellus, to come with his army, he would employ it, in person, to enforce his commands. Upon his arrival at Brundisium, however, as formerly, upon his return from Africa, he dispelled those fears, by an immediate dismissal of the troops, with instructions, merely, that they should attend at his triumph. He himself came forward to Rome, with the single equipage of his proconsular rank. Multitudes, of every condition, went forth to receive him, and, with shouts and acclamations, recompensed the moderation with which he acquiesced in the condition of a citizen.

Cæsar, from whatever motive he acted in regard to Pompey, gave every other sign of disaffection to the senate, and employed the name of this rising favourite of the people, to mortify such of the members, in particular, as were objects of personal animosity to himself. The repairs or rebuilding of the capitol, being finished about this time, the honour of dedicating the edifice, and of being named in the inscription it was to bear, was, by a resolution of the senate, conferred on Catulus, under whose inspection the work had been executed. But Cæsar, affecting to obtain this honour for Pompey, alleged that Catulus had embezzled the money allotted for the service; that much yet remained to be done; and moved, that the inscription of Catulus should be erased; that the completion of the work, being left to Pompey, should carry an inscription with his name.* Here he probably acted as much from antipathy to one, as from an intention to flatter the other. But the design being extremely odious to the

* Sueton. in Jul. Cæsare, c. 15.

whole body of the nobles, who saw, with indignation, in that proposal, an attempt to affront a most respectable citizen, in order to flatter the vanity of one person, and to gratify the profligate resentments of another, Cæsar under this aspect of the business, was obliged to withdraw his motion.*

It was probably during this year, in which Cæsar was prætor, and before the arrival of Pompey from Asia, (although historians refer it to an earlier date) that Cæsar promoted, as has been already mentioned, prosecutions, upon a charge of assassination, against some of the persons concerned in the execution of Sylla's proscriptions. The prætors had in charge, by lot, to superintend the application of particular laws. The law respecting assassination, appears to have been the lot of Cæsar; and he was entitled, in virtue of his office, (the jurisdiction of which was still very arbitrary) to extend, by his edict, or plan of proceeding for the year, the description of the crime under his cognizance, to any special case.

While he seemed to have formed so many designs, against the peace of the commonwealth, and, in the capacity of prætor, supported them with the authority of a magistrate, the senatorian party made a powerful exertion of their influence, to have him suspended, and actually obtained a decree for this purpose. He affected, at first, to slight their authority; but finding that a power was preparing to enforce it, perhaps at the hazard of his life, he laid aside, for some time, the robes and badges of magistracy, dismissed his lictors, and abstained from the functions of prætor, until, having rejected an offer of the people, to restore him by force, he was, with proper marks of regard, for this instance of moderation and duty, reinstated by an act of the senate itself.†

The aristocratical party, meanwhile, to confirm and perpetuate the evidence, on which they had proceeded against the accomplices of Cataline, continued their prosecutions on this subject, and obtained sentence of condemnation, in par-

* Dio. Cass. lib. xlvii. c. 44. † Sueton. in Jul. Cæsare, c. 16.

ticular, against a citizen, of the name of Vergunteius, and against Autronius, who, about two years before, having been elected consul, was set aside, upon a charge of bribery; and who, from the disgust which he took to the senate, upon that occasion, had connected himself with the more desperate party. Publius Sylla, as has been mentioned, was also tried; but, upon the pleading and testimony of Cicero, who possessed all the information obtained on this subject, was honourably acquitted.

Cæsar likewise was accused by Vectius, as accessory to the conspiracy of Cataline; but it is not likely that he was concerned, further than by the general encouragement he gave to every party at variance with the senate. Opposition to this body was reputed the cause of the people, and was, pretended by every person, who had any passions to gratify by crimes of state, or who wished to weaken the government, to which they themselves were accountable. Among the supporters of this interest, Crassus also was accused, but probably on no better grounds than Cæsar.

The whole of these proceedings, however, were suspended, by the approach of Pompey. This leader had now drawn the attention of all men upon himself, was quoted, in every harangue, as the great support of the empire, and courted by multitudes, who, without inquiry, or knowledge of his person, affected to be classed with his admirers and friends. While the contagion spread, like a fashion, among the people, he himself affected indifference to this mighty tide of renown, though not without much dignity and state, which he tempered with affability and grace; employing the greatness he possessed, to give the more value to his condescensions. His manner, though acceptable to the people and the army he commanded, was disagreeable to the senate. Having previously sent Piso, one of his lieutenants, before him, to stand for the consulate, he had the presumption to desire, that the senate would defer the elections until he himself could be present to canvass for his friend. The senate, according to Dio, complied with his desire; but, according to Plutarch, rejected the proposal with disdain. This

author imputes the resolution, which they took upon this occasion, to Cato, and subjoins, that Pompey afterwards endeavoured to gain this opponent, by a proposed marriage with one of his near relations; and that Cato declined the connexion, saying, that he should not be caught in a female snare. Piso, however, was elected, together with Valerius Messala, and entered on his office before the solemnity of Pompey's triumph.

This followed soon after; and, though continued for two days, could not make place for all the magnificent shows, which had been provided to adorn it. The ^{U. C. 692.} list of conquests exceeded that which had ever been produced at any other triumph; including Asia, Pontus, Armenia, Cappadocia, Paphlagonia, Medea, Colchis, Iberia, Albania, Syria, Cilicia, Mesopotamia, Phœnicia, Judæa, Arabia, Scythia, Crete,* with the sea, on all its coasts. Among the nations or potentates subdued, were the Basterni, Mithridates, and Tigranes. Among the captures, a thousand fortresses, nine hundred cities reduced, eight hundred galleys taken, above two millions of men in captivity. Towns repeopled, not less than three hundred and ninety-nine. To this pompous list, it was subjoined, by his friends, that, this being his third triumph, he had now made a round of the known world, or had triumphed oved all the three parts of the earth—Africa, Europe, and Asia.

After rewarding the soldiers, of whom none received less than fifteen hundred denarii,† he carried to the treasury twenty thousand talents.‡ Among his principal captives were led, besides the chief pirates, Tigranes, son to the king of Armenia, with his wife and his daughter; Zozimé, the queen of Tigranes the father; Aristobulus, king of the Jews; a sister of Mithridates, with five sons, and some Scythian women; the hostages of the Iberii and the Commageni; together with trophies for every battle he had fought; making, in all, a more splendid exhibition than any that was to be found on the records of the state.

* Plin. Nat. Hist. lib. vii. c. 26. † About 50 l. ‡ About 3,860,000 l.

The triumphal processions of Pompey merit more attention than those of any other person, because they exhibit his character as well as military success. Others took the benefit of an established practice, to publish and to ratify the honours they had acquired; but Pompey, it is likely, would have invented the triumph, even if it had not been formerly thought of; and it is not to be doubted that he over-ran some provinces in which the enemy were subdued, or in which they were so weak as not to be able to make any resistance, merely to place them in the list of his conquests; and that he made some part of his progress in Asia merely to accumulate trophies and ornaments for this pompous scene.

The triumph, in its ordinary form, consisted only of such exhibitions as had a reference to the service in which it was obtained; the captives and spoils of the enemy, with effigies or representations of the first, where the originals, by any accident, could not be displayed. But, in the solemnities instituted for the honour of Pompey, were admitted whatever could distinguish or signalize the occasion. Among these, according to the record transcribed by Pliny,* there were many costly ornaments of gold and of precious stones, not taken from the enemy, but fabricated on purpose to be shown. Plates, used for some species of game or play, made of one entire crystal; a model of the moon in gold, weighing thirty pondo; tables, utensils, statues, crowns adorned with precious stones, the representation also of an entire mountain in gold, with its herds of deer, and other animals, haunted with lions: and, what serves as an evidence that these exhibitions were not limited to the spoils actually taken in war, there is mentioned an effigy of Pompey himself, incrustated with pearls. The whole conducted with more arrangement and order than were necessary, perhaps, in the disposition made for any of the battles which the triumph was intended to celebrate.

Among the images, representations, and memorials, which were carried before the victor, on this occasion, there was held up to view a state of the public finance, from which it

* Nat. Hist. lib. xxxvii. c. 2.

appeared, that, before Pompey's time, the revenue amounted to no more than fifty millions;* and that the addition, which he alone brought to it, amounted to eighty-five millions.†

Soon after this pomp was over, an assembly of the people was called in the Circus Flaminius, to receive an address from the victorious commander; but, from an extreme caution not to offend any party, the speech which he made upon this occasion was acceptable to none. "It gave no hopes," says Cicero,‡ "to the poor; no flattery to the rich; no satisfaction to the good; no encouragement to the profligate." Pompey was suffered to possess the highest place in the consideration of the public, merely because he assumed it; and he preserved his dignity, by never committing his reputation without being prepared, or without having concerted a variety of arts by which it might be supported.||

* 416,666 l.

† 708,333 l. Plutarch. in Pompeio, edit. Lond. p. 470.

‡ Cicer. ad Atticum, lib. i. ep. 14.

|| Sallust. in Catalin. c. 54, in contrasting the characters of Cæsar and Cato, does not propose to decide on the comparative merit of their objects; for this he assumes to have been consideration or glory, and the same in both; but in reality he seems to have mistaken the object of either. That of Cæsar was not consideration: for although he courted the public opinion, when subservient to his power, yet he slighted it also, when it stood in his way to dominion. In the object of Cato, consideration had no share. His life was distinguished by the general tenor of reason, integrity, humanity and justice, in the public cause, whatever the world might think of his conduct; and his resolution often led him into measures, unsuccessful from the want of co-operation in a corrupt or misguided age. The great distinction of Pompey, if we insert his character into this comparison, was the prevailing attention to consideration or glory, in preference to either virtue or power.

CHAPTER XIX.

Transactions at Rome, and in the Provinces.—Julius Caesar appointed, in the Quality of Proprætor, to his first Province of Lusitania.—Trial of Clodius.—Proposed Adoption into a Plebeian Family, to qualify him for the Office of Tribune.—Cæsar a Candidate for the Consulship.—The Triumvirate of Cæsar, Pompey and Crassus.—Consulship of Cæsar.—Motion of Vatinius, to confer on Cæsar, for five Years, the Command in Gaul.—Marriage of Pompey to Julia.—Of Cæsar to Calpurnia.—Plot of Vettius.—Consulate of Lucius Calpurnius and A. Gabinius.—Attack made upon Cicero.—His Exile.

POMPEY, at his departure from Syria, left that province with two legions, under the command of M. Æmilius Scaurus, one of his lieutenants. This officer occupied the country from the Euphrates to the frontier of Egypt, and continued the war, which his predecessor had begun, with the Arabs.

Caius Antonius, the late colleague of Cicero in the consulate, soon after the defeat of Cataline, proceeded to the province of Macedonia, of which, by the arrangements of the year, he had been appointed the governor. He entered his province with the ensigns of victory, which had been obtained by the defeat of Cataline; but these he soon forfeited by his misconduct in a war against the Thracians, and by the disgrace which he otherwise incurred in the mal-administration of his province. Complaints were exhibited against him for extortion. On this occasion, it had been reported, by himself or by some of his family, that, having agreed to divide the profits of his government with Cicero, part only of his exactions was made on his own account. This allegation, Cicero, in a letter to Atticus, mentions with scorn; and, being asked to undertake the defence of Antonius, questions

whether he can decently do so under this imputation.* But as he soon afterwards undertook the cause, and employed his interest to have the proconsul continued in his province, it is probable that this imputation either gained no credit, or was entirely removed.†

The Allobroges, though deprived of the support they were made to expect from the party of Cataline, nevertheless took arms, and invaded the Roman province of Gaul. After a variety of events, they were repulsed by Pontinius, who then commanded the legions in that quarter, and forced to retire into their own country.‡

About the same time, Caius Julius Cæsar, upon the expiration of his term in the office of prætor, obtained his first military command, being appointed by lot to the government of Lusitania, where, under different pretences, he found an opportunity to quarrel with the natives, to shew his own capacity for war, and to lay some ground for his claim to a triumph.¶ In pushing his way to the preferments which he now held in the state, he had ruined his fortune by largesses, public shews, and entertainments to the people; by his lavish bounty, in private, to needy and profligate citizens; and in supporting every desperate cause against the senate and the government; and is reported to have said of himself, when he set out for his province, that he needed one hundred and fifty millions, Roman money, or one million two hundred thousand pounds sterling, to be worth nothing.§ When about to depart from the city, he was pressed by his creditors, and had recourse to Crassus, who became his surety for great sums.**

A person who, in any other state than that of Rome, could suppose such a fortune reparable, must have thought of means alarming to the state itself; but Cæsar had now quitted the paths of pleasure for those of ambition; and, in an empire

* Vid. Cicero, ad Atticum, lib. i. ep. 12. † Ad Familiar. lib. v. ep. 5.

‡ Dio. lib. xxxvii. || Dio. c. 52. &c.

§ Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. ii. p. 715.

** Ibid. About 160,000*l*. Plutarch. in Cæsare.

which extended over so many opulent provinces, needed only to have power, in order to become rich. Although the province, which now fell to his lot, was not the most wealthy, or was only a step to somewhat farther, more considerable, and more likely to supply him with the means of pursuing his objects, he was nevertheless reported, even there, to have supplied his own wants, and to have enriched his army.*

In passing the Alps, on his way into Spain, at a village on the way, one of his company having observed, that "*Here too there might be parties and contests for power.*" "*Ay,*" said Cæsar, with a characteristical confession, "*and I would rather be the first man in this place, than the second at Rome.*"† Upon his arrival in Lusitania, he made the necessary augmentation of the army, and soon over-ran all the districts that were disposed to resist his authority. With the same ability, with which he conducted his military operations, he supported the dignity of a Roman governor, no less in the civil than in the department of war. Historians, upon an idea which occurred to them, that the disorder in his own affairs might have rendered him partial to insolvent debtors, and being at pains to acquit him of any such charge, observe that he gave proofs of the contrary, among which they specify a rule, which he followed, in ordering two-thirds of the debtor's effects to be sequestered, for the use of his creditors.‡

While these things passed in the provinces, the people being indulged in their favourite gratifications, suffered an increase of the political distempers with which the public had been for some time infected. The expense and dissipation attending the public shews, in particular, were augmented to a great degree. Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus exhibited the baiting of an hundred bears by African huntsmen;|| and whereas such entertainments had formerly ended at one meeting, they were now continued through many acts,** and were intermitted only while the spectators retired to their meals.

* Plutarch. in Cæsare, edit. Lond. p. 111. † Ibid. ‡ Ibid. p. 112.

|| Plin. Nat. Hist. lib. viii. c. 36. ** Dio. Cass. lib. xxxvii. c. 47.

The office of censor, as appears from the transactions which are mentioned relating to the farms of the revenue and the rolls of the senate; was in actual exertion at this time, although the names of the persons, by whom it was exercised, are not recorded. These officers are said to have let the revenues of Asia, at a rate, of which the farmers afterwards complained, alleging, that their own avidity, in grasping at the profits to be made in this new province, had misled them.* The censors likewise put upon the rolls of the senate all who had ever held any office of magistracy; and by this addition increased the number of members beyond any former and ordinary rate.†

About the same time happened the memorable trial of Publius Clodius, for the scandal he had given by profaning the sacred rites in Cæsar's house. This debauchee was supposed, for some time, to have sought for an opportunity of a criminal correspondence with Pompeia, Cæsar's wife; but to have been prevented, if not by her own discretion, at least by the attention and vigilance of her family.‡ In these circumstances, during the preceding year, it fell to the lot of Pompeia, as being wife to one of the prætors in office, to celebrate, at her house, the festival of a certain female deity,|| worshipped by the Romans; and at whose rites women alone were admitted. Every male domestic, even the husband, was obliged to absent himself from home while the rites were administered. Clodius took this opportunity to carry on his intrigue; put himself in a female dress, and, being young and of an effeminate aspect, expected to pass for a woman.** Pompeia was supposed to be apprised of the design, and to have stationed a female slave to receive and conduct her paramour through the apartments. But being met by another slave, who was not in the secret, his voice betrayed him. A cry of amazement and horror was immediately communicated through all the apartments, and the occasion of it discovered to the matrons, who were met to celebrate the rites. Clodius

* Cicer. ad Atticum, lib. i. ep. 17. † Dio. lib. xxxvii. c. 46.

‡ Plutarch. in Cæsare, edit. Lond. p. 109. || Called the Bona et Dea.

** Cicero, ad Atticum, lib. i. ep. 12, 13.

escaped, but not without being known. The college of pontiffs made a report, that the sacred rites had been profaned. The senate resolved that inquiry should be made into the grounds of the scandal; and that the people should be moved to authorize the prætor in office to select, without drawing lots, proper judges, for the trial of the accused.

Clodius, by the suspicion of an incestuous commerce with his own sister, the wife of Lucullus; by his perfidy in seducing the troops of that general to mutiny, and by his profligacy on every occasion, had incurred a general detestation; and many of the senators, as the likeliest way of removing him from the commonwealth, combined in urging the present prosecution against him.

He himself, foreseeing the storm, had taken refuge in the popular party, and endeavoured to silence the voice of infamy, by professing extraordinary zeal for the people, and vehement opposition to the senate. These parties, accordingly, became interested in the issue of his cause. The popular leaders endeavoured to preserve him, as an useful instrument, and the senate to remove him, as a vile and dangerous tool, from the hands of their enemies. Even Cæsar, though personally insulted, and so far moved, by the scandal which had been given in his own house, as to part with his wife, still affected to consider as groundless the charge which was laid against Clodius; and being asked, why he had parted with a woman who, upon this supposition, must appear to be innocent, said, that his wife must not only be innocent, but above imputation. Pompey, to avoid giving offence, declined to favour either party; but being called upon, in the assembly of the people, to declare his opinion, whether this trial should proceed according to the decree of the senate, made a long speech, full of respect to the nobles, and of submission to the senate, whose authority, in all questions of this sort, he said, should ever, with him, have the greatest weight. He afterwards, in the senate itself, being called upon by Messala, the consul, delivered himself to the same purpose; and when he had done, whispered Cicero, who sat by him, that he thought he had now sufficiently explained himself; intimating proba-

bly, that he meant also to comprehend, in this declaration, his judgment with respect to all the acts of the senate, which had passed relating to the accomplices of Cataline.*

The consul Piso was instructed to carry to the people, for their assent, an act for the better conduct of the trial of Clodius, dispensing with the usual mode of draughting the judges by lot and authorizing the prætor to select them, that he might name the more respectable persons. On the day on which this motion was to be made, a numerous party of young nobility appeared for the defendant. His hirelings and retainers crowded the Comitium. Even Piso, who moved the question, dissuaded the people from passing the law, and allowed the friends of Clodius to put a ridiculous trick on the assembly, by distributing to the people, as they came forward to vote, two ballots, which, instead of being, as usual, one negative and the other affirmative, were both negative. This trick being observed, Cato, with the authority of tribune, suspended the ballot, and strongly remonstrated against the proceeding of the consul.† In this he was supported by Hortensius and Favonius. The assembly broke up, and the affair again returned to the senate. The members were importuned by Clodius, who cast himself at their feet as they entered; they, nevertheless, confirmed their former resolution by a majority of four hundred to fifteen.‡

Hortensius, however, having proposed that, instead of the motion which the consuls had been instructed to make for the selection of the judges, the tribune Fusius should move the people to grant commission for the trial, leaving the judges, as usual, to be drawn by lot, an edict was accordingly framed and passed to this effect. Hortensius, who conducted the trial, was confident that no jury could acquit the accused; and the court, in all their proceedings, seemed at first inclined to severity. They even applied for a guard, to protect their persons against the partisans of the criminal; but the majority, nevertheless, it was alleged, suffered

* Cicero, ad Atticum, lib. i. epist. 13. 14, 16. † Ibid. ‡ Ibid.

themselves to be corrupted, or took money in the course of the trial. Of fifty-six judges, that were inclosed, twenty-five gave their voice to condemn, and thirty-one to acquit. Catulus, on this occasion, asked the majority, to what purpose they had desired a guard? "Was it," he said, with a sarcasm, which modern juries could ill endure, "to secure the " money you expected to receive for your votes?" *

Soon after this judgment, the senate resolved that inquiry should be made concerning those judges, who had been corrupted in the trial. And by this resolution gave a general offence to the equestrian order, who considered it as an imputation on their whole body.†

Pompey, in the course of this transaction, had been obliged to declare himself for the senate; but his object was to be on good terms with all parties, and to manage his interest, by having some of his creatures always chosen into the highest offices of state. He offered, as candidate for the consulate of the following year, Afranius, one of his dependants, who is represented by Cicero as a person of mean character, and who, having no personal dignity, nor any credit with the people, was to be supported in his canvass by money alone. Pompey himself, and the consul Piso, openly employed bribery in obtaining votes in his favour.‡

A variety of resolutions were obtained in the senate, to restrain these practices. Two of them were proposed by Cato and Domitius. The first was levelled against the consul Piso himself, and gave permission, on the suspicion of illicit practices respecting elections, to visit the house even of a magistrate. By the other it was declared, that all those who were found distributing money to the people should be considered as enemies to their country.||

The senate, at the same time, encouraged Lurco, one of the tribunes, to propose a new clause to corroborate the laws against bribery. By this clause promises of money made to

* Dio. Cass. lib. xxxvii. c. 46.—Cicero, ad Att. lib. i. ep. 16.

† Dio. Cass. lib. xxxvi. c. 46.—Cicero, ad Att. lib. i. ep. 17.

‡ Cicero, ad Att. lib. i. ep. 16. || Ibid.

the people, if not performed, did not infer guilt; but, if performed, subjected the guilty person from thenceforward to pay to each of the tribes an annual tax of three thousand Roman money, or about twenty-four pounds sterling; and there being thirty-five tribes, this tax amounted in all to about eight hundred and forty pounds of our money. That the tribune might not be interrupted in carrying this law, the senate further resolved, that the formalities or restrictions of the *Lex Ælia* and *Fusia** should not be opposed to him.† It appears, however, that the liberality or other influence of Pompey prevailed against these precautions; as Afranius was elected, together with Q. Cæcilius Metellus Celer.

Soon after the election of these officers the farmers of the revenue of Asia, supported by the whole equestrian order, complained, as has been mentioned, of the terms of their contract; in which they alleged that they had greatly exceeded what the funds of that province could afford, and made application to the senate for relief. Their plea was contested for some months, with great animosity on both sides.‡

Upon the accession of the new consuls, several other matters, tending to innovation and public disturbance, were introduced. Metellus Nepos, late tribune, being now in the office of prætor, procured a law to abolish the customs payable at any of the ports of Italy. The Romans, as has been observed, upon the accession of wealth derived from Macedonia, had exempted themselves from all the ancient assessments, and they now completed the exemption of all the Italians from every tax, besides that of quit-rents for public lands, and the twentieth penny on the value of slaves, when sold or emancipated. They were become the sovereigns of a great empire, and, as such, thought themselves entitled to receive, not obliged to pay, contributions.||

* These were formalities and restrictions provided to check the precipitate passing of laws.

† Cicero ad Atticum, lib. i. ep. 16. ‡ Ibid. lib. i. ep. 17, 18.

§ Ibid. lib. ii. ep. 16.—Dio. Cass. lib. xxvii. c. 51.

The tribune Herennius, at the same time, made a motion for an act to enable Publius Clodius to be adopted into a Plebeian family, which, though an act of a more private nature than any of the former, tended still more to embroil the parties of the senate and the people. This factious and profligate person had entertained great resentments against many of the senators, on account of the prosecution he had lately incurred, and against Cicero in particular, who, having been called as an evidence on his trial, gave a very unfavourable account of his character. The summary proceedings against the accomplices of Cataline, in which Cicero presided as consul, exposed him to the resentment of the popular faction; and Clodius now proposed to qualify himself to be elected tribune of the people, in order to wreak his vengeance on that magistrate in particular, as well as on the other abettors of the senatorian party. The motion, however, for the present, was rejected, though not finally dropped, either by Clodius himself, or by the popular faction, whose cause he professed to espouse.*

Two other motions were made, in which Pompey was deeply interested: one, to ratify and confirm all his acts in the province of Asia; another, to procure settlements for the veterans who had served under his command. The first, as it implied a reflection on Lucullus, many of whose judgments Pompey had reserved, roused this statesman from the care of his household and his table to that of the republic.† He opposed this motion with vigour, and insisted that the acts of Pompey should be separately examined, and not confirmed in a single vote. In this he was supported by Catulus, by Cato, by the consul Metellus, and by the senate in general. Afranius, though vested with the consulate, and acting almost as the agent of Pompey, had neither dignity nor force to support such a measure; and Pompey, finding it rejected by the senate, declined carrying it to the people.‡

* Dio. Cass. lib. xxxvii. c. 51.

† Plutarch. in Lucullo, edit. Lond. p. 197.

‡ Dio. lib. xxxvii. c. 49.

The other proposal, relating to the allotment of settlements for the soldiers of Pompey, was, by L. Flavius, one of the tribunes, moved in the assembly of the people, under the title of an Agrarian Law. In this act, to guard against the imputation of partiality to any particular class, certain means of relief were projected for the indigent citizens in general;* and, to enable the commonwealth to extend its bounty, it was proposed, first of all, to revoke the conveyance of certain lands, which, having belonged to the public in the consulate of P. Mucius and L. Calpurnius, were sold by the senate; and that the price should be restored to the purchasers. It was proposed, likewise, to seize certain lands which had been confiscated by Sylla, but not appropriated to any particular use; and to allot, during five years, the fruits of the recent conquests in Asia, to purchase settlements, which should be distributed in terms of this act.†

The consul Metellus Celer, supported by the senate, strenuously opposed the passing of this law. But the tribune persisted with great obstinacy, and, to remove the obstruction he met with, committed the consul to prison. The whole senate would have attended him thither, and numbers accordingly crowded to the place, when the tribune, vested with the sacred defences of his person, to bar their way, planted his stool or chair of office in the door of the prison; and, having seated himself upon it, "This way," he said, "you cannot pass; if you mean to enter, you must pierce through the walls."‡ He declared his resolution to remain all night where he sat. The parties were collecting their strength, and matters were likely to end in greater extremities than suited the indirect and cautious conduct of Pompey. This politician, although he engaged all his friends to support the motion of Flavius, affected to have no part in the measure; and now, probably, in secret, instructed the tribune to remove from the doors of the prison. This at least might be suspected, from the sudden resolution of the tri-

* Dio. lib. 1. † Cicer. ad Att. lib. i. ep. 19.

‡ Dio. lib. xxxvii. p. 50.

bune to give way, saying that he did so at the request of the prisoner, who begged for his liberty.*

It is supposed that Pompey, on this occasion, severely felt the checks which his ambition received from the senate; that he regretted, for a moment, the dismissal of his army, and wished himself in condition to enforce what his craft or his artifice had not been able to obtain. The error he had committed, in resigning the sword, if he conceived it as such, might have still been corrected by recovering the possession of some considerable province, which would have given him the command of an army and of proper resources to support his power. He, nevertheless, appears to have preferred the scene of intrigue in the city and the capital of the empire; a choice in which he was probably confirmed by Cæsar, who professed great attachment to him, and who was, about this time, returned from the government which he held, as proprætor, in Lusitania.

This officer, according to Dio, had found some pretences for a war with the nations on the frontier of the Roman province; had obliged them to take refuge in some of the islands on the coast, and afterwards subdued them in that retreat. His object was to return, to resign his command with the reputation of victory, to obtain a triumph, and to offer himself as a candidate for the consulship of the following year. For this purpose he quitted his province, without waiting for a successor; and, upon his arrival at Rome, halted, as usual, with the ensigns of his military rank at the gates of the city, applied for a triumph, and at the same time made interest for votes at the approaching election.† The senate, and the friends of the republic in general, were already become extremely jealous of his designs, and of his credit with the people. From a libertine he became an ardent politician, seemed to have no passion but emulation, or animosity to the more respectable orders of the state; without committing himself, he had abetted every factious leader against them, and seemed to be indifferent to consideration or ho-

* Dio. lib. xxxvii. p. 50. † Dio. Cass. lib. xxxvii. c. 50, &c.

nours, except so far as they led to power. Cicero and Cato were at this time the principal, or most conspicuous, members of the senate. The first was possessed of consular rank, great ingenuity, wit, and accomplished talents: the other, possessed of great abilities and an inflexible resolution, embraced the cause of the republic with the same ardour that others displayed in conducting their interests or pursuing their pleasures. He had penetration enough to perceive in Cæsar, long before the senate in general was alarmed, a disposition to vilify the aristocracy, and, in conjunction with needy and profligate citizens, to make a prey of the republic. Under this apprehension, he opposed him with a degree of keenness, which Cæsar endeavoured to represent as a mere personal hatred or animosity to himself.

The senators, in general, now aware of their danger from Cæsar, were disposed to resist his applications, whether made for honours or for public trust. They, on the present occasion, disputed his pretensions to a triumph; and, while he remained without the city, in expectation of this honour, refused, according to the forms of the commonwealth, to admit him on the list of candidates for the office of consul. But the day of election being fixed, Cæsar, without hesitation, preferred the consulate to the triumph, laid down the ensigns of his late military character, assumed the gown, and entered the city as a candidate for the consulship.*

The people were at this time divided into a variety of factions. Pompey and Crassus distrusted each other, and both were jealous of Cæsar. Their divisions strengthened the party of the senate, and furnished that body with the means of thwarting separately many of their ambitious designs. This Cæsar had long perceived, and had paid his court both to Pompey and to Crassus, in order to hinder their joining the senate against him. The expedience of this precaution now appeared more clearly than ever; and he is supposed to have separately represented to these rivals the advantage which their enemies derived from their misunder-

* Sueton. in Cæsare, c. 18.—Dio. lib. xxxvii. c. 54.

standing, and the ease with which, if united, they might concert among themselves all the affairs of the republic, gratify every friend, and disappoint every enemy. Upon this representation, Pompey and Crassus were reconciled, and agreed to act in concert with Cæsar, and, in particular, to support him in his pretensions, at the approaching elections.*

This private combination, which remained some time a secret, was afterwards, by a kind of mockery, called the triumvirate, alluding to the designation by which certain collegiate officers were known, derived from the numbers which were joined in the commission.† In the mean time, these leaders of supposed opposite factions, in abating their violence against one another, took a favourable aspect of moderation and candour. They paid their court, separately, to persons whom they wished to gain; and flattered them with hopes of being able to heal the divisions of their country. This sort of court they paid in particular to Cicero; and, by their flatteries, and real or pretended admiration of his talents, seem to have got entire possession of his mind. Pompey affected to place the merits of Cicero greatly above his own. "I, indeed," he said, "have served my country; but this man has preserved it."‡ At this time it appeared that Cicero, though a fine genius, was but a weak man. The senators, with whom he had hitherto acted, were alarmed: Atticus, it seems, had taxed him with leaving his party, to commit himself into the hands of their enemies. In his answer to this imputation, he seems to have flattered himself that he had made an acquisition of Pompey, not surrendered himself into his power; at least, that he had reclaimed or diverted him from the dangerous projects in which he had been lately engaged, and that he thought himself likely to succeed in the same manner with Cæsar; so much, that he triumphed in the superiority of his own conduct to that of

* Dio. Cass. lib. xxxvii. c. 54, 55.—Plutarch. in Pompeio, Cæsare, et Crasso.

† As the Decemvirs, Septemvirs, &c.

‡ Cicero. ad Atticum, lib. ii. epist. 1.

Cato, who, by his austerity and vehemence, he said, had alienated the minds of men, otherwise well disposed to the republic; * "While I," he said, "by a little discretion, disarm, or even reclaim, its enemies."†

Few persons, where his vanity did not blind him, were possessed of more penetration than Cicero; but it will afterwards appear how egregiously he was mistaken on this occasion. He chose not to see what checked his vain glory, or prevented his enjoying the court which was paid to him by such eminent men as Pompey and Cæsar. His own importance, for the most part, intercepted every other object from his view, and made him the dupe of every person who professed to admire him: and he was incapable of any serious regard for any one who did not pay him, on every occasion, the expected tribute of praise; a description under which Cato, though his most sincere well-wisher and friend, appears at this time to have fallen.

Cæsar, to the other arts which he employed to secure his election, added the use of money, which he obtained by joining his interest, in opposition to Bibulus, with that of Lucceius, another of the candidates, possessed of great wealth. He himself, having squandered his fortune, as has been observed, was still greatly in debt, and Lucceius willingly furnished the money that was given to the people in the name of both. This illegal proceeding, together with the menacing concerts of which he began to be suspected with Pompey and Crassus, greatly alarmed the friends of the republic. They determined to support Bibulus against Lucceius; and, in order to give Cæsar a colleague, who might occasionally oppose his dangerous intentions, they even went so far as to contribute sums of money, and to bid for votes as high as

* Alluding to the opposition which Cato gave to the farmers of the revenue, in their petition for an abatement of their rent. But Cato followed his judgment in this matter; and there is no reason to prefer the judgment of Cicero to his.

† Cicero ad Atticum, lib. ii. epist. 1.

their opponents. In this crisis, it is said that even Cato owned it was meritorious to bribe.*

During the dependence of this contest, the senate, by the death of Lutatius Catulus, was deprived of an able member, and the people of a fellow-citizen of great integrity, moderation, fortitude, and ability; a model of what the Romans in this age should have been, in order to have preserved the state. He partook with Cato in the aversion which Cæsar bore to the most respectable members and best supports of the senate, and would probably have taken part with him likewise, in the continual efforts he made to maintain its authority. The aristocratical party, notwithstanding this loss, prevailed in carrying the election of Bibulus, against Lucceius; and though they could not exclude Cæsar from the office of consul, they hoped, by means of his colleague, to oppose and to frustrate his designs.†

Cæsar, well aware of their purpose, opened his administration with a speech in praise of unanimity, and recommending good agreement between those who were joined in any public trust. While he meant to vilify the senate, and to foster every disorderly party against them, he guarded his own behaviour, at least in the first period of his consulship, with every appearance of moderation and candour; paid his court, not only to leaders of faction, but to persons of every condition; and while he took care to espouse the popular side, in every question, was active likewise in devising regulations for the better government of the empire: so that the senate, however inclined to counteract his designs, as calculated to raise himself on the ruins of the commonwealth, could scarcely, with a good grace, oppose him in any particular measure. He set out with a project for the relief of such indigent citizens as had numerous families, including the veterans and disbanded soldiers of Pompey; these he proposed to settle on some of the public lands in Italy. He gave out, that he expected the concurrence of Cicero in this measure; sent him

* Sueton. in *Caio Cæsare*, c. xix.—Appian. de Bell. Civil. lib. ii.

† Plutarch. Appian. Dio. Sueton. &c.

a message, by Balbus*, with assurances *that he meant to consult with Pompey and himself, in all matters of importance, and that he had hopes of bringing Crassus also into the same mind*: words, from which it is manifest that the coalition of these persons was not yet publicly known. "What a fine prospect I have before me," says Cicero to Atticus; "a perfect union with Pompey, even with Cæsar, if I please; peace with my enemies, and tranquillity in my old age." But his heart soon after misgave him; the honours of his former life recurred to his mind. With his eminent talents, he was destined to transmit a more honest fame to posterity, and to become the lamented victim of his country's betrayers, not the detested associate of their crimes.†

This consulate is distinguished by the passing of many laws; particularly this, which was devised for the settlement of citizens on certain parts of the public domain; and, therefore, known by the title of an Agrarian Law. On this act Cæsar was to rest his popularity, and his triumph over the senate. He gave out that he was to make a provision for twenty thousand citizens, without any burden to the revenue. But he well knew that his antagonists would perceive the tendency of the measure, or not suffer it to pass without opposition; and he affected great moderation in the general purpose, and in framing every part of his plan; affecting solicitude to obtain the consent of the senate; but, in reality, to make their opposition appear the more unreasonable and the more odious to the people. He declared, that he did not mean to strip the revenue of any branch, that was known to carry profit to the public, nor to make any partial distribution in favour of his friends; that he only meant to plant with inhabitants certain unprofitable wastes, and to provide for a number of citizens, who, being indigent and uneasy in their circumstances, filled the city itself with frequent disorders and tumults; and that he would not proceed a step without consulting the senate, and every person of credit and authority in the state.

* Dio. Cass. lib. viii. initio.—Plutarch. in Cæsare. In Pompeio, Lucullo, Catone, &c. &c.—Sueton. in Cæsare.—Appian. de Bell. Civil. lib. ii.

† Cicero ad Atticum, lib. ii. ep. 3.

In a way to save these appearances, and with these professions, Cæsar formed the first draught of an act, which he brought to the senate for their approbation, and in hopes to obtain their support, in proposing it to the people. It was difficult to find topics on which to oppose a measure so plausible, and conducted with so much appearance of moderation and candour. But the tendency of the act itself was, evidently, not to promote the peace of the commonwealth, but to constitute a merit in the person who procured it, and to confer high measures of power on those who were to be intrusted with its execution.

In great and populous cities, indigent citizens are ever likely to be numerous, and would be more so, if the idle and profligate were taught to hope for bounties and gratuitous provisions, to quiet their clamours and to suppress their disorders. If men were to have estates in the country, because they are factious and turbulent in the city, it is evident that public lands, and all the resources of the most prosperous state, would not be sufficient to supply their wants. Commissioners, appointed for the distribution of such public favours, would be raised above the ordinary magistrates, and above the laws of their country. They might reward their own creatures, and keep the citizens, in general, in a state of dependence on their will. The authors of such proposals, while they were urging the state and the people to ruin, would be considered as their only patrons and friends. "It is not this law I dread," said Cato; "it is the reward expected for obtaining it."

Odious as the task of opposition, on such difficult ground, might appear to the people, this senator did not decline it. Being asked his opinion in his turn, he answered, that he saw no occasion for the change that was now proposed in the state of the public domains; and entered on an argument with which he meant so to exhaust the whole time of the sitting, as to prevent the senate from coming to a question. He was entitled, by his privilege as a member in that assembly, to speak without interruption, and might, if he chose to continue speaking, persist until all the members had left the house. Cæsar, suspecting his design, and finding it impos-

sible otherwise to silence him, ordered him into custody. The whole senate instantly rose in a tumult. "Whither go you, before the meeting is adjourned?" said Cæsar to Petreius, who was moving from his side. "I go," said the other, "into confinement, with Cato. "With him a prison "is preferable to a place in the senate with you." The greater part of the members were actually moving away with Cato, and Cæsar felt himself at once stripped of the disguise of moderation he had assumed, and dreaded the spirit which he saw rising in so numerous a body of men, who, on former occasions, had maintained their authority with a vigour too fatal to those who opposed it. He had relied on their want of decision, and on their ignorance of their own strength. But his rashness broke the charm. He wished that the prisoner would procure some friend among the tribunes, to interpose; but Cato, seeing him embarrassed, and the senate engaged in the cause, went off, in the custody of the lictor, without any signs of reluctance. Cæsar immediately recollected himself, and, never hurried to far by any passion, dispatched a tribune, of his own party, with secret directions to rescue the prisoner; and this being done, the senators again returned to their places. "I meant," said Cæsar, "to have submitted this law to your judgment and "correction; but, if you throw it aside, the people shall take "it up."*

Cæsar, upon this occasion, increased his own popularity, and diminished that of his enemies in the senate, who were supposed in this, as in some other instances, to withstand, with keenness, every measure that was devised for the comfort of the people. The imputations cast out against him, by Cato and others, were supposed to proceed from malice or cynical prejudices. He found himself strong enough to extend his bounty to the people, so as to comprehend the lands of Campania, which were hitherto considered as unalienable, and the richest demesne of the public, together with a valuable district near the confluence of the Volturnus and the Sabbatus, formerly consecrated to pious uses. In

* Dio. lib. xxxvii. c. 1, 2, 3.—Plutarch. in Scuton. Appian, &c.

these valuable tracts of land there was sufficient subject for an ample provision for the soldiers of Pompey, and for the retainers of those who, together with Crassus and Cæsar himself, were proposed to be commissioners for carrying this law into execution.

At the first assembly of the people, Cæsar proposed his scheme to impropriate the lands of Campania, with the above additions; and, first of all, called on his colleague Bibulus, to declare his mind on the subject. Bibulus spoke his dissent; and in vehement terms declared, that no such alienation of the public demesne should be made in his consulate. Cæsar next called upon Pompey, though in a private station; and the audience, ignorant of the concert into which these leaders had entered, were impatient to hear this oracle, on the subject of a measure which was likely to elevate a supposed rival so high in the favour of the people. To the surprise of all who were present, Pompey applauded the general design, and, in a speech of considerable length, discussed all the clauses of the act, with great approbation of each. When he had done speaking, Cæsar, alluding to what had dropped from his colleague, and affecting to fear the interposition of force; "Will you support us," he said to Pompey, "in case we are attacked?"—"If any one," said the other, "shall lift up a sword against you, I shall lift up both sword and shield."* Crassus, being called upon, also spoke to the same effect. The concurrence of all these leaders portended the unanimous consent of all parties; and a day being fixed for finally deciding the question, the assembly adjourned.

To oppose a measure so popular, and from which such numbers had great expectations, no means remained so likely to succeed as superstition. To this aid Bibulus, accordingly had recourse; and, by virtue of the authority with which he was vested, proclaimed a general fast, and a suspension, for the present year, of all the affairs of state. The design of this suspension, and the extravagant length of time to which it was extended; probably enabled his colleague to

* Cicer. ad Att. lib. ii.—Plutarch, in Pompeio.—Dio. Cass. lib. xxxviii. c. 5.

treat it with contempt, and to proceed in the design of putting his question, as if no such proclamation had been issued. The assembly was accordingly summoned, in the temple of Concord. Cæsar, early in the morning, secured all the avenues and the steps of the portico, where he had Vatinius, one of the tribunes of the people, who was entirely devoted to his interest, and even in his pay,* stationed with a party, and prepared to take the odium of all violent measures on himself. Bibulus, however, attended by numbers of the senate, and three of the tribunes, who were engaged, by their negative, to put a stop to every proceeding, came into the place of assembly, with all the forms of office, and protested against the legality of any meeting to be held in a time of general fast; but the opposite party, being in possession of the temple, forced him from the steps, broke the ensigns of the lictors, wounded the tribunes who interposed in his defence, and effectually removed all further obstruction to their own designs. The question then being put, the law passed, without opposition, including a clause to oblige every senator, under pain of exile or death, to swear to the observance of it.

This oath was probably a snare laid by Cæsar for the most resolute of his opponents, like that which had been formerly laid by Marius, on a like occasion, for Metellus Numidicus, and by means of which that virtuous citizen was actually, for some time, removed from the commonwealth.†

Metellus Celer, the late consul, together with Cato and Favonius, unaware of the snare which was laid for them, at first declared their resolution not to swear to the observance of any such ruinous law; but, on further deliberation, they became sensible that in this they were serving the cause of their enemies. "You may have no need of Rome," said Cicero, now awake from his dream, to Cato, "and may go

* Cicero, in Vatinius. Cæsar was reported to have said, at Aquileia, some time after this date, when Vatinius was disappointed of the ædileship, that he had no business with honours, being intent on money only; and that he was paid for all his services in the tribunate.

† See vol. ii. c. 13.

"into exile with pleasure; but Rome has need of you. Give not such a victory to her enemies and your own." Upon this view of the matter, it was determined to comply.*

Bibulus, on the day following that of his violent expulsion from the assembly of the people, convened the senate, represented the outrage he had received, and submitted the state of the republic to their consideration. But even this assembly, though consisting of above six hundred of the most powerful citizens of Rome, not destitute even of personal courage, were declined in their spirit, and became averse to exertions of vigour; being occupied with their villas, their equipages, and the other appurtenances of wealth and of high rank. "They appear," said Cicero, upon this occasion, "to think, that even if the republic should perish, they will be able to preserve their fish-ponds."

The consul Bibulus, and even Cato, though far removed from any ambiguity of conduct, saw no possibility of withstanding the torrent. The first retired to his own house, and, from thenceforward, during the remainder of his term in office, did not personally appear in his public character; and even Cato absented himself from the senate.†

While Cæsar engrossed the full exercise of the consular power, Bibulus was content with issuing his edicts or manifestos in writing, containing protests, by which he endeavoured to stop all proceedings in public affairs, on account of the religious fast, or continuation of holidays, which, according to the forms of the commonwealth, he had instituted to restrain his colleague. In these writings he published violent invectives against Cæsar, in which, among other articles, he charged him with having had a part in the conspiracy of Cataline.‡ The tribune Vatinius, in return, issued a warrant to commit the consul Bibulus to prison; and, in order to seize his person, attempted to break into his house; but in this he was foiled, and the parties continued, during the remainder of this consulate, in the same situation, with respect to each other.

* Plutarch. in Catone.—Appian. de Bell. Civil. lib. ii.

† Cicero, pro Sexto.—Plutarch. in Catone.

‡ Sueton. in C. Cæsare.

In dating the year, instead of the consulate of Cæsar and Bibulus, it was called, by some wag, the consulate of Julius and Cæsar.* This able adventurer, though suspected of the deepest designs, went still deeper in laying his measures for the execution of them than his keenest opponents supposed. He found means to tie up every hand that was likely to be lifted up against himself; as those of Pompey and Crassus, by their secret agreement, of which the articles were gradually disclosed in the effect. He confirmed to Pompey all the acts of his administration in Asia; and, by putting him on the commission for dividing the lands of Campania, and for settling a colony at Capua, gave him an opportunity, which the other earnestly desired, of providing for many necessitous citizens of his party. He flattered Crassus sufficiently, by placing him on the same commission, and by admitting him to a supposed equal participation of that political consequence which the triumvirs proposed to secure by their union. He gained the equestrian order, by granting a suit which they had long in dependence, for a diminution of the rents payable by the revenue farmers in Asia.† These he reduced a third; and by this act, acquired, with that order of men, the character of great liberality and candour. He himself was the only person who, in appearance, was not to profit by these arrangements. He was occupied, as his retainers gave out, in serving the republic, and in promoting his friends; was the general patron of the distressed and the indigent, and had nothing to propose for himself.

With his consent, and under his authority, Fusius, one of the prætors, and Vatinius, one of the tribunes, obtained two laws, both of them equitable and salutary: the first, relating to the use of the ballot in the comitia, or assembly of the people; the other, relating to the challenge of parties in the nomination of judges or juries. The introduction of the ballot, in political questions, had greatly weakened the influence of the aristocracy over the determinations of the people; and resolutions were frequently carried in this manner, which no

* Sueton. in C. Cæsare, c. 20.—Dio. Cass. lib. xxxvii. c. 6. 8.

† Cicero, ad Att. lib. ii. ep. 1.—Appian. de Bell. Civil. lib. ii. p. 435.

party, nor any particular order of men, were willing to acknowledge as their measure. The nobles imputed absurd determinations to the majority which was formed by the people, and these, in their turn, retorted the imputation. To leave no doubt in such matters, for the future, Fusius proposed, that the separate orders of patrician, equestrian, and plebeian, should ballot apart.* This regulation had some tendency to restore the influence of the superior classes.

Vatinus proposed that, in criminal actions, when the judges were drawn by lot, the defendant and prosecutors might, in their turns, challenge, or strike off from the list, persons to whom they took a particular exception.†

Cæsar himself was busy in devising new regulations to reform the mode of elections, and to improve the forms of business in some of the public departments. By one of his acts the priests were to be elected agreeably to the former laws of Atius and Domitius; with this difference, that candidates might be admitted even in absence. By another of his acts, regular journals were to be kept in the senate and in the assemblies of the people, and all their proceedings recorded, for the inspection of the public. By a third, persons convicted of treason were subjected to new penalties, and governors of provinces to additional restraints in the exercise of their power. Such officers were not allowed to receive any honorary gift from their provinces, until their services, being considered at Rome, were found to have entitled them to a triumph.‡ They were restrained from encroaching on the right of any state, or principality, beyond the limits of their province. They were obliged to leave copies of their books and of their acts at two of the principal towns in their government,|| and, immediately upon their arrival at Rome, to give in a copy of the same accounts to the treasury. They were doomed to make restitution of all subjects received in extortion, not only by themselves, but by any of their attendants.**

* Dio. lib. xxxviii. c. 8. † Dio. lib. xxxviii. c. 8. Appian.

‡ Cicero ad Att. lib. v. ep. 16. et lib. vi. ep. 7.

|| Cicero ad Famil. lib. ii. ep. 17. et lib. v. ep. 20.

** Cicero. in Vatinium pro Sext.

With these acts Cæsar adorned his consulate, and in some measure discountenanced the party which was disposed to traduce him. He is, nevertheless, accused of having stolen from the treasury, to which he had access in the capacity of consul, bars of gold, weighing three thousand pondo, and of having concealed the theft by substituting gilt brass, of the same form, in its stead.*

Whatever foundation there may have been for this report, it soon appeared that Cæsar had objects of a more serious nature; could copy, on occasion, the example of Pompey; and, in his manner, cause what was personal to himself to be proposed by others, whom he might be free to support or disavow, according to the reception which his proposal should meet from the public. It cannot be doubted that he now conceived the design of having a military force, if necessary, to support his pretensions in the city. Hitherto kingly power being odious at Rome, whoever had aspired to it had always perished in the attempt; and the mere imputation, however supported, was fatal. The most profligate party among the populace were unable, or unwilling, to support their demagogues to this extent; and the people in general became jealous of their most respectable citizens, when it appeared that merit itself approached to monarchical elevation. Marius, by the continued possession of the highest offices, and by the supreme command of armies, had acquired a species of sovereignty which he knew not how to resign. Cinna came into partnership with Marius, and wished to govern after his decease. Sylla, to avenge his own wrongs and those of his friends, to cut off a profligate faction, and restore the republic, took possession of the government. He led his army against usurpers, and had the power to become himself the most successful usurper, as he was put in possession of a sovereignty which he, no doubt, might have retained. So far in him, therefore, every ambitious adventurer found a model, and was instructed in the means which could insure to a single person the sove-

* Sueton. in Jul. c. 54. Cæsar is said to have sold the gold bullion he brought from Spain at 3000 H. S. or about 25l. of our money, the pondo. This will make his supposed theft about 75,000l.

reignty of Rome. Cataline, with his accomplices, Lentulus and Cethegus, by means of a profligate party among the populace or citizens of desperate fortune, had vainly attempted to overturn the state, or usurp its government.* Cæsar was become head of the same party; but, an army like that of Sylla, a convenient station, and the resources of a great province, were necessary to support the contest, and to carry it against his rivals, as well as against the republic itself, to any favourable issue.

The republic had taken many precautions to prevent the introduction of military power at Rome. Although the functions of state and of war were intrusted to the same persons, yet, the civil and military characters, except in the case of a dictator, were never united at once in the same person. The officer of state resigned his civil power before he became a soldier, and the soldier was obliged to lay aside his military ensigns and character before he could enter the city, and, if he sued for a triumph in his military form, must remain without the walls till that suit was discussed. The command of armies and of provinces in the person of any officer, was limited to a single year at a time, at the end of which, if the commission were not expressly prolonged, it was understood to expire, and to devolve on a successor named by the senate.

That no leader of party might have an army at hand to overawe the republic, no military station was supposed to exist within the limits of Italy. The purpose, however, of this precaution was in some measure frustrated by the situation of a province in which an army was kept within the Alps. Italy was understood to extend only from the sea of Tarentum to the Arnus and the Rubicon: beyond these boundaries, on the north-west, all those extensive and rich tracts, on both sides of the Appennines, and within the Alps which now make the duchies of Ferrara, Bologna, Modena, Milan, the states of Piedmont and Venice, with the duchy of Carniola, and the whole of Lombardy, and part of Tuscany, were considered, not as Italy, but as a province termed the Cisalpine Gaul, and,

* Speaking of the imaginary danger, to a state, of being overturned by the rabble; we might as much fear, said a witty writer of the present age, that a city would be drowned by the overflowing of its own kennels.

like the other Roman provinces, was to be held by a military officer, supported by an army.

This, then, was the most commodious station at which a political adventurer might unite the greatest advantages, that of having an army at his command, and that of being so near the city of Rome, as not only to influence the public councils, but to be able also, by surprise, to occupy the seats of government whenever his designs were ripe for such an attempt.

Sylla had an army devoted to his pleasure; but, having the seas of Asia and Ionia to pass, in his way to Italy, could not, without giving an alarm from a great distance, and without putting his enemies on their guard, approach to the capital. He, therefore, when he had this object in view, made no secret of his purpose.

Cæsar, from his native disposition, could not restrain his ambition short of the sovereignty, and, without any signal incitement or singular circumstances, like those of Sylla, was prepared to obtain it. He arranged his measures like the plan of a campaign, which he had ability to digest, and the patience to execute with the greatest deliberation. He proposed to make himself master of an army at the gates of Rome, and to have the resources of a province contiguous to the capital. He proposed to secure the possession of these advantages by an unprecedented prolongation of the usual appointment for five years; so that, after an appointment in these terms, the people themselves could not, without a breach of faith, recal their grant upon any sudden alarm of the improper use he might propose to make of their favours.

The cisalpine Gaul, or that part of Italy which extended from the Rubicon to the Alps, was thus peculiarly suited to the purpose of Cæsar. But the distribution of the provinces was still within the prerogative of the senate; and the provincial governments were filled by their nomination, in pursuance of an express *régulation* ascribed to Caius Gracchus, and known, from his name, by the title of the Sempronian Law.* Cæsar had ever been at variance with the greater part of the senate. In the office of prætor he had been sus-

* *Lex Sempronia.* Vid. vol. ii. c. 10.

pended by their authority. In his present office of consul he had set them at open defiance. He had no prospect of being able to obtain from them the choice he had made of a province; and the proposal to put him in possession of the cisalpine Gaul for a term of years, joined to the preceding parts of his conduct, would have given a general alarm, and opened at once the whole extent of his design.

It was necessary, therefore, in order to obtain this object, to set aside the authority of the senate, and to procure his nomination by some degree of surprise. The tribune Vatinus, accordingly, upon a rumour that the Helvetii, or the nations inhabiting the tracts or valleys from Mount Jura to the Alps, were likely to cause some commotion on the frontier of Gaul, moved the people to set aside the law of Sempronius, and, by virtue of their own transcendent authority, to name Cæsar as proconsul of the cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum, for five years, with an army of three legions. The senatorian party, as might have been expected, were greatly alarmed at this proposal. They vainly, however, hoped to evade it by substituting another appointment for Cæsar, in place of this province. It was proposed to make him superintendant of the public forests throughout the empire; a charge which, though not, in our acceptation of the word, a province, was however, like every other public department in that empire, known by this name. This substitute for the government of the Cisalpine Gaul was thought to be the better chosen, that it neither implied nor required the command of an army, and was to withhold the engine of military power from a person so likely to abuse it. This weak attempt, however, against so able an adversary, only tended to expose the meaning of those by whom it was made, and, by shewing to the senate their own weakness, hurried them into concessions which, perhaps, might have been otherwise avoided. In order that Cæsar might not owe every thing to the people, and nothing to them, they extended his command at once to both sides of the Alps. On the one side of these mountains he had a station, from which to overawe the city: on the other, he had a great extent of territory, and a theatre of war, on which he might form an army, and inure them to service. The senate,

seeing he had already, by a vote of the people, obtained the first, with an army of three legions, for five years, and imagining that it was no longer of any use to oppose him, or hoping to occupy his attention, or to wear out the five years of his command in wars that might arise beyond the Alps, they joined to his province on the Po that of the transalpine Gaul also, with an additional legion. In this manner, whether from these or any similar motives, it is affirmed, by some of the historians,* that the senate even outran the people in concessions to Cæsar; and to this occasion is referred the memorable saying of Cato: "Now you have taken to yourselves a king, and have placed him, with his guards, in your city—del."†

Cæsar, at the same time, on the motion of the tribune Vatinius, was empowered to settle a Roman colony on the lake Larius, at Novum Comum, with full authority to confer the privilege of Roman citizens on those he should settle in this place. Having obtained the great object of his consulate, in his appointment, for a term of years, to the command of an army within the Alps, he no longer kept any measures with the senate, nor allowed them any merit in the advantages he had gained. He was aware of their malice, he said, and had prevailed in every suit, not by their concession, but in direct opposition to their will. Though capable of great command of temper, and of the deepest dissimulation, when in pursuit of his object, he appears, on this and other occasions, to have had a vanity which he idly indulged, in braving the world, when his end was obtained.‡ As he insulted the senate when no longer depending on their consent for any of his objects, so he no longer disguised his connection with Pompey and Crassus, or the means by which, in his late measures, the concurrence of these rivals had been obtained.

As such combinations and cabals generally have an invidious aspect to those who are excluded from them, the tri-

* Sueton. in Jul. Cæsare, c. 22.

† Plutarch. in Catone.—Dio. Cass. lib. xxxviii.—Appian. de Bell. Civil. lib. ii.

‡ Sueton. in Cæsare, lib. ii. c. 22.

umvirate, for so it began to be called, in detestation and irony,* notwithstanding the popularity or influence enjoyed by those who had formed it, became an object of aversion and general abuse.† They were received, at all public places, with groans and expressions of hatred. An actor, performing on the public theatre, applied, to Pompey the Great, a sentence of reproach, which occurred in the part he was acting. The application was received with peals of applause, and called for again and again.‡

The edicts that were published by Bibulus, in opposition to Cæsar, were extolled, and received with avidity. The places of the streets, at which they were posted up, were so crowded with multitudes, assembled to read them, that the ways were obstructed. Cæsar and Pompey endeavoured to lessen the effect of these edicts, in speeches to the people; but were ill heard. Pompey lost his temper and his spirit, and sunk in his consideration as much as Cæsar advanced in power. It became manifest, even to the people, that Cæsar was the only gainer by this coalition; that he had procured it for his own conveniency;|| but Pompey himself probably felt that he was too far advanced to recede.

The senate, and all the most respectable citizens of Rome, though unanimous in their detestation of the design that was formed by Cæsar, Pompey, and Crassus, to dispose of the republic at their pleasure, yet either were, or believed themselves, unable to cope with the power of so many factions united. Cæsar, in order to hold by force what he gained by artifice, and by some degree of surprise, filled the streets with his retainers in arms, and shewed, that, in case of any attempt to recal what had been so weakly given up to

* The titles of Duumvirs, Triumvirs, and so on, were the designations of legal commissions at Rome, acting under public authority; such title was given to the private coalition of these adventurers in mere irony.

† Cicer. ad Att. lib. ii. ep. 16.

‡ "To our misfortune thou art great." He was called upon to repeat these words, again and again, innumerable times. "The time will come, when thou shalt rue this state;" likewise repeated with peals of applause, &c. Cicero ad Att. lib. ii. epist. 19.—Val. Max. lib. vi. c. 2.

|| One of the sentences, so much applauded in its application to him at the theatre was, "Eandem virtutem tempus veniet, cum graviter gemea.

him, he was in condition to resist, and to lay the city in blood. If he were driven from Rome, he had provided within the Alps an army of two or three complete legions, with which he could maintain his province, or even recover his possession of the city. Every one censured, complained and lamented; but there was little concert, and less vigour, even among the members of the senate.

Cato, with his declared disapprobation of the late measures, was reduced to the single expedient of assisting Bibulus in drawing up the edicts or manifestos against the proceedings of Cæsar, which, as has been mentioned, were at this time received with so much avidity by the people.

Cicero now declined taking part in any affair of state; but being known for an advocate of the greatest ability, was courted, in this capacity, by many citizens, who had affairs in dependence before the courts of justice; but apprehending an attack which was likely to be made upon himself, on account of the transactions of his consulate, he avoided, as much as possible, giving offence to any of the parties which divided the commonwealth. The storm was to be directed against him by Publius Clodius, under whose animosity to the government of the nobles, and to Cicero in particular, it was perceived, for some time, to be gathering.*

This bustling profligate having, in the former year, in order that he might be qualified for tribune of the people, got himself adopted into a plebeian family, could not obtain the necessary ratification of the deed of adoption in the assembly of the Curizæ, until his cause was espoused by Cæsar, who seems to have taken his part, in resentment of some insinuations thrown out against himself by Cicero, in pleading for M. Antonius, his late colleague in the consulate. Antonius being, as has been mentioned, on account of his administration in Macedonia, accused of extortion, was defended by Cicero, who took that occasion to lament the state of the republic, brought under subjection as it was by a cabal which ruled by violence, and in contempt of the laws. Cæsar was greatly provoked at these expressions: "This person," he

* Cicero, ad Att. lib. ii. epist. 19, 20, 21, 22, 23.

said, "takes the same liberty, to vilify the reputation of others, that he takes to extol his own;" and considering this speech as a warning of the part which Cicero was likely to take in his absence, he determined not to leave him at the head of the senatorian party, to operate against him. His destruction might be effected merely by expediting the formality of Clodius's adoption into a plebeian family, to qualify him for tribune of the people;* and Cæsar, on the very day in which he received this provocation from Cicero, permitted the act of adoption to pass in the assembly of the *curiæ*.

Pompey, likewise, concurred in executing this deed of adoption for Clodius, and assisted, in the quality of augur, to carry it through the religious forms. Clodius, in the mean time, gave out, that he had no design on the tribunate, but was soliciting an embassy to Tigranes, king of Armenia. Cicero was so much blinded by this pretence, that he was merry in his letter to Atticus on the absurdity of Clodius, in having himself degraded into a plebeian, merely to qualify him to appear at the court of Tigranes. He was merry, likewise, with his not being put on the commission of twenty for the execution of Cæsar's agrarian law. "Strange," he said, "that he who was once the only male creature in Cæsar's house, cannot now find one place among twenty in the list of his friends!"†

The more effectually to impose upon Cicero and his friends, Cæsar affected to believe, that the intention of Clodius was against himself, and taken up with the animosity of a person who had already attempted to dishonour his house;‡ and he pretended to dispute the validity of his adoption, and, of consequence, his qualification to be elected a tribune. Pompey joined also in the same vile artifice. "Nay," says Cicero, upon hearing of their pretended opposition to Clodius, "this is vexation merely. Send but the proper officers

* *Dir. Cass. lib. xxxviii. c. 10. &c.*—Plutarch. in *Cicerone*.—Cicero, *pro domo sua, de Provinciis Consularibus*, &c.

† *Cic. ad Att. lib. ii. epist. 7.*

‡ In the intrigue with Cæsar's wife.

“ to me, and I will make oath that Pompey told me himself
 “ he had assisted as augur in passing that decree.”*

With these transactions the year of Cæsar's consulate drew to a close. He ratified his treaty with Pompey, by giving him his daughter Julia in marriage. During the former part of the year, this lady had been promised to Servilius Cæpio, and had been of great use to her father, by securing the services of Cæpio against Bibulus. But now it was found more expedient to attach Pompey; and Servilius, on his disappointment, was pacified by the promise of Pompey's daughter. Cæsar himself married the daughter of Calpurnius Piso, who, together with Gabinius, the creature of Pompey, was destined to succeed in the consulate, and who was, by this alliance, secured in the interest of Cæsar. “ Provinces, armies, “ and kingdoms,” said Cato on this occasion, “ are made the “ dowries of women,† and the empire itself an appendage of “ female prostitution.”

In this situation of affairs, and among parties who dealt in impositions and artifices, as well as in open and daring measures, some particulars are recorded, which, to gain our belief, require some acquaintance with the intrigues of popular faction. Vettius, a citizen of some note, who had been employed by Cicero in the time of his consulship, to gain intelligence of the Cataline conspiracy, now himself appeared as the author of a plot, of which the origin and the issue were matter of various conjecture. Knowing that Curio, a young man of high rank, and a declared enemy of Cæsar, was on bad terms likewise with Pompey, Vettius told him, in confidence, that he himself had determined to assassinate Pompey, and proposed to Curio to join with him in that design. The young man communicated the matter to his father, and the father to Pompey, who laid it before the senate. Vettius being examined in the senate, at first denied any intercourse with Curio, but afterwards confessed, that he had been drawn into a conspiracy, in which this young man was concerned, with Lucullus, Brutus, Bibulus, and some others, who had formed a design on Pompey's life.

* Cic. ad Att. epist. 10.—Vul. 12.

† Plutarch. in Catone.

It was suspected, that Cæsar had employed Vettius to pretend this design against Pompey, and, by opening himself to these persons, to engage some of them in a concert with himself; and that it was intended, as soon as he had laid some foundation for an imputation of guilt against any of them, that he should, attended by a party of slaves, armed with daggers, put himself in the way of being taken; that he should at first deny the plot, but afterwards suffer himself to be forced, by degrees, to confess, and to declare his accomplices; but that this plan was disconcerted by the early intimation which Curio gave to his father, before all the circumstances, projected to give it an air of probability, were in readiness.

It was scarcely credible, however, that Cæsar should have committed his reputation to the hazard of detection in so infamous a project. He laid hold of it, indeed, with some avidity, and endeavoured to turn it against his opponents. After Vettius had been examined before the senate, and was committed to prison for further examination, Cæsar presented him to the people, and brought him into the rostra, to declare what he knew of this pretended most bloody design. The prisoner repeated his confession, but varied in the account of his accomplices, particularly in leaving Brutus out of the list; a circumstance, likewise, in the scandal of the times, imputed to the partiality of Cæsar, and considered as proof of his clandestine relation to this young man. Vettius was remanded to prison, and a process commenced against him on the statute of intended assassination. A trial must have, probably, disclosed the whole scene; and for this reason was said to have been prevented, by the sudden death of Vettius, who was supposed to have been strangled, by order of Cæsar, in prison.*

By the influence of Pompey and Cæsar, Gabinius and Piso were elected consuls; and, by their connivance, Clodius became tribune of the people. The ascendant they had gained, however, was extremely disagreeable to many of the other officers of state, and even to some of the tribunes. L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, and C. Memmius Gemel-

* Cicero, ad Att. lib. ii. epist. 24.—Sueton. in Cæsare, c. 20.

lus, joined in a prosecution against Cæsar, late consul, for proceedings, in office, contrary to law and religion. Cæsar, for sometime, affected to join issue with them on the questions proposed, and to submit his cause to judgment; but at last, apprehending delay and trouble, without any advantage, from such an inquiry, he pleaded his privilege, as a person destined for public service; and, accordingly, without staying to answer the charge which was laid against him, withdrew from the city, continued to make his levies, and to assemble an army in the suburbs of Rome. In this posture of affairs, one of the quæstors, who had served under Cæsar in his consulship, was convicted of some misdemeanor;* and the opposite party, as if they had of a sudden broke the chains in which they were held, commenced suits against all the tools that had been employed by him in his late violent measures. Gabinius had been charged with bribery by Caius Cato, then a young man. But the prætor, whose lot it was to exercise the jurisdiction in such cases, being under the influence of Pompey, evaded the question. Caius Cato complained to the people; and, in stating the case, having said that Pompey usurped a dictatorial power, so far incensed part of his audience, that he narrowly escaped with his life.†

Vatinius, the late mercenary tribune, was accused before the prætor Memmius, who willingly received the accusation; but all proceedings in the matter were suddenly stopped by the interposition of Clodius in his new situation; and the attention of the people and of the senate soon afterwards came to be more intensely occupied with the designs this factious tribune himself, than with any other business whatever.

The ruin of Cicero appears to have been the principal object which Clodius proposed to himself, in soliciting the office which he now held; and this, though affecting to be of the popular party, he pursued chiefly from motives of personal animosity and resentment. Cicero had given evidence

* Sueton. in Nerone, c. ii. et in Cæsare, c. xxiii.

† Cicero, ad Quint. Frat. lib. i. epist. 2.

against him on his late trial, and afterwards in the senate made him the object of his wit and invective.* He is generally represented as effeminate and profligate, void of discretion or prudence. On the present occasion, however, he seems to have managed, with considerable steadiness and address. He acted evidently in concert with Cæsar, Pompey, and Crassus; but, probably, had not from them any particular direction in what manner he was to proceed.

Ever since the summary proceedings which were employed against the accomplices of Cataline, the danger of this precedent was a favourite topic with the popular faction. Clodius professed that the whole object of his tribunate was to provide a guard against such dangers for the future. He began with paying his court to the different parties, and different orders of men, in the republic, by proposing such acts as were favourable to each; and he stated his motion for better securing the people against arbitrary executions, without any application to Cicero, as but one of many regulations, intended by him, for the benefit of the public, and which he joined with some acts of gratification to private persons. He gained the present consuls, by procuring them lucrative appointments, at the expiration of their year in office; to Piso, Macedonia, including Achaia; to Gabinius, Syria, with a considerable addition beyond the usual bounds of that province.† He gained the indigent part of the people by an act to remit all the debts which were due for corn at the public granaries; and by ordering, for the future, gratuitous distributions to be made from thence.‡ He, at the same time, procured another act extremely agreeable to many of the citizens, for restoring and increasing the number of incorporated societies, which had been abolished about nine years before, on account of the troubles to which they gave rise.

The operation of corporate bodies, in a city so much addicted to faction and tumult, had been the cause of frequent disorders. As persons, affecting to govern the state, endeavoured to gain the people by indulging their humour in idle-

* Cicer. ad Att. lib. i.

† Plutarch. in Cicerone.

‡ Pædianus in Pisoniana.—Dio. lib. xxxviii.—Cicer. pro domo sua.

ness and dissipation, with games, theatrical entertainments, combats of gladiators, and the baiting of wild beasts; so the head of every corporate body, though upon a smaller scale, had his feasts, his entertainments, and shows, forming to himself a party of retainers, on occasion to be employed as his faction might require. The renewal, therefore, of such establishments, a measure which carried to every ambitious tradesman, in his stall, the feeling and consequence of a Crassus, a Pompey, or a Cæsar, affecting to govern the world, in their respective ways, was greedily adopted by the lower people; and Clodius took occasion, in the first ardour of such corporate meetings, to foment and to direct their zeal to his own purpose.* He even gained a considerable party in the senate, by affecting to circumscribe the discretionary power of the censors in purging their rolls. Many of the members had reason to dread the censorial animadversions, and were pleased with an act which this tribune obtained to provide, that, for the future, no one could be struck off the list of the senate without a formal trial, and the concurrence of both the censors.†

Joined to so many arts, practised to reconcile different parties to the measures he affected to take for the security of the people, Clodius promulgated his law of provision against arbitrary executions, and gave it a retrospect, which was undoubtedly meant to comprehend the summary proceedings which had been held against Cethegus and Lentulus, in the consulate of Cicero. While the subject was under consideration, he thought of two circumstances which might operate against his design, and which he was therefore determined to prevent. One was, the practice of recurring to the celestial auspices, by which the proceedings of the people were sometimes suspended; and the other was, the opposition which he might expect from Marcus Cato, who was likely to consider the cause of the senate and the republic as involved in that of the magistrate, who had preserved the state by executing their decrees. To secure himself against the first, he procured an

* Dio. lib. xxxviii. c. 13.—Cicero, in Pisonem, c. 4. et Ascanius, *ibid.*

† *Ibid.* See a summary of these acts.—Cicero, pro Sextio, from c. 15. to c. 28.

edict to prohibit all persons from observing the heavens while the people were deliberating on any affair of state; and to obviate the second, he thought of a pretence for a temporary removal of Cato from Rome.

In the preceding consulate, Cato, though armed, as he was, solely with the reputation of integrity, unable to prevent the progress of a ruinous faction affecting popular measures, yet, by his unremitted opposition, had forced them, on occasion, to shew, what Pompey in particular was extremely desirous to conceal, that they prevailed by corruption and force, not by what they pretended, the free choice of their fellow-citizens. Clodius, foreseeing, if Cato remained at Rome, a like opposition, and possibly a disappointment in his design against Cicero, devised a commission to employ him in foreign service. Ptolemy, king of Cyprus, had put a personal affront on Clodius, by refusing to pay his ransom when taken by pirates on the coast of Asia, near that island. But now, in the wretched condition of nations depending on the will of a single profligate citizen, he took an opportunity to be revenged on this prince, by procuring an act to forfeit his kingdom and his treasure; and by making Cato the instrument of his revenge, he proposed to free himself, at the same time, from the interruption which this citizen was likely to give to his projects in the city.*

At an interview with Cato, Clodius had the impudence to pretend great admiration of his virtue; told him that the commission to reduce Cyprus into the form of a province was solicited by many; but that he knew of none, who, by his faithfulness and integrity, was so well qualified for the trust as Cato; and that he meant to propose him to the people. "That," said Cato, "I know is a mere artifice; not an honour, but an indignity, intended to me." "Nay," said Clodius, "if you do not go willingly, you shall go by force;" and on that very day moved and obtained his nomination from the people. Lest the affair of Cyprus should not detain him a sufficient time, he was further charged in his commission to

* Cicero pro Sextio.

repair to Byzantium, to restore some exiles, and to quiet some troubles which had arisen in that place.

Cæsar and Pompey likewise concurred in procuring this commission to Cato, in order to remove a powerful support from the prætors Memmius and Domitius, whose proposal to repeal all the acts of Cæsar was yet in suspense.

The storm was now ready to burst upon the magistrate who had presided in the suppression of Cataline's faction; and no man had any doubt of its direction. Cato, before he left Rome, seeing Cæsar in possession of the gates, with an army, and ready, in the event of any tumult, under pretence of repressing disorders, to enter the city by force, and to seize on the government; or apprehending that the cause in question, however just, was altogether desperate, earnestly exhorted Cicero rather to yield, and to withdraw from the city, than to bring matters to extremities, in the present state of the republic.*

Cicero, however, was for some time undecided. Having secured the support of L. Ninius Quadratus, one of the tribunes, he proposed to obstruct the proceedings of his enemy, by opposing the negative of a colleague, to all his motions. Afterwards, upon assurances from Clodius, that the purpose of the act was altogether general, and had no special relation to himself, he was prevailed on not to divide the college of tribunes, nor to engage his friends in the invidious task of giving the negative to a law, which was intended merely to guard the people for the future against arbitrary proceedings.†

But Clodius, having thus made way for the declaratory act, which he had drawn up in general terms, no longer made any secret of his design against the magistrate who had dared to order the execution of Lentulus and Cethegus, and boasted of the concurrence of Cæsar and Pompey. In this neither of these professed friends of Cicero denied the imputation;‡ but excused themselves, in private, by pleading, that while their own acts of the preceding year were still questioned by

† Plutarch. in Cicerone.

† Dio. lib. xxxviii. c. 14.

‡ Cicero, post reditum in senatum.

the prætor, it was necessary for them to keep terms with so violent a tribune as Clodius;* and Pompey, together with this apology for his present conduct, gave Cicero the strongest assurances of future protection. "This tribune," he said, "shall kill me, before he injure you." It is not credible that Pompey then meant to betray a person for whom he professed so much friendship; it was sufficiently base that, in the sequel, he did not perform his promise. On the contrary, when his aid came to be most wanted by his injured friend, he retired to the country, under pretence of business; and being at his villa, near Alba, where Lentulus, Lucullus, and many of the most respectable senators repaired to him, with the warmest intreaties in behalf of a person to whose eloquence and panegyric he owed so many of his honours, he coldly referred them to the ordinary officers of state for protection, saying, that, as a private citizen, he could not contend with a furious tribune, at the head of an armed people.†

In the meantime, the consul Gabinius, though under the absolute direction of Pompey, promoted the attack against Cicero, and checked every attempt that was made in his favour. When the equestrian order, together with numbers of the most respectable citizens, from every quarter of Italy, crowded in mourning to Rome, and presented a memorial to the senate in his behalf, and when the members of the senate itself proposed to take mourning, and so intercede with the people, Gabinius suddenly left the chair, broke up the meeting, went directly from thence to the assembly of the people, where he threw out injurious insinuations against the senate, and mentioned the meetings which had been held by the equestrian order as bordering on sedition and riot; said that the knights ought to be cautious how they revived the memory of that part which they themselves had acted in the violent measures which were now coming under review, and which were so likely to meet with a just retribution from the people of Rome.

In this extremity Cicero attempted to see Pompey, in person, at his country house; but while the suppliant was enter-

* Ibid. pro Sextio, c. 17 et 18

† Cicero, in Pisonem.

ing at one door, this treacherous friend withdrew at another.* No longer doubting that he was betrayed by a person on whom he had so fully relied, he began to be agitated by a variety of counsels and projects. He was invited by Cæsar to place himself in the station of lieutenant in his province of Gaul; and, in that public character abroad, to take refuge from the storm that was gathering against him in Italy. But this, from a person who had so much contributed to raise the storm, was supposed to proceed from a design to insult or betray him; or, at best, to reduce him to a state of dependence on himself. Being attended by a numerous body of citizens, chiefly of the equestrian order, who had taken arms in his cause, he sometimes had thoughts of defending himself by force; at other times, he sunk in despair, and, as appears from his letters, proposed to die by his own hands; an intention from which he was diverted only by the entreaties and anxious care of his friends.

Such was the state of affairs, when Clodius assembled the people, to pass the act he had framed against arbitrary executions. He had summoned them to meet in the suburbs, that Cæsar, who, on account of his military command, was then excluded from the city, might be present. This artful politician being called upon among the first to deliver his opinion, with an appearance of moderation, and unwillingness to bear hard on any person to whom the law might apply, referred the people to his former declarations; said, that every one knew his mind on the subject of arbitrary executions; that he certainly approved the act which was now proposed, as far as it provided against such offences for the future; but could not concur in giving it a retrospect to any transaction already passed.

While Cæsar thus, in delivering his own opinion, affected to go no further than consistency and a regard to his former conduct seemed to require, he permitted or directed his party to go every length with Clodius, and meant either to ruin Cicero, or force him to accept of protection on the terms that should be prescribed to him.

* Plutarch. in Cicerone.

When the general law had passed, there was yet no mention of Cicero; and his enemies might have still found it a difficult matter to carry the application to him; but he himself, in the anguish of his mind, anticipated the consequence, went forth in mourning to the streets, and implored mercy of every citizen, with an aspect of despondency, which probably did not encourage any party to espouse his cause. He was frequently met in this condition, and insulted by Clodius, who walked in the streets, attended by an armed rabble; and determined at last to abandon the city. Being escorted by a company of his friends, he passed through the gates in the middle of the night, on the first of April, took the road of Lucania, and intended to have made his retreat into Sicily, where he flattered himself the memory of his administration, in the quality of quæstor, and the subsequent effects of his patronage at Rome, were likely to procure him a favourable reception.* But Clodius, immediately upon his departure, having carried a special attainder, by which, in the language of such acts, he was interdicted the use of fire and water, and by which every person, within five hundred miles of Italy, was forbid, under severe penalties, to harbour him, Virgilius, the prætor of Sicily, though his friend, declined to receive him. He turned from thence to Brundisium, passed into Macedonia, and would have fixed his residence at Athens; but apprehending that this place was within the distance prescribed to him by the act of banishment, he went to Thessalonica, in his way to Cyzicum. Here he had letters, that gave him intimation of some change in his favour; he entertained some prospect of being speedily recalled, and, accordingly, determined to wait the issue of these hopes.

We have better means of knowing the frailties of Cicero, than, perhaps, is safe for the reputation of any one labouring under the ordinary defects of human nature. He was open and undisguised to his friends, and has left an extensive correspondence behind him. Expressions of vanity, in some passages of his life, and of pusillanimity in others, escape him, with uncommon facility. Being at least of a querulous and

* Vid. *Actionem in Verrem*.

impatient temper, he gave it full scope in his exile, perhaps not more from weakness than from a design to excite his friends in redoubling their efforts to have him restored. He knew the value of fortitude as a topic of praise, and might have aspired to it; but would it not, he may have questioned, in the present instance, encourage his party to sleep over his wrongs? In any other view, his complaints resemble more the wailings of an infant, or the strains of a tragedy composed to draw tears, than the language of a man, supporting the cause of integrity, in the midst of unmerited trouble. "I wish I may see the day," he writes to Atticus, "in which I shall be disposed to thank you for having prevailed upon me not to lay violent hands on myself; for it is certainly now matter of bitter regret to me that I yielded to you in that matter."*

In answer to the same friend, who had chid him for want of fortitude, "What species of evil," he says, "do I not endure? Did ever any person fall from so high a state? in so good a cause? with such abilities and knowledge? with so much public esteem? with the support of such a respectable order of citizens? Can I remember what I was, and not feel what I am? Stripped of so many honours, cut off in the career of so much glory, deprived of such a fortune, torn from the arms of such children, debarred the view of such a brother, dearer to me than I was to myself, yet now debarred from my presence, that I may spare him what he must suffer from such a sight, and myself what I must feel in being the cause of so much misery to him. I could say more of a load of evils, which is too heavy for me to bear; but I am stopped by my tears."†

From the whole of this correspondence of Cicero, in his exile, we may collect to what degree the unjust reproaches which he had suffered, the desertion of those on whom he relied for support, the dangers to which he left his family exposed, affected his mind. The consciousness of his integrity, even his vanity, forsook him; and his fine genius, no

* Cicero, ad Att. lib. iii. epist. 3.

† Ibid. lib. iii. epist. 10

longer displayed in the forum or in the senate, or busied in the literary studies which afterwards amused him* in a more calamitous time of the republic, now, by exaggerating the distress of his fortunes, preyed upon himself. It appeared from this, and many other scenes of his life, that although he loved virtuous actions, yet his virtue was accompanied with so unsatiable a thirst of praise, to which it entitled him, that his mind was unable to sustain itself without this foreign assistance; and when the praise to which he aspired for his consulate was changed into obloquy and scorn, he seems to have lost the sense of good or of evil, in his own conduct or character; and at Thessalonica, where he fixed the scene of his exile, sunk or rose, even in his own esteem, as he seemed to be valued or neglected at Rome.†

* See the Book of Tusculan Questions.

† Vid. Cicero ad Att. lib. iij.

CHAPTER XX.

Cæsar takes possession of his Province.—Migration of the Helvetii.—Their Defeat.—War with Ariovistus.—Return of Cæsar for the Winter into Italy.—Great Concurrence of Citizens to his Quarters.—Motion to recal Cicero.—Disorders that followed upon it.—Consultations of Pompey and Cæsar.—Augmentation of the Army in Gaul.—Second Campaign of Cæsar.—Operations on the Aisne.—On the Meuse and the Sambre.—Battle with the Nervii.—Successful Attempt for the Restoration of Cicero.—Controversy relating to his House.—Repeated Riots of Clodius.—Trial of Milo.

WHILST the transaction which terminated in the exile of Cicero was still in its course, Cæsar, although, by assuming the military character, he had disqualified himself to take any part in civil affairs, had actually left the city and embodied his legions, yet he still remained in the suburbs of Rome to observe the issue of that business, and to direct the conduct of his party. He thought himself too much interested in the event to leave it entirely under the direction of Pompey, with whom his own connection was recent or precarious, and might be of short duration. He was inclined to ruin, if he could not gain, a person, who, by his talents and character, was of so much consequence to the parties who contended for power in the state. Having failed in the attempt which he made to gain him as a dependant on himself, or to carry him as a part of his own retinue into Gaul, he secretly promoted the designs of Clodius against him, and employed his own retainers and friends to co-operate with this furious tribune, until he saw the purpose accomplished.

The provinces, of which Cæsar had obtained the command, comprehended, as has been observed, under the denomination of the two Gauls, considerable territories on both sides of the Alps. The cisalpine Gaul, which was joined to Italy, extended to Lucca, not far from Pisa, on one side of the Apennines, and to the Rubicon, not far from Ariminum, on the other. Beyond the Alps, the whole territory from the Medi-

terranean to the Rhine and the Meuse, was known by the name of Gaul. A part of this tract, which was bounded by the Rhône, the mountains of Auvergne, the Garonne, and the Pyrenees, was already a Roman province, including, together with Languedoc and Dauphiné, what, from its early subjection to the Romans, took the name, which it still retains, of Provence.

The remainder of the country was divided into three principal parts, occupied by the Aquitani, the Celtes, and the Belgæ, nations differing in language, establishments, and customs. The first division extended from the Pyrenees to the Garonne; the second from the Garonne to the Seine; and the third from thence to the Meuse and the Scheldt.

In each of these tracts there was a multiplicity of separate cantons or independent communities, of which Cæsar had occasion to enumerate no less than four hundred. Even the smallest of these communities, by his account, was broken into parties and factions, which had their respective objects, and were engaged in opposition and frequent contests. The people, in general, were held in a state of dependence by two separate orders of men, whose condition and character may account for the manifold divisions and animosities that took place in their country. One order was ecclesiastical, composed of the Druids, who, by their profession, had the keeping of such mysteries, and the performance of such rites, as were then in use; and, having over their fellow-citizens the claim to a hierarchy, had, among themselves, in the various pretensions to preferment and rank in their own order, continual subjects of competition, jealousy, and quarrels.

The other division was entirely military, formed under leaders whose principal distinction arose from the number of their armed adherents; and who, therefore, vied among themselves in the multitude of their retainers, or in the force of their parties.*

The country, we learn, in general, was interspersed with what are called towns, and what were, in reality, safe retreats, or places of strength. It abounded in corn and cattle, the

* Cæsar. de Bell. Gall. lib. vi. c. 10,—20.

resources of a numerous people; armies were collected, and political assemblies were stately, or occasionally, called: but how the people were accommodated, or in what degree they were supplied with the ordinary productions of mechanic or commercial arts, is no where described.

In these particulars, however, as they were probably less skilful than the Italians, so they surpassed the Germans, to whom they yielded in the reputation of valour; and they were now in reality on the eve of becoming a prey to the rapacity and ferocity of the one, or to the ambition, refined policy, and superior arts, of the other.

Among parties, who were already so numerous, and likely to be divided, indefinitely, by family or personal jealousies, Cæsar was about to find the occasion which he undoubtedly sought for, of raising his reputation in war, of enriching himself and his dependants, and of forming an army inured to service, and attached to himself. While he was yet in Italy, he had intimation of a wonderful project formed by the Helvetii, natives of the tract which extends from the Jura to the Alps, and of the valleys which divide those mountains, to quit their own country, in order to exchange it for a better settlement, in a less inclement region, on the lower and more fertile plains of Gaul.

They had taken, for this purpose, in every canton, an exact account of their own numbers, and mustered no less than three hundred and fifty-eight thousand souls, of whom ninety-two thousand were warriors, or men fit to bear arms. To put this multitude in motion, a great apparatus of provisions, of horses, and of carriages was necessary; and they allotted no less than two years for the preparations necessary to this undertaking. This time was now elapsed, and the swarm began to dislodge on the twenty-fifth of March, of the year in which Cæsar was to take possession of his province. On receiving the alarm, he set out from Italy, and with hasty journeys arrived at Geneva, where, to prevent surprise, he broke down the bridge of the Rhône, and took other measures to preclude the access of strangers to his province.

In the meantime the Helvetians sent a pacific message, desiring, that they might be allowed to pass the Rhône, and

giving assurances that they would abstain from every sort of hostility on their march through the Roman province. Cæsar, in order to gain time, affected to take their request into consideration, promised to give them an answer by the middle of April; and in this manner amused them, while he assembled the legion, that was dispersed in different parts of the province, and ordered new levies to be made with the greatest dispatch. At the same time, he fortified the banks of the river, from the lake of Geneva, to the narrow pass* at which the Rhône enters between the Jura and the Vuache, and from thence, running under cliffs and steep mountains, renders the access from Helvetia to Gaul either impracticable or easily obstructed.†

* Fort l'Ecluse.

† The track of Cæsar's lines at Geneva, like that of Hannibal's passage of the Alps, has occasioned some controversy among antiquaries. His own words in the Commentaries are,—“A lacu Lemanno, qui in flumen Rhodanum influit, ad montem Juram, qui fines Sequanorum ab Helvetiis dividit, millia passuum decem novem, murum, in altitudinem, pedum sexdecem, fossamque perducit.” This line has been fancied by some, and even represented in maps and plans, as having one end on the lake, at or near Nyon; the other at the foot of Mount Jura, near the Dole. But in assuming this track, we must suppose Cæsar to have committed a great blunder in breaking down the bridge of Geneva in his own rear, by which he was to have communication with the province he was to defend, and from which he was to draw his supplies. We must also overlook every circumstance of the attack afterwards made upon his line, when the Helvetians, being refused a passage, came to force it, by fording the Rhône, or passing in boats and rafts, and trying to scale the banks where least inaccessible:—“*Helvetii, ea spe dejecti, navibus junctis, ratibusque compluribus factis alii, alii, vadis Rhodani, qua minima altitudo fluminis erat, nonnunquam interdum, sæpius noctu, si perrumpere possent conati, operis munitione et militum consursu et telis repulsi, hoc conatu destiterunt.*” These circumstances necessarily place the line to be attacked on the very banks of the Rhône, opposite to where the Helvetians approached it; and as it was certainly unworthy of Cæsar to be fencing impassable rocks and precipices, the amount of his line was probably no more than some breast-works, cast up at places where the banks of the river, generally steep, were most accessible. And his words apply to this track no less than to any other: it actually measures from the point at which the Rhône issues from the lake of Geneva to the Jura, near L'Ecluse, about nineteen miles.

As Cæsar never lost sight of his interest in the city, nor ceased to consider how he was talked of there, it is probable that his Commentaries contain the

Being thus prepared for his defence, he, on the return of the Helvetian deputies, gave them for answer, That the Romans never allowed strangers to pass through their country; and that if any attempt were made on his province, he should repel it by force. Upon receiving this answer, the Helvetians, though too late, endeavoured to effect the passage of the Rhône, and made repeated attacks, either where the river was fordable, or where it admitted the use of rafts or of boats, but were repulsed in every attempt, and were at last obliged to turn to the right, where, by the consent of the Sequani, their neighbours in that part of the country, they passed over the Jura into Gaul.

Cæsar, probably not more alarmed for the safety of his province, than desirous to render it a scene of action, determined to observe the migrations of this enemy, and to seize the occasion they furnished him of forming his troops to service. For this purpose he himself, in person, repassed the Alps, and without any regard to the limitations of his commission, which restricted his military establishment to three legions, ordered additional levies, and with the forces he had assembled near Aquileia, returned to his northern province. In this march he met with opposition from the inhabitants of the mountains, who endeavoured to obstruct his way: but he had traversed the country of the Allobroges, and passed the Rhône above its confluence with the Soane,* when he had intelligence that the Helvetii, having cleared the passes of Jura, and marched through the country of the Sequani, were arrived on the Soane; and although they had hitherto, agreeably to their stipulations with the natives, abstained from hostilities, that they threatened the nations inhabiting beyond this river, with fire and sword.

very accounts that were sent to be propagated at Rome; and the better for his purpose, that they left every one to conceive this nineteen-mile fence, of sixteen feet high, as continued without interruption from end to end. But the present compiler trusts he will be approved in stating the fact, as it results from circumstances without ambiguity or the chance of mistake. *Vida Cxs. de Bell. Gall. lib. i. c. 8.*

* Then the Arar.

Upon application made to him for protection from the natives inhabiting between the Soane and the Loire, this willing auxiliary continued his march; and being informed that, of the Helvetii, who had moved in four divisions (this being the number of their cantons), the three first had already passed the Soane; and that the fourth division, being to follow, yet remained on the nearer bank of the river, he marched in the night with three legions, surprised this rear division; and, having put many of them to the sword, forced the remainder to take refuge in the neighbouring woods.

As soon as the main body of Cæsar's army arrived on the Soane, he constructed a bridge, and passed that river in his way to the enemy. The Helvetians, sensible of their loss in the late action, and alarmed at the rapidity of his motions, he having executed in one day the passage of a river which had detained them above twenty days, sent a deputation to treat with the Roman proconsul, and to obtain, if possible, his permission to execute their project of a new settlement, on amicable terms. They offered, in case they were allowed to sit down in quiet, to leave the choice of the place to himself; bidding him remember, at the same time, that "the arms of the Helvetii had, on former occasions, been felt by the Romans: that the recent fate of a single canton, taken by surprise, ought not to flatter him too much: that the Helvetians had learned from their fathers to rely more on valour than on negotiation or artifice; but that they did not wish to have their present migration signalized with any massacres, nor their new settlement stained with Roman blood." To this message Cæsar replied, "That he could recollect to have heard of insults which had been offered to the Romans by their nation, and to which they now probably alluded: that he likewise had more recent provocations, which he knew how to resent: nevertheless, if they meant to comply with his demand, to repair the injuries they had done to the Allobroges * and to the Ædui,† and to give hostages for

* Inhabitants of what is now the territory of Geneva, and part of Savoy.

† Occupying the country between the Soane and the Loire.

“their future behaviour, that he was willing to grant them peace.”

Upon this reply the Helvetian deputies withdrew, saying, That it was the practice of their countrymen to receive, not to give, hostages; and both armies moved on the following day: the Helvetians, in search of some quarter where they might settle without interruption; and Cæsar, to observe their motions, and to restrain them from plundering the country, of his allies. Both continued on the same route during fifteen days, with no more than an interval of five or six miles between the front of the one army and the rear of the other.

On this march Cæsar's cavalry, having rashly engaged themselves on unfavourable ground, received a check; and he himself, being obliged to follow the course of the Soane, by which he received his provisions, was likely to lose sight of the enemy, when he had intelligence, that they had taken post at the foot of a hill, about eight miles in his front, and seemed to have formed a resolution to receive him, in that position, if he should choose to attack them. Having examined the ground on which they were posted, and observing, that the height in their rear was not by nature inaccessible, nor sufficiently secured against him, he dispatched Labienus in the night, at the head of two legions, with orders to possess himself of the eminence, and to fall down from thence on the enemy's rear whenever he saw them attacked by himself in front. Labienus accordingly got possession of the hill, while Cæsar continued his march on the plain, to occupy the attention of the enemy, and to attack them in front. But the purpose of this disposition was frustrated by the misinformation of an officer of horse, who, being advanced before the army, reported, that the enemy still appeared on the height, and that Labienus probably had failed in his attempt to seize it. Cæsar, disconcerted by this information, made a halt, in which he lost so much time as to give the enemy an opportunity to decamp, and to retire in safety. He nevertheless continued his pursuit for one day longer, and at night encamped about three miles in the rear: but being obliged, on the following day, to alter his route, in order to receive a supply of provisions, the enemy believed that he was retreating, and began to pursue

in their turn. He halted on a rising ground to receive them, placed the new levies with his baggage on the heights, and the choice of his army on the declivity towards the plain. Here the enemy advancing to attack him, after an obstinate engagement, which lasted from one in the afternoon till night, were defeated with the slaughter of about two hundred thousand of their people; and the remainder, amounting to no more than one hundred and thirty thousand souls, reduced to despair by the sense of their losses, and the want of subsistence, surrendered at discretion. Cæsar ordered them back into their own country, charging the Allobroges to find them subsistence, until they should be able to provide for themselves. The Boii however, a part of this unfortunate migration, were received by the Ædui, who, to gain this accession of people, allotted part of their own lands to accommodate these strangers.*

At the end of this first operation of Cæsar, while great part of the summer yet remained, another service on which to employ his army soon presented itself. The nations who inhabited the banks of the Soane and the Loire, being sensible of the deliverance they had received from a storm, which, by the uncertainty of its direction, alarmed every quarter of Gaul, sent deputies to congratulate the Roman general on his late victory, and to propose that they might hold, under his protection, a general convention of all their states. The object of their meeting, as it soon after appeared, was to obtain some relief from the common oppression they underwent from the tyranny of Ariovistus, a German chief, who, when the Gauls were at war among themselves, had been invited as an auxiliary to one of the parties, and had obtained the victory for his allies; but took, for the reward of his services, possession of one-third of their territory, which he bestowed on his own people, and assumed for himself the sovereignty of the whole. His force was daily augmented by the continual arrival of more emigrants from Germany; so that, from fifteen thousand men, with whom this Chief had at first arrived from Gaul, his followers had multiplied to an hundred and twenty thousand. To accommodate this numerous people he had recently made a demand of another third of the territory.

* Cæs. de Bell. Gall. lib. i. c. 28, 29.

tory of the Sequani, and was extending his possessions from the neighbourhood of the Rhine to the Soane. Most of the nations on this tract had been obliged to submit to exactions made by these strangers, and to give hostages for the regular payment of their contributions.

The unfortunate nations, who, by trusting to the protection of a barbarous prince, had exposed themselves to this calamity, now applied for relief to another power, whose pretensions in the end were likely to be equally dangerous to their freedom. Sensible of the hazard to which they exposed their hostages, by entering into any open concert against the Germans, they made their application to Cæsar in secret, and found him sufficiently willing to embrace every opportunity of rendering his province a theatre of action to his army, and of renown to himself. He sent, without delay, a message to Ariovistus, desiring to have a conference with him on affairs that concerned the general interests of Gaul. This haughty chieftain replied with disdain, "That if the Roman general meant to have an interview with him, his place of residence was known; that he neither could trust himself in the quarters of Cæsar, without a proper escort, nor would he subject himself to the expense of assembling an army, merely for the satisfaction of a conference with him."

Cæsar renewed the message with an express requisition that the hostages of the Ædui should be restored; that Ariovistus should abstain from hostilities against this people, or against any other ally of the Romans; and that he should not suffer any more of his countrymen to pass the Rhine.

To this message Ariovistus replied, That he had conquered the possessions which he held in Gaul, and that he knew of no power which had a right to direct him in the use of his conquests; that whoever attacked him should do so at his peril; and that Cæsar, if he thought proper, might try the spirit of his people; they were ready to receive him, and had not for fourteen years slept under any roof.

Cæsar, not to seem backward in accepting this challenge, and in compliance with a maxim which he often observed with success, *That his blows should anticipate his threats, and outrun the expectations of his enemy*, advanced upon the Germans

before they could think him in condition to act against them. For this purpose, without communicating his design to any person of his own army, he repassed the Soane, and ascended by the course of the Douse to Vesontio, now Besançon, a place of strength, which he understood Ariovistus meant to seize, and employ as the principal resort of his forces.

Here, for the first time, his intention of making war on the Germans began to be suspected in his own army; and the legions, taking their account of the strength and ferocity of that enemy from the report of the Gaulish auxiliaries, were greatly alarmed. Many citizens of distinction, who had crowded to the standard of Cæsar, as to a place of victory and honour, now, under various pretences, applied for leave to retire. Their example spread a kind of panic in the army, and both officers and men muttered their resolution not to obey, if they should be ordered upon what they were pleased to consider as a service so unreasonable and wild.

Cæsar, being thus called upon to exert that undaunted courage and masterly eloquence by which he was distinguished on many occasions, assembled all the officers of his army, and reprimanded them for attempting to penetrate the designs of their general, or for pretending to question the propriety of his motions. The matter in dispute with Ariovistus, he said, might be terminated in an amicable manner. This chieftain had very lately made advances of friendship to the Romans, had been favourably received, and there was no reason to believe that he would now wantonly provoke their resentment. "But if he should, of whom are you afraid? Of a wretched remnant of the Cimbri or Teutones, already vanquished by Marius? Of a people confessedly inferior to the Helvetians, whom you have subdued? But some of you, I am told, in order to disguise your own fears under the affectation of wisdom, talk of difficulties in the ways by which you are to pass, and of the want of provisions which you are likely to suffer. I am not now to learn from such persons what I owe to my trust, nor to be told that an army must be supplied with provisions. But our allies are ready to supply us in greater quantities than we can consume; and the very country we are to pass is covered with ripe

“ corn. As for the roads, you shall speedily see and judge
“ of them. I am little affected with what I hear of a design
“ to abandon me, in case I persist in this expedition. Such
“ insults, I know, have been offered to commanders, who, by
“ their avarice or by their miscarriages, had forfeited the re-
“ gard or the confidence of their troops: what will happen to
“ me a little time will discover. I meant to have made a
“ longer halt at this place, but shall not defer giving you an
“ opportunity to shew, whether regard to your duty, or the
“ fear of a supposed enemy, is to have the greatest effect on
“ your minds. I mean, to-morrow, at two in the morning, to
“ decamp, and shall proceed, if no other part of the army
“ should follow me, with the tenth legion alone.”

This speech had a very sudden effect. The tenth legion, having been formerly distinguished by their general, felt this expression of confidence as an additional motive to deserve it, and sent a deputation of their officers to return their thanks. The whole army soon vied in excuses for their late misbehaviour, and in assurances of their resolution to support their general in any service on which he might be pleased to employ them. He accordingly decamped at the hour appointed; and making a circuit of forty miles, to avoid some difficulties which lay on the direct road, after a continual march of seven days, in which he was conducted by Divitiacus, a native of Gaul, he arrived within twenty-four miles of the German quarters.

Upon this unexpected arrival, Ariovistus, in his turn, thought proper to desire a conference with Cæsar. He proposed that they should meet on horseback, and be attended only by cavalry. In this part of his army, which was composed chiefly of Gaulish horse, Cæsar was weak. But, not to decline the proposal that was made to him, he mounted his supposed favourite legion on the horses of the Gauls, and with this escort came to the place appointed for the conference.

It was an eminence in the midst of a spacious plain, about half-way between the two armies. The leaders, each attended by ten of his officers, met at the top of the hill. Their escorts drew up on each side, at the distance of two hundred yards.

Cæsar began the conference, by reminding Ariovistus of the honours recently bestowed upon him by the Roman senate, who ordered him the usual presents, and gave him the title of King. "The Ædui," he said, "were the allies of Rome; they had formed this connection in the height of their prosperity, and when they were supposed to be at the head of the Gaulish nations; that it was not the custom of Romans to let nations suffer by their alliance, but to render it, in every instance, to the party who embraced it, a source of prosperity and honour. He therefore renewed his former requisition, that Ariovistus should not make war on the Ædui, or on any nation in alliance with the Roman people; that he should remit the tribute he had imposed upon them, and release their hostages; and, if he could not send back into their own country such of the Germans as were already on this side of the Rhine, that he should at least prevent the arrival of any more from that quarter."

In answer to these propositions, Ariovistus replied, That he had been invited into Gaul by the natives of this country; that he had done them services, and had exacted no more than a just retribution; that, in the late quarrel betwixt them and himself, the Gauls had been the aggressors, and had suffered no more than the usual effects of defeat; that, to indemnify him for his losses, they had subjected themselves to a tax, and had given hostages for the regular payment of it. "Am not I too," he said, "by your own account, in alliance with the Romans? Why should that alliance, which is a safeguard and an honour to every one else, be a loss and a misfortune to me? Must I alone, to preserve this alliance, resign the advantage of treaties, and remit the payments that are due to me? No; let me rather be considered as an enemy than an ally upon these conditions. My countrymen have passed the Rhine, not to oppress the Gauls, but to defend their own leader. If strangers are to be admitted here, the Germans, as the first occupiers, have a right prior to that of the Romans. But we have each of us our province. What do the armies of Rome on my territory? I disturb no possession of yours. Must I account to you likewise for the use which I make of my own?"

To this pointed reply Ariovistus subjoined a reflection, which shewed that he was not unacquainted with the state of parties at Rome. "I know," he said, "that the Romans are not interested in this quarrel, and that, by cutting you off, I should perform an acceptable service to many of your countrymen. But I shall take no part in your internal divisions. Leave me; make war where you please; I shall not interpose in any matter which does not concern myself."

Cæsar continued to plead the engagements which the Romans had contracted with many of the nations who now claimed their protection. "If conquest could give any right to possession," he said, "we are the first conquerors. We have long since subdued the Arverni; but it is not our practice to enslave every nation we vanquish, much less to forsake those we have once patronized." While he yet spoke the German horse had advanced, and even began to throw darts, which made it expedient for Cæsar to break up the conference. He accordingly withdrew, giving strict orders to his people not to return the insults of the enemy.

In a few days after this conference, the German chief proposed another personal interview, or, if that were declined, desired that some person of confidence should be sent, with whom he might treat. Being gratified in the second part of this alternative, but intending no more by the request than a mere feint, to lull his antagonist into some degree of security, he pretended to take offence at the quality of the persons who were sent to him, ordered them into custody, and on the same day put his army in motion upon a real design, which shewed that, barbarian as he was, he understood the plan, as well as the execution, of military operations. Observing the quarter from which the Romans derived their subsistence, he made a movement, by which he passed their camp, took a strong post about eleven miles in their rear, and by this means intercepted their ordinary supply of provisions.

Cæsar, for many days successively, endeavoured, by forming on the plain between the two armies, to provoke the enemy to a battle; but having failed in this purpose, was obliged to divide his army, and to place it in separate posts, which he

fortified, in order to recover a communication with the country behind him. It was reported, that the Germans, although they had borne, with great impatience, the defiance which Cæsar had given, were restrained from fighting by the predictions of their women, who foretold that their own people would be defeated, if they should hazard a general action before the change of the moon; but while they waited for this period, their warriors, notwithstanding the awe in which they stood of predictions, endeavoured to dislodge one of the divisions of Cæsar's army, and, having failed in that attempt, were afterwards attacked by the Romans in their camp, and defeated with great slaughter. Ariovistus himself, with the remains of his followers, fled to the Rhine, about fifty miles from the field of battle, passed that river in a small boat; while numbers of his people perished in attempting to follow him, and the greater part of those who remained were overtaken, and put to the sword by the cavalry, which pressed in their rear.

In this manner Cæsar concluded his first campaign in Gaul; and laid the foundation of further progress in that country, by stating himself as the protector of its native inhabitants against the Helvetii and the Germans, two powerful invaders, who were likely to subdue them. He placed his army, for the winter, among the nations whom he had thus taken under his protection, and set out for Italy, under pretence of attending to the affairs of his province on that side of the Alps; but more probably to be near the city, where he had many political interests at stake, friends to support, and enemies to oppose, in their canvas for the offices of state. His head quarters were fixed at Lucca, the nearest part of his province to Rome; and that place began to be frequented by numbers who were already of his party, or who desired to be admitted into it, and with whom he had previously made his own terms in stipulating the returns they were to make for the several preferments, in which he undertook to assist them.

At the election of consuls for this year, P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther was joined with Q. Cæcilius Metellus Nepos, of whom the latter had, in the capacity of tribune, distinguished himself as an instrument of the most dangerous factions.

Lentulus had lately attached himself entirely to Pompey, and, by the influence of this patron, probably now prevailed in his election. He had been *ædile* in the consulate of Cicero, and had taken a vigorous part in those very measures for which Cicero was now suffering in exile*. He was likely to favour the restoration of that injured citizen, and upon this account was now the more acceptable to Pompey, who, having an open rupture with Clodius, was disposed to mortify him by espousing the cause of his enemy.

Clodius, soon after his late victory over Cicero, greatly rose in his presumption, and, forgetting that he had prevailed more by the connivance of Pompey and Cæsar, and by the support of their friends, than by any influence of his own, ventured to set Pompey himself at defiance, to question the validity of his acts in the late settlement of Asia, to set the younger Tigranes, still the prisoner of Pompey, at liberty,† and proposed to restore him again to his kingdom. During the debates which arose on these measures in the assembly of the people, Pompey had the mortification to find that the sarcasms of Clodius were received by the audience in general with applause, as well as by the partisans of the senate, in particular, with marks of great satisfaction. Chiefly governed by vanity, and impatient of obloquy, he absented himself from the assemblies in which he received these insults, so long as Clodius remained in office, and was ready to embrace every measure by which he might be revenged of that factious tribune, or regain his own credit with the more respectable class of the citizens.‡

The majority of the senate, who justly considered as their own the cause of a magistrate, under whose auspices they themselves had acted, now encouraged by this division among their enemies, had ventured on the twenty-ninth of October, while Clodius was yet in office, to move for the recall of Cicero. Eight of the tribunes concurred in urging this measure, and it was rejected only in consequence of the negative of *Ælius Ligur*, one of the college whom Clodius had prepared to act

* Cicero, ad Att. lib. iii. ep. 22.

† Vid. Ascon. Padian. in Orat. pro Milone.

‡ Plutarch. in Vit. Cicer. p. 475. et 476.

this part, and whom he was ready to support with a party in arms, if the opponents should persist in their motion.*

Upon the election of the new consuls and tribunes for the following year, better hopes of success were entertained by the friends of the exile. Lentulus declared that the restoration of Cicero should be the first object of his administration; and that he should not fail to move it on the day that he entered on office. Metellus too, the brother-in-law of Clodius, though always inclined to favour the popular faction, could not in this matter set himself in opposition to Pompey, whom he had hitherto followed in all his designs; and declared his intention to concur with the consul.† At the same time, Milo, Sextius, and six more of the tribunes, with all the prætors, except Appius Claudius, the brother of Publius, declared their intention to take an active part in forwarding this measure.

Encouraged by these appearances, Cicero left his retreat at Thessalonica, and arrived at Dyrrachium, before the twenty-fifth of November, to be at hand to consult with his friends on the steps that were to be previously taken. Meanwhile the consuls-elect had their provinces assigned. Lentulus was destined to command in Cilicia and Cyprus; and Metellus in the farther province of Spain. Both were amply gratified in every article of their appointments, in order to confirm them in the interest of the senate: but Cicero expressed great anxiety lest these concessions should be found premature; and, being made before the new tribunes entered on office, or could have their voice in these destinations, was afraid lest it might alienate their affections from his party, and render them less zealous to move for his recall. The consul Lentulus, notwithstanding, kept his word; U. C. 696. and, on the first of January, the day of his entering on office, moved the senate to resolve that Cicero should be immediately recalled from banishment; that all persons opposing his return should be declared enemies to their country; and that if the people should be disturbed by violence in passing this decree, it should, nevertheless, be lawful for the exile to avail himself of it.‡

* Cicero, ad Att. lib. iii. ep. 23.

† Ibid. ep. 24.

‡ Ibid. lib. iii. ep. 26. et in Orat. post Reditum.

This motion was received in the senate with general applause. Eight of the tribunes were zealous in support of it. On the contrary, two members of the college, Numerius and Serranus, were gained by Clodius to oppose it. Serranus, at the first meeting of the senate on this business, could venture no further than to plead for a delay. He was prevailed upon, however, during the intervening night, to interpose his negative in form, and the motion, accordingly, could proceed no further in the senate.

It was resolved, notwithstanding, to propose a law to the people for Cicero's restoration; and a day was fixed for this purpose. Early in the morning of that day, Fabricius, one of the tribunes in the interest of the exile, endeavoured to occupy the place of assembly with an armed force, but found that Clodius, with a numerous troop of gladiators, was there before him. A conflict ensued, in which Fabricius, together with Cispus, another of the tribunes who came to his assistance, with all the party of the senate, were driven from the forum.

Clodius, at the head of his gladiators, with swords already stained in blood, pursued his victory through the streets. The temple of the nymphs, in which were kept some public-records which he wished to destroy, was set on fire;* the houses of Milo and Cæcilius the prætor attacked. "The streets, the common sewers, the river," says Cicero, "were filled with dead bodies, and all the pavements were stained with blood." No such scene had been acted since the times of Octavius and Cinna, when armies fought in the city for the dominion of Rome.†

Quintus Cicero escaped, by hiding himself under the dead bodies of his own servants, who were slain in defending his house. The tribune Publius Sextius actually fell into the hands of his enemies, received many wounds, and was left for dead among the slain. This circumstance, however, alarmed the party of Clodius not less than it alarmed his opponents. The odium of having murdered, or even violated the person

* Cicero, pro Milone, 27 Parad. 4 d.—Harpuricum Responsio 27.

† Orat. pro Sext. c. 35, 36, 38.

of a tribune, was likely to ruin their interest with the people; and they proposed to balance this outrage by putting to death Numerius, another tribune, who, being of their own side, should appear to be killed by the opposite party; but the intended victim of this ridiculous and sanguinary artifice, receiving information of their design, avoided being made the tool of a faction, at the expense of his life, and made his escape.*

After so strange a disorder, parties for some months, mutually afraid of each other, abstained from violence. The tribune Milo commenced a prosecution against Clodius for his crimes; but it was for some time eluded by the authority of Appius Claudius,† brother of the accused, who was now in the office of prætor; and the forms of trial, when actually begun, were repeatedly interrupted by the armed party of gladiators, with which Publius Clodius himself infested every place of public resort. It was vain to oppose him without being prepared to employ a similar force, and Milo accordingly had recourse to this method. He purchased a troop of gladiators and of bestiarii, or persons trained to the baiting of wild beasts, the remainder of a band which had been employed for public entertainment by the ædiles Pomponius and Cosconius, and which was now in the market for sale. He ordered the bargain to be secretly struck, concealing the name of the buyer, lest the opposite party, suspecting the design, should interpose to prevent him.

So provided, Milo ventured to encounter with Clodius. Their parties frequently engaged in the streets, and the populace, fond of such shews, enjoyed the spectacle which was thus freely presented to them in every corner of the city.‡

While the disorders which arose from the disputes relating to Cicero's restoration were daily augmenting, he himself fell from the height of his hopes to his former pitch of dejection and sorrow. The attempt which had been made in his favour

* Cicero, pro Sextio.

† The family name of these brothers is differently spelt by Cicero and others, probably from the affectation of Publius to refine on the orthography of his name.

‡ Cicero, ad Att. lib. iv. ep. 2.

might have succeeded, if Pompey had been fully prepared to concur in it. But all the measures of the triumvirate being concerted at the quarters of Cæsar, Pompey was obliged, after declaring his own inclinations on the subject, to consult his associate, and found him by no means inclined to restore a citizen who was likely to be of so much consequence, and who was to owe the favour of his restoration to any other than himself. The tribune Sextius, before the late violent convulsions, had made a journey into Gaul, to solicit the assent of Cæsar to this measure, but could not prevail; and it is probable that this artful politician was unwilling to restore an exile who was likely to ascribe the principal merit of that service to Pompey, and who, by his own inclinations in favour of the senate, was to become an accession to a party which Cæsar wished to degrade and to weaken, by every mean in his power. It was to strengthen himself against the senate that Cæsar made his coalition with Pompey and Crassus; and, from animosity to this body, he wished to crush every person of consequence to their party, and to favour the pretensions of any turbulent citizen who ventured to act in open defiance of their government.

Pompey, in the meantime, though committing himself as a tool into the hands of Cæsar, was flattered with the appearance of sovereignty which he enjoyed in the city, and willingly supported his rival in every measure that seemed to fix his attention abroad, blindly consented to the repeated augmentations of the army in Gaul, and approved of every enterprise in which their leader was pleased to employ them.

In this year, which was the second of Cæsar's command, two more additional legions were by his orders levied in Italy; and, under pretence of an approaching war with the Belgæ, a nation consisting of many cantons in the northern extremities of Gaul, this reinforcement was made to pass the Alps to the northward, in the spring. As soon as the forage was up, Cæsar himself followed in person, took the field, and, in the usual spirit of his conduct, endeavoured, by the rapidity of his motions, to frustrate or to prevent the designs of his enemies.

The army of Gaul now consisted of eight Roman legions, besides numerous bodies of horse and foot from different parts of the provinces, archers from Crete and Numidia, and slingers from the Balearian islands; so that it is likely the whole may have amounted to about sixty thousand men. The greater part of his army had wintered on the Soane * and the Douse,† as protectors, not as masters, of the country; being received only in the character of allies.

Cæsar being attended by many of the natives, as auxiliaries or as hostages, and having spent twelve days in preparing for his march, took his route to the northward, under pretence of carrying the war into the enemy's country, or of preventing them from gaining, in accession to their supposed confederacy against the Romans, any of the nations in the southern parts of Gaul. His passage lay through the high, though level, countries, now termed Burgundy and Champagne, in which the Soane, the Moselle, the Meuse, and the Seine, with so many other considerable rivers, that run in different directions, have their source. After a march of fifteen days, he arrived in the canton of the Remi,‡ where he found a people, though of the Belgic extraction, disposed to receive him as a friend, and to place themselves under his protection.

From this people he had a confirmation of his former intelligence, relating to the designs of the Belgic nations, and an account of the forces which they had already assembled. From the tract of country that is watered by the rivers which are now called the Oise, the Scheldt and the Meuse, he understood that no less than three hundred and fifty thousand men could be mustered, and were actually assembled, or preparing to assemble, against him. To prevent the junction of this formidable power, or to distract part of its force, he detached his Gaulish auxiliaries to make a diversion on the Oise, while he himself advanced to the Aine, passed this river, and fortified a station on its northern bank. Having a bridge in his rear, he left six cohorts properly intrenched in

* Anciently named the Arar.

† The Dubis.

‡ Now the district of Rheims.

its neighbourhood, to secure his communication with the country behind him.

While he remained in this position, the Belgæ advanced with a great army, attacked Bibrax, a place of strength, about eight miles in his front; and having spent many hours in endeavouring to reduce it, were about to renew their assault on the following day; when Cæsar, having in the night thrown into the garrison a considerable reinforcement of archers and slingers, the appearance of this additional strength on the battlements induced the enemy to refrain their attack.

They, nevertheless, continued to advance, laid waste the country, and came within two miles of the Roman camp. They had a front, as appeared from their fires, extending about eight miles.

Cæsar, considering the numbers and reputation of this enemy, thought proper to proceed with caution. He observed them, for some days, from his intrenchments, and made several trials of their skill in partial encounters, before he ventured to offer them battle: but being encouraged by the event of these trials, he chose a piece of sloping ground, which, extending in front before his camp, was fit to receive his army. As the enemy's line was likely far to exceed him in length, he threw up intrenchments on the right and left, to cover his flanks; and with this precaution, to prevent his being surrounded, drew forth his army to battle. The Belgæ too were formed on their part; but the ground between the two armies being marshy, neither thought proper to pass that impediment in presence of the other; and, after a few skirmishes of the horse and irregular troops, the Romans re-entered their camp. The enemy, upon this event, disappointed in their expectations of a battle, took their way to the fords of the Aïne,* in order to pass the river, and get possession of the bridge in the rear of the Romans. Cæsar had intelligence of this movement from the officer who was stationed to guard that post; and, marching instantly with all the cavalry, archers, and slingers of his camp, arrived in time to overtake them, while yet entangled in the fords, and obliged them to retire.

* Aizna.

The Belgæ, having made these successive attempts, with more impetuosity than foresight or conduct, soon appeared to be ill qualified to maintain a permanent war with such an enemy. They were disheartened by their disappointments, and alarmed by the rumour of a diversion which Cæsar had caused to be made in a part of their own country. They had exhausted their provisions, and found themselves under a necessity to break up their camp. It was, therefore, resolved, in their general council, that their forces, for the present, should separate; and that if any of their cantons should be afterwards attacked by Cæsar, the whole should assemble again for their common defence.

With this resolution they decamped in the night; but with so much noise and tumult, that Cæsar suspected a feint, or an intention to draw him into a snare. He, therefore, remained in his lines till the morning, when it appeared that they were actually gone, and were seen at a distance on the plain, moving without any regard to order, and, as in a total rout, striving who should soonest get beyond the reach of their enemies. He pursued them with his cavalry, so long as it was day, and though, with great bravery, resisted in his attacks on the rear, made considerable havoc. At the approach of night he discontinued the pursuit, and withdrew again to the camp he left in the morning. On the following day he moved with his whole army; and, that the enemy might not have time to re-assemble their forces, determined to penetrate into the heart of their country. In the beginning of his march he followed the course of the Aïne, and in his way reduced the Suessones and Bellovaci, two cantons which lay on the right and the left, near the confluence of this river with the Oise. From thence, being himself to march to the northward, to visit the banks of the Sambre and the Meuse, he detached the young Crassus, with a considerable force, towards the sea-coasts, to occupy those cantons which now form the provinces of Normandy and Brittany.

Part of the country through which the Meuse and the Sambre passed, now forming the duchy of Hainault, was then occupied by the Nervii, one of the fiercest of the Belgic nations, who, having heard with indignation of the surrender

of the Bellovaci and Suessones, their neighbours, prepared for resistance, sent such of their people as, by their sex or age, were unfit to carry arms, into a place of security, assembled all their warriors, and summoned their allies to a place of general resort. They took post on the Sambre, where the banks, on both sides of the river, being covered with wood, enabled them to conceal their numbers and their dispositions. They had intelligence that Cæsar, except in presence of an enemy, usually moved his legions with intervals between them, which were occupied by their baggage; and they made a disposition to surprise him on the march, and under this disadvantage. For this purpose they chose their ground on the Sambre, and agreed that the van of the Roman army should be suffered to pass unmolested; but that the appearance of the first column of baggage should be the signal for a general attack, to be made at once, from all the different stations in which their parties were posted.

Cæsar, in the meantime, about three days after he had marched from Samarobriua, now supposed to be Amiens, being apprised that he was come within ten miles of the river, on the banks of which the enemy was posted, altered the form of his march, placed six legions, clear of incumbrance, in the van of his army, next to these the whole of his baggage, and in the rear the two legions recently embodied in Italy. When he entered the open grounds on the Sambre, a few parties of horse appeared, but were soon driven into the woods by his cavalry. The legions that came first to their ground, began, as usual, to intrench, and received no disturbance till the column of baggage came in sight. At this signal multitudes of the enemy presented themselves on every side, drove in the cavalry that were posted to cover the working parties, and in many places were close in with the main body of the army before the infantry had time to uncover their shields, or to put on their helmets. The Roman soldier, nevertheless, ran to his colours, and, without waiting for the orders of his general, from whose abilities, on this occasion, he could derive no advantage, endeavoured to join his companions in the order to which they were accustomed.

The first events of this tumultuary action were various in different places. The Nervii, in one part of the field, forced the imperfect works of the Roman camp; but, in another part of it, were themselves forced from their ground, and driven in great numbers into the river. Some of the Roman legions were broken, lost the greater part of their officers, and, when Cæsar arrived to rally them, were huddled together in confusion. He himself was reduced to act the part of a legionary soldier: with a shield, which he took from one of his men, he joined in the battle; and, in this manner, by his presence or by his example, kept the enemy at bay, until he was relieved by the arrival of two legions of the rear-guard, and of two others, that were sent by Labienus to support him.

This seasonable relief, where the Romans were most distressed, changed the fortune of the day; and the confusion, which, in the beginning of the action, had by the Nervii been turned to so good account against their enemy, now became fatal to themselves. The greater part of them fell in heaps on the ground where they first began the attack. The few who attempted to fly were met at every opening of the woods by parties of the Romans, by whom they were forced into the thickets, or put to the sword; and as they fell in the end with little resistance, many became a prey even to the followers of the legions, who put themselves in arms, and bore a part in the massacre. Of four hundred chiefs, only three escaped; and of an army of sixty thousand men, no more than five hundred left the field of battle. The piteous remains of this nation, consisting of superannuated men, of women, and of children, sent, from the marshes in which they had been concealed, a message to implore the victor's mercy; and he, with a mildness uncommon in this or any ancient war, took them under his protection, and restored them to their usual place of abode: laying, at the same time, an injunction on their neighbours not to molest them. In this he studied the reputation of clemency to the vanquished,* as in battle he maintained the superiority of force and valour.

* Ut in miseros ac supplices usus misericordiâ videretur. De Bell. Gall. lib. ii. c. 28. The world was yet to learn how odious, and, in the end, how

Another enemy yet remained in the field. The Attuatici, descendants of the Cimbri and Teutones, the late terrors of Gaul, of Spain, and of Italy, being settled below the confluence of the Sambre and the Meuse, had been on their march to join the Nervii, when they heard of this unfortunate action; and then withdrew to their own country. Being pursued by Cæsar, they shut themselves up in their principal fortress. Here they made a voluntary submission; and being commanded to lay down their arms, threw such a quantity of weapons from the battlements, as almost filled up the ditch to the height of the ramparts. But Cæsar, having delayed taking possession of the place till the following day, the besieged, whether they only meant to deceive him, or repented of their surrender, took arms again in the night, and in a sally endeavoured to surprise the Roman army. In this desperate attempt, four thousand of them being killed, and the remainder being forced back into the town, were, in consequence of their former breach of faith, to the amount of fifty thousand persons, sold for slaves.

Thus Cæsar having, in the second year of his command, penetrated to the Meuse and the Scheldt; being master of the eastern frontier of Gaul, as far as the Rhine, and having, even from beyond that river, received some offers of submission; being master, too, of several cantons in Normandy and Bretanny, which had submitted to the young Crassus; quartered his army for the winter in the midst of these conquests, and himself, as at the end of the former campaign, set out for Italy and the neighbourhood of Rome.

Here the principal point which he left in contest between the parties, relating to the restoration of Cicero, had been for some time determined. Clodius had found a proper antagonist in Milo, and, as often as he himself, or any of his party, appeared in the assemblies of the people, or in the streets, was every where attacked with weapons similar to his own.

calamitous, for both, it is for one nation to become subject to another; and Cæsar, intent to preserve as well as effect his conquests, took measures of mildness and clemency for the one, as he did those of prowess and valour for the other.

And, in the view of these disorders, it was agreed among the citizens in general, that if the laws could not give protection to those who were most willing to be governed by them, they should not by their formalities screen the disorderly and profligate in the practice of every species of crime.

Clodius had now, for some months, lain under an impeachment from Milo, and had declared himself candidate for the office of ædile, endeavouring by violence, and by the artifices of his brother, to put off the trial till after the elections ; when, if he should be vested with any public character, he might find a refuge under the privilege of his office. His own influence, however, and the fear which citizens entertained of his armed banditti, who were now, in a great measure, restrained by Milo, had abated so much, that the party of the senate determined to make another vigorous effort for the recal of a member, whom the violence of this profligate had forced into exile.

This business was, accordingly, again brought forward ; and about the beginning of June a decree was obtained, in the fullest terms, for the restoration of Cicero. The consul was charged with the further conduct of this measure, as of the utmost consequence to the public. This officer, accordingly, issued a proclamation, in terms employed only on the greatest occasions, requiring all, who had the safety of the republic at heart, to support him in the execution of this decree. There was, in consequence of this proclamation, a great concourse of orderly citizens from all parts of Italy. The enemies of the measure shrunk, and withdrew their opposition. The act passed in the assembly of the people, on the fourth of August. Cicero had been so confident of this event, that he on the same day sailed from Dyrrachium, and on the following arrived at Brundisium. On the eighth day, being still at this place, he had notice of the act being passed, set out for Rome, continued his journey through multitudes of people, who were assembled on the roads to testify their joy upon his return, and entered the city on the fourth of September.

Next day he addressed the senate in a harangue, which is still extant, composed of lavish panegyric or vehement invective, corresponding to the demerit or merit of parties, in his late

disgrace and restoration. The multitudes that were assembled on this occasion, their impatience to see him, their acclamations and wonderful unanimity in his favour, raised him once more to his former pitch of glory, and appeared to repay all the services he had rendered to the public, and to compensate all the sorrows of his late disgrace. The whole matter may have been, to persons of reflection, an evidence of that weakness with which this ingenious man suffered himself to be affected by popular opinion, and of the levity with which multitudes, in the changes of fortune, run into opposite extremes.

During these transactions Cæsar was at a great distance, on the northern extremities of Gaul, engaged with fierce and numerous enemies, involved in difficulties, concerning which there were various reports, and of which the issue, with respect to himself and his army, was supposed to be doubtful. In these circumstances, however willing Pompey may have been to persevere in the measures concerted with Cæsar, it is probable that he found himself unable to resist the force of the senate, which was now exerted to obtain the restoration of a person who had taken so distinguished a part in their measures.

It is possible, likewise, that, in these circumstances, Pompey may have taken upon him to act independently of his associates, though he afterwards, in trying to gain Cicero to the party of the triumvirate, affected to give Cæsar equal merit with himself in procuring his recall; and he appealed to Quintus, the brother of Marcus Cicero, for the truth of this assertion.* Cicero himself, however, was not disposed to give Cæsar any credit upon this account; and, though both Cæsar and Crassus, after the matter was decided affected to concur in the measure, yet he does not seem to have believed them sincere. He imputes to Cæsar an active part in the injury he had received, but none in the reparation that was done to him.†

Pompey, not the less jealous of Cæsar for their pretended union, and sensible of the advantage his rival had gained in having a military command of so long a duration at the gates

* Cicero, ad Familiar. lib. i. ep. 9.

† Orat. in Senat. post Redit. c. 15.

of Rome, now wished to propose for himself some appointment of equal importance. The moment of cordiality in the senate, on their recovering a favourite member, and the first emotions of gratitude in the breast of Cicero himself, whom he had recently obliged, seemed to form a conjuncture favourable for such a proposition; and he laid, with his usual address and appearance of unconcern, the plan of a motion to be made for his purpose.

The importation of corn into Italy had been lately interrupted, and a great scarcity and dearth had ensued. The populace being riotous upon this complaint, had in the theatre attacked with menaces and violence numbers of the wealthy citizens who were present, and even insulted the senate itself in the capitol. A report, industriously raised by the enemies of Cicero, was propagated, to make it be believed that the distress arose from his engrossing, for so long a time, the attention of government; and, in opposition to this surmise on the one hand, it was alleged on the other, that the late corn act of Clodius, and the misconduct of one of his relations, intrusted by him with the care of the public granaries, was the cause of all this distress. But whatever may have been the cause, it was insinuated by the adherents of Pompey, that no man was fit to relieve the people besides himself; that the business should be committed to him alone; and Cicero, in entering the senate, was called upon by the multitude, as he passed, to make a motion to this purpose, as bound to procure some relief to the people, in return to their late cordiality in his cause.

Cicero had in reality owed his recal to the declarations of Pompey in his favour; and, however little reason he had on the whole to rely on his friendship, it was convenient for the present to appear on good terms with a person of so much influence. He suffered himself, therefore, to be carried by the stream that seemed to run in favour of this fashionable leader. As if the necessity of the case had suggested the measure, he moved the senate that a commission, with proconsular power over all the provinces, should be granted to Pompey, to superintend the supplies of corn for the city. The senate, either of themselves disposed to grant this request, or won by

the eloquence of their newly-recovered member, instructed the consuls to frame a resolution to this purpose, and carry it to the assembly of the people for their assent.

Here C. Messius, one of the tribunes, proposed to enlarge the trust, and to comprehend the superintendency of the revenue, with an allotment of fleets and armies suited to the extent of this unprecedented commission. Pompey, however, observing that this additional clause was ill received, denied his having any share in proposing it, and affected to prefer the appointment intended for him in the terms of the act which had been proposed to be drawn up by the consuls. His partisans, in the mean time, still pleaded, though in vain, for the extension of the commission as proposed by Messius. The extravagance of the proposal gave a general alarm to the senate, and still more to the party of Cæsar, who were willing to employ Pompey as an agent in the city; but not to arm him with a military force, or to give him, in reality, that sovereignty in the empire of which, by his residence in the capital, he so much affected the appearance.

The extraordinary commission, now actually granted to Pompey, although it was exorbitant in respect to the influence it gave him over all the producers, venders, buyers, and consumers of corn, throughout the whole empire; yet, as it did not bestow the command of an army, fell short of the consequence which Cæsar principally dreaded in his rival; and though, probably, the cause of some jealousy betwixt them, did not produce any immediate breach.

Pompey, being entitled by this commission to appoint fifteen lieutenants, put Cicero at the head of the list; and this place was accepted of by him, on the express condition, that it should not prevent his standing for the office of censor, in case an election took place on the following year.* He was now in the way of recovering his consideration and his dignity, but was likely to meet with more difficulty in respect to his property, which Clodius had taken care to have forfeited, having even demolished his house, and consecrated the ground on which it stood to pious uses. This last cir-

* Cicero, Orat. in Senat. post Redit. c. 13, ad Att.

cumstance had placed a bar in his way, which could not be removed without a formal decree of the pontiffs.

The college met on the last of September to hear parties in this cause. A violent invective having been pronounced by Clodius against his antagonist, Cicero replied in that oration, which is still extant among his works, on the subject of his house.* The question was, whether the ground on which Cicero's house had formerly stood, being formally consecrated, could be again restored to a profane or common use? The pontiffs appear to have been unwilling to give any explicit decision. They gave a conditional judgment, declaring, that the consecration of Cicero's ground was void, unless it should be found that this act had been properly authorized by the people. Both parties interpreted this judgment in their own favour; and the senate was to determine, whether, in the act of consecration, the consent of the people had or had not been properly obtained.

The senate being met on the first of October, and all the parties who were members of it being present, Lucullus, in the name of the pontiffs, his colleagues, reported, that they had been unanimous in their judgment to revoke the act of consecration, unless it should be found, that the magistrate, who had performed that ceremony, had been properly authorized by the people; but that this was a question of law now before the senate. A debate ensued, in which Lentulus Marcellinus, consul elect for the following year, gave his opinion against the legality of the consecration: he was followed by numbers, and the judgment of the senate was likely to be on that side; when Clodius, to put off the question, spoke for three hours, and would have prevented the senate's coming to any resolution, if the members, becoming impatient, had not silenced him, at last, by their interruptions and clamours. A resolution being moved for, in the terms that had been proposed by Marcellinus, the tribune Serranus, who had formerly suspended the decree for the recal of Cicero, now again interposed with his negative. The senate, nevertheless, proceeded to engross the decree, in which it was re-

* Pro Domo sua.

solved, that the ground on which Cicero's house had formerly stood, should be again restored to the owner in property; that no magistrate should presume to contest the authority of the senate in this matter; and that, if any interruption were given in the execution of this decree, the tribune, who now interposed with his negative, should be accountable for the consequences. Serranus was alarmed. His relation, Cornicius, to give him the appearance of greater importance, and an opportunity to recede with dignity, laid himself on the ground at his feet, and besought him, by his intreaties, to say, that he would not insist for the present on the negative he had given; but he begged the delay of a night to consider of the matter. The senate, recollecting the use which he had formerly made of such a delay on the first of January, was disposed to refuse it, when, upon the interposition of Cicero himself, it was granted; and this tribune having thought proper to withdraw his negative, the act accordingly passed on the second of October. Cicero was allowed two millions, Roman money,* to rebuild his house in town; five hundred thousand,† to rebuild his villa at Tusculum, and two hundred and fifty thousand,‡ to rebuild that at Formiæ. The first sum he seems to have considered as adequate to his loss, but complains of the other two.¶ He proceeded, without delay, to take possession of his ground, and to employ workmen in rebuilding his house. He had made some progress, when Clodius, on the third of November, came with an armed force, dispersed the workmen, and attacked the house of Quintus Cicero, the brother, that was adjoining, set it on fire, and kept a guard of his retainers in the streets till it was burnt to the ground.

By this act of violence, Clodius had rendered his cause, in the criminal prosecution which still hung over him, in a great measure, desperate. His safety required the actual destruction of his enemies, and he had no scruple to restrain him from the most violent extremes. He, accordingly, attacked Cicero, as he passed in the streets, on the eleventh of November, attended by a company of his friends, forced them into a

* About 16,145 l. 16s. 8d.

† About 4,036 l. 9s.

‡ About 2,018 l. 4s. 6d.

¶ Ad Atticum, lib. iv. epist. 2.

walled court, where they found means, with some difficulty, to defend themselves. Clodius, in this attack, had frequently exposed his own person, and might have been killed; but Cicero was now become too cautious for so bold a measure. "I have put my affairs," he writes to Atticus, "under a gentle regimen; and, in all the cures I am to apply for the future, have renounced the use of the surgeon's knife."

Clodius, upon this occasion, being disappointed of his design upon Cicero's life, came into the streets on the following day, which was the twelfth of November, with a number of slaves provided with lighted torches, and escorted by a party, armed in form, with shields and swords. They made directly for a house belonging to Milo, with intention to set it on fire; took possession of that of P. Sylla, in its neighbourhood, as a fortress or place of arms, from which to resist all attempts to extinguish the flames, and till the house they were about to destroy should be burnt to the ground.

While they were proceeding to execute this design, a number of Milo's servants, led by one Flaccus, sallied forth against the incendiaries, killed several of the most forward, put the rest to flight, and would not have spared Clodius himself, if he had not withdrawn to the cover, which, in forming this project, he had prepared for his party.

On the following day, Sylla made his appearance in the senate, in order to exculpate himself of the ill use which had been made of his house; but Clodius did not venture abroad. It appears scarcely credible that a state could subsist under such extreme disorders; yet the author of them had been long under prosecution for crimes of the same nature; and it was still a question, whether the charge against him should be heard, or whether he should not be allowed to take refuge in some one of the offices of state, to which he was sure of being named by the people, provided the elections were allowed to precede his trial.

Marcellinus, the intended consul of next year, moved the senate to hasten the trial, and to join the late disorders committed by the criminal to the former articles of the charge which lay against him. But Metellus Nepos, one of the present consuls, and the relation of Clodius, having formerly

found a pretence for delay, still struggled, if possible, to repel the attack; and for this purpose endeavoured to prevent any immediate determination of the senate, by prolonging the debate. But the majority of the members were greatly exasperated, and obtained a resolution, that the trial of Clodius, for these repeated acts of violence and outrage, should precede the elections. His friend, the consul Metellus, nevertheless, that he might have the chance of a refuge from this prosecution in the public office of *ædile*, to which he aspired, would have brought on the elections on the nineteenth of November, if he had not been prevented by Milo, who, in the middle of the preceding night, had, with an armed force, occupied the place of assembly, and was prepared to observe the heavens, and to announce some of the celestial presages of unfavourable events, in case other methods to suspend the elections should not have prevailed.

Metellus, with the two brothers, Appius the prætor, and Publius Clodius, being apprised of this intention, and of the power with which it was supported, did not make their appearance in the field, and Milo kept his station till noon, when he withdrew, with the general applause of the senate and of the more orderly citizens.

The meeting, or assembly of the people, being adjourned to next day, Metellus, in order to lull the vigilance of Milo, assured him, that there was no occasion to occupy posts in the dead of the night; that he meant to do nothing before it was day; that if any one wished to suspend the election, he should, in the morning, be found in the market-place, and there submit to the forms which any one was legally entitled to plead against his proceeding. Milo, accordingly, at break of day, repaired to the market-place, where he expected to be joined by the consul; but soon afterwards was told, that Metellus had deceived him, was hastening to the field of Mars, where the elections were commonly held, and would instantly begin to call the votes, when it would be too late to interpose, even under the pretence of religion. Upon this information, Milo immediately pursued and overtook his antagonists before the election began; and, by declaring his intention to

observe the heavens, once more frustrated the designs of the faction.

On the twenty-first, the people could not assemble by reason of the public market; and their meeting being called for the twenty-third, Milo again took possession of the field with an armed force; and Cicero, who concludes a letter to Atticus with describing this state of affairs, made no doubt of Milo's success.* What passed on this day is not particularly mentioned; but it is known, that Clodius at last prevailed; that, being elected ædile, he was, by the privilege of his office, screened from the prosecution that was intended against him; and being himself safe, did not fail, upon the expiration of U. C. 697. Milo's tribunate, to retort the charge upon his prosecutor; and accordingly brought him to trial, on the second of February, for acts of violence, or breach of the peace.

Pompey, as well as Cicero, appeared in defence of Milo; and they succeeded in having him acquitted, while they incurred a torrent of reproach and invective on the part of the prosecutor. The market-place was crowded with the partisans and retainers of Clodius, who had instructed them, in replies to his interrogations, to direct all their abuse on Pompey. "Who starves the people for want of corn?" he asked. They answered, "Pompey." "Who wants to be sent to Alexandria?" Answer, "Pompey." This farce greatly disturbed the concerted dignity of this politician. As his principal object was consideration, he could not endure contempt. He was on bad terms with the senate; and they listened to the invective of his personal enemies with apparent satisfaction. He complained to Cicero, that the people were alienated from him; that the nobility were his enemies; that the senate was adverse, and the youth in general ill-disposed, to him.† He had, indeed, submitted to become the agent of a faction at Rome; and, with the friends of the republic, incurred all the odium of what was done by their influence. Cæsar, in the meanwhile, was rising every day in military reputation, and had formed an army almost at the gates of

* Cicer. ad Att. lib. iv. ep. 3. † Cicer. ad Quint. Frat. lib. ii. epist. 3.

Rome, with which he held every party in the republic in awe. Pompey, on this occasion, really did, or affected to, believe, that a design was formed against his own life; he assembled a numerous party of his retainers from the country, and absented himself, during some time, from the senate and from the assemblies of the people.

CHAPTER XXI.

Return of Cato from Cyprus.—His Refulse at the Election of Prætors.—Arrival of Ptolemy Auletes at Rome.—Visit of Pompey and Crassus to Cæsar's Quarters at Lucca.—Renewal of their Association.—Military Operations in Cæsar's Province.—Violent Election of Crassus and Pompey.—Provinces.—Of Crassus in Syria.—Of Pompey in Spain, for five Years.—Crassus departs for Syria.

THE particulars we have related in the last chapter have led us on to the middle of February, in the consulate of Lentulus Marcellinus and L. Marcius Philippus. The first was attached to the forms of the republic, and was a strenuous partisan of the senate. His election was probably a sequel of the victory which this party had obtained in the restoration of Cicero. Philippus, the other consul, was now nearly related to Cæsar, having married Atia, his niece, the widow of Octavius; and possibly owed his preferment in part to this connection. He was, by his marriage with the mother, become the stepfather of young Octavius, now a boy of ten years of age, and entered as a part of his family. This parent, indeed, appears to have been a man of great moderation, no way qualified to be a party in the designs or usurpations of the family with which he was now connected, and which make so great a part in the sequel of this history.

Some time before these consuls entered on office, or in the end of the preceding year, Marcus Cato arrived from having executed his commission to Byzantium and Cyprus. The business, upon which he had been sent to the first of these places, was to restore some exiles who had been driven from their country in the violence of faction. At the second he was to seize the treasure and the other effects of the king, and to reduce his kingdom to the form of a Roman province. This measure, by all accounts, was unjust, and the office highly disagreeable to Cato; but he was determined to perform it with the punctuality and respect due to an order of the state. While he himself went to Byzantium, he sent

forward Canidius to Cyprus, to intimate the commands of the Roman people, and to exhort the king to submission. Upon his return to Rhodes, in his way to Cyprus, he had intelligence, that this prince, unable to bear the ruin of his fortunes, had, in despair, killed himself. His treasure was seized, and his effects sold: the whole yielded to the treasury about seven thousand talents of silver. Upon the approach of Cato to Rome, the magistrates, the senate, and multitudes of the people, went forth to receive him. The senate thought proper in this manner to distinguish a friend, and to favour him with some marks of consideration, in order to balance, if possible, the public honours which were so frequently lavished on their enemies. For the same purpose likewise they resolved to insert the name of Cato among the prætors of the present year; but this honour he himself rejected as unprecedented and illegal. The year following, however, when he stood candidate for this office in the ordinary form, he was rejected; and Vatinius, the well-known tool of Cæsar, who had been commonly employed by him, in things which were thought too mean for himself to appear in, was chosen.*

Cæsar, as has been observed on different occasions, had a serious antipathy to Cato, considering him as a determined and resolute opponent. He employed all his influence to exclude him from the offices of state, and probably had a particular pleasure in procuring him a repulse, by the preference of so mean an antagonist as Vatinius, who, in this instance, had the majority of votes against him. But, in mentioning this event, Valèrius Maximus, with the sense which remained of it in subsequent ages, though with the quaintness of epigram, is pleased to reverse the form of expression, usual in speaking of disappointed candidates, saying, "That the list of prætors for this year had not the honour of Cato's name."†

Cato, in the execution of his late commission, had taken exact inventories of all the effects sold at Cyprus; but his books being lost, or burnt in a vessel which took fire on the

* Plutarch. in Vit. Catonis, et Cicero, in Vatinium.

† Val. Max. lib. vii. c. 5.

voyage, Clodius frequently threatened him with a prosecution to account for the sums he had received; and in this was seriously instigated by Cæsar, who, from his winter quarters at Lucca, watched all the proceedings at Rome.

From this station, the proconsul of Gaul, although he could not attend in person, sent his agents to the city, and took part in every transaction of moment that related to his adherents or to his enemies. It appeared to be his maxim, that no man should be his friend or his enemy without feeling the suitable effects. Memmius, who had been prætor with Domitius Ahenobarbus, and who had joined his colleague in the prosecution that was commenced against Cæsar, at the expiration of his consulate, having since been prætor of Bithynia, and accused of misconduct in his province, was attacked by him in a memorial, which he drew up, to be employed in support of the charge. Memmius, in defending himself, recriminated, sparing no kind of invective; and, in the issue of this matter, had the good fortune to escape from the resentment of his enemy.

The power of Cæsar, aided by his influence in so important a station, was daily increasing; and as he spared no pains to crush those whom he despaired of gaining, so he declined no artifice to gain every one else. All the spoils of his province were distributed in gratuities at Rome. He knew the state of every man's family, and where he could not reach the master, paid his court to the mistress, or to the favourite slave. While in his winter quarters at Lucca, so many senators resorted from Rome to pay their court, that of these no less than two hundred were said to have been present at one time; and so many of them in public characters, that the lictors, who, with the badges of office, paraded at the entrance of his quarters, amounted to one hundred and twenty.*

During this winter a question, relating to the restoration of Ptolemy Auletes to the throne of Egypt, gave rise to warm debates in the senate. This prince had been dethroned by his subjects; and conceiving that he had sufficient credit with many persons at Rome, who had experienced his bounty, he

* Plutarch. in Cæsare.

repaired thither to solicit his own restoration. In his way he had an interview with Marcus Cato at Cyprus, and was advised by him to return to Egypt, and to accept of any terms from his own people, rather than to enter on such a scene of anxiety and mortification as he should find every suitor for public favour engaged in at Rome. The giddiness of the multitude, the violence of the parties, of which one was sure to withstand what the other promoted, the avarice of those who might pretend to be his friends, and whose rapacity the treasures of his kingdom could not assuage, were sufficient to deter the king from proceeding on his voyage. But the importunity of his attendants, who wished to have him restored without any concession to his subjects, confirmed him in his former resolution. He, accordingly, proceeded to Rome; and, to the great encouragement of his hopes, was favourably received by Pompey, who was then possessed of the reigning influence in the city, and who considered this occasion, of restoring a king of Egypt to his throne, as a proper opportunity to have a military command for himself, joined to the civil commission of which he was already possessed.

In the meanwhile the people of Alexandria, not knowing to what place their king had withdrawn, imagined that he was dead; and put his daughter Berenice in possession of the kingdom. Being afterwards informed, that he had gone to sea, and steered for Italy, where he was likely to engage the Romans against them, they sent a deputation to counteract his solicitations in the senate. But these deputies being intercepted, and murdered by order of the king, he proceeded, without opposition, in his application at Rome, and obtained a decree for his restoration to the crown. In this the opposite parties agreed; for some one leader in each aspired to be employed in resettling the kingdom of Egypt; but the unfortunate king soon found, that, in this act, pronounced in his favour, he had yet made but a small progress in his suit. The whole difficulty arose in the choice of a person to carry the decree of the senate into execution.

Soon after the general decree had passed, Lentulus Spinther, consul of the present year, being destined, at the expiration of his magistracy in the city, to command in Cilicia

and Cyprus, had inserted the business of restoring the king of Egypt as a part of his own commission. But after Lentulus was gone for his province, this part of the commission, probably by the influence of Pompey, who had views on that expedition, as the object of a military command, for himself, was recalled. A strong party of the nobles, however, being jealous of the state which Pompey affected, and of his continual aim at extraordinary powers, conceived an expedient to disappoint him on this occasion, or to render the commission unworthy of his acceptance. In visiting the books of the sybils, verses were said to be found, containing an injunction to the Romans, not, indeed, to withhold their friendship from a king of Egypt, soliciting their protection, but "to beware how they attempted to restore him with a military force." The authenticity of this oracle was acknowledged, or declared by the augurs; and the tribune Caius Cato, who was averse to the cause of Ptolemy, availed himself of it, to suspend the effect of the resolution which had been already taken in favour of that prince. The senate and people were divided in their opinions. One party urged, that Pompey should be appointed to restore the king of Egypt to his throne; others agreed, that he might be appointed, provided that he undertook the commission as proconsul, attended by two lictors, and, in the terms of the oracle, without any military force.* Pompey himself affected to think, that the business should have been left as it was, in the department of Lentulus the proconsul of Cicilia and Cyprus; but his retainers, so long as they had any hopes of rendering this a military commission, or of making it a pretence for placing their patron again at the head of an army, never ceased to urge that he should be employed in it.

Ptolemy himself, likewise, wished to have this business devolve upon Pompey, as the most likely person to have the force of the republic at his disposal, and to employ it effectually. But both despairing at last of success, Ptolemy retired to Ephesus; and fearing the resentments he had pro-

* Dio. lib. xxxix. c. 12—16.—Cicero ad Lentulum. Epist. ad Familiares, lib. vii.

voked in the contest with his own people, and in the late murder of their deputies, he took refuge in the temple of Diana; a retreat from which he was not conducted, till about two years afterwards, when Gabinius undertook to replace him on his throne.*

Pompey was disgusted with his disappointment in not being named to this service, and probably mortified more by the little respect that was paid to him by all parties, while he lay under the lash of continual invectives from his petulant opponents, Clodius and Caius Cato. Having obtained, on the fifth of April, a grant of some money towards executing his office of general purveyor of corn for the people; and having heard his own and Cæsar's embezzlement of the public treasure, especially in the alienation of the revenues of Campania, severely censured in the senate; † he left Rome, on pretence of applying, in Sardinia and Sicily, the sums with which he was now intrusted for the purchase of corn. In his way to this market he passed by Lucca, and, together with Crassus, augmented the number of attendants who paid their court at the quarters of Cæsar. At an interview of these three leaders, they renewed their former confederacy; and it being known, that Domitius Ahenobarbus was to stand for the next election of consuls, Cæsar, considering how much a citizen so determined in opposition to himself, instigated by Marcus Cato, and supported by the party of the senate, might attempt or execute against him in his absence, proposed that the opposition to this candidate should not be committed to any person of inferior consideration in their party; but that Pompey and Crassus should themselves enter the lists, in order to exclude Domitius from the consulate.‡

It was agreed, likewise, at this conference, that, upon the expiration of the term for which they were to hold the magistracy at Rome, Pompey should have the province of Spain, Crassus that of Syria, each with a great army: that Cæsar should be continued in his present command, and have such additions to the establishment of his province as might enable

* Liv. Epitom. Decad. xi. lib 5.

† Cicero, ad Quint. Frat. lib. ii. ep. 5 et 6. ‡ Suet. in Cæsare, c. 24.

him to support an army of eight Roman legions, with the usual accompaniments of auxiliaries and irregular troops. Such was already, in fact, the state of his forces,* including a legion of native Gauls; he having, contrary to the express limitations of his commission, by which he was restricted to three legions, made this enormous augmentation. This concert, like the first which united these parties together, was, for some time, kept a secret, and only began to be surmised about the usual time of elections.

Soon after these matters were settled, Crassus beginning to remain in Italy, Pompey proceeded on his voyage to Sardinia, and Cæsar repaired to his army in Gaul, where the war in different places had been renewed in his absence. Among the dispositions he had made for the winter, the young Crassus was left to command on the coasts of the British Channel, and Galba, another of his lieutenants, was posted among the Alps, to protect the traders of Italy at a principal pass of these mountains. This officer had dislodged the natives from many of their strong-holds, from which they were accustomed to infest the highways, or to lay such as were passing under severe contributions; and he took hostages for their good behaviour for the future. He fixed his quarters, during the winter, at Octodurus, supposed to be the village of Martiñach in the Valais, situated at the foot of the mountains, by which travellers now pass in the route of the greater abbey of St. Bernard. Here he remained for some time in quiet possession of his post; but the natives observing that the legions under his command had been greatly reduced by the services of the preceding campaign, and by the detachments which he had recently made from his quarters, formed a design to surprise and to cut him off. For this purpose, the inhabitants of the village in which he was quartered suddenly withdrew from him, and soon after appeared with multitudes of their countrymen on the neighbouring mountains. From thence they made a furious attack on the Roman intrenchment, continually sending fresh numbers to relieve those who became fatigued, or who had exhausted the store of their missile weapons.

* Suet. in Cæsare, c. 24.

The Romans, on the first prospect of this attack, had deliberated, whether they should not abandon their post; but had resolved to maintain it, and were now become sensible that they must perish, if they could not, by some impetuous effort, disperse the enemy who were assembled in such numbers against them. For this purpose, they determined to break from their lines, and to mix with their assailants sword in hand; a manner of fighting, in which, by the superiority of the Roman shield and sword, they always had a great advantage. They accordingly sallied from their intrenchment, and, after the slaughter of ten thousand of the enemy, about a third of the whole, put the remainder to flight. Galba, notwithstanding the respite he obtained by this victory, not thinking it prudent to remain in a situation in which he had been exposed to so much danger, withdrew, for the remainder of the winter, to the neighbourhood of Geneva.

The war had broke out at the same time in the quarters of Crassus, at the other extremity of the province. Some nations, who had made their submission, and given hostages at the end of the preceding campaign, repented of this step, and entered into a concert to recover their liberties. They began with seizing the Roman officers who had been stationed among them as commissaries to provide for the subsistence of the army, and they detained them as pledges for the recovery of those whom they themselves had given as hostages for their own peaceable behaviour.

The principal authors of this revolt were the inhabitants of what is now termed the coast of Bretanny, between the rivers Vilaine and Blavet. They trusted to the strength of their situation on small islands, peninsulas, or head-lands, of which many were joined to the continent only by some narrow beach or isthmus, which the sea, at high-water, overflowed. They depended likewise on the strength of their shipping, in the use of which, by the practice of navigation on that stormy sea, and by their frequent voyages even to Britain, they were extremely expert. They were said to supply the want of canvas and hempen cordage with hides and thongs of leather, and the want of cables with iron chains, to which they fastened their anchors.

Cæsar, having received intelligence of this revolt while he remained in his quarters at Lucca, sent orders to build as many ships as possible upon the Loire, and to assemble mariners from the neighbouring coasts. Apprehending, at the same time, a general defection of the province, and perhaps a descent from the Germans, that were ever ready to profit by the distress or divisions of their neighbours, he sent Labienus with a large body of horse to the Moselle, at once to awe the Belgic nations, and to observe the passage of the Rhine. He sent also Titurius Sabinus with a proper force into Normandy, where the natives were already in arms; and the young Crassus to the Garonne, to occupy the people of Gascony in their own country, and to prevent their junction with the principal authors of this rebellion.

He himself made haste to join the troops that were stationed in Brittany, and ordered Decimus Brutus to assemble his fleet, and to make sail without loss of time for the bay of Vannes. After his arrival on the coast, he met with all the difficulties which he had reason to expect from the nature of the country, and from the disposition and skill of its inhabitants. The enemy had retired from the continent to their strong-holds on the promontories or head-lands, in which they were periodically surrounded by the sea. Being attacked at one station, they withdrew in their boats to another; and by their situation seemed to be secure from any enemy, who was not in a condition to assail them at once, both by sea and by land. They could frustrate his operations on shore, by embarking on board of their vessels; and his attack from the sea, by landing from their boats, which they drew upon the beach.

Cæsar, to decide the event of this singular contest, was obliged to wait the arrival of his shipping. As soon as it appeared, the natives, sensible that their fate depended on the event of a sea-fight, embarked the most expert of their warriors, got under sail with all their force, amounting to two hundred and twenty vessels, and steered directly for their enemy. While the fleets drew near to each other, the shores ~~were~~ crowded with spectators; and the army, with Cæsar

himself, came forth on the heights, from which they could behold the scene.

The Romans being inferior to their enemy in the management of sails, as well as in the strength of their vessels, endeavoured to supply their defect, as usual, by an effort of address or unexpected contrivance. They had provided themselves with scythes, fastened to shafts of a proper length, to cut the enemy's rigging, and by this means to let loose or discompose their sails; and having thus, in the first encounter, disabled many of their ships, they afterwards grappled, and boarded them sword in hand.

The Gauls, seeing a great part of their fleet in this manner irrecoverably lost, would have escaped with the remainder; but were suddenly becalmed, and being, from ten in the morning till night, exposed to the continual attacks of their enemy, were all either taken or destroyed; and the nation, thus bereft of its principal strength and the flower of its people, surrendered again at discretion.

Under pretence that the inhabitants of this district had violated the law of nations, in seizing the persons of officers who were stationed among them in a public character, their leaders were put to death, and their people sold for slaves. Those of the lower banks of the Seine, at the same time, having been defeated by Titurius, agreeably to what was said to be the character of Gaulish nations in general, returned to their former submission, with a levity equal to that with which they had joined the revolt.

The nations inhabiting the banks of the Garonne were still inclined to resist the approach of the Romans to their country. To the advantage of numbers they joined a lively courage, of which these invaders had frequently felt the effects. Every chief was attended by a number of followers, whom he called his *Soldurii*, and who had devoted themselves to his service. While the chieftain lived, the *Soldurii* fared in every thing alike with himself; but if he perished by violence, they too must die, and there was no instance of their failing in this part of their engagement.

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Crassus being arrived on the Garonne, and warned by the example of other Roman officers, who had fallen or miscarri-

ed in that country, deferred passing the river till he had augmented his force by the junction of some troops from Toulouse, and other parts of the Roman province. Being thus reinforced, he proceeded against the natives: these comprehended many little hordes, of which Cæsar has, on this occasion, enumerated twelve; but jealous of one another, and unwilling to join even in their common defence. They, accordingly, notwithstanding their known valour, fell separately into the hands of the Romans; and, in the end, were all of them vanquished, or made their submission.

By these conquests, the former acquisitions of Cæsar on the Seine and the Marne had a direct communication with the districts of Toulouse and Narbonne, or what had already been, for a considerable period, the Roman province of Gaul; and the conqueror, having re-established peace in those parts of the country, which are now termed Bretanny and Normandy, closed the campaign with a march still further to the northward, where he penetrated through marshes and woods into Brabant; but, being stopped by heavy rains and the approach of winter, he returned on his route, without making any settlement; and having put his army into winter quarters among the nations who had lately revolted, he himself set out, as usual, for Italy. There his presence was greatly wanted by Pompey and Crassus, who, on the approach of the elections, were likely to meet with unexpected difficulties in executing the plan which had been lately concerted between them.

At Rome, the spring, and part of the summer, had passed in disputes among those who were attached to the opposite parties. Clodius had attacked Cicero in his own person, in his effects, and in the persons of his friends. P. Sextius, who, in the character of tribune, had been so active in the recall of this injured exile, and who had exposed his own life in the riots to which that measure gave rise, was now accused, and brought to trial, for supposed acts of violence committed by him in the course of those contests. He was defended with great zeal by Hortensius, and with a proper gratitude by Cicero; and by their joint endeavours was, on the twelfth of March, acquitted, by the unanimous verdict of his judges.*

* Cicero, ad Quint. Frat. lib. ii. epist. 4.—Orat. pro Sext.

After this trial was over, a point of superstition, curious as it serves to mark the age, gave occasion to a fresh dispute between Cicero and his enemy Clodius. Upon a report, that horrid noises and clashing of arms had been heard under ground, in one of the suburbs, the senate thought proper to take the subject under consideration; and they referred it for interpretation to the college of augurs. This body delivered in judgment, that the gods were offended, among other things, by the neglect and profanation of holy rites, and by the prostitution of sacred places to profane uses. This response Clodius endeavoured to apply to the case of Cicero's house, once consecrated and set apart for religion, and now again profaned by being restored to its former owner. Cicero endeavoured to remove the charge of profanation from himself to Clodius, by reviving the memory of his famous adventure in Cæsar's house. "If I quote any more recent act of impiety," says he, "this citizen will recal me to the former instance, in which he intended no more than adultery." He proceeded, however, to apply the response of the augurs to a more late adventure of Clodius, in alarming the theatre, at the head of an armed rabble, while the games were celebrating in honour of the great goddess.

The senate, for two days together, listened to the mutual invective of these parties, and were entertained with their endeavours to surpass each other in declarations of zeal for the sacred rites which had been profaned. Cicero, however, by the goodness of his cause, the force of his admirable talents, and, perhaps, still more by the aid of the triumvirate, who were at this time at variance with Clodius, prevailed in the contest.

This martyr in the cause of the senate, ever since his return from banishment, had courted the formidable parties, whose power, at least to hurt, he had experienced. He committed, or affected to commit himself entirely into the hands of Pompey; and, with a declaration of much attachment also to the party, composed a flattering panegyric on Cæsar, which this leader received with great pleasure,* probably more on ac-

* Cicero, ad Att. lib. iv. epist. 5.

count of the breach it was likely to make among his opponents in the senate, than on account of any satisfaction he otherwise received from it, or of any real accession of strength it gave him, in the pursuit of his designs. By this conduct, indeed, Cicero disgusted his former friends, and felt his situation in the city so painful, that he absented himself during great part of the summer; a circumstance which interrupted the course, or changed the subject, of those letters to which we are indebted for the best record or account of the times.

We have great reason to regret any interruption of materials, from which the history of a consulate so interesting as the present could be collected. The republic seems in part to have recovered its dignity, by the able and resolute conduct of Marcellinus, and by the tacit concurrence of his colleague Philippus, who, though connected with Cæsar, did not co-operate in the projects of his party.* By the influence of these consuls the applications made to the senate by Gabinius, now commanding in Syria, for certain customary honours, were rejected.† This refusal was intended to mortify Pompey, who protected Gabinius, and who himself was commonly treated by Marcellinus with great freedom and severity. Those who opposed the triumvirs recovered their courage, and Domitius Ahenobarbus, by their influence, was in a fair way to succeed in his election for consul of the following year. While the tribunes, conducted chiefly by a Cato, one of their number, distinguished from his more respectable namesake by the appellation of Caius, indirectly supported their cause, by proposing many regulations in behalf of what was called the popular interest. The consul Marcellinus endeavoured to mar or interrupt their proceedings, by the appointment of fasts and holidays, in which it was not lawful to transact affairs in the assembly of the people. The tribunes, in their turn, suspended the election of consuls, and in this were encouraged by Pompey and Crassus, who feared the effect of a choice to be made under the direction of Marcellinus, and had not yet ventured to declare their own intentions to offer themselves. But their late interview with Cæsar, and the part they had

* Cic. ad Quint. Frat. lib. ii. ep. 6.

† Ibid. ep. 7.

taken in consequence, had created suspicion of their views. Marcellinus put the question to Pompey in the senate, Whether he desired the consulate for himself? And this politician, long unaccustomed to make plain declarations, answered indirectly, That if there were no ill-disposed citizens in the commonwealth, he should have no such desire. Crassus, to the same question, made a like evasive reply, That he should be governed by what he judged best for the state. Both appeared to have perceived that they were to rely for success chiefly on popular tumults; and as these would come to be employed with great disadvantage against such an able and resolute magistrate as Marcellinus, they took measures to defer the elections until the term of the present consuls in office should elapse.*

They found the tribune Caius Cato a proper instrument for their purpose, secured his negative, and employed it repeatedly to suspend the elections. The republic, upon the approach of the new year, being to lose its former magistrates, without any succession of new ones, was likely to fall into a state of great confusion. The senate went into mourning, and discharged every member from assisting at any of the public entertainments or shows. In this state of suspense and alarm, Publius Clodius, who had for some time been at variance with Pompey, as if gained by the concurrence of measures on this occasion, was reconciled to him, and attacked Marcellinus with continual invectives.

While the year was suffered to pass without any election of consuls, the fasces dropped from the hands of Marcellinus and Philippus, and an interregnum ensued. Pompey and Crassus then openly appeared as candidates for the vacant offices of state. Young Crassus coming from the army in Gaul, attended by a numerous body of citizens then serving under Cæsar, brought a considerable accession of votes to the party of their general, and were themselves not likely to be outstripped by their opponents in acts of sedition or violence. Domitius Ahenobarbus alone, supported by the councils of Marcus Cato, who was his kinsman, had the courage to per-

* Dio. lib. xxxix. c. 37.

sist in a contest with these powerful and dangerous antagonists. The time of election being fixed, this candidate went, before break of day, to occupy his place in the field of Mars, but found his way already obstructed by a disorderly populace, and even by men in arms. The slave who carried a light before him was killed. Some of his friends, particularly Marcus Cato, was wounded;* and his adherents, not being in condition to dispute the ground with such a force as was assembled against them, retired to their own houses, leaving Pompey and Crassus to be named without opposition.

In the same manner the faction of the triumvirate overruled every other election, procured the preference, which has already been mentioned, of Vatinius to Marcus Cato, and filled every office with their own creatures. They prevailed in the appointment of ædiles by actual force, and at the expense of the lives of some of those who opposed them. Pompey himself, having been entangled in one of these tumults, retired to change his clothes, which were stained with blood. They were overpowered in the nomination only of two of the tribunes, Publius Acquilius Gallus and Atteius Capito, in whose election the aristocratical party prevailed.

These events, however, were, by the contest which arose on every question, deferred for all the months of winter U. C. 698 and spring. The offices of prætor were not filled up by the middle of May.† The elections had begun, for this purpose, some time before; but it being observed that Marcus Cato had the first centuries, Pompey, under a pretence, allowed by the Roman superstition, that he was to observe the heavens, interposed to suspend the ballot. The faction employed the time which they obtained by this delay in procuring votes, and were so unguarded in giving money, that they laid themselves open to a criminal prosecution, and had reason to apprehend that whatever election they made would be disputed before the tribunals of justice. To prevent this consequence, Afranius, a person entirely under the direction of Pompey, moved in the assembly of the people for a dispensation from the statute of bribery, in the case of elections then depending for the office of prætor; and having obtained

* Plutarch. in Crass. Pompeio, &c. † Cicer. ad. Quint. Frat. lib. ii. ep. 9.

this extraordinary indulgence, secured to the party the fruits of their influence and of their money.*

Among the acts of Pompey and Crassus, in their second consulate, are mentioned some regulations respecting the courts of justice, by which the juries, though taken in equal numbers from the senate, the equestrian order, and the mass of the people, were nevertheless limited to persons of considerable property. There are likewise mentioned some resolutions, then passed, to enforce the laws against murder, and to amend those against bribery by additional penalties, together with a sumptuary law to check the extravagance and prodigality of the age. "So willing were these magistrates," said Hor-tensius, "to compensate by the laws they enacted for the defects of their own practice, that they made laws even to limit the expense of the table." Such professions to reform the age were, probably, intended to retrieve the character which the popular leaders had lost by the violence and bare-faced corruption of their recent canvass, and to mark their administration with some measures that might seem to disprove the imputations of libertinism, commonly laid to their charge.

Pompey, at the same time, had an opportunity to signalize his consulate, by opening, during the present year, the magnificent theatre which he himself, or his freedman Demetrius, had erected for the accommodation of the people at the public shows. At this solemnity were brought on the stage many dramatic performances, and other exhibitions of a different sort. Among these, in the course of five days, no less than five hundred lions were let loose and killed by African hunters; and the whole concluded with the baiting of eighteen elephants, animals that seemed to have sagacity enough to be conscious of the indignity and the wrong which they suffered. By their piteous cries they moved compassion in the breasts even of that barbarous rabble, for whose entertainment they were slain.†

The allotment of provinces, which was the principal object of this consulate, was for some time kept from the view of the

* Cicero ad Quint. Frat.

† Dio. lib. xxxix.—Cicero ad Familiar. lib. vii.—Plin. lib. viii. c. 7.

people. Pompey continued to profess that he did not intend to accept of any province whatever. But the public did not give credit to such declarations on his part; and his own partisans were as usual prepared to press upon him what they knew he wished, but affected to decline.* Every one, therefore, in all conversations, endeavoured to accommodate him in a province, some with Syria, others with Spain and Africa; to all which suggestions, or officious projects, he affected indifference, or even aversion. Trebonius, meanwhile tribune of the people, made a motion, which was soon understood to be the real mind of his authors, and the actual result of their counsels: that the province of Syria should be assigned to Crassus; that of Spain, together with Africa, to Pompey; and, not to fall short of Cæsar's appointment in Gaul, each of them to continue for five years, with such establishments of men and of money as the necessity of the service, during that period, might require. This motion was made in execution of the original plan concerted with Cæsar, and it served to bring into light the object of their late consultation at Lucca, which had so much alarmed the friends of the republic.

On the day that this arrangement was proposed in the assembly, Marcus Cato, by means of the tribunes Atteius Capito and Acquilius Gallus, obtained leave to address the people. He endeavoured to disappoint the faction by occupying so much of their time as to prevent their coming to any decision. Being commanded silence, and still persisting to speak, he was ordered by Trebonius into custody. In this manner, however, the time of the first meeting was spent, and the assembly adjourned to the following day.

The tribunes Atteius and Gallus, suspecting that means might be used to exclude them from the assembly which was then to be held, took measures to secure their admission. For this purpose Gallus remained all night in the senate-house, which fronted the comitium, or place of popular assembly. But this device was turned against himself; the opposite party having placed a guard to confine him where he was. His colleague Atteius, with Marcus Cato, Favonius,

* Cicero, ad Att. lib. iv. ep. 9.

and some others, eluded the parties that were placed to intercept them, and found their way to the place of assembly. When the question was put, Cato, being lifted up into view by those of his friends who were near him, gave an alarm that it thundered; an intimation ever held by the superstition of the Romans to be ominous, and sufficient to suspend their procedure in any business of state. He was, however, on this occasion, forced from the comitium, with the slaughter of some of his friends, who resisted the force that was employed against them. About the same time the tribune *Acquilius* was wounded in attempting to force his way from the senate-house, and a great concourse of people was forming around him, as he stood bleeding in the streets. Violence to the person of a tribune was still considered with religious horror, and the consuls, in whose behalf this tumult had been raised, fearing the consequence of suffering such a spectacle to remain in the view of the people, ordered the multitude to withdraw, and, affecting concern for the accident, removed the tribune, still bleeding of his wounds.

In the sequel of these operations, *Pompey* and *Crassus* having obtained the provinces allotted to themselves, and in the terms proposed, proceeded to fulfil their part of the late engagement to *Cæsar*, by moving, that his command should be continued during an additional term of five years. "Now, indeed," said Cato (addressing himself to *Pompey*), "the burden is preparing for your own shoulders. It will one day fall on the republic; but not till after it has crushed you to the ground."

These arrangements being made, the consuls, in the prospect of vacating their office of magistracy in the city, proceeded to anticipate the charge of their respective trusts. *Pompey*, the newly-named proconsul of Spain, under pretence of a war subsisting with the *Vacceii*, raised the establishment of his province to four legions, two of which, the subject of much animadversion hereafter, *Cæsar*, under pretence of more urgent service in Gaul, had the address to borrow from him.

Pompey either had not yet begun to perceive what Cato suggested, that the greatest difficulty he had to apprehend,

in preserving the eminence to which he aspired, was the competition of Cæsar, and that the sword must determine the contest between them; or he flattered himself that, like the person who stays at the helm, he was to command the vessel; and that, by remaining at the seat of government, while his associates and rivals accepted of appointments at a distance, he continued to preside as sovereign, or supreme head of the republic. Under the influence of these conceptions, although his proper station was Spain, he either procured, or at least availed himself of, a motion that was made by some of the tribunes to detain him in Italy; and fancied, that while he sent his own lieutenants, Afranius and Petreius, as private agents for himself in that province, even Cæsar and Crassus, though in the command of formidable armies, were to act in a subordinate station to himself, who should appear, by residing at Rome, to have the supreme direction of their operations, as well as other affairs of state.

Crassus ever considered riches as the chief constituents of power; and he expected, with the spoils of Asia, to equal the military or political advantages that were likely to be acquired by his rivals in Europe. From the levies and other preparations which he made for his province, it soon appeared that he intended a war with the Parthians, the only antagonists which the Romans had left to dispute their progress even to India itself. Observing that he was likely to meet with an opposition to this design from the senate, and from the tribunes, who exerted their powers to interrupt his preparations, or took measures to detain him at home, he became the more impatient to set out for his province, and left Rome even before the full expiration of the year for which he was elected into the office of consul. The tribune Atteius endeavoured to stop him, first by his tribunitian negative, next by actual force, and, last of all, by solemn imprecations, devoting the leader himself, and all who should follow him on that service, to destruction.

While the consul passed through the gates of Rome, on his intended departure for Asia, this tribune, with a lighted fire, the usual form of devoting a victim to the infernal gods, denounced a curse, which greatly alarmed many of those who

were destined with Crassus on this expedition. This piece of superstition he might, in his own mind, have justly condemned: but it was imprudent to slight the effects of it on the minds of the people, and on the minds of his own army. In the apprehension of both, he was, by this form, in a manner doomed to destruction; and proceeded in the war, at the head of troops ill-prepared to ward off calamities which they were thus made to believe hung over them, in consequence of imprecations of which they were not disposed to doubt the effect.

CHAPTER XXII.

State of the Commonwealth.—Administration of the Provinces.—Operations of Cæsar in Gaul, Germany, and Britain.—State of Pompey at Rome.—Progress of Crassus into Syria.—Kingdom of Parthia.—Invasion of Crassus beyond the Euphrates.—Second Invasion of Cæsar in Britain.

THE provincial appointments of Pompey and Crassus, with that which was at the same time prolonged to Cæsar, seemed to dismember the empire, if not to expose the republic itself to imminent danger.

Of these three adventurers, Pompey and Cæsar, apart from the evil particularly apprehended in any of the measures they pursued, were in themselves subjects of a very dangerous character. Neither possessed that dignity of mind which disdains every advantage beyond that of equal justice; neither could acquiesce in the same measures of consideration or power which other senators had enjoyed before him; neither could be at ease where he did not command as master, or appear at least as the principal personage in every scene in which he was employed.

This paltry ambition, some ages before, might have been held in contempt by the meanest of the people, or must have shrunk before that noble elevation of mind by which the statesman conceived no eminence besides that of high personal qualities employed in public services, or before that austere virtue, which confined the public esteem to acts of public utility, supported by unblemished reputation in private life. But, in the present age, there was a fashion which set such antiquated notions at defiance, controled the authority of the state itself, and bestowed on private adventurers the attachment which belonged to the commonwealth, and the deference which was due only to the laws of their country.

In the progress of this republic the character of parties has already repeatedly changed, and the danger to be apprehended from them accordingly varied.

In the first periods of its history, citizens were divided on the supposed distinctions of birth; and, in the quality of patrician or plebeian, strove for prerogative or privilege, with much emulation, as separate orders of men in the commonwealth, but with little jealousy of personal interests.

In a subsequent period, when the invidious part of the former distinction was removed, citizens, having no longer the same subject of animosity, as being born to different pretensions, they entered more fully on the competition of individuals, and the formation of separate factions. They strove for the ascendant of aristocratical or democratical government, according to the interest they had formed to themselves in the prevalence of either. They were ready to sacrifice the peace and honour of the public to their own passions, and entered into disputes accordingly, which were in the highest degree dangerous to the commonwealth. They thought personal provocations were sufficient to justify public disorders; or, actuated by vehement animosities, they signalized their victories with the blood of their antagonists. But, though sanguinary and cruel in their immediate executions, they formed no deliberate plans of usurpation to enslave their country, nor formed a system of evils to continue beyond the outrage into which they themselves were led by their supposed personal wrongs or factious resentments.

We are now again once more to change the scene, and to have under our consideration the conduct of men who were in reality as indifferent to any interest of party as they were to that of the republic, or to any object of state; who had no resentments to gratify; or who easily sacrificed those which they felt to the purposes of a cool and deliberate design on the sovereignty of their country. Though rivals, they could occasionally enter into combinations for mutual support, frequently changed their partisans, and had no permanent quarrel but with those who uniformly wished to preserve the republic. They were surrounded by persons who admired the advantages of wealth or of power, which might be obtained at the expense of their country, and who, indeed, were ready to extol the virtues of any adventurer who could lead a numerous

list of retainers to share with himself in the spoils of the commonwealth.

Peace had now, for some years, except in that part where Cæsar commanded, been established throughout the empire. Instead of military operations, the state was occupied in directing the farms of the revenue, in hearing complaints of oppression from the provinces, and in appointing the succession of military governors. Besides the disputes which have been mentioned relating to the provincial appointments of Crassus and Cæsar, there arose a question on the subject of provinces to be assigned to their immediate predecessors in the consulate, Marcellinus and Philippus. It was strongly urged that Piso, Gabinius, and even Cæsar himself, should be recalled, to make way for officers who were intitled to similar command in their turns. This measure was supported in part by Cicero, who vehemently contended, that Piso and Gabinius should be superseded; but urged the continuance of Cæsar in his station; a circumstance for which this able adventurer had taken sufficient precaution not to leave it in hazard from the issue of this debate.

Piso, the near relation of Cæsar, in the event of these deliberations, was actually recalled, and, upon his return to the city, complained to the senate, in terms of great asperity, of the injury done to his character. Cicero had ever treated Piso and Gabinius, though in reality but the instruments of Pompey and Cæsar, as the principal authors of his own calamities; and, upon the present occasion, had pronounced against Piso that violent invective which still remains among his works, and which the subsequent conduct of the person, against whom it was directed, in a great measure disproved.

Gabinius had for some years enjoyed the government of Syria, and during this time had ventured to employ the force of his province in a manner which, together with some other offences, drew upon him, at his return to Rome, the animadversion of the senate.

It has been mentioned, that Ptolemy Auletes, king of Egypt, in exile from his kingdom, had applied to the Romans for aid in recovering his crown; that his suit had been granted, but rendered ineffectual by the regard which was paid to

a supposed oracle, which forbade his being reinstated with a military force; that he had withdrawn to Ephesus, and taken sanctuary in the celebrated temple of that place, where he waited for some change of fortune in his favour. Lentulus, the governor of Cilicia, to whom the business of restoring him, though without military force, had been committed by the senate, deliberated whether he should not venture to disregard the restriction imposed upon him; march with an army to restore the king of Egypt; possess himself of the wealth which was to be found in effecting such a revolution; and trust to the influence of his friends at Rome in procuring his pardon from the senate, and even their approbation of what he should do.

Upon this question Cicero advised Lentulus, if he had a force sufficient to undertake the enterprise, not to lose an opportunity of performing a service which, though not authorised, could be afterwards vindicated. But the business still remained in suspense, when Gabinius arrived in Syria; and, probably, by an advice from Pompey to the same purpose with that of Cicero to Lentulus, undertook, in opposition to a decree of the senate and of the augurs, the restoration of this exile to his throne. Having received or bargained for a great sum of money, in return for this service, he advanced with a fleet and an army towards Egypt, passed through Palestine, and, on his way, raised a contribution in that country.

Berenicé, the daughter of Ptolemy, now in possession of the crown, had married Archelaus; and, in order to strengthen her hands against her father, had assumed her husband as a partner in the throne. But the forces of these associated sovereigns were defeated by Gabinius, and Ptolemy was restored to his kingdom. Gabinius, with the treasure amassed on this occasion, hoped to be secure against the attacks which, at his return to Rome, were likely to be made upon him, for his contempt of the senate and of the oracle, and for the extortion of which he was accused at the same time in Palestine, a part of his own province.

In this busy time of Cæsar's faction at Rome, he himself, upon the alarm of an invasion from Germany, had been called to defend the northern extremity of Gaul. Two separate

bordes, the *Tenchteri* and *Usupetæ*, pretending to be driven by superior force from the usual tract of their own migrations, had united together, and presented themselves on the banks of the Rhine. The natives on the right bank of that river instantly abandoned their habitations, and, collecting all the boats that could be found to the opposite side, made a disposition to stop the passage of these invaders.

The Germans observing the precautions which were taken to resist them, affected to lay aside the design of passing the Rhine; and, by changing their course, made a feint to divert the attention of their antagonists. In execution of this purpose, they continued for three days to retire from the river. At the end of this time, supposing that their opponents would be off their guard, or returned to their ordinary way of life, they suddenly changed their direction, and in one night re-passed the ground over which they had marched on the three preceding day, surprised a sufficient number of boats with which to accomplish their passage, dislodged the natives of the country on the left of the river before them, and from thence continued their migrations betwixt the Rhine and the Meuse, over what is now called the duchies of Juliers, of Limburg, and Luxemburg.

These invaders amounted, by Cæsar's account, to upwards of four hundred thousand souls;* a number which exceeds that of the inhabitants of any city in Europe, besides London and Paris, and which may perhaps raise some suspicion of error in copying the text, or of exaggeration in the commentary, which was itself intended to raise the character of Cæsar at Rome. But, on the question relating to the probability of so great a number, it may be observed, that those migrating nations, certainly unacquainted with many of the arts which are practised to supply and to accommodate populous cities, were likewise exempt from the want of such supplies, and acquiesced in what was necessary to mere subsistence. Such nations have less skill and industry than the manufacturer and the trader in a settled and well-regulated city; but they have less waste and less misapplication of labour to superflu-

* Cæsar. de Bell. Gal. lib. iv. c. 15.

ous and unprofitable purposes than take place in times of luxury or refined accommodation.

The German nations of this age, although they had opportunities to observe among their neighbours the advantages of land-property, and of agriculture supported by skill and industry, yet frequently preferred the state of migration, and from policy declined making any permanent settlement, lest the care of property, and the studies of ease and convenience, should corrupt or enervate their people. Their favourite occupation was hunting, which they considered as a preparation for war. They traversed the woods and pasture lands, with numerous herds, and subsisted chiefly by milk, flesh, and game. They likewise knew the use of corn, of which they sometimes took a crop from favourable lands; but without remaining beyond the period of a single seed-time and harvest to cultivate any particular portion of ground.

They moved in great and numerous bodies, which must, to a great extent, have covered the face of the country over which they passed; but the multitude, thus moving as one body, was distinguished into separate clans and fraternities, led by their headmen or chiefs, who kept order in their several divisions. They allowed private parties to make war beyond the limits of their own country, and to choose their leaders for this purpose. But, in peace, the separate clans had no band of connection. If they had, at any time, a general government, which comprehended the whole of their tribes, it was but a temporary expedient, to which they had recourse in military adventures, and on other pressing occasions.

Under such equality of conditions, every individual, who was of a proper age, was obliged to labour for himself, and to subsist by what he procured; and he employed his labour only in procuring what was necessary. In these circumstances, it was not likely that commodities should accumulate; but the numbers of the people, if we may rely on the testimony of Cæsar in this place, or on the evidence of ancient history in general, was certainly great.*

* Cæsar de Bell. Gal. lib. iv. 6.

The Suevi, before whom the present invaders of Gaul had retired, were said to consist of a hundred cantons, each furnishing annually a thousand men for war, and a like number for the care of their herds and domestic concerns. Such clouds, gathering on the frontier of Cæsar's province, required his presence. He, accordingly, assembled his army, and advanced to observe them between the Rhine and the Meuse.

The Germans, in general, were accustomed to despise the Gauls, and the present invaders expected no formidable opposition on this side of the Rhine. They had ventured to divide their forces, had sent the great body of their horse upon an excursion beyond the Meuse, to scour the lower parts of the country; and, upon Cæsar's approach, they offered to treat of an alliance with him. "They neither sought, (they said) nor would they decline, a war with the Romans. It was their way to repel injuries with the sword, not to elude them by negotiation. But, in the present case, they should, nevertheless, condescend so far as to assure the Roman general, that they had passed the Rhine from necessity, and not with any intention to invade his province. That if he were pleased to receive them as friends, they were in condition to merit this title, should be content with the ground they had gained, or accept of any other which he might choose to assign them." Cæsar replied, "That while they remained in Gaul, he could not consider them as friends. That if they repassed the Rhine, he had allies in Germany, with whom he should endeavour to join them in a league of defence against any enemy, by whom they had been thus forced to relinquish their usual bounds."

Having received this answer, the German deputies, to make their report, and to receive the command of their nations, desired a cessation of arms for three days. But Cæsar, suspecting that they only meant to amuse him, and to gain time for the junction of all their forces, refused to comply with this request, and continued his march. Being arrived within twelve miles of their camp, he was again met by their deputies, with fresh intreaties that he would advance no farther, or, at least, that he would give to the cavalry, who

made the van-guard of his army, orders to abstain from hostilities for three days: that in this time, they might have an answer from the German nations mentioned in their last conference, and know whether such a league could be formed, as was then proposed, to give them some prospect of safety in returning to their usual haunts.

Cæsar, upon this occasion, seems to have granted a cessation of arms; though, on account of what afterwards happened, he is willing to diminish the extent of his own engagement, and to impute the breach of faith which followed to his enemies. He agreed to advance no farther than four miles, for the convenience of water, and sent an order to his van-guard to abstain from hostilities. This order, however, had no effect. His advanced-guard, consisting of five thousand horse, had an encounter with eight hundred of the enemy.

When this encounter happened, the Germans were not yet joined by the great body of their horse. They had earnestly sued for a cessation of hostilities; it was not likely that they would have begun the attack. Yet Cæsar accused them of a design, with this small party, to surprise the whole of his cavalry.

On the day which followed this skirmish of the cavalry, or the parties advanced, the leaders and principal men of the Germans, leaving their own camp, without officers, in perfect security, came in great numbers to that of Cæsar, to exculpate themselves of what had passed on the preceding day, to convince him of their own pacific dispositions, and to deprecate the further progress of his army. This he thought a favourable opportunity to cut off, by a complete surprise, this enemy entirely, and to finish the war. Having, accordingly, secured the persons of their leaders, who had thus unwarily put themselves in his hands, he advanced with his whole army directly to their camp, easily overcame the few that took arms to oppose him, and without distinction of sex or age, put the whole to the sword. The country, over all the ways by which they endeavoured to escape from the camp, at which the slaughter began, to the confluence of the Rhine or Wall, and the Meuse, was strewed with the slain.*

* That branch of the Rhine, which falls into the Meuse, changes its name for that of Wall.

when an accident happened, which encouraged them again to resist.

On the fourth day after the Roman infantry had landed, a second division of ships, with the cavalry, appeared in sight ; but before they could reach the shore, were dispersed by a violent storm : part was driven back towards Gaul, part carried down the British channel, and cast in distress on the contiguous coast. Even the shipping, from which the legions had disembarked, lying aground in the surf, or at anchor in a high sea and spring-tide, circumstances with which the Italians were little acquainted, were set adrift, or filled with water, many of them beat to pieces or greatly shattered, and rendered unserviceable.

By these misfortunes, Cæsar, although he had made no provision to subsist for the winter in Britain, was in danger of being obliged to remain in the island for want of shipping. The natives retracted their late submission, began to drive away the cattle, and to lay waste the country within reach of his camp. They flattered themselves that he would be obliged to depart, or must perish for want of provisions ; and that they would, by the example of so vain and calamitous an attempt, deter every enemy for the future from invading their country.

Cæsar, in the mean time, while he employed all his workmen with the greatest diligence in repairing his ships, endeavoured to collect some provisions, and to form a magazine. The natives assembled in great bodies to intercept his foragers, and obliged him to cover every party employed on this service with the force of his army. The legions were at first greatly disconcerted by the unusual effect of the British chariots, and by the want of their own cavalry ; but as they prevailed in every close fight, the Britons were driven to renew their former submission, and became bound to deliver double the number of hostages they had formerly stipulated. Victorious, however, as this mighty commander has recorded himself, not thinking it proper, with shattered vessels, at the mercy of autumnal winds and stormy seas, to await the performance of this article, he ordered the hostages to be sent after him into Gaul, reimbarbed with his army, and with the first

favourable wind repassed to the continent. At his arrival, he found that the Gauls, upon the report of his late misfortunes, had revolted; that one of his transports, with three hundred men on board, having parted with the fleet, and landing at a separate place, was attacked; and that it was necessary to send the remains of his cavalry to their relief. The Morini, inhabiting what are now the districts of Calais and Dunkirk, with other nations of the low countries, had taken arms against the officers he had stationed in his absence to keep them in awe. The campaign, therefore, concluded with the operations which were necessary to quell this revolt. Labienus subdued the Morini. Quintus Titurius Sabinus, and Lucius Cotta, having recovered possession of the interior country, fell back to the coast.

The Roman army was soon after put into winter quarters; and Cæsar, as if sensible that he had made his attempt on Britain with too small a force, and, whatever representation he might give of particulars, had incurred the imputation of a miscarriage, gave orders to refit his fleet, and to add, during the winter, as many more ships as possible, built upon a construction more fit for the service to which they were destined; broader, and more capacious in the hull, for the reception of men and horses, and lower in the gunwale, for the convenience of landing. The timber was, probably, taken from the neighbouring forests; but the materials of his rigging, it is said, were brought from Spain. Having taken these measures to enable him at a more convenient season to renew his expedition into Britain, he set out as usual for Italy and his winter station in the neighbourhood of Rome.

Here he found Pompey and Crassus employed, as has been already related, in accomplishing for themselves, and for him, the objects which they had severally in view. Crassus had fixed his thoughts on the treasures of the East, and projected the sale of kingdoms, of which he hoped to have the disposal in that part of the world. Pompey still more especially was gratified in his wishes; being stationed to act for the party, with a degree of consideration and majesty, little short of monarchy, at Rome; while he obtained a separate military establishment, and the patronage of a mighty province for

vanity in the leader, we must admire the hardness and vigour of the troops who could accomplish these services.

The extent of this island, the numbers and character of its people, were then unknown on the continent. Cæsar having in vain endeavoured to procure information in these particulars, sent a galley with orders to explore the coast, and to observe the countenance of the natives. He ordered all his shipping, and even those vessels which he had employed the preceding year against the Veneti,* to sail round the Cape of Brittany into the British channel, and repair to the straits which separate this island from the continent.

On the report of these preparations, which evidently pointed at Britain, some of the natives, willing to avert, by negotiation, the storm which threatened them, sent to the Roman proconsul a submissive message, and offered to come under his protection.

Cæsar, founding a claim to the possession of the island on these advances, which were made to him, proceeded with more boldness to the execution of his enterprise. In order that the natives of the country he was leaving behind him might not create any trouble in his absence, he obliged them to give hostages, and made a proper disposition of his army to keep them in awe. He had assembled, at the most convenient haven on the Gaulish side, now supposed to be the Wissan, between Calais and Boulogne,† eighty transports or ships of burden, with a number of galleys to accommodate the officers of rank and their equipage. The remainder of his shipping was yet detained, by contrary winds, in a creek at some distance, supposed to be Boulogne; thither he sent his cavalry, with orders to embark on board the ships where they lay. He himself went on board, with the infantry of two legions, at the former haven, and having found a favourable wind with moderate weather, weighed about ten at night, and reached the coast of Britain on the following day, at ten in the morning. The cliffs, where he first approached the shore, were high and steep, and the hills were covered with

* In the Bay of Biscay, about Vannes.

† See Danville's Geography of ancient Gaul.

numerous bodies of men, on foot, on horseback, and even in wheel-carriages, a species of machine on which the natives of this country were accustomed to make war. It being impossible to land under such difficulties, and in the face of this opposition, he bore away, as is probable, to the northward, about eight miles, with a favourable wind, to some part of the flat shore* which is contiguous to the Downs; and here, in the manner of ancient debarkations, for which the shipping of those times was built, ran his transports aground, and prepared to land.

In the meantime the Britons, who, in their march on the hills, had kept pace with the Roman galleys, came down to the strand, and advanced even some way into the water to oppose the descent. As the surf on that shore usually runs high, and the Romans, from where their vessels struck, had some way to wade in water too deep to allow them the free use of their arms, they durst not meet the enemy under such disadvantages, and remained on board. Cæsar, seeing his men unusually backward, did not think proper in these circumstances to urge them further; but ordered some of the lightest vessels, which were mounted with missile engines, or manned with archers and slingers, to row as near to the shore as they had water on the right and left of the landing place, and from thence to gall the enemy. This disposition had the effect to clear the way for his men to descend from their ships; but they were still slow to avail themselves of the opportunity; until the bearer of a standard, plunging into the water, and calling aloud for those who were near, to follow, if they meant to save a Roman eagle from falling into the hands of the enemy, numbers at once, from different ships, and without any order, obeyed this call, and the islanders, notwithstanding the advantage of the ground, and the superiority of their numbers, both on horseback and on foot, withdrew from the landing-place, and soon after disappeared. Seeing their enemy thus in possession of the land, they, in a few days, even offered to surrender, and were about to deliver their hostages,

* *Planum et apertum littus.* See Cæsar's Commentaries.

when an accident happened, which encouraged them again to resist.

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himself, abroad. In this new distribution, Cæsar appears to have been least considered: but he had already provided, what he knew in the end was to decide every controversy, a great army, inured to service, and in a station which gave an easy access to Italy, and the command of Rome. As if secure of their interests, therefore, they permitted the election of consuls to proceed without disturbance; and suffered Lucius Domitius Ahenobarbus, a professed partisan of the senate, together with Appius Claudius, to be elected consuls; Marcus Cato, and Milo, to be placed in the list of prætors; and several citizens, well affected to the senate, to be admitted into the college of tribunes.

The winter and spring, however, were inactive on the part of the aristocracy. Cato, probably, did not see any public object in which to engage with advantage beyond the duties of his office, in which he endeavoured to restrain, by his authority and by his example, the extravagance and luxury of the age. The dangerous powers which had been recently granted to persons, from whose ambition the republic had so much to fear, no doubt, greatly alarmed the senate; but this body, though led by Domitius, one of the consuls, by Cato and Milo, two of the prætors, and supported by many of the tribunes, either did not think themselves entitled to dispute the validity of those grants, nor to attempt the revocation of what had been so recently confirmed by the people, or perhaps thought themselves happy in the supposed removal of so many factious adventurers from the scene of affairs at Rome.

Even in this, Pompey disappointed their hopes; though now master of Spain and part of Africa, with an adequate army, still under the pretence, as has been mentioned, of his commission to furnish the public granaries with corn, he remained in Italy, and passed the greater part of his time among his country villas, executing the duties of general purveyor, with the assistance of his lieutenants, and managing his intrigues in the city by means of his agents and friends. He was attended by numbers of every rank and condition, who resorted to him with the assiduity of courtiers, and with a servility, which seemed to place the sovereignty in his hands. He even

maintained the appearance of a monarch in the state which he assumed, as well as in the influence he acquired. While he affected reserve and moderation, in order to appear worthy of his rank, his retainers ever treated him as a great prince, and with his connivance fomented disorders tending to shake the government of the senate; in order that the republic might be forced to rely on him for support, while he himself affected to decline the burden.

In the management of these intrigues, and in the full hopes of their success, Pompey was now left, seemingly, at the helm of affairs by Crassus, as well as by Cæsar. The first, in his impatience to take possession of his government, had broken through all the impediments already mentioned, that were placed to hinder his departure from Rome, made haste to Brundisium with his army, embarked, notwithstanding the unfavourableness of the season, and, with considerable loss, both of men and of shipping, in a storm, made his passage into Macedonia. The prohibition of the tribune still sounded in his ears. He dreaded a vote of the senate or people to recal his commission. It appears, indeed, that soon after his departure, a motion had been actually made for this purpose; and that Cicero, though formerly on ill terms with Crassus, being taught by his late sufferings to court the favour of those who at least could hurt, if they could not protect him, appeared on this question in his favour, and claimed a share in the merit of obtaining the decision that was given to confirm the commission* under which he was already set out for the East.

But without attending to the issue of these deliberations at Rome, Crassus continued his march by Macedonia and the Hellespont into Asia. In passing through Galatia, finding Dejotarus, sovereign of that principality, then of an advanced age, occupied in a work that is becoming at every age, devising the plan of a new city, and making a settlement for increased population; he is said to have observed to this veteran, that it was somewhat too late, at his age, to be forming new projects of settlement; "nor are you very early," replied "the other, "in your undertaking of a conquest in Parthia."

* Cicero, ad Famil. lib. v. ep. 8. ad Crassum.

Crassus was turned of sixty, and having ever considered riches as the surest means of arriving at eminence and power, now joined, to the rapacity of a youthful ambition, the avarice of age. Upon his arrival in Syria, he pillaged the temple of the Jews, and laid hold of treasure wherever else he could find it. He made a pretence of the military levies to be made in the provinces for extorting money ; and afterwards, reserving the money for his own use, neglected the levies. He exacted, from the different districts of his province, and from the neighbouring allies, large quotas of men and military stores, merely that they might buy exemptions with proportional sums of money.* In the same spirit of avarice and rapacity he invaded the Parthians, without any authority from the state, and even without the pretence of a quarrel.

The Parthians, like other dynasties which before or since have arisen in that part of the world, or in the neighbourhood of the Euphrates and the Tigris, were of Scythian extraction. On the decline of the Macedonian power, about two hundred years before the present date, a swarm from the north had migrated to the lower banks of the Tigris, over-ran the country round Ctesiphon, continued to harass the neighbourhood by their depredations ; and, at last, being commanded Arsaces, the founder of this new kingdom, took possession of an extensive country, and, though under a new name, in fact restored the monarchy of Persia.†

The Parthian, or new Persian, monarchy, being yet in its vigour, was the most formidable power that now any where appeared within reach of the Roman arms. Its forces consisted almost entirely of horse. Part cased in heavy armour, and using the lance, were intended for regular charges ; part mounted in a lighter manner, for expedition or swiftness, and using the bow. While in the field they were attended by herds of spare horses, which they pastured, or had drove in the rear of their armies. With this supply, upon any occasional loss, they new-mounted their cavalry, or having reliefs

* Plut. in Crasso, 11.—Dio. Cass. lib. iv. c. 13.

† Justin. lib. lxi.—Dio. Cass. lib. xl, xli.

of fresh horses, performed amazing marches, and frequently presented themselves to their enemies, where it was not expected they could appear. They had different notions of victory and defeat from other nations; they always counted it a victory, when, by their own flights, they led an enemy into hasty and unguarded pursuits,* which enabled them to return with advantage from what appeared to be a rout or dispersion of their forces.

When Crassus advanced to the Euphrates, Orodes king of Parthia, then engaged in a war with Artabazus, on the side of Armenia, sent a deputation to expostulate with the Roman general on the cause of his hostile approach. Crassus made answer, that he would give the reasons of his coming when he arrived at Seleucia. "Here," said one of the Parthian deputies (shewing the palm of his hand), "hair will grow, before you shall arrive at Seleucia." Crassus proceeded in his march, passed the Euphrates, and ravaged Mesopotamia, without any resistance. Having continued his operations until the end of the season, he returned for the winter into Syria.† Upon his arrival in this province, he was joined by his son Publius, who had served some years under Cæsar in Gaul, and was now detached by him with a thousand horse, and many marks of honour, to act under his father in Syria.

This invasion of Mesopotamia, after the season was far spent, served only to alarm and provoke the enemy, without procuring any advantage to the arms of the Romans; and hostilities were likely to proceed in the spring with great animosity, when Crassus was to prosecute the war, which he had thus commenced on such dangerous ground.

Cæsar, in the meantime, found continual occupation for his troops in Gaul, or in the neighbourhood of that province. He himself, with his usual activity, having been in Italy in the beginning of winter, and having conferred with the persons with whom he intrusted the management of his affairs at Rome, proceeded to Illyricum, upon a report, that this part of his province was infested by the incursions of the Pырустæ,

* Dio. Cass. lib. xl. c. 15.

† Dio. lib. xl.—Plut. in Crasso.

a warlike tribe on the frontier. Upon his arrival, the invaders of his province withdrew, and were disowned by their own nation. The Pyrustæ denied, that they had ever given a commission to make war on the Roman province, became bound for the future to restrain the depredations of private adventurers, and gave hostages for the observance of this article.

Early in the spring, Cæsar returned from this expedition to the quarters of his army in the low countries, and found, that in consequence of the orders he had given at the end of the preceding campaign, no less than six hundred transport-vessels, and twenty-eight galleys, were actually built in different harbours from Ostend to Boulogne, and in a few days might be ready for sea. He, accordingly, ordered them to be launched, and directed the whole to assemble at the same port from which he had sailed on the preceding year, in order to receive the army on their intended invasion of Britain. But, before his departure, being informed that certain nations on the Moselle were meditating a revolt, and were soliciting the Germans to come over the Rhine to their assistance, in order that he might not leave any enemy on foot in his rear, and that he might secure the peace of Gaul in his absence, he marched to the Moselle with four legions and eight hundred horse. Upon his arrival he had the good fortune to find the people divided between two leaders, who, being jealous of each other, made their submissions separately, and gave the necessary hostages as pledges for their future behaviour.

With these securities, Cæsar returned to the coast, found all his armed galleys and five hundred and sixty of his transports actually assembled; the other forty transports had been put back by contrary winds, and were still retained in the port at which they had been built. The force intended for this expedition to Britain consisted of five legions, amounting possibly, or on the probable supposition that they were not complete, to about twenty thousand men,* together with a body of Gauls, including many of their chiefs, whom Cæsar chose to retain with his army, rather as hostages for the

* The legions, at the end of this campaign, were reduced to 3,500.

fidelity of their countrymen, than as auxiliaries in the war. The fleet consisted of five hundred and sixty transport vessels, twenty-eight armed galleys, with many tenders, and small craft provided by officers for their own accommodation, and for the reception of their equipages; making in all eight hundred sail.

The wind being northerly for five-and-twenty days* after the fleet was assembled, the troops still remained on shore. At the expiration of this time the wind changed, and the troops began to embark, but were suddenly interrupted by the desertion of a Gaulish chief, who, being averse to the service, thought this a favourable opportunity to disengage himself, with his followers. Cæsar considered this desertion as a declaration of war; and being sensible of the danger he might incur, in case of any disaster, by having such enemies in his rear, suspended the embarkation, and sent a party of horse in pursuit of the fugitive, who, being overtaken, was killed in attempting to defend himself. His followers were brought back, and obliged with others of the country to join the forces that were destined for Britain.

On the return of the party employed in this service, the embarkation proceeded, and being completed at sunset of the same day, the wind being still fair, the fleet weighed, and got into the channel; but the wind soon after having failed, or shifted more to the west, and the tide being set to the northward, they were carried a considerable way, in that direction, past the port for which they had steered. At day-break, they saw the land of Britain on their left, and seemed to leave some conspicuous part of the island, probably the south-foreland, astern: but with the turn of the tide, and the help of their oars, they arrived at noon at a convenient part of the coast not far distant from the landing-place of the former year, but less exposed to the sea. This place we may suppose to have been *Pigwell Bay*, beyond the mouth of the Stour, or the entry to Sandwich Haven.†

* See Cæsar's Commentaries.

† M. d'Anville, on a supposition that Cæsar must have passed into Britain by the shortest possible line, fixes upon Hithe, about eight miles west of

The Britons had assembled, as formerly, to oppose the descent of the Romans; but, on the appearance of so great a fleet, were intimidated, and again withdrew from the coast.

Cæsar, flattering himself that he had found a safer road for his ships than that at which he had stationed them in the preceding year, left his fleet at anchor, and guarded against any attempts of the natives by a body of ten cohorts and three hundred horse, who were properly intrenched on the shore. Being informed that the Britons had their forces assembled on a small river (probably the *Stour*), at the distance of ten or twelve miles from his landing-place, he put his army in motion in the night, and at break of day came up with them, dislodged them from their post, and obliged them to withdraw to a place of retreat in that neighbourhood, which, on occasion of their own wars, had been fortified in their manner with a moat, and ramparts of wood. To reduce them in this strong hold, he erected some works, and made regular approaches; but as he had not invested the place, the only effect of his attack was to force the enemy to abandon their station, and to continue their retreat. He had taken his resolution to pursue them on the following day, and had begun his march in three divisions, when it appeared, that the element which so greatly favours the defences of Britain, though not always sufficient to keep its enemies at a distance, yet is subject to accidents which render the attempt of invaders abortive, and their condition, even when on shore, sufficiently hazardous. To this purpose a messenger overtook Cæsar on his march, with tidings, that all his ships, in a storm which arose in the preceding night, had been driven from their anchors, had run foul of one another, that many of them were stranded or wrecked, and all of them greatly damaged.

Dover, as the place of his landing in his first invasion of Britain; and, consequently, on some other contiguous part as the place of his landing in the second invasion: but this does not agree, either with the description of the coast, being *planum et apertum littus*, or with the sequel of the story, which places some such river as the *Stour* to be passed in his march, about twelve miles from where he debarked. The coast at Hithe, though not altogether inaccessible, is steep and hilly, and would have exposed Cæsar to difficulties in his first operations on shore, which he could not possibly have omitted to mention.

On this report, Cæsar suspended his march, and, having fixed the main body of his army in a well-fortified camp, he himself, with a proper escort, returned to the coast. At his arrival, he found that forty of his ships were irrecoverably lost; but that the remainder, though greatly damaged, might be refitted. For this purpose he gave orders in the army, that all who had been instructed in the trade of a carpenter should repair to the sea-port, to be employed in restoring the fleet; he called many workmen likewise from Gaul, and gave directions for building a number of new vessels on different parts of that coast; and to guard, for the future, against such accidents as had lately befallen his ships, he ordered that they should be drawn up on shore. In this work part of the army was incessantly employed for ten days, and without intermission even in the night. The fleet, at length, being in this manner secured from the dangers of the sea, and covered by an intrenchment on the side of the land, he returned to his camp, and resumed the operations he had projected for his farther progress in the island.

It appears that the natives of Britain, being divided into many small cantons or separate principalities, and, as usual in such cases, frequently at war among themselves, had been actually so engaged when Cæsar arrived; but, during the short respite which the disastrous state of his fleet had given them, they had agreed to suspend their own quarrels, and were assembled in greater numbers than formerly, under Cassivelaunus, a chieftain of Middlesex, or, as Cæsar describes him, a prince residing on the northern banks of the Thames, and about seventy or eighty miles from the sea.

This chieftain brought into the field a numerous army of infantry, of horsemen, and armed chariots. His knowledge of the woods enabled him to harrass the Romans on their march, and, following the tracts that were clear of underwood, not only to gall them with missiles from the thickets, but to charge them likewise with his horsemen and chariots, even in places where the ground seemed least fitted to the movement of such bodies. Encouraged with his success in this species of warfare, he ventured to attack the Roman cavalry, which, being on a foraging party, was supported by an entire legion.

But being defeated in this attempt, with great slaughter, he lost courage, or was deserted by his followers, and never more attempted to face the victorious enemy.

Cæsar, finding this chieftain remit his ardour, advanced with a quicker pace. From his silence on the subject of any difficulty in passing the Medway, we must suppose him to have followed the vale of the Stour to Ashford, and from thence to have kept on the plains to Maidstone, near to which place the river Medway is everywhere naturally fordable; and, from the length of his march, being about eighty miles from the sea, when he came upon the banks of the Thames, we may suppose him to have arrived somewhere below where it winds nearly from south to north, between Kingston and Brentford. There he observes, that the only ford in the river was fenced and guarded; having a row of sharp stakes driven under water, and the opposite bank lined with a palisade, which was manned by a numerous body of the natives. He, nevertheless, proceeded to force his way, and by the impetuosity of his attack, drove the enemy from their post, and, without any loss, effected his passage, although his men were obliged to wade up to the chin.

Cassivelaunus had, for some time, made no attempt to resist the Roman army; he had contented himself with observing their motions, and with endeavouring to strip the country before them of every particular by which they could profit on their march. Cæsar, on his part, advanced with the precautions necessary against such an enemy; and, as they had destroyed what could be of immediate use to his army, he destroyed what was left, in order to distress the natives, and force them to submission. In this state of the war, having leisure and opportunity to observe the condition of the country and the manners of the people, he gives the following account of both: "That on the coast there were colonies from the neighbouring continent, still distinguished by the names of the countries from whence they had come; that these colonies, being possessed of agriculture, and well stocked with cattle, were extremely populous; that they had money coined of iron or brass; the first of which metals, with great quantities of tin, were found in their own island; the other metal

“ was imported from abroad; that the winter was milder here
“ than in Gaul; that the woods of Britain furnished the same
“ timber with those of Gaul, except the fir and the beech; and
“ that the houses were built in the same manner in both coun-
“ tries.” From this account of the coast he proceeds to ob-
serve, “ that the inland parts were occupied by the original
“ natives, who, with little corn, subsisted chiefly by milk and
“ the other produce of their herds; that, by a particular
“ superstition, although hares were numerous in the fields,
“ and the country well stocked with geese, and other such
“ fowls, the people were forbid to eat of these animals; that
“ they were curious in the ornaments of the person, affected
“ to have bushy whiskers, and long hair; that they stained or
“ painted their bodies of a blue colour, and had no clothes
“ besides the skins of beasts; that they associated in small
“ clubs or fraternities, of ten or a dozen in number.” And,
with respect to these, adds a circumstance, in which, if he
was not deceived, as is common enough to foreigners, by
some appearances which were not sufficiently explained to
him, he gives a striking example of the diversity which takes
place among mankind in settling the canon of external actions.
The brothers, the father, and the son, though separately mar-
ried, and reputed parents of the children brought forth by
their respective wives, yet, without jealousy or imputation of
evil, cohabited with those wives in common.*

Cæsar, being on the northern bank, or on the left of the
Thames, made an alliance with the Trinobantes, supposed to
have been inhabitants of Essex and Suffolk. The sovereign
of this canton having, in some quarrel with his own people,
been expelled from his kingdom, had taken refuge with Cæsar
in Gaul, and was now, by force of the Roman arms, restored
to his kingdom. Five other principalities made their sub-
mission at the same time. Cassivelaunus retired to his prin-
cipal fortress, which, consisting of a palisade and a ditch,
situate in the least accessible part of the woods, was by the
natives, as Cæsar is pleased to express himself, called a town,
and was in reality, in case of alarm, a place of retreat for

* See Cæsar's Commentaries on his last expedition to Britain.

themselves and their cattle. Upon the approach and attack of Cæsar, Cassivelaunus retired by an outlet on the opposite side of his stronghold, leaving some herds of cattle, and many of his men, to fall into the enemy's hand.

After this defeat, the British prince endeavoured, as a last resource, to give Cæsar an alarm on his rear; and for this purpose sent an order to the four princes of Kent, to assemble their people, endeavour to force the Roman station, and destroy the shipping, where it lay on the coast. They accordingly attacked the intrenchment, but were repulsed; and Cassivelaunus himself, reduced to despair by the defection of so many of his countrymen, and by his repeated defeats, determined to make his submission. Meanwhile, the season of the year being far advanced, and Cæsar, desirous to retire with honour from a country in which he was not prepared to make any permanent settlement, accepted, on easy terms, the offer which was made to him.

A certain tribute was imposed on the nations inhabiting the banks of the Thames, hostages taken for the payment of it, and the invaders, with a numerous assemblage of captives, then the only or principal spoils of this island, retired to their ships, which, not being sufficient to receive them at one embarkation, were obliged to return for a second; and in this way, successively, without any material accident, transported the whole of the Roman army into Gaul.

CHAPTER XXIII

Death of Julia, the Daughter of Cæsar, and the Wife of Pompey.—Trial of Gabinius.—Detection of an infamous Transaction of Memmius and Ahenobarbus.—Revolt of the Low Countries.—Military Execution against the Inhabitants of the Country between the Rhine and the Meuse.—Operations of Crassus in Mesopotamia.—His Death.—Competition for the Consulate.—Death of Clodius.—Riot in the City.—Pompey sole Consul.—Trial of Milo.

WHILE the Roman army was in Britain, there happened, by the death of Julia, the daughter of Cæsar, and the wife of Pompey, a great change in the condition of parties at Rome; this being a discontinuance of the relation which subsisted between those rivals in the state, and a separation of their political interests, to unite no more. The connection, which then came to be dissolved, had been devised as a bond of confederacy between parties whose interfering objects of pursuit, always a subject of jealousy, must otherwise, on many occasions, have proceeded to a manifest breach. Neither the father-in-law, nor the son, indeed, was likely to sacrifice his ambition to mere affection; but each may have expected that the other should be, in some degree, the dupe of his relation, or should abate a little of the jealousy to which he was, by his situation and his objects, so much inclined. This passion, however, we may believe, was far from having been extinguished in the mind of either. The choice which Pompey made of Spain for his province, with a military command for a term of five years, sufficiently bespoke his emulation of Cæsar, and even his apprehension of a struggle, in which the force of armies was to decide. Cæsar had the advantage of being nearer the capital: but in a position to be awed by the forces of Pompey on his rear, and by the resources of a province better matured under the dominion of Rome.

Notwithstanding the effects of emulation, imperfectly disguised whilst the familiar relation of father-in-law and son subsisted between Cæsar and Pompey, and while Crassus con-

tinued to hold a species of balance in their councils, they seemed to acquiesce in a participation of popularity and of power. But the death of Julia, and that likewise of the child of which she had been delivered only a few days before her death, put an end, not only to any real cordiality in this connection, but even to any semblance of regard; and rendered them, from this time forward, more openly jealous of the advantages they severally gained, whether in respect to force in the provinces, or to state and consideration at Rome.

It is observed, that, from this date, Cæsar became more than formerly attentive to reports from the city, or watchful of his intelligence from thence;* and that he endeavoured to gain every person who might be of consequence in deciding the contest which he perceived must arise. Among these he paid his court in particular to Cicero, who was otherwise likely, about this time, to devote himself entirely to Pompey, and whom he wished, at least, to keep in suspense between them: for this purpose, as appears from their correspondence, he applied, as usual, to his vanity; and, while he himself was piercing the woods of Britain, in pursuit of Cassivelaunus and his painted followers,† affected to read and to admire verses composed and sent to him by Cicero, a person much more esteemed for his prose than his poetry.

The Roman army had been tempted into Britain by the hopes of finding mines of silver, but were disappointed; for, besides slaves, they did not find any booty in this island. Such, probably, were likewise the principal spoils of Gaul; yet we find their general, in consequence of his conquests in that country, enabled to expend great sums in supporting his influence at Rome. While Pompey procured his own appointment to the command of an army, in order to keep pace with Cæsar in the provinces, Cæsar, in his turn, projected public works at Rome, to vie with the magnificence of Pompey, and with that of other citizens, who engaged in such works, as a part of their policy to gain the people. For this

* Cicero, ad Quint. Frat. lib. ii. ep. 15. et lib. iii. ep. 1.

† Ibid. lib. ii. ep. ult. Ad. Atticum, lib. iv. ep. 16.

purpose Cæsar proposed to build a basilica,* and to enlarge the forum, at an expense of six millions Roman money, or about fifty thousand pounds; to rail in the field of Mars with marble ballisters, and to surround the whole with a colonade or portico extending a thousand paces, or about an entire mile.

In these works Cæsar affected to consult or to employ Cicero, in a manner which flattered his vanity, and renewed his hopes of being able to direct his councils also † in what related to matters of state.

In the meantime, parties in the city, though engaged on the side of different competitors for office at the approaching elections, were likewise intent on the cause of Gabinus, which involved, in some measure, the interest and credit of Pompey, by whom he was supported. This officer, while yet in his province, had been impeached for disobeying the orders of the senate, and for contempt of religion in his expedition to Egypt. But having, by the joint influence of Pompey and of Cæsar, eluded this first attack, he set out for Rome in great confidence, and, on his journey, gave out, that he was to demand a triumph. But, upon his approach to the city, hearing in what manner the senate and people were affected towards him, he thought proper to make his entry in the night; and being arrived, on the eighteenth of September, did not even venture to appear in the senate for ten days. No less than three prosecutions were preparing against him: for treason, for extortion in his province, and for other crimes. The first day on which he presented himself in the senate, the consuls, when he would have withdrawn, commanded him to stay: and, having called the farmers of the revenue from Syria, who attended with a complaint from that province, bade them state their charge.

An altercation ensued, in which Cicero, mindful of the injuries he had received from Gabinus, took a principal part against him, and pronounced an invective, which the other

* What the Romans called a basilica or palace, was a kind of exchange, containing porticoes for merchants, and other public accommodations.

† Cicero ad Atticum, lib. iv. ep. 16.

returned with the abusive appellation of *fugitive*, in allusion to his late exile.* Yet, soon after, when this criminal was brought to trial for extortion in his province, Cicero, as will be mentioned, undertook, at the solicitation of Pompey, to appear in his defence.

Before this trial for extortion took place, C. Memmius, one of the tribunes, on the ninth of October, delivered to the people, with great force, a charge of treason against Gabinius.† The judgment of the tribes being called for, and sentence of condemnation likely to pass, while the lictors were preparing to seize their prisoner, his son, a young man, with much filial piety, a virtue highly esteemed by the Romans, threw himself at the feet of the tribune, and, being rudely spurned on the ground, happened to drop his ring, the badge of Roman nobility; the spectators were moved; Lælius Balbus, another of the tribunes, interposed, and, with the general approbation of the people, commanded the process to stop.‡

The other prosecutions, nevertheless, were continued against the offender. One before the prætor Alfius, in which, though the majority of the judges voted to acquit, there were twenty-two, out of seventy, who voted guilty.|| Another before Cato, on a charge of depredation in his province, to the amount of quater millies, four hundred millions Roman money, or about three millions sterling; in this last suit he was condemned, and forced into exile. At this trial, Pompey and Cæsar continued to employ their influence in his favour: and even Cicero, although he had hitherto treated Gabinius as the author of his own exile, being reconciled to Pompey and Cæsar, no longer continued at variance with a person who had been no more than their tool or instrument in procuring his misfortunes, and condescended, on this occasion, though ineffectually, to plead his cause.**

After this bustle was over, the approaching elections gave rise to competitions and intrigues more connected with the

* Cicero, ad Quint. Frat. lib. iii.

† Ibid. lib. iii.

‡ Val. Max. lib. viii. c. 1.

|| Cicero, ad Att. lib. iv. ep. 16.

** Dio. lib. xxxix. c. 63.—Cicero ad Quint. Frat. lib. iii. ep. i. et 3.

state of the republic, and more an indication of the manners which then prevailed. The poorer citizens were come in a great measure to depend for their subsistence on the distributions of corn from the granaries, and on other gratuities, which were made or procured by those who courted popularity, or who aspired to the offices of state. Corruption became every day more flagrant or less disguised; and the laws against bribery were losing their force for want of persons to prosecute a crime, of which so many either wished to reap the benefit, or which many were so strongly tempted to commit. To supply this defect, Cato moved in the senate, that every one elected into office should be subjected to an inquest, even if no one should prosecute;* and actually obtained an edict, requiring the ordinary judges, who were named for trials within the year, to take cognizance of the means by which candidates succeeded to office; and to set those aside who were found to have incurred the penalties of corruption.† The tribunes interposed their negative, or suspended the effect of this resolution, until an act of the people should be obtained to confirm it. The proposal gave great offence to the parties concerned; and Cato, being attacked by the populace, narrowly escaped with his life. He afterwards, in a full assembly of the more respectable citizens, was favourably heard on this subject. But Terentius, one of the tribunes, still persisting in his negative, this attempt to restrain the corrupt practices of those who canvassed for office had no further effect.

The candidates themselves, in the meantime, if each could have trusted the laws for restraining others, as well as himself, from the practice of giving money, or if any number of them could have relied upon an agreement to be entered into among themselves to refrain from it, would, it is probable, have been glad to be relieved from an abuse which rendered their pretensions so expensive and so precarious. Moved by these considerations, candidates for the office of the tribune entered into an agreement not to bribe, and deposited each a

* Plutarch. Cicero ad Att. lib. iv. ep. 16.

† Cicero, ad Att. lib. iv. ep. 16.

sum of money* in the hands of Cato, to be forfeited by any person who should be found acting in contravention to their treaty.† One of them, however, was detected in giving money, and accordingly forfeited his pledge.

In the competition for the consulate, corruption was carried to the greatest excess. An office was opened, at which the candidates dealt out money to the people, who came in the order of their tribes to receive it.‡ A gratuity of ten millions of sesterces|| was offered to any person who should secure the vote of the first century, or, as it was called, the *prerogativa*. The demand for money, to be employed in this species of traffic, became so great, that, by the first of July, interest rose from four to eight per cent.** All the four candidates, Memmius, M. Scaurus, Cn. Domitius, and M. Messala, mutually raised prosecutions for bribery against each other; and, in the course of these transactions, it appeared that Caius Memmius, once a vehement partisan of the senate against Cæsar, had made his peace with this enemy, and was now supported by his party at Rome.

Memmius, it may be remembered, having been prætor at the expiration of Cæsar's consulate, brought a charge of high misdemeanour in office against him. And Cæsar appeared for some time to resent this attack; but was in reality as little to be diverted from his purpose by resentment, as he was by affection, and knew how to choose his friends from among those who had the resolution to provoke, as well as from among those who inclined to serve, him. Cæsar, accordingly, in the present ardour of competition, found means to separate Memmius from the rest of his enemies, and by his means brought to light a scene of corruption, in which Memmius himself, with other professed supporters of the senate, had been concerned, and which furnished the supposed popular party with a great triumph against these pretenders to purity of manners and disinterested virtue.

* Quingena, 500,000 Roman money, about 4000l.

† Plutarch,—Cicero, ad Att. lib. iv. ep. 15. ad Quint. Frat. lib. ii. c. 12.

‡ Ad Att. lib. iv. ep. 17.

|| About 80,000l.

** Ad Quint. Frat. lib. ii. ep. 15. *Idibus quintilibus fœnus fuit bessibus ex triente.*

It appeared that, among other irregularities at Rome, in the administration of government, even laws, and supposed acts of the senate or people, could be forged or surreptitiously obtained. The present consuls, Cn. Domitius, Ahenobarbus, and Ap. Claud. Pulcher, entered into a compact with two of those who were candidates to succeed them, Caius Memmius and C. Domitius Calvinus: the two first, to secure their own nomination to lucrative provinces, at the expiration of their consulship; the two others, now standing for this office, to secure their elections. The parties agreed to forge an edict of the senate and of the people, fixing the consular provinces. And a sum of money was deposited by the candidates in the hands of the consuls, to be forfeited, if they did not support this forgery, with the evidence of three augurs, who should vouch for the passing of the law in the assembly of the people, and two senators of consular dignity, who should swear they were present when this allotment of provinces was confirmed by the senate, although it was notorious that no meeting of the senate had ever been held for this purpose.

Memmius being gained by what was called the popular party, was persuaded to sacrifice his own reputation, in order to ruin that of Domitius Ahenobarbus, who was held in esteem by the other. He laid this strange agreement, which had been drawn up in writing, together with the bonds which had been granted upon it, before the senate. Appius Claudius braved the detection; but Ahenobarbus, professing himself to be of a party which contended for purity and reformation of manners, incurred much reproach and disgrace.

From this transaction it should appear, that not only the assemblies of the people, as we have said, were extremely irregular and tumultuary, and might be made up of such persons as were by any party purposely brought to the comitium; but that even the meetings of the senate might be packed; that their proceedings were carelessly recorded, and might be easily forged. The numbers required to form a comitium, or collective body of citizens, not being fixed by law, any convention of persons, at which a tribune presided, occupying the usual place of assembly, might take upon them the de-

signation and powers of the Roman people ; and as the fluctuating sovereignty of the state by this mean passed from one party to another, its orders were often surreptitious and contradictory ; and every act might be considered as the mandate of a party or faction in the field, not as the will of the community.* Great as these disorders were, there were at all times numerous parties who had an interest in the continuance of them ; and the age, though suffering under the most grievous abuses, was still more averse to the necessary reformations.

The infamy of this recent transaction produced a delay of the elections, until the term of the present consuls in office was expired. An interregnum accordingly ensued. The partisans of Pompey hinted the necessity of naming a dictator. He himself affected great reserve, in expectation that, when the present troubles came to their height, the powers necessary to suppress them would, by general consent, be pressed into his hands.

In the mean time, Cæsar, whose councils were wont to have so great a share in determining such events, was detained in the northern parts of Gaul, and was obliged, contrary to his usual practice, to pass the whole winter on this side of the Alps. On his return from Britain, finding that the harvest in Gaul had been scanty, he was tempted, in order to facilitate the subsistence of his army, to extend his quarters much further than had been his ordinary practice. Labienus, with one division, was sent to the Moselle ; Titurius Sabinus, with another, to the neighbourhood of the Meuse, near to what are now the districts of Liege and Maestricht. Quintus Cicero was posted on some of the branches of the Scheldt or the Sambre, in the county of Hainault. And the whole army, by this disposition, extended from the Seine to the Meuse about Maestricht, and from the sea to the neighbourhood of Treves. The distance at which the posts were placed from each other being observed by the natives, who still bore with impatience the intrusion and usurpation of these strangers, tempted them to form a design against each of the

* Dion. Cassius, lib. xxxix. c. 65.

quarters apart, and, by cutting them off, to rid their country for ever of these imperious and insatiable guests, who acted as lords or proprietors on every territory into which they were received, and branded every act of resistance to their unjust usurpation with the name of defection and rebellion.

In execution of this design, Ambiorix, leader of the nations which were situated in the angle, above the confluence of the Meuse and the Rhine, and round the quarters of Sabinus, which are supposed to have been at a place which is now called Tongres, suddenly presented himself with a numerous body before the Roman station, and endeavoured to force the intrenchment; but being repulsed, had recourse to an artifice, in which he succeeded. Affecting a great regard for the Romans, he desired that he might have an opportunity of communicating to their general a matter of the most serious concern. An officer being sent to him, upon this request, he pretended to disclose, with the utmost regret, a secret design formed by the Gauls to cut off the Roman army; gave notice that a great body of Germans had already passed the Rhine, to join in the execution of this purpose; that he himself had been very much averse to the project; but had been obliged to give way to the popular impetuosity of his countrymen, which he could not restrain; that all he could do was to warn the Romans of their danger, to the end that they might, in the most effectual manner, consult their own safety. If the commander at this place, while it was in his power, chose to gain the nearest station of his own people, it was possible to hinder his being molested on the march: but if he should hesitate for any time, or did not depart before the Germans arrived, it would no longer be in the power of any friend to avert the storm with which he was threatened.

This admonition, even from an enemy, after a long debate in the council of war, determined Sabinus to quit his present situation. He, accordingly, began a march of fifty miles, towards the quarters of Quintus Cicero; and falling into a snare, which the treacherous chieftain had laid for him, perished, with an entire legion and five cohorts, of whom the greater part were put to the sword. Some got back to the station they had left; but finding no security in that place,

killed themselves in despair. A very few escaped, by the woods, to Labienus on the Moselle.

The natives, thus encouraged by the success of their first operation, pushed on to the quarters of Quintus Cicero, armed and assembled the country as they passed, and arrived with such expedition, that they intercepted all the parties which were abroad in search of wood, provisions, or forage, and made so unexpected an attack on the Roman station, as left Cicero scarcely time sufficient to man his intrenchments. The Nervii, making part of this insurrection, renewed the artifice which had been practised with so much success against Sabinus. But Cicero, though unacquainted with the manner in which the legion retiring from Tongres had been betrayed, determined to remain in his camp, and with the utmost dispatch to make Cæsar acquainted with his danger. For this purpose, while he strengthened his post with additional works, he published a reward to the first person who should succeed in carrying intelligence to the nearest quarter of the Roman army.

The enemy, being about sixty thousand men, formed a circle, facing to the centre, quite round the Roman intrenchment; and, the more effectually to cut off all communication of supplies or intelligence from without, effected a line of circumvallation, consisting of a ditch fifteen feet wide, and a breastwork eleven feet high, extending over a circumference of fifteen miles.* In this work, being unprovided with intrenching tools, they were obliged, as Cæsar reports, to cut the turf with their swords, and fetch earth in their cloaks. But having broke ground at once on every point of a circumference, which their number was sufficient to cover, the whole was accomplished in no more than three hours.

From this line, which they formed by the direction of some Italian deserters, they made regular approaches to the Roman intrenchment; and, having pushed their turrets quite up to the ditch, threw, by means of their slings, red hot bullets and burning darts into the thatch with which the winter huts of the camp were covered; set them on fire; and, in the midst

* Cæsar, de Bell. Gallico, lib. v. c. 41.

of the confusion which arose from this circumstance, endeavoured to scale the palisade and the parapet.

While Cicero continued, with great ability and courage, to withstand these attacks, the persons who endeavoured to carry the tidings of his situation to Cæsar, were repeatedly intercepted, and, to deter others from renewing the same attempt, cruelly tortured. The intelligence, however, was at last carried to the head-quarters of the Roman army, by a native Gaul, who, availing himself of the dress, manners, and language of his country, passed, unobserved, through the lines of the enemy.

Cæsar, as usual, trusting more to dispatch and rapid execution than to the number of his men, left a legion at Samarobriva* to guard his stores, magazines, and baggage, and with two other legions, not exceeding seven thousand men, being all that, without hazarding an improper delay, he could assemble, hastened his march to the quarter from which this alarm was brought. He, at the same time, dispatched two messengers, one to Labienus, with orders, if possible, to put the troops under his command in motion towards the Meuse, and another to Quintus Cicero himself, with hopes or assurances of immediate relief. The first messenger found Labienus beset with a numerous army of Gauls, and therefore unable to move; the other, having come to the foot of Cicero's intrenchment, cast the billet which contained the intelligence, wound up on the shaft of a dart, against one of the towers, where it stuck, and hung for some days unobserved; but being found at last, it was carried to Cicero, and gave notice of Cæsar's approach. At the same time the fire and the smoke of his camp began to appear on the plain, and gave both parties equal intimation of his coming.

The Gauls, without delay, got in motion with all their force, and having abandoned their lines of circumvallation, advanced to meet Cæsar. Cicero sent him intelligence of this movement of the enemy: and the armies arrived nearly at the same time on the opposite sides of a brook running in a hollow tract between steep banks, which neither party, in the presence of the other, could safely venture to pass.

* Amiens.

Cæsar, supposing that the inferiority of his numbers might inspire the Gauls with contempt, endeavoured, by exceeding his usual caution, to feed their presumption. He affected to choose a ground that was fit to secure his camp; and, contracting its limits, crowded both his legions within the dimensions which were usually occupied by one. In this posture he meant to await the effects of the enemy's temerity, or, if they declined passing the brook, he proposed to avail himself of the security they were likely to feel, and by surprise to attack them in their own camp.

The event justified Cæsar in his first expectation. The Gauls, trusting to the superiority of their numbers, thought they had nothing to dread but the escape of their enemy; and they, accordingly, began to scale the banks of the rivulet, in order to surround them. Upon their approach, instead of waiting to defend his camp, he poured forth his two legions at once from all its avenues, and, with the advantage of a surprise upon those who meant to assail him, and by the great superiority which the Romans ever had, when mixed sword in hand with an enemy, routed, dispersed, or forced to lay down their arms, the greater part of this multitude, which had advanced to the ground with so much ferocity and confidence.

By this victory Cæsar not only relieved Quintus Cicero, whom he joined the same evening, but likewise dispelled the cloud which hung over the other separate quarters of his army, of which many had been at the same time invested by the natives. These insurrections, however, which kept all the inhabitants of the low countries in motion, even in the most unfavourable season, gave him the prospect of an early and a busy campaign, and so much disconcerted the plan which he had formed for the winter, that he was hindered, as has been now mentioned, from making his usual journey across the Alps.

During this necessary stay in Gaul, it does not appear that the interests which Cæsar commonly studied were suffering in any considerable degree at Rome. The civil government in the city was hastening fast to its ruin, and the longest sword was soon likely to decide the sovereignty of the em-

pire. The office of consul was unoccupied, and continued to be so from the beginning of January to the middle of July. In all this time there was no administration of justice,* nor any exercise of magistracy, besides that of the interrex, who, during the five days of his appointment, was supposed to have no other object besides the elections of consuls. This object was vainly attempted by every successive interrex. The popular tumults were fomented by the tribunes who were in the interest of Pompey; and some prodigy, or unfortunate presage, was continually alleged, to prevent the elections. The senate, striving to put an end to these disorders, even ventured to commit to prison Q. Pompeius Rufus, a tribune, who seemed to be most active in disturbing the public peace. The occasion seemed ripe for the execution of a design, which was some time a hatching, to throw the whole powers of the state into the hands of Pompey; and, accordingly, another tribune, Luceius Hirrus, known to be in the secret of all his intrigues, moved that he should be named dictator.† He himself, as usual on such occasions, kept aloof from the assembly, and was ready, as the case might require, to avow or to disown the measures of his party.

This motion was strongly opposed by Cato, and appeared to be extremely disagreeable to all the principal members of the senate.‡ Pompey, therefore, thought proper to disclaim the measure, denied his having encouraged the tribune who made the motion, and even refused to accept of any such power, if it should be offered; adding, that he had been already called to the exercise of great powers earlier than he himself had expected; and that he had always resigned such powers earlier than had been expected by any one else.¶ In this was expressed the great object of Pompey's ambition: he preferred this point of estimation to the possession of power itself. The odium of the proposed measure fell upon Luceius Hirrus, the tribune who moved it, and had nearly brought upon him a deposition or degradation from his office. Cato, willing to gain Pompey, or to confirm him in the virtue

* Plutarch. in Pompeio, p. 483.

† Plutarch. in Pompeio.—D. Con. Cicero, Epist. ad Quint. Frat. lib. iii. ep. 9.

‡ Ibid.

¶ Plutarch. in Vit. Pompeii.

he assumed, pronounced an encomium on this act of moderation, recommended the republic to his care, and encouraged him in the resolution he had taken, to prefer the esteem of his fellow-citizens even to the power of disposing of their lives and fortunes at his pleasure. Pompey, from thenceforward, joined with the senate in bringing on the elections; and accordingly, after seven months interval of confusion and anxiety, Cn. Domitius Calvinus and M. Valerius Messala were chosen and entered on office in the month of July.

While Pompey was endeavouring, by his intrigues in the city, to make a species of monarchy in his own person appear to be necessary, Cæsar was, in fact, providing himself with the only means which, in so distracted a state, can either acquire or preserve such a power. He was joining three additional legions to the establishment of his province; and, under pretence of his late losses on the Meuse, or of his fears of a general defection in Gaul, he had the address to bring into his own service a legion which had been recently formed in Italy under the commission of Pompey. This legion he now borrowed, and, as will appear in the sequel, either actually debauched, or rendered of doubtful fidelity, if ever it should be recalled and destined to act against himself.

While he took these measures for the augmentation of his forces, and before the end of winter, having intelligence that the Nervii, or the inhabitants of the county of Hainault, who had such a share in the attack of Cicero's station, were holding frequent consultations together, and were about to take arms, he determined to prevent them; and for this purpose, with four legions drawn from the nearest quarters, he marched into their country, and, without meeting with any opposition, destroyed their habitations, moved away their cattle, and made many prisoners. He continued these severities until the natives, reduced to great distress, implored his mercy, and gave hostages for their future submission.

Having, in the course of this winter, called the nations of Gaul to a general congress at an island in the Seine,* he

* Now Paris.

began the operations of the following summer by punishing some of the cantons,* who had absented themselves from that assembly, and who, by this act of disrespect, had incurred his resentment, or given him suspicion of hostile intentions. The principal object of the campaign, however, was the punishment of Ambiorix and his countrymen, by whom, as has been related, Sabinus, with a legion and five cohorts, had been circumvented and cut off in the beginning of the preceding winter.

As the Romans scarcely appear to have conceived that any people had a right to withstand their invasions, and treated as rebellion every attempt a nation once vanquished made to recover its liberties, Cæsar states it as necessary, for the credit of the Roman army, for the security of their quarters, and for preventing such acts of supposed perfidy in future, that the subjects of Ambiorix should suffer an exemplary punishment. To secure this effect, he projected two expeditions ; one to the right and the other to the left of this enemy's country, with intention to preclude them from any retreat or assistance on either side. In execution of this design, he penetrated into the woods and marshes on the left of the Meuse, and obliged the inhabitants to come under engagements not to assist or harbour any enemy of his, if they should attempt to take refuge in that country.

From thence, still avoiding to give any alarm to the nation which was the principal object of these operations, and having formerly sent his baggage under an escort of two legions to the Moselle, he now followed in the same direction with the whole of his army; and finding that Labienus had, by a recent victory, vanquished all his enemies in that quarter, he continued his march to the Rhine, constructed a bridge on that river, a little way higher up than the place at which he had formerly passed, and once more set foot upon German ground.

The Suevi, and other great migrating nations of the continent, having recently moved to the eastward, leaving nothing behind them but deserts, on which no army could subsist, he

* The Senones and Carnutes.

contented himself with exacting hostages from the Ubii and other contiguous nations, to secure their neutrality, or rather to make sure of their concurrence in the execution of his sanguinary project. And with these pledges he repassed the Rhine, broke down part of his bridge, and left a guard of twelve cohorts, properly intrenched, to secure the remainder.

From thence he sent forward his cavalry, with orders to make quick and silent marches into the countries he meant to lay waste, and himself followed with the infantry. Hitherto Ambiorix and his countrymen, who were the principal objects of all these operations, had taken no alarm, and had enjoyed such perfect security, that the leader himself, upon the arrival of Cæsar's horse in his quarters, narrowly escaped, and had no more than time, by a general intimation, to warn his people to consult their own safety. They, accordingly, separated; part hid themselves in the contiguous marshes, others endeavoured to find refuge with some neighbouring nations, or fled to the islands that were formed at the confluence of the Meuse and the Rhine.

Cæsar, as if he had been forming a party of hunters, separated his army into three divisions; sent Labienus with one division to pursue those who fled to the confluence of the two rivers; Trebonius with the second, up the course of the Meuse; and he himself, in pursuit of Ambiorix, directed his march to the Scheldt. His orders were, that each division should put all they met to the sword, and calculate their time, so as to return to the place of general rendezvous in seven days.

To render this execution the more complete, all the neighbouring nations were invited to partake in the spoils of a country that was doomed to destruction. Among the parties who were allured by this invitation, two thousand German horse had passed the Rhine, and continued in a body to ravage all the country before them, without even respecting the Roman posts. Cæsar, in making a disposition for his present march, had lodged the whole baggage of his army at the station (supposed to be Tongres) which in the preceding winter had been fortified for the quarters of Sabinus. Here the works

being still entire, he left a guard with his baggage, under the command of Quintus Tullius Cicero.

The Germans, in the present instance, knowing no distinction of friend or enemy, ceased to plunder the natives of the country, and turned all their thoughts on seizing the baggage of the Roman army. Their coming was so little expected, that the traders and sutlers, who had erected their stalls and displayed their merchandize, as usual, without the intrenchment, had no time to save their effects. Numbers of the guard, which were posted with Cicero to cover the baggage, were gone abroad in search of forage. The remainder with difficulty manned the avenues of their camp, and must have been forced, if the foragers, upon hearing the noise with which the Germans began the attack, had not returned to their relief, and forced their way through the enemy, who, mistaking them for a vanguard of the whole army, thought proper to consult their own safety by an immediate flight.

Cæsar, upon his return to the post at which the baggage of his army had been so much exposed, censured the officer commanding the guard, for having divided his party, and for having omitted, on the supposition of any degree of security whatever, any part of the precautions usual upon such a duty. At the same time he continued to pursue the revenge he had projected against the unhappy followers of Ambiorix, sending parties in every direction to burn the houses, and to lay waste the fields which had been formerly spared or overlooked; and this being done on the approach of winter, made the destruction complete, as the few who might have escaped the sword must inevitably perish by famine, or by the asperity of the season.

The Roman general having in this manner made an example, which he supposed was to overawe all the nations of that neighbourhood, withdrew with his army from a country in which he had made it impossible for any numbers of men to subsist; and having stationed two of his legions on the Moselle, and the remainder on the Marne, the Seine, and the Loire, he himself hastened into Italy, where all his views and preparations ultimately centred. The scene of political intrigue, in which Crassus had hitherto born a part with Pom-

pey and himself, was now, in consequence of recent events on the other extremity of the empire, about to undergo a change, which was, likely, in addition to the death of Julia, to affect the conduct of parties concerned.

In the spring, Crassus had taken the field on the frontier of Syria, with seven legions, four thousand horse, and an equal number of light or irregular troops. With this force he passed the Euphrates, was joined by an Arabian chieftain, who is mentioned by historians under different names, of Acbarus* or Ariamnes, in whom, on account of his supposed knowledge of the country, the Roman general had placed great confidence. Here he expected, likewise, to have been joined by Artabazes, king of Armenia; but Orodes, now on the throne of the Parthians, had prevented this junction, by invading the kingdom of Armenia in person, while he left Surena, a young warrior of great reputation, in Mesopotamia, to oppose the Romans.

Crassus intended to have followed the course of the Euphrates, to where it approaches nearest to Seleucia and Ctesiphon, the capital of the Parthian kingdom; but was dissuaded by his guide and confident Ariamnes, who prevailed on him to direct his march eastward on the plains, where he might easily force the post of Surena, and at once effect his entrance into the enemy's country. Some parties too, that were advanced to examine the route which the army should take in that direction, reported, that they had been on the track of departing cavalry, but that no enemy was anywhere to be seen. Thus Crassus was induced to quit the Euphrates, and, agreeably to the directions of his guide, took the route of Carræ to the eastward. This place he fortified in his way, and occupied with a garrison. From thence, in a few marches, he arrived on sandy and barren plains, without trees, herbage, or water. While the army, though discouraged by these appearances, still continued its march, a few horsemen belonging to the advanced guard returned to the main body with signs of terror, and brought an account that their division had been surrounded by numerous bodies of horse, and,

* Plutarch. et Dion. Cass.

to a few, cut off: that the enemy was advancing apace, and must soon appear. Crassus at first, fearing to be outlined, extended his front as far as he possibly could; but recollecting that the Parthians were all on horseback, and by the rapidity of their motions might easily gain either or both his flanks, however extended, and on this account supposing it necessary to present a front in every direction, he changed his disposition from a line to a square, having his cavalry placed on the angles.

The Roman army being thus compacted, the Parthians soon after appeared on every side, came within reach of an arrow shot, and galled them without intermission. The weapons of the Romans, in this situation, availed them nothing; even the shield could not cover them from arrows, that showered from every quarter, and in many different directions. They stood, however, in their place, with some degree of courage, in hopes that the quivers of the Parthians might soon be exhausted, and that this enemy would be obliged either to join them in close fight, or to retire. But they found themselves deceived in this expectation, observing that the enemy had a herd of camels in their rear, loaded with arrows, and that the quivers of those in the front were continually replenished from thence. At the same time Ariamnes, the supposed associate and guide, disappeared, or was perceived to go over to the enemy. The desertion of this traitor, by discovering that his pretended attachment, and his counsel, which had been unhappily followed, was only a piece of barbarous treachery, to draw the army into its present situation, completed the general dismay which the Romans had already begun to feel. They crowded together in despair, and, oppressed with heat and thirst, or stifled with dust, continued for a while, like beasts caught in a snare, to present a passive and easy prey to their enemies.

In this extremity, Crassus determined to make an effort with his cavalry to drive the enemy to such a distance as not to be able to reach his infantry with their arrows. His son Publius, accordingly, formed the Roman horse into one body, and made a general charge, to which the Parthians, according to their usual practice, gave way, in seeming disorder. The

young man advanced with great impetuosity, as against a flying enemy, and in hopes of completing his victory: but the Parthians, under cover of the dust, which everywhere arose on the plain, instead of flying before him, as he supposed, were actually turning on his flanks, and even falling behind him, to encompass his rear. The legions, at the same time, happy to be relieved from the attack of an enemy who galled them, quitted their ground, and for a little resumed their march; a movement which enabled the Parthians the more effectually to surround the cavalry: but the father, recollecting the danger to which he exposed his son, again prevailed on his columns to halt. In this situation, a few of the horse arrived, with accounts that they had been surrounded, that Crassus, the son, was slain, and the whole cut off, except a few who escaped to the father with these melancholy tidings.

Night, however, was fast approaching, and the Parthians, on a sudden, withdrew, sensible that their way of fighting might expose them to suffer many disadvantages in the dark. It was, indeed, their general practice to retire at night to a considerable distance from the enemy whom they had harassed by day, and upon these occasions they generally fled, like an army defeated, until they had removed so far as to make it safe for them to pasture their horses, and to store up their arms. Crassus, apprised of this practice, took the benefit of the night to continue his retreat, and, abandoning the sick and wounded of his army, made a considerable march before it was day. But the advance he had gained was not sufficient to hinder his being overtaken by the same flying enemy, and again involved in the same distress. Having his defeats and his flights in the same manner renewed on every succeeding day, he arrived at last at the post which he had fortified at Carræ, and there found some respite from the attacks of the enemy. At this place, however, it was not possible to make any considerable stay, as the whole provisions of the army were lost or consumed; and such supplies as the country around might have furnished were entirely in the power of the enemy. Nor was it convenient to depart immediately. The moon was then at the full, and night was almost as favourable to the Parthians as day. In these cir-

circumstances, it was determined to wait for the wain of the moon, and then, if possible, to elude the enemy again by marches in the night.

In this interval, the army mutinied against their general, and offered the command to Caius Cassius; but he, although desired even by Crassus himself, declined to accept of the charge.* The troops of consequence no longer obeyed any command whatever, and separated into two bodies. The first went off by the plains, on the nearest way into Syria: the other took the route of the mountains; and, if they could reach them before the enemy, hoped to escape into Cappadocia or Armenia. The first division was accompanied or commanded by Cassius, who, though with considerable loss, led them back into Syria. The other, with Crassus himself, was pursued by Surena, and harassed on every ground where the Parthian horse could ply on their flank or their rear. Being exposed to frequent losses, they suffered a continual diminution of their numbers, and were not likely to be long in condition to avoid the enemy, or make any resistance.

Surena, apprehending that these remains of the Roman army might gain the mountains before he could force them to surrender, sent a deputation to Crassus, proposing, at some intermediate place, between the two armies, a conference, to which they might severally bring a stipulated number of attendants. While this message was delivering, Surena himself appeared at a little distance, on an eminence, waved with his hand, and, in token of peace, unbent his bow. Crassus, distrusting the faith of a barbarous enemy, who was supposed to hold perfidy lawful, as a mere stratagem of war, declined the interview; but his troops, weary of continual fatigue and danger, and flattering themselves that by an accommodation an end might be speedily put to their sufferings, expressed such a desire of the proposed conference, as their general, in this situation, could not safely withstand. He put himself, therefore, with a few friends, under the direction of Surena's messengers, and submitted to be led to their general; but, on the way, finding himself treated as a prisoner, he refused to

* Dio. lib. iv. c. 28.

proceed, and, having made some resistance, was slain. The army separated into sundry divisions, a few escaped into Armenia or Syria, the greater part fell into the enemy's hands.*

Thus died Crassus, commonly reputed a rare instance of ambition, joined with avarice and a mean capacity. It is not to be doubted, that, in point of ambition, he even rivalled Pompey and Cæsar; and it is probable, therefore, that his avarice was merely subservient to this passion. It is quoted, as a saying of his, that no man who aspired to a principal place in the republic should be reputed rich, unless he could maintain an army at his own expense.† Such was the use of wealth, which, in place of equipages, horses, and dogs, occurred to a rich man of that age at Rome. Of his capacity we cannot form any high estimation, either from the judgment of his contemporaries, or from his own conduct.‡ It appears, indeed, that he owed his consequence more to his wealth than to his genius or personal qualities of any kind. On account of his riches, probably, he was considered by Cæsar and Pompey as a person, who, if neglected by them, might throw a weight into the scale of their enemies; and he was admitted into their councils, as a person fit to witness their transactions, and, on occasion, to moderate or to suspend their animosities. These circumstances placed him among the competitors for the principal influence at Rome, and makes his death an epoch in the history of those factions which were hastening to overwhelm the republic. By this event, his associates, Cæsar and Pompey, already disjoined by the dissolution of their family connexion, were left to contend for the superiority, without any third person through whom they might occasionally reconcile or explain their pretensions.

The calm which had succeeded the late election of consuls was but of short duration. The time of electing their successors was fast approaching, and the candidates, Scipio, Milo, and Hypsæus, were already declared. Clodius, at the same time, stood for the office of prætor. This Scipio was by birth

* Dio. Cass. lib. xl.—Plutarch. in Crass. † Cicero, de Officiis, lib. i. c. 8.

‡ Is igitur mediocriter a doctrina instructus; angustius etiam a natura, &c. Cicero, de Claris Oratoribus, c. 66.—Ad Atticum, lib. iv. ep. 13.

the son of Metellus Pius, adopted into the Cornelian family by Scipio Nasica. His daughter, in consequence of this adoption, bearing the name of Cornelia, the widow of young Crassus, was recently married to Pompey, who, upon this connexion, supported Scipio, his father-in-law, in his pretensions to the consulate. Milo had a powerful support from the senate, in whose cause he had retorted the arts and violences of the seditious demagogues against themselves. Claudius had great interest with the populace, and, from inveterate animosity to Milo and to his party, joined all his interest with Scipio and Hypsæus against him.

It is in the nature of human things to advance, in accumulating, the good or evil to which they tend; and there is ever, accordingly, either a progress or a decline in human affairs. These competitors, in contending for the forum and the usual places of canvassing the people, joined, to the former arts of distributing money and of exciting popular tumults, the use of an armed force, and a species of military operations in the streets of Rome. Three parties in arms every day were on the parade, in different quarters of the town; and, wherever they encountered, violence and bloodshed ensued. The opposite parties of Hypsæus and Milo had fought a battle in the *Via Sacra*; many of both sides were killed, and the consul Calvinus was wounded in attempting to quell the riot.

These disorders continued so long to obstruct the elections, that the term of the present consuls in office expired, before the nomination of any successors; and every legal power in the commonwealth being suspended, the former state of anarchy returned, with accumulating distractions. The senate, and the other friends of Milo, would gladly have hastened the elections, but were hindered by the
U. C. 701.
partisans of the other candidates. The populace too, enjoying this season of gratuities, of entertainments, and of public shows, in which the competitors continued to vie with one another, and to waste their fortunes, were glad to have the canvas prolonged.*

* Padianus, in Argument. Orat. pro Milone.

When the senate proposed to have recourse to the remedy usual in such disorders of the state, by naming an interrex (the only title under which any person could preside in restoring the magistracy by an election of consuls), they were restrained by the negative of the tribune Munatius Plancus, who was supposed to co-operate with Pompey in some design, which was not understood; but supposed to be favoured by the delay of every measure proposed for the restoration of order.

In the midst of this scene, which kept the minds of men in fear of some general calamity, an accident happened, which brought the disorder to a height, and forced every party to accept of a remedy. On the 13th of the kalends of February, or the 30th of January, Milo, going to Lanuvium, a town about fifteen miles from Rome, of which he was chief magistrate, met with Clodius, about three o'clock in the afternoon, returning from his country-seat at Aricia. Milo was in a carriage with his wife Fausta, the daughter of Sylla, and a friend, Fusius. He had a numerous escort, amounting to some hundreds of servants in arms, and, in particular, was attended by two noted gladiators, Eudamus and Birria. Clodius was on horseback, with a retinue of thirty servants, likewise in arms. It is likely that this encounter was altogether accidental; for the companies continued on their way without any disturbance, till Birria, the gladiator, unwilling to pass without giving some specimen of his calling, as he straggled a little behind his party, quarrelled with some of the followers of Clodius. A fray ensued: Clodius himself returned to quell it, or to punish the authors of it; but meeting with little respect among the gladiators, received a wound in the shoulder, and was carried to be dressed in the inn at Bovillæ, near to which place the disturbance began. Milo, being told of what had passed, likewise returned to the place; and thinking it safer to end their quarrels there, than await the revenge of an enemy thus provoked, who would not fail, at the head of his faction in the city, to rouse the fury of the populace against him, encouraged his people to pursue their advantage: they accordingly forced their way into the inn, dragged Clo-

dius from thence, and, having killed him, and dispersed his followers, left him dead of many wounds in the highway.

Sextus Tedijs, a senator, happening to pass, put the body into his own carriage, and sent his servants with it to Rome. They arrived before six at night, and, proceeding directly to the house of the deceased, which stood on the Palatine hill, over the forum, laid the corpse in the vestibule.

The servants of the family, and multitudes from the streets, immediately crowded to see this spectacle. Fulvia, the wife of Clodius, stood over the body, and with loud lamentations uncovered and pointed out the wounds of her deceased husband. The crowd continued to increase all night, and until break of day, when Q. Munatius Plancus, and Q. Pompeius Rufus, tribunes of the people, likewise repaired to the same place, and gave orders to carry the dead body naked to the market-place, and there to leave it exposed to public view on the rostra; and at the same time accompanied this spectacle with inflammatory harangues to the people.

Sextus Claudius, kinsman of the deceased, soon after removed the body from the market-place to the senate-house, meaning to reproach the order of senators as accessory to the murder. The populace, who still followed in great numbers, burst into the place, tore up the benches, and brought into a heap the materials, with the tables and desks of the clerks, the journals and records of the senate, and, having set the whole on fire, consumed the corpse on this extraordinary pile. The fire soon reached the roof, and spread to the contiguous buildings. The tribunes, Plancus and Rufus, who were all this while exhorting the people to vengeance, were driven from the rostra by the flames which burst from the buildings around them. The senate-house, the Porcia basilica, and other edifices, were reduced to ashes.

The same persons, by whom this fire had been kindled, repaired to the house of M. Lepidus, who, upon the first alarm of an insurrection, had been named interrex, forced into the hall, broke down the images of the family ancestors, tore from the looms the webs, in weaving of which the industry of Roman matrons was still employed, and destroyed what else they could reach. From thence, they proceeded to attack the house

of Milo; but there met with a more proper reception. This house, during the riots, in which the master of it had borne so great a part, was become a kind of fortress, and, among the other arrangements made for its defence, was manned with archers, who plied the aggressors with arrows from the windows and terrace, in such manner as soon obliged them to withdraw.

The rioters, being repulsed from the house of Milo, crowded to the temple, in which the consular fasces, during the interregnum, were kept, seized them by force, and carried them to the houses of Scipio and Hypsæus, the present popular candidates for the consulate; these, without any other form of election, they pressed to assume the ensigns of consular power. But not having prevailed in this proposal, they proceeded to the house of Pompey, saluting him with mixed shouts of consul or dictator, according as they wished him to assume the one or the other of these titles or dignities.

From this time, for some days, an armed populace, mixed with slaves, continued, under pretence of searching for Milo and his adherents, to pillage every place they could enter.* And the partisans of the candidates, Hypsæus and Scipio, thinking they had Milo at a disadvantage, beset the house of the interrex; and, though it was not customary for the first in this nomination to proceed to the elections, they clamoured for an immediate assembly of the people for this purpose. The party of Milo, though professing likewise to join the same clamour for an immediate election, came to blows with their opponents, and protected the house and the person of the interrex from further violence.

Milo himself, who was at first supposed to have fled or gone into exile, hearing of the excesses committed by the opposite party, and of the general inclination of the more sober part of the citizens to check and disappoint their violence, ventured again to appear in the city, and, at the head of his friends, renewed his canvass. A succession of officers, with the title of interrex, continued to be named at the expiration of every usual term of five days; but such was the confusion

* Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. ii.

and distraction of the scene, that no election could be made. The senate, under the greatest alarm, gave to the interrex, and to the tribunes of the people, to whom they joined Pompey, (who by virtue of his proconsular commission as purveyor of corn, for the people, held a public character in the state) the usual charge given to the consuls, to watch over the safety of the republic. They even recommended to Pompey to make the necessary levies throughout Italy, and to provide a military force to act for the commonwealth, in repressing the disorders which were committed by the candidates for office.

Under the protection of such temporary expedients, to restrain the violence with which all parties endeavoured to do themselves justice, some applied for redress, in the way of prosecution and civil suit. The two Claudii, nephews of the deceased Publius Clodius, demanded that the slaves of Milo, or those of his wife Fausta, should be put to the torture, in order to force a discovery of the manner in which their uncle was killed. The two Valerii, Nepos and Leo, with Lucius Herennius Balbus, joined in the same demand. On the opposite party, a like demand against the slaves of the deceased Publius Clodius was made by Cælius, one of the tribunes; and a prosecution for violence and corruption was entered by Manlius Cænianus against Hypsæus and Scipio, the competitors of Milo for the office of consul.

Milo, in answer to the demand that was made to have his slaves put to the torture, pleaded, that the persons, now demanded as slaves, were actually freemen, having received their liberty as a reward for their faithful services in defending his person against a late attempt made by Clodius on his life. It was alleged, on the other hand, that they were manumised merely to evade the law, to preserve them from the torture, and to screen their master from the evidence which they might in that manner be obliged to give. M. Cælius and Manlius Cænianus being tribunes, and disposed to favour Milo, had ventured to vindicate him to the people, and to load Clodius as the aggressor, and the intended assassin, in the fray which cost him his life. Cicero too, with great zeal and courage, while the friends of Milo were yet unsafe in the streets, maintained the same argument in the senate,

and before the people.* Milo, however, would have been glad to make a composition; and, as Pompey had all along, in the competition for the consulate, favoured not only Scipio, but likewise Hypsæus, against him, he offered to drop his pretension in favour of those candidates, if Pompey would agree to suppress the prosecutions that were commencing against him. To these proposals Pompey refused to listen. He probably thought the election secure for his friends, and, by affecting a zeal for justice, hoped to increase his authority with the people.

The partisans of Pompey, in the midst of this wild and disorderly state of affairs, were busy in renewing the cry, which they had raised in the former interregnum, that he should be named dictator, for the re-establishment of order, and the restoration of the public peace. Such an extraordinary remedy had never been at any time more wanted in the republic; but the times, in which it might be safely applied, were no more. The name of dictator recalled the memory of Sylla's executions, and it appeared to be uncertain against whom they might now be directed. To avoid the title more than the power of dictator, Bibulus moved, in the senate, that all the present candidates for the consulate should be set aside, and that the interrex should assemble the people for the election of Pompey sole consul. Cato, to the surprise of every body, seconded this motion. He observed, that any magistracy was preferable to none, and that, if the republic must be governed by a single person, none was so fit for the charge as the person now proposed. Pompey, being present, thanked Cato for this declaration of his esteem, and said, that, if he accepted the charge, it should be in hopes of being aided by his counsel. Cato made answer, in terms, meant to be literally interpreted, but which, in other instances of the same kind, under an aspect of sullenness, have been intended to flatter, that he meant no favour to Pompey, and deserved no thanks from him; that his intention was to do the best that the times could allow for the republic.

* Ascon. Pædian. in Argument. Orat. pro Milone.

It was resolved, in terms of this motion, that Pompey should be presented to the people as sole candidate for the consulship, and that, after two months were elapsed, he might propose any other person to be joined with himself in this office.* The election was accordingly brought on by the interrex Servius Sulpicius, on the twenty-fourth of February, and Pompey declared sole consul,† with a commission from the senate to arm, if necessary, the inhabitants of Italy, for the better establishment of order in the city.

The first object of Pompey, in the high and unprecedented dignity which was now conferred upon him, appears to have been the framing of laws to restrain for the future such disorders as had lately prevailed, and to bring the persons convicted of such crimes to justice. For this purpose, he obtained an act to enforce the laws already subsisting against the practice of violence or corruption in the contest for office; and to regulate the form of proceeding in trials on such criminal accusations.

By the regulations now suggested, every trial was to end in four days. The examination of evidence might occupy the three first of those days; the hearing of parties, and the judgment, the fourth. The prosecutor was allowed two hours to support his charge, and the defendant three hours to make his defence. The number of advocates was restricted, and the use of commendatory characters prohibited.‡ The quaesitor, or judge criminal, was to be chosen from among those who were of consular dignity, and eighty-one judges or jurors were to be impannelled, and obliged to attend the trial. After the evidence and pleadings were heard, the parties were then allowed each to challenge and to reject fifteen of the jury or judges, or five from each of the orders of which they were composed; when the court, being thus reduced to fifty one, was to be inclosed, and to give judgment.||

Corruption was become so frequent, and supposed so unavoidable in conducting elections, that it was difficult to find any one willing to prosecute the crime. To remedy this

* Plutarch. in Vit. Pomp. et Catonis, Dio. lib. xl.

† Ascon. Pædian. in Argument. Orat. pro Milone.

‡ Dio. Cass. lib. xl. c. 53.

|| Ascon. Pæd. ibid.

defect, a clause was enacted in the law of Pompey, by which any person, formerly convicted of bribery, might obtain a remission of the penalties he had incurred, by convicting any one else of an equal crime, or by convicting two persons, though of an offence less heinous than his own. By these means, it was proposed that a first conviction should lead to many more in succession. That conviction, in every instance, should be attended with infamy; but that the pains of law should ultimately rest only on such person as could not find another on whom to shift the burden from himself.*

Some of these regulations were made with a particular view to the trial of Milo, now arraigned on the statutes both of corruption, and of violence or assassination. They were, accordingly, opposed by the friends of the person whose case they were likely to affect, on the ground of their partiality as acts of attainder, having a retrospect, or application to matters which passed before they were enacted. Cælius the tribune, and Cicero, maintained this argument. Pompey replied, with impatience, that if he were hindered to proceed in a legal way, he should employ force.† He appeared to entertain some animosity to Milo, such, at least, as they who love to govern have to others who appear not to be easily governed. He either had, or affected to have, apprehensions of danger to his own person, confessed or alleged this apprehension in the senate, and retired, as for safety, to his own house in the suburbs: there he retained, for the guard of his person, a party of armed men; and there too, under the same affectation of withdrawing from violence, he caused the assemblies of the senate to be held.

The aristocratical or senatorian party was much interested in the preservation of Milo: they had been frequently assailed by the popular rioters, who set the laws at defiance; and as the laws had not always been of sufficient force to protect their own persons, it was their interest to protect those who, on occasion, had defended them, though by means not agreeable to law. The argument, in equity, indeed, was strong on the side of Milo. During the late suspension of

* Dio. Cass. lib. xl. 52.

† Ascon. Padian. in Argument. Orat. pro Milone.

government, the factions were rather separate parties at war, than subjects enjoying the protection, and amenable to the jurisdiction, of any civil power whatever. They alone, who procured or prolonged this state of anarchy, were chargeable with the consequences. In this contest, which could not be maintained without force or violent measures, the friends of the republic and of the senate were badly circumstanced. They contended for laws, and a constitution, which might be turned against the irregularities which had been necessary to their own preservation, while the opposite faction, if defeated, might claim the protection of those very forms which they themselves had endeavoured to subvert.

It would have been fair, perhaps, to have closed the late scene of confusion with a general indemnity, and to have taken precautions for the regular uninterrupted exercise of legal administration in future. This, however, would not have calmed the resentments of those who were aggrieved; and Pompey determined to signalize his government by a more specious appearance of justice. Domitius Ahenobarbus was chosen commissioner for the trial of Milo, on the charge of murder; and the other judges, taken from among the most respectable of each order in the commonwealth, were impanelled in terms of the late statute. The defendant was cited to answer this charge on the fourth of April; and, on the same day, to answer a charge of corruption brought against him in the ordinary court of the prætor Manlius. Marcellus appeared for him at the bar of the prætor, and procured a delay until the other trial should be ended.

The court, as usual, was held in the forum, or open market-place. There was a tribunal or bench railed in for the judges. The whole space was crowded with multitudes of the people. The prosecutors began with examining Cassinius Schola, who had been in company with Clodius when he was killed. This witness gave direct evidence to the fact, and exaggerated, the atrocity of the crime. Marcellus would have cross-questioned him; but the populace and many others assembling in the crowd, who favoured the prosecution, raised a menacing cry, which alarmed the accused and his counsel so much, that they claimed the protection of the court. They were, accord-

ingly, received within the rails, and the judge applied to the consul, who had taken his station near to the place of assembly, in order to restrain, by his presence, any disorders that might arise at the trial. Pompey, who was then attended only by his lictors, was himself likewise alarmed by that disorderly shout, and said that, for the future, a proper force should be provided to keep the peace. He accordingly, on the following day, filled every avenue, which led to the forum, with men under arms; and, upon some tumult among the populace, gave an order that the place should be cleared. And in the execution of this order, numbers were killed.

Under the impression made by this vigorous exertion of power, the witnesses continued to be examined for two days, without any disturbance. Among these the inhabitants of Bovillæ, the family and relations of Clodius, with his wife Fulvia, were examined on the several circumstances that fell within their knowledge, and left no doubt remaining with respect to the fact. The minds of men every day became more intent on the issue: so that, on the fourth day, when the parties were to plead, the shops and offices were shut, and all other business was suspended in the city.

There appeared, for the prosecutors, Appius Claudius, M. Antonius, and Valerius Nepos. They began at eight, and spoke till ten. For the defendant appeared Q. Hortensius, M. Marcellus, M. Calidius, Faustus Sylla, M. Cato, and M. T. Cicero, of whom the last only attempted to speak. Some were of opinion that, as the fact was undeniable, it ought to be justified on the plea of political necessity or public expedience. Cicero himself thought this too bold a plea, and therefore chose that of self-defence, alleging that Clodius was the aggressor, and intended to assassinate Milo. It is remarked of this celebrated orator, that, practised as he was, he began all his orations under considerable solicitude and awe of his audience. On this occasion, when he stood up to speak, the partisans of Clodius, who were likewise inveterate enemies to himself, endeavoured to disconcert him with clamours and menacing cries. The unusual parade of military guards, commanded by an officer who was supposed to be prejudiced against his client, it is said, so far overcame

and sunk his spirit, that he spoke feebly, and concluded abruptly; and the speech he actually made was far short of that masterly oration which he composed, and afterwards published, under the title of Milo's defence.

The accused, however, even in this alarming scene, stood at the bar with an undaunted countenance; and while every one else, in imitation of the senators, appeared in mourning, he alone appeared in his ordinary dress. When judgment was given, and the ballots inspected, it appeared that, of the senators, twelve condemned, and six, or perhaps rather five, acquitted; of the knights, thirteen condemned, and four acquitted; of the tribuni ærarii, or representatives of the plebeian order, thirteen condemned, and three or four acquitted. And Milo, upon the whole, was condemned by thirty-eight against thirteen.

Before sentence was pronounced, being still at liberty to withdraw, he retired into exile, and fixed his residence at Marseilles. Thither Cicero sent him a copy of an oration in his defence, composed at leisure, as an effort of his eloquence, and a specimen of what could be urged in the cause. The packet containing this writing, it seems, was delivered or read to Milo while he sat at dinner. "How lucky it was," he said, "that this oration was not actually spoken. I should not now have been eating these excellent fish at Marseilles."* These marks of indifference make a striking contrast to the figure which Cicero himself had exhibited in his exile. If he could have thus trifled with apparent or unmerited disgrace, that single addition of constancy and force to his character would have undoubtedly placed him as high in the order of statesmen as, by the other parts of his character, he stands in the list of ingenious men and virtuous citizens.

Milo was likewise, soon after, condemned, in absence, by the prætor, upon a charge of bribery and corruption. Some of his competitors, particularly Hypsæus and Scipio, were brought to trial for the same offence. The tribune Munatius Plancus and Pompeius Rufus, were, at the expiration of their

* Asconius Pædianus et Argument. et Notis in Orat. pro Mil.—Dio. Cass. lib. 41.—Plut. in Pompeio, Catone, &c.

office, tried and condemned for the share which they had in the assault which was committed on the house of M. Lepidus the interrex, and in lighting the fire which consumed the senate-house.

CHAPTER XXIV.

Conduct of Pompey in his Quality of sole Consul.—Pretensions of Caesar to be admitted as Candidate for the Office of Consul, without resigning his Province.—General Revolt of the Gauls.—Operations in that Country.—Blockade and Reduction of Alesia.—Distribution of Caesar's Army in Gaul.

POMPEY, in his dignity of sole consul, having joined a legal authority to the personal elevation which he always affected, possessed much of the influence and consideration of a real monarch; and it would have been happy, perhaps, for the state, if he could have made such a dignity hereditary, and a permanent part of the constitution, or given to the commonwealth that reasonable mixture of kingly government, of which it appears to have stood so greatly in need. In his present elevation he rose, for awhile, above the partialities of a factious leader, and appeared to adopt that interest which the well-advised sovereign ever has in the support of justice. He even seems to have stepped into the character of a prince, or to have considered himself as above the rank of a citizen. Among other instances of this sort, is mentioned his haughty saying to Hypsæus, late candidate for the consulate, now under prosecution for bribery; who, as Pompey passed from the bath to supper, put himself in his way, to implore his protection. "Detain me not," he said; "you only make supper to cool for no purpose."* In the midst of the solicitations

* Val. Max. lib. ix. c. 5.

of his courtiers and flatterers, he even ventured to dispense with his own regulations. Contrary to the rule he himself had laid down for the direction of criminal trials, he furnished Munatius Plancus, when arraigned at the prætor's bar, with a commendatory testimony. "I cannot prefer this writing of Pompey," said Cato, "to the law of which he himself is the author." On account of this saying, Plancus, when the judges came to be inclosed, thought proper to include Cato among those he rejected: the accused was nevertheless condemned.*

Besides the measures taken to punish past offences, or to deter those who might be inclined to violate the laws, it was thought expedient also to lessen the temptation to crimes, by which the public had of late been so much aggrieved. The principal source of the late disorders appeared to be the avidity of candidates for those offices of state which led immediately to the government of lucrative provinces. To remove this temptation, it was ordained, at the suggestion of Pompey, that no man could have a lucrative appointment till five years after the expiration of that office, whether of consul, prætor, or quæstor, in consequence of which he claimed a proportionate station in the provinces.

Before the enacting of this law, however, Pompey had the address to procure for himself a prolongation of his government in Spain for five years. This circumstance, which continued to give him the command of an army abroad, while he likewise bore the highest civil office in the state at home, set a very dangerous precedent for the commonwealth, of which Cæsar was not slow to avail himself.

The commission which was held by this adventurer in Gaul was soon to determine; and, according to the laws then in force, he must even resign it before he could aspire to the consulate, or pretend to cope with his rival in civil preferences. It had been wisely ordained by the laws, that the persons offering themselves as candidates for the office of consul, should appear in person to sue for it; and that no man, without resigning his military command, and dismissing his

* Plutarch. in Pompeio, p. 484.

army, could enter the city, or even go beyond the limits of the province in which he had governed. By this regulation it was intended to prevent the conjunction of civil power in the state with the command of an army. Pompey, however, though vested with such a command in Spain, had contrived to be exempted from the observance of this law; and, under pretence that his office of general purveyor of corn for the Roman people did not confine him to any station, or, if it did not extend to the whole empire, had at least a particular reference to Italy, he still continued to occupy the seat of general administration at Rome.

Cæsar, to keep pace with his rival, openly aspired to the same privilege which Pompey had enjoyed; and claimed, as a mere instance of equal treatment, what the other had obtained; but what, if bestowed on himself, with his other advantages, must give him a great and immediate superiority. The army attached to his person was already in the most advantageous situation for commanding the empire. The addition of consular power at Rome to that of general in both the Gauls was joining Italy, and the city itself, to his provinces, and putting him at once in possession of the whole. Any opposition made to his authority as consul would be construed as rebellion against the state, and justify recourse to the arms which he bore at the very gates of Rome. Pompey would be driven at once from the helm of affairs to the command of a distant province, in which he, at most, could only defend himself, but not be in a condition to contest the sovereignty, either in behalf of the senate or himself.

With these objects in his view, Cæsar instructed his partisans among the tribunes to move that, being continually engaged in a hazardous war, which required his presence, and being necessarily detained abroad in the service of his country, he might be exempted from the law which required the candidates for office to attend their canvass in person, and might, therefore, be admitted as candidate for the consulship, without appearing at Rome, or divesting himself of his power in the province.

This proposition was sufficiently understood by the leading men of the senate, and by the few who joined with them in

support of the commonwealth. It was known to be intended that Cæsar should have a privilege of being elected consul, without resigning his province, or dismissing his army; and they withstood the motion as of the most dangerous consequence. But Pompey, who ought likewise, for his own sake, to have been alarmed at the progress of Cæsar, and at the uncommon advantage which he now attempted to gain, was either lulled into security by the artifices of his rival, or thought himself sufficiently raised above any danger from this or any other quarter. He had accepted, in his own person, many unprecedented honours; and was possibly unwilling to contend for forms, which, at some future period, might limit his own pretensions. Cato loudly renewed the alarm which he had frequently given on the subject of Cæsar's designs. Cicero could not be neutral in any dispute that should arise between Cæsar and Pompey. He had been banished by the one, and restored by the other. Besides the personal obligation he owed to Pompey, his natural bias was on the side of the senate, and for the support of the forms which were provided for the safety of the commonwealth. On this occasion, however, he appears again willing to deceive himself; and, dazzled with the court which Cæsar had paid to him for some time, with a view to this very question, he condemned the indiscreet zeal of Cato, who, in his opinion, was ruining the cause of the republic by setting both Cæsar and Pompey at defiance, while he himself, by temporizing, and by managing the inclinations of these parties, had secured them both in its interests. He stated the danger of a quarrel with Cæsar at this time, supported as he was by a powerful army, and in the very bowels of Italy; but did not consider that he was then giving up, without a quarrel, all that, in the issue of any quarrel, could be extorted.

The army of Cæsar was not then so well prepared to follow him against his country, nor he himself furnished with the same colours of justice, under which, upon the recal of the privilege now granted him, he afterwards made war on the commonwealth. To temporize, therefore, in this instance, was to give an enemy the time necessary to ripen his plans for execution, or rather, in effect, to deliver up the republic,

without a contest, to that fate which the councils which Cicero now flattered himself were so prudent rendered almost inevitable. Under colour of this prudence, nevertheless, Cicero, as well as Pompey, supported the tribunes in their motion, and obtained for the proconsul of Gaul the dispensation he desired, to retain his army, while he offered himself a candidate for the highest office of the state at Rome.

Cæsar, immediately upon his arrival within the Alps, in the beginning of winter, observing the distractions which, upon the murder of Clodius, took place in the city, affected much zeal for the laws which had been so grossly violated in that instance; and, under pretence of furnishing himself with the means of supporting the state against those who were inclined to disturb it, ordered new levies in every part of his provinces, and made a considerable addition to his army; but, contented for the present with the privilege he had obtained of suing for the consulate, without quitting his province, or resigning his military power, he left the state, as before, apparently in the hands of Pompey; and, in the middle of winter, on the report of a general defection of all the Gaulish nations, repassed the Alps.

Most of the nations that lay beyond the mountains of Auvergne, the original limits of the Roman province, roused by the sense of their present condition, or by the cruel massacre lately executed in a part of their country, were actually in arms. They had submitted to Cæsar, or were separately gained by him, under the specious pretence of alliance or protection against their enemies; and, with the title of ally, suffered him to become their master. But the violence with which he had threatened the canton of the Carnutes,* for absenting themselves from the congress which he had formed on the Seine, and the merciless severities executed by him against the unfortunate natives of the tract between the Rhine and the Meuse,† convinced all the nations of Gaul, whether the voluntary or forced allies of Rome, that they were reduced to the condition of slaves; and that every exertion they made for liberty was to be punished as a crime. They saw the

* New Chartres.

† Now chiefly Liege and Guelderland.

folly of their former dissensions, and suspended all their animosities to enter into a general concert for their common safety. The occasion, they said, was favourable for the recovery of their country. The Romans were distracted at home, and Cæsar had sufficient occupation in Italy. His army could not act in his absence. The present time, they concluded, was the favourable opportunity to shut out the Romans forever beyond the Cevennes, or even force them to retire within the Alps.

All the nations on the Seine, the Loire, and the Garonne, quite round to the coast of the British channel, received these representations with joy. They held private meetings, and instead of exchanging hostages, which would have been too public a measure, and have led to a discovery of their designs, they plighted their faith by a more secret form, commonly practised among them on great occasions, that of pressing their banners together.

The people of the Carnutes undertook to begin hostilities; and, accordingly, on a day fixed, surprised the town of Genabum,* where they put many Roman traders, together with the commissary-general of the army, to death.

It was the custom of the Gauls to convey intimation of such events by means of a cry which they raised at the place of action, and repeated wherever the voice was heard, till passing almost with the velocity of sound itself, it gave the speediest information of what was done. In this manner intelligence of what had been transacted at Genabum at the rising of the sun, was, before night, propagated in every direction, to the distance of a hundred and sixty miles, and put all the nations within this compass in a ferment. Its first and principal effects, however, were produced in the country of the Arverni.† Here Vercingetorix, a youth of heroic spirit and great capacity, assembled his retainers, took possession of Gergovia, now Clermont, the capital of his country, and from thence sent messengers, in every direction, to urge the execution of the measures lately concerted for the general freedom of Gaul. He himself, in return for his zeal, being cho-

* Orleans.

† Auvergne.

sen the common head of the confederacy, fixed the quota of men and of arms to be furnished by each separate canton, and took hostages for the regular observance of the conditions to which the several parties had agreed.

This general, commander of the Gauls, having assembled a considerable army, sent a part of his force to act on the Garonne, and to harass the frontiers of the Roman province on that side, while he himself moved to the Loire, in order to rouse the nations of that quarter to a proper sense of the occasion; and he, accordingly, brought to his standard all the warriors of those cantons which lay on the left of that river. His party on the Garonne, at the same time, were joined by all the nations of Aquitania, and, in formidable numbers, threatened with immediate destruction the cities of Toulouse and Narbonne, or such parts of their districts at least as were open to invasion.

Thither Cæsar, with all the forces he could assemble upon his return from Italy, immediately repaired; and, having put the province of Narbonne in a condition not to be insulted, proceeded to give the enemy an alarm in their own country. His object was, if possible, to effect a junction with the legions which he had left on the northern frontiers of his new acquisitions. Those legions could not be moved from their present position to favour his junction, without being exposed to be cut off by the natives: nor was it easy for himself, with the force under his command, to penetrate through so many enemies as lay in his way to join them. It was yet winter, and the mountains were deeply covered with snow. This circumstance, although it increased his difficulties, as it was likely to render the enemy secure, still encouraged him to make his attempt. He, accordingly, passed the mountains* which lay in his way, at a time when the snow, in many places, being six feet deep, was to be removed with shovels, and when that passage was supposed to be entirely impracticable. After he had surmounted this difficulty, his object being to divert the attention of his enemy, he sent his cavalry abroad, in numerous parties, with fire and sword, to lay waste the country,

* The Cevennes.

and destroy the people, with their habitations and effects. When he thought the alarm was sufficiently spread, and must have reached the Gaulish army on the Loire, pretending that his presence was required in the province behind him, he gave the command of the troops in Auvergne to Decimus Brutus, then a young man; giving him orders, at the same time, to keep his parties abroad, and to continue to harass that district, as he himself had done.

Having taken these measures to fix the attention of the enemy in one quarter, Cæsar, with a few attendants, made haste to pass in a different direction to Vienna on the Rhône, where he was received by a party of horse, which he had appointed at that place to wait his orders; and, under this escort, without halting by day or by night, he passed by Bibracté* and the country of the Lingones,† to the nearest quarter of his army in the north; and while he was yet supposed to be in Auvergne, had actually assembled his legions which had been distributed on the course of the Seine.

Vercingetorix having notice that Cæsar, in this manner, had passed him, and that the Roman army on the Seine was in motion; and perceiving that the invasion of his own country had been no more than a feint, and that the chief force of the enemy was to be expected from a different quarter, he resumed the operations which he had intermitted on the Loire, and endeavoured to possess himself of a post in the territory of Bibracté, where the people still professed themselves to be in the alliance of Rome.

Cæsar, notwithstanding the difficulty of procuring provisions and forage so early in the season, thought himself under a necessity of opposing the progress of the enemy. For this purpose he left his baggage, under the guard of two legions, at Agendicum;‡ and from thence, with the remainder of the army, proceeded to Genabum,|| leaving Trebonius by the way, to take possession of a town which the natives, after a little show of resistance, had surrendered.

Upon his arrival before Genabum, the Gauls, who were in arms at that place, resolved to abandon the town; and, shut-

* Afterwards Augustodunum, now Autun.

† Langres.

‡ Sens.

|| Orleans.

ting the gates against the Romans on one side, endeavoured to escape by the bridge of the Loire on the other. But Cæsar, having intelligence of their design, while they were busy in the execution of it, forced open a gate of the town in their rear, and overtook them, while crowded together in the entrance and passage of the bridge, and in the narrow streets which led to it, put the greater part to the sword, and, under pretence of revenging the massacre of the Roman traders, who had been cut off at this place, ordered that the town should be destroyed. From thence he penetrated into the country of the Bituriges,* on the left of the Loire; and, on his way to Avaricum,† the principal strong-hold in that quarter, forced every place that opposed his passage.

Vercingetorix, observing the rapid progress of the Romans, and knowing that the Gauls, being without order or discipline, could not withstand them in battle, declined an engagement, but endeavoured to distress the enemy by delays and want of provisions. He had authority enough with his countrymen to prevail on them to lay their own country waste everywhere within many miles of Cæsar's route. And, in compliance with his orders, twenty towns of the Bituriges were burnt in one day. Avaricum alone, contrary to his opinion, and at the earnest request of its inhabitants, who undertook to defend it to the last extremity, was spared.

Thither, accordingly, Cæsar advanced, as to the only prize that was left. He attacked the place, under great disadvantage, in the midst of a country that was entirely laid waste, and trusting for the daily subsistence of his army to the Ædui beyond the Loire, who, notwithstanding their professions, were far from being hearty in his cause, or diligent in sending their supplies of provisions to his camp. Such as they sent were intercepted by Vercingetorix, who had occupied a strong post with his army, and infested the highways with his parties. In these circumstances, the Romans were sometimes reduced to great distress. Cæsar himself, to pique the resolution of his men, affected a willingness to raise the siege, whenever they were pleased to intimate that they could not endure

* Now Berri.

† Bourges.

their fatigues any longer. "We are got into a difficult situation," he said; "but if the troops are discouraged, I shall withdraw." To this affected tenderness for the sufferings of the army, he was everywhere answered with intreaties that he would not dishonour them, by supposing that any hardships could oblige them to forfeit the character they had acquired by the labour of so many successful campaigns. He, accordingly, continued the attack of Avaricum, under all the discouragements to which he found himself exposed.

The place, situate in an angle, was covered on two sides by a river and a morass, and was accessible only on the third. The walls of the town were ingeniously constructed, with double frames, forming compartments or pannels of wood, filled up with masonry and large blocks of stone. The masonry secured the timber from fire, and the frames preserved the masonry against the effects of the battering ram, which could act only on the stones contained within a single pannel or division of the frame, without ruining at once any considerable part of the wall, or effecting a breach. The Roman army had to attack this wall by methods the most laborious and difficult then practised; having a way to make, by a mound of approach, before they could ascend to the level of the battlements, or touch the walls; a work to be begun at a considerable distance, in order to have an easy slope or ascent, and requiring a breadth of above eighty feet, to admit sufficient numbers in front.* The earth on the sides of this mound was to be supported by timbers, hurdles and faggots, and the workmen upon it were to be covered with mantlets and moveable pent-houses. The besieged, as this fabric arose, that they might still overtop the besiegers, raised their walls by additional frames of wood, which they covered with raw hides, as a security against the arrows and burning shafts which were darted against them.

In this contest the works on both sides were mounted up to the height of about eighty feet, and the besieged still endeavoured to preserve their advantage, not only by raising their own battlements, but likewise by undermining and sink-

* The Agger.

ing the mound of the besiegers. They made galleries under the foundation of their own rampart to the bottom of the enemy's mound, by which they endeavoured, from below, to remove the earth and other materials of the mound, as fast as they were accumulated above. They came, at the same time, from their sally-ports, on different sides of the mound, and endeavoured to set fire to the wood by which the earth was supported: in all these particulars shewing that they possessed the arts of defence in common with ancient nations,* Vercingetorix, also, continued to harass the Roman army from without, intercepted their supply of provisions, and, by passing the river or the morass, maintained his communication with the town, and sent in frequent relief.

Notwithstanding all these difficulties, Cæsar by degrees brought forward and raised his mound of approach to the height of the battlements; so that, by a single assault, he might determine the fate of the town. And while both parties were preparing for a last effort, he took his opportunity to storm, as he frequently did, in the midst of a heavy fall of rain. The besieged, as he supposed, had taken shelter from the weather, and were in that instant put off their guard. He, accordingly, got possession of their defences, with little resistance, and forced the parties who manned to retreat. The inhabitants, being driven from the walls, formed in the streets, and the Romans, who had entered on the ramparts, extending their line to the right and the left, were about to occupy the battlements over the whole circumference of the place, when the garrison, observing their danger, began to escape by the gates. In the confusion that followed, the town was sacked, and could make no resistance. Of forty thousand persons, who had taken shelter in it, no more than eight hundred escaped. This massacre was joined to that lately performed at Genabum; and, under the pretence of completing the vengeance which was due for the murder of the Roman traders, who were put to death at the breaking out of the

* Cæsar. de Bell. Gall. lib. vii. c. 22, &c.—Vid. Thucid. lib. ii. in the siege of Platæa.

present revolt, all the inhabitants of this place, without exception, were put to the sword.

The Gauls, as usual on every calamitous event, were greatly disheartened, and were about to despair of their cause, when their leader reminded them, that, contrary to his judgment, they had reserved this place from the general devastation of the country, and had themselves undertaken to defend it; but their loss in this instance was the effect of mistake, and might be retrieved by abler conduct. His authority as usual rose on the ill success of councils which he had not approved, and brought an accession of numbers to his standard.

Cæsar, finding a considerable supply of stores and provisions at Avaricum, remained some days to relieve and to refresh his army. The country around him, however, being entirely laid waste, or occupied by parties of the enemy, it became necessary for him to repass the Loire, and to open his communication with a country of which the inhabitants still professed to be in alliance with the Romans, and, having had their possessions covered by the river from the incursions of the enemy in their late devastations, were still in condition to supply his camp. As in this movement he seemed to retire and to give up the ground he had disputed with the prince of the Arverni, he pretended that he was called to settle a dispute which had arisen among the Ædui, relating to the succession of the chief magistrate, or head of their canton. Having repassed to the right of the Loire without any loss, he made a demand on his allies of that side for ten thousand men on foot, and all the horses they could furnish.

The Romans now had enemies on every quarter, and it was good policy to keep them divided, and to occupy them separately. For this purpose Cæsar sent four legions towards the Seine, while he himself took the route of Noviodunum,* at the confluence of the Loire and Allier; and there leaving his money, spare horses, and unnecessary baggage, he continued his march on the banks of the Allier, with intention to pass that river, and to invade the Arverni, from whom this revolt had originated, and whose chief was now at the head of it.

* Nevers.

This prince, knowing that the river Allier is never fordable till autumn, and till the melting of snows on the Cevennes begin to abate, ordered all the bridges upon it to be demolished, and hoped to prevent the Romans from passing it during the greater part of summer. As soon as Cæsar marched from Noviodunum, he presented himself on the right of the Allier, and regulated his motions by that of the enemy on the opposite side. The two armies commonly decamped, marched, and encamped again, in sight of each other; and Cæsar never affected to elude the vigilance of the Gauls, till he saw an opportunity to do so with advantage.

It happened that one of the bridges on this river had been but imperfectly destroyed; most of the piles were yet fast in the ground, and appeared above water; so that a passage might be effected in a few hours. The country around was woody, and furnished sufficient cover, or place of ambush, to any number of men. From these circumstances, Cæsar conceived the design to over-reach his enemy. He put his army in motion as usual, but himself remained with a sufficient detachment in the neighbourhood of the ruined bridge, which he meant to repair. In order that the Gauls might not be led to suspect that any part of his army was left behind, he ordered that those who were to move should divide, and present the same number of separate bodies, the same distinction of colours and standards, which they were accustomed to shew on a march of the whole army: at the same time, as he knew that the Gauls would endeavour to keep pace with his motions, in order to hasten and increase their distance from the place at which he meant to pass the river, he ordered his people to make a quicker and a longer march than usual. When he supposed that this feint or stratagem had taken its full effect, he began to work on the piles which were left in the river, and, in a few hours, repaired the bridge so effectually, that he passed with the division of the army he had reserved for this purpose, and instantly fortified a post to cover them on the opposite bank. From thence he sent orders to recal the main body; and, by the time the enemy were apprised of his design, had reunited all his forces on the left of the river.

Vercingetorix, as soon as he had intelligence that the Romans had passed the Allier, fell back to Gergovia,* the capital of his own principality, in order to take measures for the safety of that place. It being situate on a height, having an ascent of above a mile from the plain, and surrounded by other hills, which made part of the same ridge, he ordered a stone wall to be built, six feet high, about half way up the ascent to the town, and encamped as many as the space could contain within the circuit of this wall. He occupied the other hills at the same time with separate bodies, having communications with each other and with the town. By this disposition, Cæsar found all the approaches of the place commanded, and no possibility of investing the whole by lines of circumvallation, or by any chain of posts: but he pitched his camp at some distance from the foot of the hill, and from thence, in a few days, got possession of a height in his way to the town, on which he posted two legions, with a line of communication, fortified on both its flanks, leading from his main encampment to this advanced station.

In this posture, Cæsar foresaw that all the heights in his neighbourhood being in possession of the enemy, while he pressed upon the town, he himself might be hemmed in, and cut off from all the supplies necessary for the support of his army. To preserve his communication, therefore, with the Allier and the Loire, he ordered his allies from the opposite side of these rivers to advance with the forces he had formerly required of them, to occupy the country in his rear, and to cover his convoys. They, accordingly, took the field; but their leaders having been for some time inclined to favour the general cause of their country, thought this a favourable opportunity to declare their intentions. Being arrived within thirty miles of Cæsar's station, they halted; and, upon a report, which was industriously spread by their leaders, that the Roman general had murdered some of their countrymen, who were already in his camp, they put all the Romans who had joined them to death, and were resolved to take part with their countrymen, who were assembled for the defence of Ger-

* Now supposed to be the neighbourhood of Clermont.

govia. They had not yet moved to execute this resolution, when Cæsar, having notice of what they had done, and what was intended, with his usual diligence arrived, after a march of thirty miles, with four legions and all his cavalry, in time to prevent their designs. Affecting ignorance of what had passed, he presented himself as a friend; or thinking it safest for the present to disguise his resentment, he produced into public view all the persons who were said to have been killed by his orders, convinced such as had been deceived of their error, and brought them, with the seeming cordiality of allies, to his camp. He also made a merit with the Ædui of this act of clemency towards their people; but found that the spirit of defection was not confined to these detachments; that it had pervaded the nation; that the violence committed in the camp was an effect of the resolutions adopted by the whole people; that, in pursuance of the same measures, his purveyors and commissaries had been assaulted and pillaged, even where they thought themselves secure, as in a friend's country; and that, in short, he could not any longer rely on the affections of any nation in Gaul.

The leaders of the Ædui, however, on hearing of the lenity that was shown to such of their people as were in the power of Cæsar, pretended to return to their duty; and Cæsar, not to break at once with the only supposed ally which remained to him beyond the Cevennes, affected to consider the late disorders as the effect of a mere popular tumult, and declared himself willing to rely on the wisdom of the state itself for the reparation of wrongs which a few ill-advised persons of their country had committed.

As to the immediate part he took in the war, this able commander appears, as usual on many occasions, to have trusted greatly to the superiority of his troops, as well as to that of his own reputation and conduct as a general. His confidence in both was required in the highest degree to support him in continuing, or even in attempting, a siege under his present difficulties, beset by enemies, numerous, increasing, and in appearance ably conducted; while he himself was deserted by those who were reputed his friends.

In his last march, to repress the defection of his allies, he had left his own camp exposed to the attacks of the enemy, and defended only by two legions against the whole force of so many nations as were assembled for the defence of Gergovia. These did not neglect their opportunity in his absence, made a vigorous assault on his lines, and must have prevailed, if he had not returned, with the utmost celerity, for the relief of the few by whom they were defended.

With the same confidence in the superiority of his men, Cæsar soon afterwards made an attempt to force the wall, which, as has been mentioned; the Gauls had built on the ascent of the hill which led to the town; and having made a feint on the opposite side with part of his horse, joined by the followers of the army mounted on horseback, who shewed themselves at a distance to appear like cavalry, he drew the enemy from the place he meant to attack, actually passed the wall, and made himself master of part of their camp. A few of his men penetrated even into the town; but not being supported, were surrounded and slain; even those who had succeeded at first under favour of the feint by which he had diverted the enemy's attention, were, upon the return of the Gauls to the defence of their camp, repulsed with considerable loss. In consequence of this defeat, it was no longer doubtful that Cæsar would be under the necessity of raising the siege.

In order to begin his retreat without any appearance of fear, he formed his army two days successively on the plain before his intrenchment, with a countenance which might be interpreted as an offer of battle to the enemy. On the third day he decamped; and, with the credit he derived from this species of defiance or challenge, in three days he arrived at the Allier, repaired his bridge, and repassed undisturbed. His passage of the same river, a short time before, was esteemed as a victory; and his return, without having gained any advantage, and merely for the safety of his army, was undoubtedly to be considered as a defeat. The low state of his fortunes, checked and baffled by a Gaulish leader, yet a youth, and unexperienced, encouraged the nations on the right of the Loire, even while he was advancing towards them, to declare for the

liberties of Gaul; and, as a commencement of hostility, they carried off, or rifled, the treasure he kept for the pay of his army, and seized all the spare horses and baggage which he had left in Noviodunum, as a supposed place of security, at the confluence of two rivers, the Allier and the Loire.

He himself, being yet inclosed between these two rivers, having enemies on every side, and no magazines or stores for the supply of his army, deliberated whether he should not fall back on the province of Narbonne; but the danger to which he must expose Labienus, commanding a division of the Roman army on the Seine, the difficulty of passing the mountains of Auvergne, then occupied by his enemies, and the discredit which his arms must incur from such a retreat, prevented him. He determined, therefore, to advance; passed the Loire, by a ford, above its confluence with the Allier; found a considerable supply of provisions and forage in the country of the *Ædui*; and continued his march from thence to the Seine.

Labienus, with the troops he commanded in that quarter, had besieged Lutetia, the original germe from which the city of Paris has grown, then confined to a small island in the Seine, and had made some progress in the siege, when he heard of Cæsar's retreat from Gergovia; of the defection of the *Ædui*; and of preparations which were making by the nations on his right against himself. In these circumstances, he laid aside his design on Lutetia, and ascended by the left of the Seine to the country of the *Senones*, through which Cæsar was now advancing to meet him. In passing the river at Melodunum,* he was attacked by the enemy, but obtained a considerable victory; and, with the credit of this event in his favour, continued his march to a place which is now called Sens, near to which he was soon afterwards joined by Cæsar.

While the Romans were thus reuniting their forces on the Seine, Vercingetorix had passed the Loire, and held a general convention of the Gaulish nations at Bibracté. He was attended by deputies of all the cantons from the Moselle to the Loire, except the *Treviri*, *Remi*, and *Lingones*.† The

* Now Melun.

† Now Treves, Rheims, and Langres.

first stood in awe of the Germans, who kept them in continual alarm. The two last professed an attachment to the Romans, who were still masters of the field in their neighbourhood.

The leader of the Gaulish confederacy being at this meeting confirmed in his command, made a requisition for an augmentation of force, chiefly of cavalry, and, accordingly, increased this part of his army to fifteen thousand. To the end that he might give the Romans sufficient occupation in their own defence, he projected two separate invasions of the province of Narbonne: one to be executed by the nations which lay between the Rhône and Garonne, towards Toulouse; the other, from the Soane and the upper parts of the Loire, towards Geneva and the left of the Rhône. He himself, though still determined to avoid any general action, was to harass the enemy in their movements, and to cut off their supplies of provisions.

Cæsar, on his part, wished to open his communication with the Roman province, that he might have access to cover it against the designs of the enemy, and to avail himself of its resources for the subsistence of his army. For this purpose it was necessary for him to return, by the Soane and the Rhône, through a level country which was in possession of the enemy, to whom he was greatly inferior in cavalry. He, therefore, sent into Germany for a reinforcement of horse; and the natives of that part of the continent being already sensible that, wherever they were admitted to act as soldiers of fortune, they were qualifying themselves to act as masters, without scruple bestowed their services for or against any cause: two thousand of them joined Cæsar; but so ill mounted, that he was obliged to supply them with horses, by borrowing such as belonged to his officers of infantry, and as many as could be spared from his cavalry. To compensate their defect in horses, the men were brave; and, in many of the operations which followed, turned the event of the battles, and determined the fate of the war.

The Roman army being thus reinforced, Cæsar began his march to the southward; and having passed the heights at the sources of the Seine, found the Gauls already posted in three separate divisions, contiguous to the different routes he might

take, and prepared, with numerous flying parties of horse, to harass him in any movement he should make in their presence. By continuing his march, he soon gave their leader an opportunity to try his fortune in a sharp encounter, in which the whole cavalry of both armies came to be engaged. The Gauls were routed chiefly by the valour and address of the Germans, to whom even Cæsar himself ascribed his victory. This event was decisive in respect to the cavalry (that part of both armies on which it was supposed that the fate of the war must turn); and Vercingetorix, not to expose his infantry to the necessity of a general action, instantly retired to the heights from which the Seine, and a number of other rivers, that mix with it before its confluence with the Marne, have their source. Cæsar, no longer apprehensive of the enemy's horse, resumed the confidence with which he always pursued his advantages, and followed his flying enemy into the ground he had chosen for his retreat.

Vercingetorix, with his very numerous assemblage from all the cantons of Gaul, took post at Alesia, a place raised on a hill, at the confluence of two rivers; the point on which it stood being the termination of a ridge that separated the channels by which these rivers descended to the plain. The fields on one side were level; on the other mountainous. The Gauls were crowded together on the declivity of the hill of Alesia, under the walls of a town; and in that position thought themselves secure from attack: but not aware of the resources, enterprise, and genius of their enemy, while they endeavoured to render themselves inaccessible, they forgot that they had got into a place in which they might be cooped up; and Cæsar, unrestrained in his motions, immediately began to surround them, making a proper distribution of his army, and employing working parties at once on a chain of twenty-three posts and redoubts.

Vercingetorix, though too late, perceiving the disadvantage of his own situation, and the enemy's design, sent his cavalry to collect what provisions could be found in the neighbouring country: but these troops, in consequence of their late defeat, not being able to keep the field against the Roman and German horse, he proposed to diminish the consumption

within his own lines, by dismissing them altogether, giving them instructions to make the best of their way to their several cantons, and there to represent the condition in which they had left the army, and the necessity of making a great and speedy effort from every quarter to relieve it. He had eighty thousand men under his command; and might be able to subsist them for thirty days, and no longer.

Cæsar, from the enemy's having sent away their cavalry, concluded that they meant to act on the defensive, and to remain in their present position until they could be relieved. With little apprehension of disturbance, therefore, from an enemy so blocked up, he continued his operations; at once to secure his prey and to cover himself against any attempts which might be made to rescue them. This great commander owed many of his distinguished successes to the surprising works which he executed; so far exceeding the fears or apprehensions of his enemy, that they found themselves unexpectedly forced into difficulties with which they were not prepared to contend.

The Roman armies in general, and those which served under Cæsar in particular, had learned to make war with the pick-ax and the shovel, no less than with the javeline and the sword, and were inured to prodigies of labour, as well as of valour. In the present case they were made to execute lines of circumvallation and countervallation over an extent of twelve or fourteen miles. They began with digging, quite round the foot of the hill, a ditch twenty feet wide, with perpendicular sides, in order to prevent any surprise from the town. At the distance of four hundred feet from this ditch, and beyond the reach of the enemy's missiles, was drawn the line of countervallation, consisting of a ditch fifteen feet wide, and a rampart twelve feet high, furnished, as usual, with a palisade. At a proper distance from this first line, which fronted the town, so as to leave a proper interval for the lodgment and forming of his army, he drew another line, consisting of the same parts and dimensions, fronting the field. From the nature of the ground, part of these works were upon the hills, and part in the hollows or valleys; and the ditches,

wherever the level permitted, or could not carry off the water, were allowed to be filled.

As he had reason, as soon as the distress of a blockade began to be felt, to expect from a garrison, which exceeded his own army in numbers, attempts to sally from within ; and, by the united exertions of all the Gaulish nations, in behalf of their friends, every effort that could be made to relieve them from without ; and, as his own army, consisting of no more than sixty thousand men, could not equally man throughout all the works of so much extent, he thought it necessary to cover his lines with every species of outwork then practised in the art of attack or defence, the *cippi*, *lilia*, and the *stimuli*.

The first were forked stakes, or large branches of trees cut short and pointed, to wound those who should attempt to pass them ; they were planted in rows in the bottom of a ditch five feet wide, and bound or lashed together to prevent their being separately pulled up.

The second, or *lilia*, consisted of single stakes sharpened and made hard in the fire, planted in the bottom of tapering or conical holes, of which there were many rows placed in quincunx ; so that a person who had passed in the interval of any two, must necessarily fall into a third. This device was commonly masked or concealed with slender brush-wood covered with earth.

The last, or the *stimuli*, were wooden shafts set in the ground, and stuck thick with barbed hooks, to fasten or tear the flesh of those who attempted to pass them in the night, or without the necessary precautions.

All these several works, it appears, the Roman army completed, considerably within the thirty days for which Vercingetorix had computed that his provisions might last. Both parties concerned in this blockade, without any attempt to hasten the event, seemed to wait for the several circumstances on which they relied for the issue. Cæsar trusted to the effects of famine, and the Gauls to the assistance of their friends, who were in reality assembling in great numbers from every quarter to effect their relief. They are said to have

mustered at Bibracté* no less than two hundred and forty thousand foot, with eight thousand horse. But if these numbers are not exaggerated, they may be considered as a proof how far those nations were ignorant of the circumstances on which the fortunes of armies really turn. The supreme command of this multitude was given to Comius, a chieftain of one of the northern cantons, who having some time made war in conjunction with the Romans, owed the rank which he held in his own country to the favour of Cæsar, but could not resist the contagion of that general ardour with which his countrymen now rose to recover their freedom.

While this great host was assembling, the unhappy garrison of Alesia received no tidings of relief. Their provisions being nearly exhausted, they began to despair of succour. A council was held to deliberate on the part they should take, and to form some plan of escape. Some were of opinion that they ought to surrender themselves, and to implore the victor's mercy. Others, that they should make a general sally, endeavour to cut their way through the enemy, and escape or perish with swords in their hands. Critognatus, a warrior of rank from the canton of the Arverni,† treated the opinion of those who proposed to surrender as mean and dastardly; that of the second, as brave rather in appearance than in reality. "Bravery," he said, "does not consist in sudden efforts of impatience and despair, but in firmly enduring for any length of time what the circumstances of war may require. Shall we think merely, because we have no communication with our friends, that they have deserted us, and do not intend to make any effort to save us? Against whom do you think Cæsar hath constructed so many works in his rear? Against whom does he man them in your sight with so much care? He has intelligence, although you have not, that a powerful army is preparing to relieve you. Take courage, and wait the coming of your friends. Even if your provisions should fail, the example of former times will point out a resource. Your ancestors, being surrounded by the armies of the Cimbri and the Teutones, rather than

* Autun.

† Auvergne.

“surrender themselves, fed on the bodies of those who were
 “unserviceable in the war; and by this expedient held out
 “till the enemy was obliged to retire. And yet, on that oc-
 “casion, our ancestors had less cause than we have to make
 “every effort of constancy and fortitude. *Their enemies*
 “were passing, and meant only to plunder a country which
 “they were soon to abandon; *our enemies* come to bind us
 “in perpetual chains, and to establish a dominion at which
 “human nature revolts.”

The Gauls kept their resolution to hold out, but rejected the means that were proposed to supply their necessities, or reserved them for a time of greater extremity. The proposition of Critognatus is, by Cæsar, who was himself the unprovoked author of so much distress, and who continued, without remorse, to gratify his ambition, at the expense of so much blood, mentioned with horror, as an act of nefarious cruelty.* So much are men affected with appearances which shock the imagination more than with the real measure of what is hurtful to mankind. What followed, however, was probably no less cruel on the part of the Gaulish army, than it was on the part of Cæsar himself; the first, to lessen the consumption of food, turned out the women, children, and unarmed inhabitants of the town, to the mercy of the enemy; and Cæsar, in order to accumulate the sufferings of the besieged, would neither relieve nor suffer these helpless victims to pass. From this circumstance we may presume, although it is not mentioned, that they must have perished a spectacle of extreme suffering and anguish in the presence of both armies.

In the midst of these extremities, Comius, with the united force of the Gaulish nations, at last appeared for the relief of Alesia, and, with their multitudes, covered the neighbouring hills. Being favoured by the nature of the ground, they were enabled to advance within five hundred paces, or less than half a mile, of Cæsar's lines. On the following day the cavalry on both sides began to act. The Gaulish horse, trusting to their superiority in numbers, or to the defensive plan

* Nec prætereunda videtur oratio Critognati propter ejus singularem ænefariam crudelitatem.—De Bell. Gall. lib. vii. c. 76.

which the Romans were likely to follow on the present occasion, drew forth on the plain below the town, and proposed to encourage their friends by braving the enemy. Cæsar thought it necessary to repel this species of insult, and sent his cavalry to accept the challenge. An action began about noon, and lasted till the setting of the sun, when the Gaulish horse, who till then had maintained the fight with great obstinacy and valour, being taken in flank by the Germans who were in the service of Cæsar, were obliged to give way. Both sides, on this occasion, had mixed parties of infantry with their horse; and the Gaulish foot who were engaged in this action, being now abandoned to the swords of the enemy, fled in the utmost confusion to the rear of their own army.

After this action nothing passed for a day and a night; but it appeared that, during this interval, the Gaulish army in the field were collecting faggots and hurdles to fill up the trenches of Cæsar, and preparing grapnels to tear down the palisade and the parapet; and that they only waited till these preparations should be finished to make a vigorous effort to open the way to their friends, or raise the blockade. They, accordingly, came down in the middle of the night, and, with a great shout, the only signal they supposed could be understood by those who were shut up in the town, gave a general assault on Cæsar's line of circumvallation, as far as their numbers could embrace it, and without any choice of place.

Cæsar had assigned to every legion and separate body of men their station; and, to render them familiar with the disposition he had made, had repeatedly roused them, and taught them to repair to their posts of alarm: he had placed Mark Antony and Trebonius, with a body of reserve, to succour any part of the lines that might be in danger of being forced. So prepared, he now received, without any surprise, the general assault of the Gauls. His men suffered considerably from the first shower of missiles that came from so numerous an enemy; but as soon as the assailants advanced to the outworks, and felt themselves entangled in the snares which had been laid for them, and against which they had taken no precaution, they were sensible that they fought at a

great disadvantage, and desisted at once from this rash and inconsiderate attempt.

Meanwhile, the besieged, in anxious expectation of what was to pass in the field, having heard the shout that was raised by their friends, and having returned it, to make known their own intention to co-operate in every attack, instantly began to employ the preparations which they likewise had made to fill up the trenches, or force the lines. They continued, during the greater part of the night, to cast such materials as they could throw into the broad ditch or moat which covered the enemy's works; but, when day appeared, seeing that their friends had retired, without making any impression on the exterior line, they too, not to expose themselves in an attempt in which they were not to be seconded, withdrew to their station on the hill.

From this disappointment the Gauls, both within and without the blockade, were sensible of their error in having made an attack before they had examined the enemy's cover. To correct this mistake, they visited the whole circumference of Cæsar's lines. They observed, in a particular place, that the exterior intrenchment was interrupted by a hill which it could not embrace without making a great circuit. That, Cæsar, to avoid so great an addition to his labour, and so much outline to defend, had stationed two legions in that place with their usual encampment, forming a kind of fortress on the summit of the hill, sufficient to compensate the discontinuance of his lines on that side.

This place was chosen by the Gauls for a second and better concerted attempt than the first; and they determined, instead of the night, to make their attack at noon-day, when the enemy were most likely to be off their guard. Five-and-fifty thousand men were selected for this service; and they began their march early in the night, arrived at their ground before break of day, and lay concealed under a ridge of hills till noon. At this time they came forward, furnished not only with grappling-irons to tear down the palisade, which was formed on the parapet, but with hurdles and faggots to fill up the ditch, and to smother the stimuli, from which they had suffered so much in their former attacks.

Cæsar, though not thrown off his guard, either by the time of the day, or by his former success, was sensible that he was now attacked in his weakest place. He ordered Labienus instantly, with six cohorts, to support the legions that were posted in that station; and as he had reason to expect, at the same time, a general assault, both from within and from without his lines, to favour this principal attack, he ordered every separate body to its post of alarm; and he himself, with a considerable reserve, took a station from which he could best observe the whole, and be ready to sustain any part that was pressed. He had given Labienus instructions, in case he found that the intrenchment of the camp could not be defended, to sally forth, and bring the action to that issue in which the Romans were generally found to have an advantage, by mixing with the enemy sword in hand.

The Gauls who were shut up on the heights of Alesia, being prepared to second the attempts of their friends in the field, began the action on their part nearly about the same time; and the Romans, being alarmed with hostile cries and shouts, at once both in their front and in their rear, were in danger of being seized with a panic, from which the best troops, on occasion, are not exempted.

Labienus was so much pressed where the Gauls made their principal effort, that Cæsar successively detached two several parties from his reserve to sustain him. First, a body of six cohorts under Decimus Brutus, and afterwards a body of seven cohorts under Fabius. At length, upon receiving information that Labienus had not been able to prevent the enemy from passing the intrenchment, but that he meant, with all the troops who had joined him from different stations, amounting to nine-and-thirty cohorts, to make a general sally according to his instructions, and to mix with the enemy sword in hand, Cæsar himself instantly moved to support him.

He had by this time observed that the enemy, by a gross misconduct, had made no feint or no attempt on any other part of the lines to favour their principal attack; and he, therefore, with those he still retained as a body of reserve, not only left the post of observation he had taken in the begin-

ning of the action, but ventured even to unfurnish some other parts of the line as he passed, and advanced with great rapidity to join in the sally which Labienus was about to attempt. In his coming he was known from afar by the conspicuous dress which he generally wore in time of action; and his arrival, on this occasion, with the reinforcement which he brought, greatly animated that part of his army which had begun to despair of the event. He had, in this critical moment, with his usual genius and presence of mind, ordered his cavalry to pass the intrenchment; and, with a circuit in the field, while the foot were engaged in front, to take the enemy in flank or in the rear. If the event had been otherwise doubtful, this movement alone, it is probable, must have secured it in his favour. The Gauls, although in the attack they had advanced with ardour, yet lost courage entirely, when they found themselves assailed and put upon their defence. Without any attempt to resist the cavalry, which came upon their flank or rear, they took to flight, and were pursued with great slaughter.

This flight at once decided the fate of both attempts; whether of the Gauls who were shut up in Alesia, or of their countrymen who had come to their relief. During the night, those in the field, discomfited by their repulse, were separating, and leaving their chieftains, or dispersing in different directions. Many fell a prey to the parties who were sent in pursuit of them. Those from within the lines, who had suffered so long a blockade, now seeing all their hopes of relief at an end, were no longer disposed to contend with their fate. Vercingetorix, having assembled the leaders together, told them, that, as he had undertaken this war, not from motives of private ambition, but from an earnest desire to restore, if he could, the freedom of his country, so he was now ready to become a sacrifice for the relief of his countrymen, and, in any manner they thought proper to dispose of him, whether alive or dead, was willing to be made the means of appeasing the victor's rage.

At this consultation it was determined to surrender; and Vercingetorix suffered himself to be delivered up. With respect to the treatment he received, Cæsar is silent; but it is

probable that, like other captive chiefs, on such occasions, he was destined to grace the future triumph of his conqueror; though, upon a fair review of the parts they had severally acted, likely to furnish a comparison not altogether to his advantage, and in some respects fit to obscure his glory.

The prisoners in general, except those who belonged to the cantons of the *Ædui* and *Arverni*, underwent the ordinary fate to which captives, in those times, were destined, being exposed to sale, or distributed as plunder among the troops. As for the prisoners of the *Ædui* and *Arverni*, they were reserved by *Cæsar*, on the present occasion, as hostages for the submission of their respective cantons, and for an immediate supply of provisions exacted from thence.

CHAPTER XXV.

Cæsar remains in Gaul.—Pompey assumes Scipio for Colleague in the Consulate.—Succession of Servius Sulpicius and M. Claudius Marcellus.—Arrangement for the Provinces.—Motion to recal Cæsar.—Continued Debates in the Senate.—Operations of Cæsar in Gaul.—Intrigues in the City.—Affairs in the other Provinces.—Campaign of Cicero.—Succession of Consuls.—State of Parties in the City and in the Senate.—Arrival of Cæsar in Italy in the Spring.—Return to Gaul.—Parts with two Legions to Pompey and the Senate.—Alarm of Cæsar's March.—The Consul Marcellus commits his Sword to Pompey.

THE seventh and the most difficult campaign of the war in Gaul being now at an end, Cæsar sent Labienus, with two legions, beyond the Soane;* Caius Fabius, with two more, to the sources of the Marne and the Meuse; other officers with separate bodies, amounting in all to three legions, into different stations beyond the Loire and towards the Garonne; Quintus Tullius Cicero, with some other officers, to a station allotted them on the Soane, to superintend the formation of magazines, and the supply of provisions, which were chiefly transported by the navigation of that river.

Cæsar himself not having any immediate object of equal importance with that of securing the possession he had gained of a country so extensive and populous, and which, though with the title only of a Roman proconsul, gave him the state and resources of a great monarch, determined to pass the winter on this side of the Alps. His exclusion from the consulate, whilst he retained his province, with the command of an army, was dispensed with: but the time was not yet come for him to avail himself of his privilege; and he was willing, by remaining at a distance, to shun the notice of parties, who were known to observe his steps, and to state every advance

* The Arar.

he made to power as matter of public alarm. He nevertheless did not suffer any thing of moment to pass in the city, without taking some part in it by means of his agents and partisans, and was continually employed in gaining to his interests all those who were likely to come into office, or who, by their personal consideration, were of any importance in the state, and ever strove to exclude from the magistracy all such as were disinclined to favour his own pretensions, or who could not be gained to his party.

Pompey had now, for some months, exercised the office of sole consul. In that time he had, in some measure, restored the energy of government, and had employed his own power with moderation, as well as vigour. He had shown himself qualified to act the part of an excellent prince, though ill qualified to endure the equality of pretension which is claimed by the citizens of a commonwealth. His continual desire of unprecedented distinction was one of the evils that distressed the republic. This evil, however, was partly mitigated by the facility with which he resigned the powers to which his vanity, more than his love of dominion, made him aspire. Having enjoyed his present dignity from the first of March to the beginning of August, he took for colleague his father-in-law Metellus Scipio, suspending the prosecution under which this senator then lay for bribery, in soliciting votes at a preceding election.

The newly-elected colleague of Pompey, desirous to signalize his consulate by some act of reformation, moved and obtained the repeal of the law, in which Clodius had so greatly circumscribed the power of the censors; and he attempted to revive the authority of this magistracy, but in vain. Few citizens, now in public view, could bear the rigorous inspection of this once awful tribunal, as few had the courage to undertake or to exercise its trust. The institution, accordingly, had fallen into disuse, as being ill suited to the times. There being few of the people who were either fit to censure, or who could bear to be censured, it was not in the power of laws to revive what the general sense and manners of the age had abolished.

Disorders arising from the weakness of government had come to that extreme at which states must either correct themselves, or undergo some fatal change. The example of punishments inflicted, and of prosecutions still carried on against persons lately in public stations, for the illegal methods employed at elections, deterred many from offering themselves for any of the offices of state; and the late law, debarring consuls, prætors, or other magistrates, from any provincial appointments for five years after the expiration of their term, removed one powerful motive by which citizens were induced to seek for such honours.

At the elections for the ensuing year only three candidates appeared: M. Marcellus, Servius Sulpicius, and M. Cato: all of them supposed to be of the senatorian party; but very differently considered by those who now endeavoured to rule the state. Marcellus had, in fact, recommended himself to Pompey; and Sulpicius, as afterwards appeared, had been gained by Cæsar; and the interests of these candidates were warmly espoused by both their powerful patrons, in the present contest, in opposition to Cato, whose success might have proved a considerable obstruction to the designs of either.

It is observed of this competition, that it was carried on without bribery or tumult. As the competitors were supposed to be all of the senatorian party, the senators thought their interest secure, whichever of the candidates should prevail. And as the senatorian party divided upon the occasion, the influence of Cæsar and Pompey, united against Cato, easily cast the balance on the side of Sulpicius and Marcellus. Their antagonist, during the competition, continued in the same habits of friendship as usual with both; and when the choice was decided in their favour, instead of withdrawing from public view, as was common under such disappointments, from the place of election, he passed to the field of Mars, stripped, went to exercise as usual, and continued from thenceforward to frequent the forum in his common undress. To those who condoled with him, or pressed him to continue his suit for another year, as he had done when first disappointed of the prætorship, he made answer, that he thought it

was the part of a good man to undertake the public service, whenever he was intrusted with it, and to make his willingness known, but not to court the public for employments as a favour to himself. "The people," he said, "at the time that they refused me the prætorship, were under actual violence: in this case, they have made a free choice, and it appears that I must either violate my own mind, or renounce their suffrage. My own mind is of more consequence to me than their favour; but, if I retain my character, I shall not be so unreasonable as to expect consideration from persons to whom it is not agreeable."*

When the new consuls were received into office, their immediate predecessors being, by the late act, precluded for five years from holding any provincial govern- U. C. 702. ment, it became necessary to fill stations of this sort with those who had formerly been in office, and who hitherto had not been appointed to any commission abroad. Accordingly, Bibulus, who had been the colleague of Cæsar in his consulate, was appointed to the government of Syria, vacant by the death of Crassus. Cicero was named to succeed Appius Claudius in Cilicia and Cyprus, Atius Varus was appointed prætor in Africa, and P. Cornelius Spinther in Achaia. Pompey, who had hitherto enjoyed a dispensation from the law, in continuing to hold by his lieutenants the government and command of the army in Spain, while he held the dignity of consul in the city, now professed an intention to take possession of his Spanish province in person; and he actually took his departure from Rome for this purpose; but was induced to suspend his journey, by a motion which was made in the senate by Marcellus, soon after his accession to the office of consul, on which he was then entered.

This motion related to Cæsar, who was now in possession of a very important privilege, entitling him to sue for the consulate, without resigning the command of his army. His view in coveting this privilege; his continual augmentation of the troops in his province; his address in attaching the army to himself; his insinuation; his liberality; his assiduity

* Plutarch. in Caton. p. 268.

to gain every person that could be won, and to preclude from power every one likely to oppose himself; the whole tendency of his conduct; and the enormous power he had acquired; began to be noticed by the most inattentive, and gave a general alarm. What Cato had so often represented, without any effect, began to be generally perceived; and persons, who had formerly temporized, or thought to conciliate Cæsar by concessions, were desirous now to recal their gifts, or to remove him from the post of enormous advantage he had gained.

Many members of the senate had become remiss in their attendance, and regardless even of their own political interests. The few who exerted themselves were distracted with personal jealousies and distrust of each other. Cicero in particular, who before his banishment had been strenuous on the side of public order, now grown timorous from the sufferings he had incurred, was chiefly attentive to his own safety, which he studied by paying his court to the prevailing powers. There was no bar in Cæsar's way, beside the great consideration and the jealousy of Pompey, who had been hitherto subservient to his designs, and even assisted him in procuring his privilege to stand for the consulate in absence; but now saw its tendency, and wished to withdraw it. It was probably, therefore, with the approbation of Pompey, though after his departure from Rome, that the consul Marcellus, while the senate was deliberating on other removes and appointments in the provincial governments, proposed that, the war in Gaul being finished, Cæsar in particular should be recalled; or, if his friends insisted on his being continued in his command, that he should not be admitted on the list of candidates for the consulate, until he complied with the law, and presented himself personally for this purpose.

The motion gave rise in the senate to warm debates, which were frequently adjourned, and as often resumed. The consul Sulpicius, supported by such of the tribunes as were in the interest of Cæsar, opposed the motion. Pompey himself, under pretence that he waited the issue of these debates, stopped short in his journey to Spain, passed some time at Ariminum in reviewing the new levies which were destined to reinforce the troops of his province; and at last, being sum-

moned to attend the senate on the fifteenth of August, to consider of the provincial arrangements,* he returned to Rome.

On this day, Pompey affected to censure the violence with which it had been proposed to recal, before the expiration of his term, an officer legally appointed. He at the same time acknowledged his opinion, that Cæsar ought not to unite the government of a province, and the command of an army, with the dignity of consul; but dissuaded the senate from taking any immediate resolution on that head. The debate was adjourned to the first of September.† Then no meeting of the senate could be formed; but, as soon as the subject was again resumed, the late consul Cornelius Scipio, the father-in-law to Pompey, proposed that, on the first of March, when the persons destined to succeed the present consuls must have entered on office, a day should be fixed, specially to consider of the province of Gaul; and moved that this question should be then resumed, in preference to any other business whatever.‡ Marcellus, accordingly, prepared and laid before the senate a decree for this purpose, on the last of September. By the first clause of this decree, the consuls elected for the ensuing year were required, on the first of March, to move in the senate the consideration of the consular provinces, to admit no other business to precede or to be joined with this, and to suffer no interruption in the meetings of the senate, even on account of the assemblies of the people. By the same clause, it was resolved, that the three hundred senators, appointed judges for the year, might be called off from their sittings in the courts to attend the senate on this business; and if it should be necessary to make any motion on this subject in the assemblies of the people at large, or of the plebeians|| separately, that the consuls Sulpicius and Marcellus, the prætors, the tribunes, or such of them as shall be named for that purpose, should move the people accordingly.

To this clause were prefixed, in the usual form, the names of twelve senators, as the authors or movers of the act.

* Cicer. Epist. ad Familiar. lib. viii. ep. 4.—Dio. Cass. lib. iv. c. 58; 59.

† Cicer. ad Familiar. lib. viii. ep. 9. ‡ Ibid.

|| Ad Populum Plebemque ferrent. Ibid.

By a second clause, bearing the same names, a caution was entered against any obstruction to be given in this business by persons empowered to control the senate's proceedings; and it was resolved, that whoever should put a negative on this decree, should be declared an enemy to his country; and that the senate, notwithstanding any such negative, should persist in recording its own act, and in carrying its purpose into effect. In the face of this resolution, the tribunes C. Cælius, L. Venicius, P. Cornelius, and C. Vibius Pansa, interposed their negatives.

By another clause, the senate resolved, that on the same day, the case of the armies of the republic should be taken into consideration, and all who claimed their dismissal, either on account of the length of service, or any other consideration, should be heard; and that this likewise should be entered on the journals of the senate, notwithstanding any negative interposed to the contrary. Here the tribunes C. Cælius and C. Pansa again forbade the decree. The last clause related to the mode of carrying into execution the purpose of the Pompeian law, with respect to the nomination of proprætors to the province of Cilicia, and the other eight prætorian provinces; and on this clause, likewise, the two last-mentioned tribunes entered their negative.*

Thus the resolutions of the senate, though preserved on their own records, were, by the continual interposition of the tribunes, prevented from having any real effect: and Cæsar, from the disputes which had arisen on his own account, had sufficient warning, if this had been necessary, to prepare himself for an approaching conflict. It is indeed likely, that though in action the principal characters of his mind were decision and rapidity, yet no man ever laid his designs more deeply, looked forward to consequences more remote, or waited with more patience the proper time for the execution of his projects. He had now, by the unremitted application of eight years, acquired the advantage, for the sake of which he had coveted the command in Gaul: he was at the head of a numerous army, which he had gradually augmented from two or

* Cicero, ad Familiar. lib. viii. ep. 8.

three legions the establishment of his province, to twelve, well inured to service, and attached to his person. He was in possession of a privilege to stand for the consulate, without disbanding his army; and when he should unite the first civil and political authority in the state, with an army at the gates of the capital, there is no doubt that he might be considered as sovereign of the empire. His apparent right to the advantages he had gained was such, that the resolutions of the senate against him, however necessary to the preservation of the commonwealth, might have the semblance of injustice, and were likely to engage both his own army and the populace of Rome in his quarrel. He himself prepared for the issue, by removing every cause of embarrassment in his province, and by further attaching the legions under his command with gratifications and bounties.

He had dispersed or destroyed all the great armies which the utmost efforts of the Gaulish nations, in the preceding campaign, had been able to assemble against him; but he had not reconciled the spirits of that people, nor inured them to his government. In this therefore he had a plausible ground, from which to refute the allegations of the senate, who proceeded in their resolutions to recall him, on a supposition that the war in his province was ended; and at the same time had a fair pretence to gratify his army with the spoils of the country. For these purposes, soon after he had placed the legions in separate quarters, he had intelligence, or affected to believe, that the war was likely to break out afresh in his province; and, under this pretence, he took occasion to carry different bodies successively into action. Leaving M. Antony to command at Bibracté,* on the right of the Loire, he himself, with the eleventh and twelfth legions, passed that river, took the canton of the Bituriges by surprise, plundered their habitations, carried many of the people into captivity, and continued to lay waste the country, until they and all the neighbouring cantons on the left of the Loire, to avert these calamities, surrendered themselves at discretion.

* Afterwards Augustodunum, now Autun.

From this expedition, in which he spent forty days, he returned to his quarters, and ordered the two legions, which had been thus employed, a gratuity of two hundred sestertii, or about thirty shillings a man to the private soldiers; and of about two thousand sestertii, or sixteen pounds to the centurions. This money, it is observed by the historian,* was not immediately paid; but was retained by Cæsar as a pledge in his own hands, or remained as a debt due to the army, giving to every individual a special interest in the safety and success of his general, on whom he depended for this and other emoluments.

About eighteen days after this first division of the army had returned to its quarters, other two legions were employed on a like expedition between the Loire and the Seine.† The inhabitants of this tract were to suffer military execution, upon a complaint that they infested the recent acquisitions of Cæsar beyond the Loire. He accordingly marched to protect his new allies; and being arrived in the country, from whence they were said to be invaded, found the supposed enemy, by the devastations of the preceding campaign, which had ruined their towns and villages, reduced to live in temporary huts, in which they withstood with difficulty the inclemency of the season, and were rather objects of pity than of hostile resentment. On the approach of the Romans, they fled to the woods, where they perished in great numbers, from the effects of famine and cold. To force them to an immediate surrender, or to cut off all hopes of advantage from delay, Cæsar made a disposition to prevent their having any respite from their present sufferings. For this purpose, he ordered the ruins of Genabum‡ to be repaired as a place of arms, quartered his legions there, and kept the horse and irregular infantry in the field to pursue the natives, to seize their persons, or otherwise to multiply the evils to which they were exposed. In this service, too, it was likely that the army was rewarded by the distribution of captives, and were allowed to have a

* Hirt. de Bell. Gallico.

† To the country of the Carnutes.

‡ Now Orleans.

claim upon Cæsar for gratuities equal to those which had been granted to the eleventh and twelfth legions.

These operations led on to the spring, when a more real service took place on the frontier of the low countries. From that quarter, the people of the Rhemi* had given information, that the Bellovaci, or inhabitants of what is now called the Beauvois, with other cantons on the right of the Oise, were actually arming, and meant to make war on the Romans and their allies.

On this intimation, Cæsar thought proper again to call forth the eleventh legion into service; and it is remarkable that this legion, though now in its eighth campaign, is expressly said to have been thus employed out of its turn, in order to improve a discipline, in which, when compared to the older legions, they were deemed to be still defective. The eighth and ninth legions, the one from the station of Fabius, and the other from that of Labienus, were ordered to join them in the country of the Suesones,† near the confluence of the Oise and the Aine. With this force Cæsar passed the Oise; but arrived too late to stifle the intended commotion. The Bellovaci,‡ with some of their neighbours, apprehending, from the fate of the nations on the Loire, that they could not rely for safety on their own innocence, nor on the care which they had taken to avoid giving offence to the Romans, had already taken arms for their own security, and with all their effects had retired to a strong post. They had a hill in their front, beyond which there lay a morass; and in that situation they thought themselves sufficiently secure, without any artificial work.

Cæsar posted himself in their neighbourhood; and supposing, as in some former instances of the same kind, that the superiority of their own numbers would inspire the enemy with confidence, he took measures to augment their presumption, and to derive some advantage from the errors they were likely to commit, under the effects of this disposition. For this purpose he affected unusual caution, fortified his camp with uncommon care, scarcely ventured abroad to cover his

* Rheims.

† The Soissons.

‡ The Beauvois.

foragers, and seemed to be entirely occupied in securing himself.

The Gauls, however, continued to avoid any general action, and were satisfied with the successful war they were suffered to make on the foraging parties which were sent from the Roman camp. Being joined by five hundred German horse, they attacked and destroyed the cavalry, which had come to the assistance of Cæsar from the cantons of the Remi and Lingones,* and on which he chiefly relied for covering the avenues to his camp. By this loss he might have been in a little time reduced to great distress, or even forced to retire, if he had not procured a speedy reinforcement, by ordering Trebonius, with the two legions lately stationed at Genabum,† and a third from Avaricum,‡ to join him without delay.

The Gauls, on hearing of this great accession of strength to their enemy, and recollecting the fatal blockade and ruin of their countrymen at Alesia, determined to change their ground. They began to execute this resolution in the night, by removing their sick, wounded, and baggage; but had made so little progress at break of day, that their intention was discovered, and Cæsar, before they began their march, had time to pass the morass, and to take possession of the rising ground in their front. This he did with the greatest dispatch; and though he did not think it expedient to attack them in their present position, he had it in his power to take advantage of any movement they should make, and accordingly continued to awe, and to keep them in suspense.

The Gauls, therefore, instead of being able to depart, as they expected, in the night, were obliged to remain a day in presence of their enemy, to cover the retreat of their wounded and baggage. They still flattered themselves, that the Romans, seeing them remain on their ground, would think proper to fall back to their former camp; but observing, that while the greater part of the legions continued in readiness for action, others began to intrench themselves where they stood, they had recourse to a stratagem, under cover of which they might themselves retire. For this purpose they brought

* Rheims and Langres.

† Orleans.

‡ Bourges.

forward the wood and straw, which remained, as usual, on the ground of their late encampment, laid them in a continued train along the front, and, having set them on fire, produced such a line of smoke, as darkened the fields between the two armies. Under this cover they began their retreat, and before Cæsar could venture to penetrate the cloud of smoke in pursuit of them, had gained a considerable distance. On the first sight of this uncommon appearance, he suspected their intention, and began to advance ; but the precautions which he was obliged to take, in order to guard against any possible ambuscade or surprise, gave the Gauls the time which they wanted to effect undisturbed the first part of their movement.

Before night they halted again, about ten miles from their former station, and with their flying parties recurred to the same means they had hitherto employed to distress the Roman army. They succeeded in most of their attempts on the small parties which were sent abroad by Cæsar to procure him provisions ; and having reduced him to the necessity of depending entirely for the subsistence of his army on what a single district in his rear could supply, they formed a design, with the choice of their army, to surround and to cut off the parties which they expected he must employ on that particular service. Cæsar had intelligence of their design, and prepared, in his turn, what seldom fails to succeed a counter surprise. He placed his army in a proper position to cut off or command their ambuscade ; and having thus taken or destroyed the flower of their army, obliged the remainder, who were thrown into despair by so great a loss, to surrender themselves at discretion. In consequence of this surrender, the Romans had entire possession of all the cantons in that neighbourhood.

The Belgic nations being thus finally subdued, and Cæsar having no longer any enemy to oppose him in the field, except a few desperate bands from different parts of the country, who, either from fear of his severity, or aversion to his government, had deserted their own settlements, he determined to act against the refractory in different quarters at once, and to cut off the retreats, which, in case of distress, this remnant of the nations who lately opposed him mutually gave to one

another. He sent C. Fabius, with twenty-five cohorts, to act on the left of the Loire; the twelfth legion, towards the sources of the Garonne, with orders to cover the approaches to Narbonne from the incursions of any stragglers, whom his intended severities might force upon desperate attempts on that side; and he himself, with Labienus and Mark Antony, proceeded to the Meuse, where the territories of the late unfortunate Ambiorix,* beginning to be re-peopled, and the nation reinstated under its former leader, were become again the object of his vengeance. To convince this unhappy people that they were not to enjoy peace under the government of a prince who had presumed to circumvent and to destroy a part of the Roman army, he renewed his military execution against them, issuing his orders, as in the former instance, to spare neither sex nor age.

While Cæsar himself was employed in this manner, C. Fabius being arrived at the place of his destination, between the lower parts of the Loire and the Garonne, found a considerable force in arms against Caninius Rebilus, the Roman officer who was stationed in that quarter. The natives had besieged a fortress which was in possession of the Romans; but, alarmed by the approach of Fabius, they withdrew, and endeavoured to pass the Loire to the northward. In this attempt, being intercepted in their march, and obliged to fight the Roman detachment, they were defeated, with great slaughter. After this calamity, about five hundred, who escaped from the field under Drapes, a prince of that country, formerly distinguished in the war, took their flight in the opposite direction, and proposed to attack the Roman province of Narbonne, in order, with its spoils, to compensate the losses which they themselves had sustained.

Meantime, Fabius, in consequence of his victory, received the submission of all the nations from the Loire to the Seine, and quite down to the sea-coast: and having taken measures to secure his conquest, followed Drapes to the southward, overtook him beyond the Garonne, and obliged him, being no longer in condition to make any attempt on the Ro-

* Now Liege, Juliers, and Guelderland.

man province, as he proposed, to take refuge at Uxellodunum,* a place of strength, situated on a steep rock, at the confluence of some of those streams which, falling from the Cevennes, form the Garonne by their junction.

Here Caninius and Fabius, having joined their forces together, made dispositions to invest their enemy: but before their works were completed, Drapes, while he had yet access to the fields, willing to spare the magazines which he had made up in the fortress, ventured abroad with a detachment, at the head of which he was surprised and taken. The natives, however, who remained in the place, being supplied with provisions for a considerable time, resolved on a vigorous defence; and, by baffling the Roman army for some time in its attack, began to raise up anew the hopes and expectations of the nations around them. Cæsar thought the reduction of this place an object that called for his own presence. Having therefore sent Labienus to the Moselle, and having left M. Antony to command in the low countries, he himself, with his usual dispatch, traversed great part of Gaul, and appeared on the Garonne, equally unexpected by his own people and by the enemy who were besieged in the fortress of Uxellodunum.

The place being strong by nature, and in no want of provisions, could be forced only by intercepting its supply of water. For this purpose Cæsar lined the banks of the river with archers and slingers, and effectually prevented the besieged from supplying themselves from thence. He proceeded next to exclude them from the use of a spring which burst from the rock in the approach to their town; for, having got the command of the ground, he pushed a mine to the source from which the water came, diverted it from its former direction, and, by depriving the besieged of this last resource, obliged them to lay down their arms, and trust to his mercy. In this, however, they experienced what the author,† from whom these accounts are taken, considered as more than the usual severity of ancient war. Cæsar, according to this historian, having given proof of his clemency, bethought himself now

* Supposed to be Cadenau.

† Hist. de Bell. Gall. lib. viii. c. 44.

of an example of justice ; and for this purpose ordered such as had carried arms in defence of Uxellodunum to have their hands struck off.* And this refined act of cruelty being joined to the many barbarous executions with which the conquest of that country had been achieved, thus ended the war in Gaul.

The usual time of putting the troops into winter quarters not being come, Cæsar thought proper to visit the nations upon the Adour, or what is now called Gascony;† the only part of his new conquests in the acquisition of which he had not acted in person. He marched through this country at the head of two legions, and was everywhere received with the most perfect submission. From thence he repaired to Narbonne, the capital of his original province, held the usual conventions for the dispatch of civil affairs, and made a disposition for the quarters of his army during the winter. By this disposition two legions were stationed in the high country, towards the sources of the Garonne and the Loire, or in the territories of the Limovaci and Arverni:‡ two at Bibracté, between the Soane and the Loire ; two between the Loire and the Seine;|| and the remaining four under the command of Trebonius, Vatinius, and Quintus Tullius Cicero, in different parts of the low countries. To this quarter of his new conquests he himself repaired, and fixed his residence at Nemetocenna,§ in the centre of his northern stations.

By this distribution of his army, Cæsar formed a kind of chain from the frontier of his original province, quite through the heart of his new acquisitions, to the Meuse and the Scheldt: and, by his seeming anxiety for the safety of his northern extremity, and still more by his own distance from Italy, he probably lulled for a while the vigilance or jealousy of his principal opponents at Rome. His own attention,

* Cæsar quum suam lenitatem cognitam omnibus sciret.—Omnibus qui arma tulerant manus præcidit. Vitam concessit quo testator esset pœna improborum.—De Bell. Gall. lib. viii. c. 44.

† Aquitania. ‡ Limoges and Auvergne. || At Tours and Chartres.

§ Supposed to be Arras.

however, to the state of politics in the city was never less remitted or slack.

Mark Antony, a person notoriously profligate and dissipated, but when the occasion required exertion, daring, strenuous and eloquent, as will appear on occasion in the sequel of this history, now began to be employed by Cæsar in the affairs of the city; and, under pretence of standing for the priesthood, was sent from Gaul, where he had recently served in the army, to bear a principal part among the agents and emissaries of his general at Rome. These agents were continually busied in extolling the merits of their employer, and in gaining to his interest every person of consideration who could in any degree advance or obstruct his designs. In the conquest of Gaul, they alleged that he added to the patrimony of the Roman people a territory of no less than three thousand miles in circumference, and a revenue of forty millions Roman money.* They took care, at the same time, in his name and by his directions, under the pious pretence of celebrating the memory of his daughter, the late wife of Pompey, to cajole the people with public entertainments and feasts; and proceeded to execute, at a great expense, the splendid works which he had formerly ordered.

Cæsar himself, at the same time, was careful to secure the affections of the army; doubled their pay, and was lavish in all the other articles which were derived from his bounty. Besides his occasional liberality to the legions in time of the war, he gave, or engaged himself to pay, to each particular soldier, what to persons of that condition was a considerable object. In the city he even entered into the secrets of every family, and, as has been mentioned, gained the master by courting the mistress or favourite slave. His purse was ever open to gratify the covetous with presents, to relieve the necessitous, and to silence the creditors of those who were oppressed with debt. He encouraged the prodigal to squander their patrimonies, and freely lent them the aids which their extravagance rendered necessary to them. He kept a cor-

* Plutarch. in Vit. Catonis, p. 268.—Sueton. in Jul. Cæs. c. 25.—Between about three and four hundred thousand pounds.

response, at the same time, with dependent and foreign princes; and took upon him the protection of provincial towns, in order to secure their attachment and their confidence.*

While the proconsul of Gaul was thus extending his influence in the empire, he had amused Pompey by assigning to him, in all their arrangements, what was apparently the place of honour and of importance at the head of affairs at Rome; as he had gratified Crassus likewise by leaving him to choose the most lucrative government, while he himself submitted to be employed as a mere provincial officer, to explore a barbarous country, and to make war with its natives. But by thus yielding the supposed preference of station to his rivals, he actually employed them as the willing tools and ministers of his own ambition. The former, with all his disposition to emulation and jealousy, for some time the dupe of these artifices, imagined that Cæsar had risen in the state by his permission, and that the present condition of parties was the fruit of his own address. As he himself, for the most part, endeavoured to obtain his ends by means indirect and artificial, he was the more easily duped by those who affected to be deceived, and who by that means were able to overreach him. Although it was impossible for him now to remain any longer insensible to the superiority which Cæsar had acquired, or to those still more important objects at which he was aiming, yet he had not hitherto taken his part openly nor directly against him, but contented himself with employing others in placing ill-concerted and ineffectual obstructions in his way, which he sometimes disowned, and always feebly supported. At last, and in the prosecution of the measures of which we have observed the beginning in the senate, he hazarded the whole authority of that body against Cæsar, without having provided any military power to enforce their commands.

Pompey himself, while most under the influence of ambition, and when he had it most in his power to trample on the civil constitution of his country, had shown a respect for the

* Sueton. in *Jul. Cæs.* c. 26, 27, 28.

commonwealth, which kept him within bounds that were consistent with this species of government; and he imagined that no man could presume to surpass himself in pretensions to rise above the ordinary level. In the course of debates relating to the present state of affairs, he generally spoke ambiguously, or affected to disbelieve the designs that were imputed to Cæsar; but finding, on the last motion which was made to recall him from Gaul, that the eyes of the whole senate were turned upon himself, he was forced to some explanation; in which, with apparent embarrassment, he said, that, although it was his opinion that the proconsul of Gaul could not, in consistence with justice, be instantly recalled, yet that after the first of March he should have no difficulties on the subject. "But," says one of the senators, "what if this motion should then have a negative put upon it?" "I shall make no distinction," replied Pompey, "between Cæsar's refusing to obey the order of the senate, and his procuring some one here to forbid that order." "But what if he persist in demanding the consulate while he retains his province and his army?" "What," replied Pompey, "if my own child should offer me violence?"*

After the attempt which had been made to fix the question of Cæsar's recall for the first of March, Pompey, being at Naples, was taken ill, and supposed to be in danger. His recovery gave a general satisfaction, of which he had afterwards very flattering proofs in his progress through Italy. He was every where met by processions, found the ways strewed before him with flowers, and was received by multitudes, who appeared to be frantic with joy for the return of his health.

Whatever part Pompey himself, or his emissaries, may have had in procuring these demonstrations of respect and affection, it is probable he was highly flattered with them, and either mistook them himself, or hoped that others should mistake them, as the proofs of a consideration and power which no attempt of his rival could overset or impair.

The principal attention of all parties, during this summer and autumn, as has been mentioned, had been turned to the

* Cicer. Epist. ad Familiares, lib. viii. ep. 8.

affairs of Cæsar, and the dangerous tendency of the course he pursued : and they were but for a little while diverted from this object by an alarm on the side of Syria. The Parthians, encouraged by their late success against Crassus, passed the Euphrates with a great army, commanded by Pacorus, son to Orodes, under the direction of Osaces, a veteran or experienced leader. They had, during the preceding winter, made an alliance with the king of Armenia, and in this invasion were to be joined by his forces. The disaster of Crassus had rendered the Parthian name terrible at Rome; and this intelligence struck a momentary panic in the city, as if an enemy were already at the gates. Some proposed to give Pompey the command in Syria; some to send Cæsar thither; and others, to send both the present consuls to the army, with a proper reinforcement.*

But before these measures could be adjusted, or before any reinforcement could be ready to join the army in Syria, the people were relieved of their fears by Caius Cassius, the general then commanding under Bibulus in that province. This officer having obliged the Parthians to withdraw from Antioch, in their retreat attacked and routed them with great slaughter. Osaces in that action received some wounds, of which, in a few days afterwards, he died; and the Parthian army remained inactive during the following year in their retreat beyond the Euphrates; sensible, in their turn, that a war carried over the wastes of that desolated frontier might be ruinous to any power by whom it was attempted.

Bibulus, the proconsul of Syria, soon after the defeat of the Parthians, arrived in his province; and, according to the established practice of the Romans, laid his pretensions to a triumph for the victory, which, under his auspices, though before his arrival, had been obtained by his lieutenant.

This invasion of Syria, as well as some disturbances in his own province, furnished Cicero, at the same time, with the occasion of some military operations, of which we have a particular account, in his letters, and which, though not material to the military history of the times, are not unworthy of

* Cicer. ad Familiares, lib. viii. ep. 10.

notice, as they relate to this eminent personage. He had taken possession of his command in Cilicia, and, however better fitted by his habits for the forum and the political assemblies at Rome than for the field, possessed abilities to qualify him for any station, put himself at the head of an army; and prepared for the defence of his province. He had set out from Rome in May; and having had a conference with Pompey at Tarentum, arrived at Brundisium on the twenty-first of that month.*

The military establishment of Cilicia being no more than twelve thousand foot and two thousand horse, Cicero applied for an augmentation of it; and on the fourth of June was still at Brundisium, waiting for an answer to this application. But finding that his request, having been opposed by the consul Sulpicius,† was unsuccessful, he set sail from that place, arrived at Actium on the fifteenth of that month, and, passing through Athens, reached his province on the last of July. Here he found the troops, in consequence of a mutiny which had recently broke out among them, separated from their officers, dispersed in places of their own choosing, the men of entire cohorts absent from their colours, and considering themselves as exempt from any authority or government whatever. In these circumstances the new governor, trusting to the respect that was due to the name and commission of proconsul, ordered M. Annius, one of his lieutenants, to assemble as many as he could of the mutinous troops, and to encamp at Iconium in Licaonia. There he joined them on the twenty-fourth of August; and, having intelligence of the Parthian invasion, took measures for the security of his province; marched, without loss of time, to Cybistra, on the frontier of Cappadocia; took under his protection the king Ariobarzanes, who was then, by a powerful faction in his own kingdom, threatened with a revolt, and, by receiving him as a prince in alliance with the Romans, dispelled the storm which had been gathering against him. He accepted, at the same time, of the offers which were made by Dejotarus to join him with all his forces; and being in this situation when

* Cicero, ad Familiar. lib. iii. ep. 3.

† Ibid.

foragers, and seemed to be entirely occupied in securing himself.

The Gauls, however, continued to avoid any general action, and were satisfied with the successful war they were suffered to make on the foraging parties which were sent from the Roman camp. Being joined by five hundred German horse, they attacked and destroyed the cavalry, which had come to the assistance of Cæsar from the cantons of the Remi and Lingones,* and on which he chiefly relied for covering the avenues to his camp. By this loss he might have been in a little time reduced to great distress, or even forced to retire, if he had not procured a speedy reinforcement, by ordering Trebonius, with the two legions lately stationed at Genabum,† and a third from Avaricum,‡ to join him without delay.

The Gauls, on hearing of this great accession of strength to their enemy, and recollecting the fatal blockade and ruin of their countrymen at Alesia, determined to change their ground. They began to execute this resolution in the night, by removing their sick, wounded, and baggage; but had made so little progress at break of day, that their intention was discovered, and Cæsar, before they began their march, had time to pass the morass, and to take possession of the rising ground in their front. This he did with the greatest dispatch; and though he did not think it expedient to attack them in their present position, he had it in his power to take advantage of any movement they should make, and accordingly continued to awe, and to keep them in suspense.

The Gauls, therefore, instead of being able to depart, as they expected, in the night, were obliged to remain a day in presence of their enemy, to cover the retreat of their wounded and baggage. They still flattered themselves, that the Romans, seeing them remain on their ground, would think proper to fall back to their former camp; but observing, that while the greater part of the legions continued in readiness for action, others began to intrench themselves where they stood, they had recourse to a stratagem, under cover of which they might themselves retire. For this purpose they brought

* Rheims and Langres.

† Orleans.

‡ Bourges.

forward the wood and straw, which remained, as usual, on the ground of their late encampment, laid them in a continued train along the front, and, having set them on fire, produced such a line of smoke, as darkened the fields between the two armies. Under this cover they began their retreat, and before Cæsar could venture to penetrate the cloud of smoke in pursuit of them, had gained a considerable distance. On the first sight of this uncommon appearance, he suspected their intention, and began to advance ; but the precautions which he was obliged to take, in order to guard against any possible ambuscade or surprise, gave the Gauls the time which they wanted to effect undisturbed the first part of their movement.

Before night they halted again, about ten miles from their former station, and with their flying parties recurred to the same means they had hitherto employed to distress the Roman army. They succeeded in most of their attempts on the small parties which were sent abroad by Cæsar to procure him provisions ; and having reduced him to the necessity of depending entirely for the subsistence of his army on what a single district in his rear could supply, they formed a design, with the choice of their army, to surround and to cut off the parties which they expected he must employ on that particular service. Cæsar had intelligence of their design, and prepared, in his turn, what seldom fails to succeed a counter surprise. He placed his army in a proper position to cut off or command their ambuscade ; and having thus taken or destroyed the flower of their army, obliged the remainder, who were thrown into despair by so great a loss, to surrender themselves at discretion. In consequence of this surrender, the Romans had entire possession of all the cantons in that neighbourhood.

The Belgic nations being thus finally subdued, and Cæsar having no longer any enemy to oppose him in the field, except a few desperate bands from different parts of the country, who, either from fear of his severity, or aversion to his government, had deserted their own settlements, he determined to act against the refractory in different quarters at once, and to cut off the retreats, which, in case of distress, this remnant of the nations who lately opposed him mutually gave to one

last competition, and immediately upon his disappointment was brought to trial for illegal means employed in his canvass. He was acquitted; but, in return for the prosecution he had undergone, retorted the charge on Marcellus, and wished to annul his election; but failed in the attempt.

Of those who were now elected, Caius Marcellus, as well as his relation and immediate predecessor Marcus Marcellus, was understood to be in the interest of Pompey. Æmilius Paulus, a senator of high rank, and of course interested in the preservation of the republic, the honours of which he was so well entitled to share, was expected to support the measures of the senate, and adhere to the established forms. And thus, together with internal peace, the government seemed to recover its ancient severity. Appius Claudius, late proconsul of Cilicia, and Calpurnius Piso, were appointed censors, and seemed to have authority sufficient to carry into execution the powers lately restored to this office by the ordinance of Scipio. It was particularly expected that these censors would hold an even balance between the factions. Appius favoured Pompey, but Piso, from his relation of father-in-law to Cæsar, was entrusted to check the partiality of his colleague. The hopes of the senate were likewise considerably raised by the unexpected nomination of Caius Scribonius Curio to be one of the tribunes. Servius Pola, after being elected into this office, had been convicted of bribery; his election therefore was set aside, and that of Curio was sustained. This young man, being of an honourable family, and possessing talents which qualified him for the highest preferments, naturally set out on a foot of independence, and indifference to party, or joined only with those who professed to maintain the freedom of the commonwealth, and their own equal pretensions to preferments, together with power. Being active and bold, as well as eloquent, the senators were fond of a partisan who was likely to take upon himself much of that fatigue and danger which too many of them were willing to devolve upon others, even where their own estates and dignities were at stake.

The new magistrates, accordingly, entered on
U. C. 703. office, with high expectations that the dangerous



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
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pretensions of ambitious citizens, particularly those of Caesar, would be effectually checked. The consuls were in possession of a decree, requiring them to proceed to the business of Caesar's province by the first of March. This recall wanted only the consent of the tribunes to render it a formal act of the executive power, of which this branch was by the constitution lodged in the senate. But one of the tribunes having forbid the proceeding, M. Marcellus, late consul, moved that application might be made to this officer to withdraw the negative, which prevented the effect of what the senate had resolved. But the motion was rejected by a majority* of the senate itself; and many other symptoms of Caesar's great influence, even over this order of men, soon after appeared.

This able politician, probably that he might not seem to have any views upon Italy, had fixed his quarters, and that of his army, chiefly in the low countries, or at the farthest extremity of his recent conquests. And, instead of seizing every pretence, as formerly, for making war on the natives of Gaul, endeavoured to quiet their fears, and to conciliate their affections;† but while he kept the whole province in a state of profound tranquillity, he collected money, provided arms, and completed his legions, as if preparing for a dangerous and important war. His distance from Italy lulled the jealousy of his opponents, and enabled him to carry on his operations unobserved. He spared no expense in gaining accessions to his interest; and when those he would gain accepted of promises, he seemed to make them with unbounded confidence in the means on which he relied for performance. In this he acted as on the eve of a great revolution, the event of which was to raise him above the want of resources, or above the necessity of a scrupulous faith with private persons. He actually remitted at this time great sums of money to Rome; and no less than fifteen hundred talents, or about £289,500, to the management of the consul *Emilius* alone, who was intrusted to lay out this money in erecting public buildings for the decoration of the city. But not being

* Cicero, ad Familiar. lib. viii. ep. 13.

† Hirt. de Bell. Gall. lib. viii. c. 49.

superior to corruption, at least not to that sort of insinuation which was addressed to his vanity, and which was now artfully practised in his nomination as agent and trustee for so popular a leader as Cæsar, he disappointed the hopes of his friends, and, in all the contests which arose during his consulate,* became an active partisan for the person who had honoured him with so flattering a trust.

It was likewise very early observed, in these debates, that the zeal of Curio, who set out with violent invectives against Cæsar, began to abate; that he for awhile endeavoured to divert the attention of the public to other objects;† and at last fairly withdrew himself from the support of the senate, and espoused the interest of Cæsar in every question.

This interest was now likewise strengthened by the accessions brought to it in consequence of the disputes of the censors. These magistrates concurred in expunging from the rolls of the senate such as were of servile extraction, and some even of noble family, on account of any infamy or blemish in their character. But Appian, having carried his affectation of zeal beyond what the age could bear, and being suspected of partiality to Pompey's friends, gave offence to Piso, who, by protecting many citizens who were stigmatized by his colleague, gained them to the interest of Cæsar. From these several causes this party became very numerous even in the senate, and continued to suspend any decrees that were proposed to deprive their leader of his command, or to recall the extraordinary privilege with which he had been formerly vested.

It was afterwards discovered, in the sequel of these transactions, that Curio, some time before he openly declared himself for Cæsar, had been actually gained by his liberalities. This young man, with the youth of that age in general, had dissipated his fortune, and incurred amazing debts. His popularity was the effect of his profusion; and the load of his debts made him a very uncertain friend to that order of things, and to those laws, which supported the just claims of his creditors against himself. He readily listened to Cæsar,

* Appian. Platarch.

† Cicero, ad Familiar. lib. viii. ep. 6.

who offered to relieve him of this burden, and actually paid his debts to a great amount;* according to some reports, to the amount of ten millions Roman money;† according to others, of six times than sum.‡

Curio, even after he took his resolution to join Cæsar, continued to speak the language of his former party, and to persist in their concerts, until he should find a plausible excuse for breaking with them. Such a pretence|| he sought by starting many subjects of debate without consulting them, and by making proposals in which he knew that the leading men of the senate would not concur. To this effect he devised a project for the reparation of the highways, offering himself to have the inspection of the work for five years. And when much time had been spent in fruitless debates on this subject, he insisted that a considerable intercalation should be made to lengthen the year of his tribunate, that he might have sufficient time to ripen his projects. Being opposed in this by the college of augurs,§ he employed his tribunitian power to obstruct all other business, and separated himself entirely from his late friends in the senate. Having in this manner withdrawn himself from his former party, he did not at once openly join their opponents; but, with professions of independence, affected to reprobate the errors of both; and, by this artful conduct, seemed to have received the instructions, or to have imitated the policy, of his leader.

When the great question of Cæsar's recall was revived, Curio inveighed, as formerly, against the exorbitant powers which had been committed to this general, and urged the necessity of having them revoked; but subjoined, that the powers granted to Pompey were equally dangerous, and proposed, that both should be ordered to disband their armies, and return to a private station. The partisans of Pompey observed, that the term of his commission was not yet expired: nor that of Cæsar's, replied Curio. If either is to be

* Plutarch.—Dio.—Sueton.—Appian.

† Velleius, lib. ii. c. 48.—80,7291. See Arbuthnot's Tables.

‡ Valerius Maximus, lib. ix. c. 1.

|| Dio. Cass. lib. xl. c. 61—Appian. de Bello Civile.

§ Cicero, ad Familiar. lib. viii. ep. 6.

disarmed, it is proper that both should be so: of two armies, if one invade, the other may defend us: but if only one be disbanded, we are certainly the slaves of that which remains.

There were probably now three parties in the state; one devoted to Caesar, another to Pompey, and a third that wished to support the republic against the intrigues or violence of either. The latter must have been few, and could not hope to be of much consequence, except by joining such of the other two as appeared by the character of its leader least dangerous to the commonwealth. Caesar had shown himself in his political course a refractory subject, and an arbitrary magistrate. In the first of these characters he had supported every party that was inclined to commit disorder in the state, or to weaken the hands of government. In the second, when prætor, it had been necessary to suspend his functions; when consul, he had violated the treasures of the commonwealth, and alienated the most valuable part of its demesne; to ensure the support of a disorderly faction against the laws of his country; and it was the general opinion of considerate persons that his thirst of power and emolument was not to be satiated without a total subversion of all civil or political institution: that if, in the contest which seemed to impend, his sword should prevail, a scene of bloodshed and rapine would ensue, far exceeding what had ever been exhibited in the prevalence of any faction that oppressed the republic. The description of his adherents,* and the character of persons who crowded to his standard, justified the general fear and distrust which was entertained of his designs. All who had fallen under sentence of the law, all who dreaded this fate, all who had suffered any disgrace, or were conscious they deserved it; young men who were impatient of government; the populace who had an aversion to order; the bankrupt, to whom law and property itself were enemies; all these looked for his approach with impatience, and joined in every cry that was raised in his favour.

Pompey, the leader of the opposite party, had indeed never ceased to embroil the state with his intrigues, and even in-

vaded the laws by his impatience for extraordinary and unprecedented distinctions ; yet, when possessed of power, he had employed it with moderation, and seemed to delight in receiving these singular trusts by the free choice of his country ; not in extorting them, not in making any illegal use of them, nor in retaining them beyond the terms prescribed by his commission. It appeared that in nothing he had ever injured the commonwealth so deeply as in caballing with Cæsar while he rose to his present elevation, from which he was not likely to descend, without some signal convulsion in the state.*

This comparison of the parties which were now to contend for power, at the hazard of the republic, made it easy for good citizens to choose their side. But they, nevertheless, naturally wished to prevent the contest from coming to extremities ; as, in the event of a war, which they dreaded, it was scarcely possible to avoid a military government. They considered the proposal of Curio as a mere pretence to justify Cæsar in keeping possession of his army : but they saw that there was no force in the republic sufficient to resist him. They wished to arm Pompey for this purpose ; but were prevented, either by the confidence which he still gave them of his own superiority, or by their fear of precipitating the state into a civil war, by seeming to take any precautions against the danger with which they were threatened.

Cæsar would have considered every attempt to arm the republic as a declaration of war against himself ; and was ready to commence hostilities before such a measure could be carried into any effect. The proposal for disarming at once both Cæsar and Pompey, in the meantime, was extremely acceptable to the popular party, who perpetually sounded the cry of liberty against the senate, and lately too against Pompey himself, who, on account of the spirit of his administration when last in office, and the severity of his prosecutions against bribery and other offences which are not odious to the vulgar, was become in a considerable degree unpopular, and supposed to aim at a tyranny. With such powers as

* Cicero, ad Atticum, lib. vii. ep. 3.

Pompey already possessed, it was reckoned an effort of courage to brave his resentment. And Curio, in coming from the senate, with the lustre of having acted so bold a part, was received by the populace with shouts and acclamations, was conducted to his own house over ways strewn with flowers, and, like a victor in the circus, presented with chaplets and garlands, in reward of his courageous, patriotic, and impartial conduct. This happened about the time that Pompey, as has been observed, was making a show of his great popularity in the country towns, where he was received with feasts, processions, and acclamations, on occasion of his recovery from a supposed dangerous illness. Cæsar too had a like reception in the towns of the Cisalpine Gaul; but it is likely that, of these three pretenders to popularity, Pompey was most elated with his share of the public favour, and the most likely to mistake these appearances of consideration for the stable foundations of power. Under this mistake probably it was that, when one of his friends asked him, with what force he was to oppose Cæsar, if he should march into Italy with his army, he answered, "In Italy I can raise forces with a stamp of my foot." He was, however, greatly alarmed by the motion which had been made by Curio, and by the reception it met with, whether in the approbation of the senators, or in the acclamations of the people. He wrote a letter, on this occasion, to the senate, in which he acknowledged the services of Cæsar, and mentioned his own. "His late consulate," he said, "was not of his seeking; it was pressed upon him to save the republic in the midst of great dangers; for the present command he bore, it had devolved upon him in consequence of his having been consul, and was given for a term of years, yet far from being expired; but he was ready, nevertheless, without waiting for the expiration of his term, to resign with alacrity what he had accepted with reluctance." He continued, on every occasion, to repeat the same professions, adding, "That, he made no doubt, his relation and his friend Cæsar would cheerfully make a like sacrifice to the fears and apprehensions of his fellow-citizens; and that, after many years of hard struggle with warlike enemies, he would now hasten to retire with

“honour, and to solace himself in the midst of family endearments and domestic repose.”

Pompey, for the most part, inclined to dissemble his sentiments, and advanced to his purpose by indirect means: he was therefore, like most artful men, easily over-reached by persons who affected to be thrown off their guard, while they penetrated, and took measures to thwart, his designs. On the present occasion, probably, he was the only dupe of his own cunning, and a prey to the artifices which were employed against himself. Curio, in the senate, openly attacked this part of his character, insisting that actions, and not professions, were now to be regarded: that the army of Cæsar was, to the republic, a necessary defence against that of Pompey; that, nevertheless, under pain of being declared, in case of disobedience, enemies to their country, both should be ordered to disband; and that an army should be instantly levied to enforce these orders. “Now,” said he, “is the time to reduce this assuming and arrogant man, while you have a person who can dispute his pretensions, and who can wrest those arms out of his hands which he now affects to resign, but which he never would have willingly dropped.”

The friends of Cæsar, in the senate, offered to compromise the dispute; and, provided Pompey retired to his province, and Cæsar were allowed to retain the cisalpine Gaul with two legions, they proposed, in his name, to disband the remainder of his army, and to resign the other part of his provinces. “Observe the dutiful citizen and good subject,” said Cato; “how ready he is to quit the northern parts of Gaul, if you only put him in possession of Italy and of the city; and how ready to accept of your voluntary submission, rather than employ your own army against you to enforce your surrender.”*

In the result of these debates, the senate, upon the motion of the consul Marcellus, came to a vote on the following questions, which were separately stated, relating to the appointments both of Cæsar and of Pompey. On the first question, whether Cæsar should disband his army? the *ayes* were

* Plutarch. in Catone.

general throughout the house. On the second, relating to Pompey, the *noes* greatly prevailed. Curio and M. Antony insisted that the questions were not fairly put; and that they did not collect the sense of the senate: that the majority might be of opinion that both should disband; and that both, therefore, should be included in the same question. To this purpose, accordingly, a third question was put; and the senate having divided, a majority of three hundred and seventy *ayes* appeared against twenty-two *noes*.* Whether these proceedings of the senate were annulled by any informality, or were deprived of effect by any other circumstance, does not appear. It is probable that neither of the parties wished to have them carried into effect. And the only immediate consequence they seem to have had was an order to Pompey and Cæsar, requiring each of them to march a legion to reinforce the army in Syria, where the Parthians, though repulsed from Antioch in the preceding year, had wintered in the Cyrrhestica, a district of that province, and threatened to repeat their invasion in the present spring and summer; and this appears to have been no more than a feeble attempt, on the part of Pompey or his friends, to strip Cæsar of two legions, of which, when it came to be executed, he well knew how to disappoint the effect.

While the subject of Cæsar's appointments occupied all parties at Rome, he himself, with his army, passed a quiet season in Gaul; and at the end of winter, or early in the spring, set out for Italy. He employed, as a pretence for this journey, the election to a vacant place in the college of augurs, which was fast approaching; and for which his friend Mark Antony was a candidate. Many votes were to be procured in the colonies and free cities bordering on that part of his province which was within the Alps; and he made his journey with uncommon speed to secure them: but being informed, on the road, that the election of augurs was past, and that his friend Antony had prevailed, he nevertheless, with the same diligence as before he received this information, continued his journey, saying it was proper he should thank his

* Appian. de Bello Civ. lib. ii.—Plutarch. in Cæsar. p. 134.

friends for their good offices, and request the continuance of their favour in his own competition for the consulate, which he proposed to declare on the following year. He alleged, as a reason for this early application, that his enemies, in order to oppress him, or to withstand his just pretensions, had placed C. Marcellus and P. Lentulus in the magistracy of the present year, and had rejected the pretensions of Galba, though much better founded.


He was met in all the provincial towns and colonies of Cisalpine Gaul with more than a kingly reception, with sacrifices and processions everywhere made by innumerable crowds, who were assembled to see and admire him. Having made the circuit of this province, and sounded the dispositions of the people, he returned with great dispatch to his quarters at Nemetocenna,* in the low countries, where he likewise wished to know the disposition as well as the state of his army; and, for this purpose, ordered the whole to assemble on the Moselle. He foresaw that the senate might possibly pass a decree to supersede him; and that he must then depend upon the humour of his legions, and make war, or submit, as he found them inclined; in this, however, it is probable that he was already in a great measure resolved, or had no doubt of their willingness to become his partners in a military adventure for the sovereignty of the empire.

In this state of affairs he assigned to Labienus his station within the Alps; and seeming to have conceived a suspicion of this officer, or rather knowing that he was not disposed to follow him, in case his commission should be withdrawn by the senate, nor to co-operate in any act of hostility against the republic, he wished to prevent the disputes which might arise on such an occasion, and to avoid the difficult task of determining how he should deal with a citizen, who, being an offender against himself, was nevertheless in his duty to the state, and who either, by his impunity or by his sufferings, might start dangerous questions, and divide the opinions and affections of the army itself. He detached him, therefore, from the legions in the northern Gaul, to command on the

* Arras.

Po, a station from which, if he should be so disposed, he could easily quit the province, and join the forces of the republic ; and by this mean rid him at once of a person on whom he could not rely, and whom he would scarcely dare to punish for defection. But, in whatever manner we understand this separation, it is noticed, that while Cæsar himself remained with the army upon the Moselle, and made frequent movements merely to exercise the troops, to change their ground, and to preserve their health, a rumour prevailed that his enemies were soliciting Labienus to desert him, and to carry off the troops that were under his command. At the same time it was reported that the senate was preparing a decree to divest Cæsar of his government, and to disband his army. These rumours he affected to treat as groundless ; observing, that he could not believe such an officer as Labienus would betray his trust ; and that, for himself, he was at all times ready to submit his cause to a free senate. The proposals of Curio, and his other friends, he said, had been so reasonable, that the senate would have long since adopted them, if that body had not been under the improper influence of his enemies.

In these dubious times of jealousy and suspense, Cæsar received the famous order of the senate, to detach a legion from his province to reinforce the army of Syria, now threatened with invasion from the Parthians ; and at the same time had a demand from Pompey, to restore the legion which, as formerly mentioned, he had borrowed from the new levies which were made for the service in Spain. These orders and demands, in the present circumstances, had a suspicious aspect ; and although Cæsar affected, with cheerfulness, to comply in every particular, yet he afterwards complained of this measure, as he termed it, on the part of his enemies, as a mere artifice to turn his own forces against him. In obedience to the orders of the senate, he sent the fifteenth legion, then upon the Po, and relieved it by one from his present camp in the northern Gaul. In restoring the legion he had borrowed from Pompey, he was at pains to ingratiate himself, and, under pretence of gratitude for services past, was most lavish of his caresses and thanks : as an earnest of future





liberality, he ordered each private man a gratuity of two hundred and fifty denarii.* By this artful conduct, while he parted with the men, he took care to retain their affections, and, together with the fifteenth legion, which he still called his own, he sent them, as at best but an uncertain and precarious accession of strength to his enemies.†

The officers, who were sent on this commission, with instructions to conduct these troops into Italy, brought to their employers a very flattering report of the state and disposition of Cæsar's army: that they longed to change their commander; had a high opinion of Pompey; and, if marched into Italy, would surely desert to him: that Cæsar was become odious on account of the hard service in which he had so long, and without any adequate reward, employed a Roman army, and still more on account of the suspicion that he aimed at the monarchy.‡ It is in the highest degree probable, that their crafty leader employed proper persons to hold this language to the commissioners of the senate, and to the officers of Pompey; and to utter complaints of their commander, and of the service, on purpose that they might be repeated in Italy. His own preparations were not of more importance to him than the supine security into which he endeavoured, by this and every other artifice, to lull his enemies.

On the approach of winter he conducted his army back to their quarters in the low countries, or the interior parts of Gaul. Trebonius was stationed with four legions on the Scheldt and the Meuse; Fabius, with other four legions, between the Soane and the Loire, or in the canton of Bibracté, now Autun. This disposition, like that of the former winter, was calculated to avoid giving any alarm to his opponents in Italy. He himself intended to winter within the Alps, but had no troops on that side of the mountains that could give rise to suspicion: one veteran legion only is mentioned, the thirteenth, which he had sent to replace the fifteenth; which, upon pretence of the Parthian war, had been called away

* About 51.

† Appian. de Bello Civile, lib. ii.—Plutarch. in Vita Pompeii, p. 435.

‡ Plutarch. in Vita Cæsar, p. 133, et in vita Pompeii, p. 486.

from his province. Upon his arrival in Italy he affected surprise, in being told that the two legions lately demanded from him had not been sent into Asia, but were kept in Italy, and put under the command of Pompey. He complained, that he was betrayed; that his enemies meant to disarm and circumvent him. "But while the republic is safe, and matters can be made up on amicable terms, I will bear," he said, "with any indignities offered to myself, rather than involve the state in a civil war."*

While the factions that were likely to divide the empire were in this situation, C. Marcellus, now third of this name in the succession of consuls, together with Publius Lentulus, was elected for the following year. Before they entered on office, a rumour arose, that Cæsar, with his whole army, was actually in motion to pass the Alps. On this alarm, Marcellus, consul of the present year, assembled the senate, laid the subject before them, and moved, that the troops then in Italy should be prepared to act, and that new levies should be ordered. A debate ensued, in which Curio contradicted the report, and, by his tribunitian authority, forbade the senate to proceed in any resolution to disturb the peace of the empire.

On this interposition of the tribune, the consul Marcellus dismissed the assembly, pronouncing, together with other expressions of impatience, the following words: that if he were not supported by the senate, in the measures which were necessary for the preservation of the commonwealth, he should put the exercise of his power into hands more likely to make the state be respected: and having spoken these words, he repaired, together with Lentulus, one of the consuls elected for the ensuing year, to the gardens where Pompey resided; being obliged, on account of his military command, to remain without the city; and, presenting him with his sword, bade him employ it for the defence of his country, and with it to assume the command of the forces then in Italy. To this address from the consul, Pompey, with an air of modesty, made answer, "If nothing better can be devised for the commonwealth."

* Hirtius, de Bello Gallico, lib. viii. c. 46.

CHAPTER XXVI.

Return of different Officers from their Provinces.—Decree of the Senate to supersede Cæsar.—Forbidden by the Tribunes.—Commission to the Consuls and to Pompey.—Their Resolutions.—Flight of the Tribunes, Antony and Quintus Cassius.—Speech of Cæsar to the Legion at Ravenna.—Surprise of Ariminum.—March of Cæsar.—Flight of Pompey and the Senate, &c.—Approach of Cæsar.—Embarkation and Departure of Pompey from Brundisium.—Return of Cæsar to Rome.—Passes by Marselles into Spain.—Campaign on the Segra.—Legions of Pompey in Spain conducted to the Var.

IN this posture of affairs, the officers, who had been sent in the preceding year to the command of provinces, were returned to Rome, and some of them, soliciting the military honours to which they thought themselves entitled by their services, remained with their ensigns of magistracy in the suburbs. Bibulus, though he had not been present in the action in which Cassius defeated the Parthians, yet, being then governor of the province, and the advantage gained under his auspices, with the number of the enemy slain, coming up to the legal description of those services for which the triumph was usually obtained, he entered his claim; and, accordingly, upon the motion of Cato, who probably wished him this consolation for the mortifications he had received in his consulate, he was found to be entitled to this honour. It had been long appropriated as the specific reward of victories, obtained by the slaughter of a certain number of enemies, and would have been preposterous in the case of any other merit. Cicero, nevertheless, now likewise applied for a triumph, partly in emulation to Bibulus, of whom he expresses some jealousy; and partly, that he might have a pretence for his stay in the suburbs, and for absenting himself from the senate, or the assemblies of the people; being very much perplexed how to steer between the parties of Cæsar and Pompey, who had both applied to him, by letters, to join

them in the present dispute.* He had, some time before his departure from Cilicia, on his return to Rome, sent an account of his military operations to Cato, and to some others of his friends, with an earnest request that a thanksgiving might be appointed for the victory he had obtained. In this he was gratified, as one of the greatest honours which a Roman officer could receive in absence, and which might lead to a triumph. To his letter Cato had replied in terms that were polite; but carrying some degree of indirect reproof for the improper ambition which Cicero betrayed in this request, and reminding him that his merit was not so much that of a warrior as of a humane, upright, and able magistrate; saying, at the same time, that he had moved the senate to pass a decree to this purpose in his favour, as thinking it more honourable than a thanksgiving, which always had a reference to some event depending on fortune or the valour of an army; but that, since Cicero had chosen to put his services on the last footing, he himself had a double satisfaction, that of having done what he thought his duty, and that of finding that the desire of his friend respecting the thanksgiving was gratified.†

Cicero at first received this declaration of Cato as a proper expression of friendship, and in the highest degree honourable to himself;‡ but on hearing of the military honours which, upon Cato's motion, were decreed to Bibulus, he was greatly provoked, and considered this conduct as partial to his rival, and invidious to himself.¶ He was instigated or confirmed in these sentiments by Cæsar, who gladly seized the opportunity to incite him against Cato. "Observe," he said, in one of his letters, which is quoted by Cicero on this subject, "*the malice of the man; he affects to give you the commendations of clemency and integrity, which you did not desire, and withholds a piece of common respect, which you had asked.*" "This conduct," continues Cicero to Atticus, "bespeaks the envy from which it proceeds. It is not sufferable, nor will I endure it. Cæsar, in his letter to me, has not failed in the proper remarks." Such were the concerns which

* Cicero, ad Att. lib. vii. ep. 1.

† Cicero, ad Familiar. lib. xv. ep. 5.

‡ Cicero, ad Familiar. lib. xv. ep. 6.

¶ Cicero, ad Att. lib. vii. ep. 2.

distracted the mind of this ingenious, but weak, man, even while he himself foresaw an immediate conflict, in which the republic itself, and all the honours it could bestow, were probably soon to perish.

In the present situation of affairs, every resolution which the friends of the republic could take was beset with danger, and every day increased their perplexity. To leave Cæsar in possession of his army, and to admit him with such a force to the head of the commonwealth, was to submit, without a struggle, to the dominion he meant to assume. To persist in confining him to one or other of these advantages was to furnish him with a pretence to make war on the republic. The powers which were necessary to repel the present danger might be equally fatal to the republic in the possession of Pompey, as they were in the hands of Cæsar himself. The only person, on whom the state was now to rely, even while his own consideration, with that of every other senator, was at stake, did not seem disposed to act, until all the distinctions that were wanting to gratify his vanity should be united in his own person. With an appearance of ease and negligence, he went upon parties of pleasure through Italy, while every one else apprehended that Rome itself, as well as Italy, must soon become a scene of blood. At an interview with Cicero, whom, on his way to the city, he met near Naples, he himself spoke of a civil war as unavoidable.* Upon his return to Rome, on the twenty-sixth of December, he even seemed averse to any accommodation of parties. He declared his mind openly, that if Cæsar should obtain the consulate, even upon laying down his arms, the state must be undone; that, in his opinion, whenever a vigorous opposition appeared, Cæsar, in making his option, would choose to retain his army, and drop his pretensions to the consulate; but, continued he, if he should persist to run headlong, and bring matters to the decision of the sword, how contemptible must he appear, a mere private adventurer against the authority of the state, supported by a regular army under my command.

* Cicero, ad Atticum. lib. vii. ep. 8.

To justify this security or presumption on the part of Pompey, who was surely a warrior of the first order, it must be remembered, that while Cæsar was forming an army in Gaul, Pompey, by means of his lieutenants, likewise formed a great army of six complete legions, and many auxiliaries, in Spain; and must have foreseen that, if Cæsar should make any attempt upon Italy, he should then be in condition to order his army to pass the Pyrennees as fast as that of Cæsar could pass the Alps, occupy his province, cut off his resources, and while Pompey himself received him with the forces of Italy, that the Spanish army should press upon his rear, and place him at once between two such formidable attacks. It ought likewise to be considered, that, although few troops were then actually formed in Italy, yet this was the great nursery of soldiers for the whole empire, and multitudes could, on any sudden emergency, be embodied in every part of the country.*

Pompey, with these securities in his hands for the final success of his views against Cæsar, suffered his rival to run his career, leaving the senate exposed to the dangers which threatened them, and under the influence of apprehensions which he expected would render them more tractable than he had generally found them in times of greater security, and more ready in every thing to comply with his own desires.

In the same strain of policy, Pompey had frequently ventured to foment or to connive at the growing troubles of the republic, in order to render himself the more necessary, and to draw from the senate and the people offers of extraordinary trust and power. By the address of Cato, and of other active men in the senate, he had been obliged, on a late occasion, when he aimed indirectly at the powers of dictator, to be content with those of sole consul. It is probable that he had entertained the same views on the present occasion, and permitted the evils to accumulate, until the remedy he wished for should appear to be necessary. He continued, accordingly, with votes and resolutions of the senate, to combat Cæsar, who was at the head of a numerous army, ready on the first

* Cic. ad Familiar. lib. xvi. ep. 12.

plausible pretence to fall upon Italy, to seize the seats of government, and of consequence to wrest from his opponents that name and authority of the republic, on which Pompey himself so greatly relied for the ascendant which he hoped to preserve.

Meantime, the new year commenced, and C. Claudius Marcellus, with L. Cornelius Lentulus, entered on their office as consuls. Both parties were prepared U. C. 704. for a decisive resolution on the subject of Cæsar's claims. He himself, for some years, had wintered near to the northern extremity of his provinces. He was now at Ravenna, the nearest station of his army to Rome; but without any troops, besides what appear to have been the usual establishment of the cisalpine province, that is, the thirteenth legion, which, as we have said, had been sent thither to replace the legion with which he had been required to reinforce the army in Syria, and, together with these, three hundred cavalry detached, making in all between five and six thousand men.* Soon after his arrival at Ravenna, he had been visited by Curio, who, at the expiration of his tribunate, made this journey to receive his directions in respect to the future operations of the party; and after their conference returned to Rome with a letter from Cæsar, addressed to the senate, and which was accordingly presented on the first of January, at the admission of the new consuls into office.†

On this occasion the consul Lentulus moved, that, prior to any other business, the state of the republic, and that of the provinces, should be taken under consideration; and, alluding to the resolutions which were already on record, relating to Cæsar's province, said, that if the senate stood firm on this occasion to their former decrees, his services should not be wanting to the commonwealth. He was seconded by Scipio, and was applauded by the general voice of the senate; but Cæsar had procured the admission of Mark Antony and of Quintus Cassius, two of his most noted and determined partisans, into the college of tribunes. These could procure

* Appian. de Bello Civil. lib. ii. p. 447.—Plut. in Cæsare.

† Dio. Cassius, lib. xli. c. 1.

insurrections, or furnish the pretence of violence in the city, whenever the military designs of their patron were ripe for execution: they were to be the instruments of what had been concerted with Curio, or whatever else should be thought proper to promote the designs of their leader. They began with threatening to stop all proceedings of the senate, until Cæsar's letter was read; and prevailed on this meeting to begin with that paper. It was expressed, according to Cicero, in terms menacing and harsh,* and contained in substance a repetition of the proposals which the party had been all along making through Curio, and its other adherents at Rome, "that Cæsar should not be disturbed in possession of the honours which the Roman people had bestowed upon him; that he should be left upon a foot of equality with other officers, who were allowed to join civil office at Rome with military establishments in the provinces; and that he should not be singled out as the sole object of their distrust and severity."†

This letter was considered as an attempt to prescribe to the senate, and unbecoming the respect due to their authority. It was by many treated as an actual declaration of war. The debates were renewed on this subject for some days successively, from the first to the seventh of January. On the last of these days, a resolution was framed, ordering Cæsar to dismiss his army, and, by a certain day, to retire from his provinces; or, in case of disobedience, declaring him an enemy to his country. The tribunes, Mark Antony and Quintus Cassius, interposed with their negative.

The hands of the senate being thus tied up by the prohibition or interdict of the tribunes, it was moved that the members should go into mourning, in order to impress the people with a deeper sense of the calamity which was likely to ensue from the contumacy of these factious officers. This likewise the tribunes forbade; but the senate being adjourned, all the members, as of their own accord, returned to their next meeting in habits of mourning, and proceeded to consider in what manner they might remove the difficulty which arose from

* Cicero, ad Familiar. lib. xvi. ep. 12.

† Suetonius, in Cæsare, c. 29.

this factious interposition of the tribunes. In the conclusion of this deliberation, it was determined to give to the consuls and other magistrates, together with Pompey, in the character of proconsul, the charge usual in the most dangerous conjunctures ; *to preserve the commonwealth by such means as to their discretion should appear to be necessary.*

This charge suggested to the minds of the people what had passed in the times of the Gracchi, of Saturninus, and of Cataline. The tribunes, who had occasioned the measure, either apprehended, or affected to apprehend, immediate danger to their own persons: they disguised themselves in the habit of slaves, and, together with Curio, in the night fled from Rome, in hired carriages.* The consuls repaired to Pompey in the suburbs; and, agreeably to the order of the senate, claimed his assistance in discharging the important duties with which they were jointly intrusted. It was agreed, in concert with him, that they should support the authority of the senate with a proper military force; that they should proceed to make new levies with the greatest dispatch; and, in order to give effect to these preparations, that Pompey should have the supreme command over the treasury, and all the forces of the republic, in every quarter of the world.

Winter was now set in, or fast approaching. The season, although nominally in the month of January, being only about fifty days past the autumnal equinox, or about the twelfth of November, Cæsar had few troops on the side of Italy; the force of his army was yet beyond the Alps, and the officers now intrusted with the safety of the commonwealth flattered themselves that much time might be found to put the republic in a state of defence, before his army at this season could pass those mountains, even if he should be so rash as to make war on the commonwealth; a supposition which Pompey did not even, in this state of affairs, appear to have believed.

When Cæsar received accounts of the senate's resolution, he drew forth the troops then at Ravenna, and in a harangue

* Appian, de Bello Civil. lib. ii.—Dio. Cass. lib. xli. c. 3.—Cicero ad Familiari. lib. xvi. ep. 12.

enumerated the wrongs which for some years he alleged had been done to himself; complained that his enemies had now found means to excite against him even Pompey, a person whose honour he had always promoted with the warmest affection; that the interposition of the tribunes, in behalf of the army and of himself, had been defeated by means of threats and of actual force; that their sacred persons had been violated, in order to oppress him; that resolutions, which had never been taken but in the most dangerous and threatening conjunctures, to prevent ruinous laws from being carried by insurrection and violence, were now formed against peaceable magistrates, and in times of profound tranquillity; he therefore now called upon his audience to maintain the honour of an officer, together with whom they had now, for nine years, faithfully served the republic; with whom they had gained many victories in Gaul, and in Germany, and reduced a most warlike province into a state of absolute submission. He was answered with a shout of applause, and a general acclamation from the ranks, that they were ready to avenge the injuries done to their general, and to the tribunes of the people.

On receiving these assurances from the troops, then present, Cæsar immediately dispatched an express to the quarters of the twelfth legion, which, from the time at which it afterwards joined him, appears to have been already within the Alps, with orders to march. The remainder of his army, in the meantime, being supposed in the low countries, or in the interior of Gaul, it would not have appeared, to an ordinary capacity, that, even in case of hostilities, any decisive operation could take place before the spring. By the return of that season, indeed, the measures now taken by both parties seemed to threaten a dangerous convulsion; but it is not to be doubted that Cæsar had foreseen, or prepared, many of the most important circumstances of the present conjuncture; that he had already brought his affairs into that posture, in which he had projected that hostilities should commence; and that the seeming neglect with which he suffered himself to be taken with so small a force on the side of Italy, was probably the best concerted preparation he could have made

for the war. For, while he brought no alarming force towards Rome, his antagonists continued secure, and made no effectual provision to resist even the small force with which he was to begin his attack. He apprehended more danger from the legions which Pompey had formed in Spain, than from any force then subsisting in Italy; and he made his disposition against those legions, by having the strength of his army to be exerted between the Pyrennees and the Alps. There the troops he had formed in Gaul served him sufficiently in his design against Italy, by securing him from any interruption on that quarter. And when the war actually broke out, being well aware that the effects of surprise are often greater than those of force, even if he had wished for more troops in Italy, it is probable that he would not have awaited their coming.

On the very day that he delivered the harangue just mentioned to the legion which was quartered at Ravenna, he ordered parties of chosen men, in the manner of stragglers roving for pleasure through the country, and armed only with swords, to take the road separately, and without any appearance of concert, to Ariminum, the first fortified place of Italy beyond the Rubicon, which was the limit of his province; there to remain, and, at a certain time of the night, to seize upon one of the gates. He likewise ordered a party of horse to parade at some distance from Ravenna, and there to wait for an officer who was to deliver them his further commands. He himself passed the day, as usual, in forming combats of gladiators, and in attending the exercises of the legion; at night he went to supper at the usual hour, and after he had taken his place at table, pretending business, or some slight indisposition, which called him away from the company, he mounted a carriage that waited for him, drove through a gate opposite to that of Ariminum, and having travelled for a little time in that direction, turned into the road on which he had posted the party of horse; and having joined them, marched about thirty miles before break-of-day, entered Ariminum by a gate of which the parties he had sent before him in the night were in possession, and thus, without any resistance, became master of a fortress which opened his way towards Rome.

It was of importance that the first report of hostilities in the city should carry an account of his success; not merely of his having made an attempt. This circumstance may justify the measures which he took to surprise a place, which, without so many precautions, might have been easily reduced, though at the hazard perhaps of delay for a few days. He himself, indeed, in his Commentaries, makes no mention of any such measures, nor of the doubts and hesitations under which he is said to have halted on the banks of the Rubicon, by the passing of which he was to enter into a state of war with the commonwealth, a subject on which his doubts were probably long since resolved.

At Ariminum, his little army, on the following day, arrived from Ravenna, and the tribunes, Mark Antony and Quintus Cassius, joined him from Rome. He presented them to the army in the disguise in which they affected to have escaped from the violence of a tyranny then established in the city. "Observe," he said, "to what extremities persons of noble birth, vested with the sacred character of tribunes, are reduced, for having supported their friend, and for having pleaded the cause of an injured army."* The occasion was suited to popular eloquence; and this eminent master of every art did not neglect the opportunity. He is said to have acted his part with great vehemence; to have torn open his vest from his breast, and to have shed tears; frequently held up to view the hand on which he wore his ring, the well-known ensign of noble birth among the Romans, and declared that he would sacrifice all the honours of his rank to reward those who were now willing to support the public cause, and who adhered to himself on the present occasion. From these signs, and the display of his ring in particular, where he was not distinctly heard, it was supposed that he had promised the honours of nobility, and a large sum of money, to every soldier in his army.†

Lucius Cæsar and the prætor Roscius, who, while the decree against Caius Cæsar was depending in the senate, made offer of their good offices to treat with him, and bring matters to

* Appian. de Bell. Civil. lib. ii.

† Sueton. in Cæs. c. 33.

an amicable issue, were now come, without any public commission, probably to hinder their friend from taking any desperate resolution. They brought, at the same time, a private message from Pompey, with some expressions of civility, and an apology, taken from the necessity of the public service, for the hardship which he supposed himself to have put upon Cæsar. Pompey, in this message, protested "that he himself had always preferred the public to private considerations;" and subjoined, "that he hoped Cæsar would not suffer any passion to carry him into measures hurtful to the state, nor, in avenging himself of his private enemies, stretch forth his hand against the republic."

Such professions had little credit with Cæsar; but if they were to be of any weight with the public, he was not likely, in his turn, to fail in the use of them. He desired those persons, by whom Pompey had favoured him with this message, to carry for answer, "That the republic had always been to him dearer than his fortune or his life; but that he could not suffer the honours which the Roman people had bestowed upon him in public, to be contemptuously torn away by his private enemies. His commission, he said, would have expired in six months; his enemies, in their eagerness to degrade him, could not bear even with this delay, but must recal him immediately. The Roman people had dispensed with his attendance at the elections, yet he must be dragged to town at that time, to shew the superiority of his enemies, and to gratify private malice. These personal insults he had patiently borne for the sake of the public; and, being resolved to disarm, requested the senate only that others should disarm as well as himself; that even this was refused, and while he was commanded to dismiss the troops of his province, new levies were ordered in Italy; that two legions, which had been called off from his army, under pretence of the Parthian war, were now retained against himself; that the whole state was in arms; for what purpose, but for his destruction? that, nevertheless, he would suffer any thing for the good of the commonwealth. Let Pompey repair to his province; let all parties disband, and no army whatever be assembled in Italy; let no one pretend to over-

"awe the city; let the assemblies of the people and of the senate be free; and, in order the more speedily to terminate these disputes, let the parties meet and confer together; let Pompey say where he will be waited on, or let him name a proper place of meeting; at a friendly conference every difficulty may soon be removed."*

From this time forward Cæsar affected, on every occasion, to have no object in view but to prevail on his enemies, by some reasonable accommodation, to save the republic from a ruinous war, and to stop the effusion of innocent blood.† He continually repeated his proposals of peace, while he urged his military operations with uncommon rapidity. He ordered new levies, at Ariminum, and sent Antony to occupy Arretium,‡ a pass in one of the branches of the Flaminian Way through the Appennines; and, as fast as troops could march, he seized Pisaurum,|| Fanum, Auximum, with the town of Ancona, and all the places necessary to give him the command of that district, or to open his way to Rome.

A general consternation spread in the country before him; the people fled from their habitations, and communicated the alarm, with every sort of exaggeration, to the city. Pompey had relied much on the name and authority of the commonwealth, and no less on his own. Others thought themselves secure, while this renowned and experienced commander gave them assurances of safety. Now, like a person awake from a dream, he seemed to perceive the whole was illusion. Cæsar paid no regard to the authority of the senate, nor stood in awe of the state. He was at hand, with the reputation of a general equal to Pompey, at the head of troops fresh from service, and inured to blood. The republic was but a name; and they who composed it, though respectable at a distance, were, on the approach of an enemy, irresolute, disunited, and incapable of the exertions which such an occasion required. Orders had gone forth to raise troops in every part of Italy; but no great progress in so short a time could yet have been

* Cæsar, de Bell. Civil. lib. i.

† Cæsar. Appian. in lib. viii. Ad Atticum, post. ep. 13.

‡ Arrege.

|| Pesaro, Fano, et Osimo.

made in that service. Besides the two legions which had served so long under Cæsar himself, there were not any forces actually embodied in the country. These were justly suspected of inclining to favour their former general; and, instead of enabling Pompey to meet the danger which threatened the commonwealth, furnished him, at the head of such troops, with particular reasons for his keeping at a distance from the enemy. In a letter to Domitius Ahenobarbus, "I sent you word," he writes, "that with these two legions I did not like to be near Cæsar.* If I should retreat, therefore, at his approach, be not surprised."†

Domitius had been appointed to succeed Cæsar in the government of Gaul; and, with some other officer in the Picenum,‡ had made some progress in raising troops. Their numbers, perhaps, surpassed those of Cæsar. If Pompey, therefore, had thought it possible to defend the city, he must have hastened to that quarter, and have put himself at the head of those troops. But he was timorous in hazarding his reputation; a weakness from which Cæsar was altogether exempt, and which was unworthy of the great military talents of either. Pompey seldom committed his fame where the prospect was unfavourable, or events extremely uncertain. Cæsar, on such occasions, never chose to trust his affairs in any other hands than his own.

Pompey, acting under these motives, assembled the senate, and informed them that it was necessary to abandon Rome; that he would meet them again at Capua, where he proposed to assemble his forces; that he should consider all those who remained in the capital to countenance or to witness the violences of Cæsar as equally guilty with those who should be found in his camp.

It being unlawful for the officers of the republic to absent themselves from the city during their term in office, the senate passed an act to dispense with their attendance at Rome, and to enable them to exercise the powers of magis-

* Meaning probably that he did not choose to give them an opportunity to desert.

† Cicero, ad Atticum, lib. viii. ep. 2.—Ad Domitium.

‡ March of Anconia.

tracy wherever the necessities of the state might require their presence. These preparations for dislodging the government, together with the actual flight of Pompey himself, damped all the courage that yet remained in any order or class of the people. It made Cæsar appear at once more odious and more terrible.* It was generally expected† that he would exceed either Cinna or Sylla in rapacity and cruelty;‡ and that the city, if he should surprise his opponents there, would become a scene of blood. The consuls, and most of the other officers of state, set out with their ensigns of power. All night the gates were crowded with senators and other persons of rank who fled on this occasion; some with their families and most valuable effects, others alone, and distracted by the general panic, without knowing whether they were to retire, or to what fate they were leaving their families.

Cæsar, in the meantime, making a rapid march through Umbria, or what is now the duchy of Urbino,|| and the Picenum, or March of Ancona, not only took possession of every place as he passed, but gained daily accessions of strength by the junction of the new levies which were raising to oppose him. Soldiers are averse to the losing side; and Pompey's flight put an end to his military power in Italy. The prætor Thermus had, with five cohorts, amounting, if complete, to twenty-five hundred men, taken post at Iguvium,** among the Appennines, on the Flaminian Way. Observing that Pompey's party in general was retreating, and that Curio was advancing towards him with a part of Cæsar's forces, he resolved to abandon his post; but as soon as he began to execute this purpose, and was on the road to Rome, the troops deserted him on the march, returned to the post from which he had removed them, and declared for Cæsar.

The dispositions of the towns of which Cæsar had got possession made it unnecessary for him to leave any garrison behind him, and permitted him to advance with all his force. Auximum†† declared for him before his arrival, and obliged

* Cicero, ad Att. lib. vii. ep. 11. † Ibid. Ep. 12. 22. ‡ Ibid. Ep. 7.
 || Umbria. ** Gubio. †† Osimo.

Atius Varus, who held that post for the republic, to abandon it. This officer was overtaken by Cæsar's advanced parties, and, like **Thermus**, was deserted by his people.

At **Cingulum**, in the **Picenum**, Cæsar was joined by the twelfth legion, to which, on his first motion from **Ravenna**, he had sent orders to march. With this accession of force he advanced to **Asculum** * on the **Fronto**; and having dislodged from thence **Lentulus Spinter**, who commanded ten cohorts, the greater part of these troops deserted to him. The remainder put themselves under the command of **Vibullius**, who was just arrived from **Pompey**, to support the hopes of the cause in that quarter.

As Cæsar made his principal push on the **Adriatic** side of the **Appennines**, the troops that were suddenly raised for the republic were, without any well-concerted plan, drawn together upon that coast: and **Pompey** himself had not yet openly laid aside the design of making head against Cæsar in those parts. **Vibullius** having assembled in all about fourteen cohorts, fell back to the **Aternus**, now called the **Piscara**, and joined **L. Domitius Ahenobarbus** at **Corfinium**, a pass in the **Appennines**, that commanded the **Valerian** way to **Rome**. This officer having assembled twenty-five cohorts, meant to join **Pompey**, wherever he should be found, and had ordered **Thermus** to follow with five cohorts more;† but imagining, probably, that **Pompey** still intended to cover **Rome** from the incursions of Cæsar, and that **Corfinium** was an important post for this purpose, he determined to observe the motions of the enemy from that place.

Pompey, by this time, had moved from **Capua** to **Luceria**, and seemed to have taken the resolution not only of abandoning the posts that covered the access to **Rome**, but even all **Italy**, to Cæsar. The consuls, the greater part of the magistracy, and the senate, had followed him to **Capua**. Here was received the message which Cæsar had given to **Roscius** and to **L. Cæsar**. It contained several reflections and insinuations in the highest degree provoking to **Pompey**; and to this circumstance Cæsar probably trusted, that he should not be

* **Oscæ**.† **Pomp. ad Cicer. in Lib. ad Att. post. Ep. 11.**

bound by any of the offers he had made, and that the odium of rejecting the peace would fall upon his enemies. But the friends of the commonwealth, deeply impressed with the necessity of their own affairs, gladly listened to any terms of accommodation. They objected, indeed, to the proposed interview between Pompey and Cæsar, remembering the dangerous concerts which at their meetings had been formerly entered into against the commonwealth.

Pompey himself was so sensible of the disadvantage at which he was taken, that he dissembled his resentment of the personal reflections cast on himself, and consented to conditions which he had hitherto rejected with disdain. It was agreed, accordingly, that he should repair to Spain, and that, his province being in profound peace, he should reduce his military establishment. Cæsar, on his part, besides the conditions he himself had offered, was required to evacuate all the towns which he had lately seized in Italy; and it was proposed that the consuls, magistrates, and senators, should return to the city, and, from the usual seat of government, give all the sanction of public authority to these arrangements. From such appearances it was not doubted that an accommodation must follow: and in this belief, Cato, though appointed to command in Sicily, chose to abide by the senate while the treaty remained in suspense: and Cicero, with all his penetration, yet unacquainted with the parties concerned, thought the agreement almost concluded. "The one," he wrote to his friend Atticus, "begins to repent of his precipitation, and the other is sensible he has not a force sufficient to support such a war."* In this, probably, his notion of Pompey was correct; but fell greatly short of the views and apprehensions of Cæsar.

This politician, however, so far as the propositions he made were adopted, was himself likely to be caught in the snare he laid for his enemies, or obliged to lay aside the disguise which he had assumed in affecting such earnest desires of peace. To avoid either of these inconveniences, he objected to some of the conditions which the opposite party had subjoined to his

* Ad Att. lib. vii. ep. 14.

proposals, and complained of the silence which they kept on others, as proceeding from a deliberate purpose to circumvent and betray himself. "Pompey will repair to Spain," he said; "but when? I am required to evacuate all the towns of Italy, while Pompey and the whole state continue in arms against me, and while my enemies not only make new levies, but employ for my destruction legions which they have actually taken away from my own army. If Pompey be sincere in desiring a peace, why does he decline the personal interview which has been proposed for that purpose?"

Cæsar had, by this time, advanced with hasty marches to Corfinium, drove in a detachment from the garrison, which he found breaking down a bridge about three miles from the town, sat down under the walls, where he employed three days in fortifying his camp, and in filling the magazines with corn from the neighbouring country. Being joined by the eighth legion and twenty-two cohorts of the new levies from Gaul, with three hundred auxiliary horse, he ordered proper posts to be seized on every side of the town, and effectually shut up those who were within from any relief, or from any communication with their friends. When the works he was executing against the place began to appear, Domitius published a reward to any one who should carry letters to Pompey. Different messengers were dispatched for this purpose, and brought for answer, that Pompey disapproved of his having allowed himself to be invested by Cæsar, had foretold him the bad consequences of this measure, and now earnestly exhorted him, if possible, to extricate himself; for that it was not in his power, as he again repeated, with these doubtful legions, which had been so lately drawn from Cæsar's army, or with new levies so recently made, to force the hardy and veteran legions of the enemy.*

This answer Domitius endeavoured to conceal from those who were under his command; encouraged them with hopes of a speedy relief from Pompey, and seemed intent on the defence of the place, while he was actually taking measures

* Pompeius, ad Domitium, lib. viii, et ad Atticum, post Ep. 12.—Cæs. de Bell. Civ.

to get off in person, without any hopes of preserving the forces^s he had assembled for the commonwealth. This design being suspected, the troops surrounded his quarters in the night, secured his person, and, to pay their court to Cæsar, while they delivered up their general, and surrendered the town, made offer of their services in prosecution of war.

In consequence of these movements in the night, Cæsar took possession of the gates, manned the walls, and gave orders that no person whatever from his army should enter the place before it was day. This being the first instance in which he met with any shew of opposition, or had any pretence to act as an enemy, it gave him an opportunity to disprove or confirm the alarming reports which had gone abroad respecting the atrocity of the part he was to act; and as we have occasion to observe, in many other instances, in this he neither mistook nor neglected what was proper. Knowing that, besides Domitius and Vibullius, there were many senators and Roman knights now shut up in the town, these he ordered in the morning to be brought before him, expostulated with them on the subject of their enmity to himself, and their precipitation in hurrying the state into this unnatural war. He then dismissed them with the respect that was due to Roman citizens of their rank; and being told that a considerable sum of money, amassed at Corfinium for the support of the troops, had been seized by his people, to complete this scene of unexpected munificence by an exhibition of disinterestedness as well as of clemency, and as afraid to defile his hands by the touch of what was not his own, he ordered this money to be restored to Domitius. The fame of this wonderful mildness and generosity, as he expected, was everywhere spread abroad; and though, by over-acting his part, in abstaining from the public money, he furnished every thinking person with a sufficient comment on the other parts of his conduct, yet many were happy to understand that, in this alarming contest, their lives and properties were, from any motives whatever, to be spared.

Rome was now open to Cæsar; but he thought the possession of the city of no moment, until he had suppressed the military arrangements that were making throughout all Italy,

and had decided who was to have the possession of the country. He therefore, on the very day on which he became master of Corfinium, detached to Sicily, under the command of Curio, the troops, by whom he had been joined, in gaining possession of this place.* He himself set out for Apulia, and, before sunset, accomplished a considerable march; but while he thus urged the war with unremitted energy and diligence, he continued his messages to the leaders of the opposite party, with the mildest professions of friendship and overtures of peace. To this effect, immediately after the reduction of Corfinium, he dispatched Balbus, an officer in his army, with a letter to the consul Lentulus, containing earnest entreaties, that this magistrate would return to Rome, and prevent the disorders which were likely to arise from the suspension of government. To induce him to comply with this request, Balbus had secret instructions to assure the consul of Cæsar's interest in procuring a proper appointment in the provinces at the expiration of his year in office. The bearer of this message, at the same time, declared it as his private opinion, that Cæsar desired nothing so much as to join Pompey, and to make peace with him on any equitable terms. And the father of this young man, one of Cæsar's retinue, wrote, at the same time, to Cicero, that Cæsar had no object but to enjoy peace and security under Pompey.† But while the fame of his clemency at Corfinium, and of this wonderful disposition to peace was gone abroad, and had pacified the minds of many to whom he had been till then an object of terror,‡ and while he hoped to amuse his enemies, or to relax the diligence of their military preparations, he advanced with so much rapidity, that, in order to avoid him, they had no more than the time which was necessary to cross the mountains from Capua to Luceria, to fall back from thence to Canusium, and from this last place, without a halt, to Brundisium.

Whilst Pompey moved in this direction, and had sent Metellus Scipio, with his own son Cnæus into Syria, to provide

* Cæsar. de Bell. Civ. lib. i. c. 25.

† Cicer. ad Att. lib. viii. ep. 9.

‡ Cicer. ad Att. lib. viii. ep. 13. Si, meherculè, neminem occidet, nee cuiquam quicquam adimerit, ab his qui eum maxime timuerant, maxime diligitur.

and assemble the necessary shipping to embark his army,* his intention to abandon Italy began to be suspected, and shook the great authority which he still derived from his military reputation. His officers were everywhere deserted on the march by the new levies, who hastened to offer their services to Cæsar. His own presence kept the other parts of the army together, and brought them safe to the port from which it was suspected they were to take their departure from Italy. Soon after his arrival at this port he effectually verified these suspicions, embarking a great part of his army with the consuls, while he himself, not having sufficient shipping to transport the whole, remained with a second division to wait for the return of his ships.

Such was the posture of Pompey, when Cæsar, with six legions, four of veteran troops, and two newly-raised or completed from those who came over to him on the march, arrived at the gates of Brundisium. Even here, he never dropped the project of amusing his enemy with proposals of peace. Cn. Magius, an officer in the service of the commonwealth, having been taken on the march, was dismissed with great courtesy, and a message to Pompey, containing a request that he would admit Cæsar to an interview. Differences, it was observed, are soon made up at a conference, which otherwise might occasion many journeys and messages, without effect.

This pacific address, as in other instances, only constituted a part in the military plan of Cæsar, and was accompanied with the most effectual preparations for a blockade and a siege. It did not as yet appear whether Pompey meant to transport all his troops, and to abandon Brundisium, or to keep possession of this post, in order to retain a passage into Italy, and to command both sides of the gulf. Cæsar, to sound his intentions, and either to shut him up, or to hasten his departure, observing that the entrance of the harbour was narrow, and might be obstructed, began an alarming work for this purpose. He employed numerous parties to throw stones, earth, and other heavy materials, in the passage between the

* Plutarch. in Pompeio.

two moles, and expected, in a little time, to be able to join them, and thus effectually to shut up this port from all communication with the sea.

In this work the besiegers advanced, for some time, with a sensible progress; but being come into deeper water, where the materials they threw in were absorbed, did not settle, or were displaced by the motion of the sea, they found it necessary to change their plan, and endeavoured to close the harbour by means of floating rafts and hulks firmly anchored in the passage. But, in executing this project they were disturbed and interrupted by a continual discharge of arrows, stones, and other missile weapons, from vessels properly placed, and on which the necessary engines were mounted for this purpose,

While the parties were thus, without intermission, engaged at the entrance of the port, Cæsar again made a shew of proposing a treaty. As he had received no answer to his former message by Magius, he affected to despair of making any progress by direct applications to Pompey himself, and sent into the town Caninius Rebilus, one of his lieutenants, who, being in great intimacy with Scribonius Libo, had directions to make application to him, and, in Cæsar's name, to entreat his good offices in bringing on a negotiation; particularly, if possible, in procuring an interview between Pompey and himself. Representing to Libo, that if an interview were obtained, some way might be found to stop the issues of blood, a blessing which, in that case, would forever be mentioned as the effect of so essential a service performed by Scribonius Libo to his country.

Pompey, upon receiving these proposals, which, though addressed to Libo, were carried directly to himself, made answer, that, in the absence of the consuls, he could not treat. In this instance, he perceived, no doubt, the insincerity of Cæsar's pacific declarations, and was not tempted to remit the vigilance of his defence, or the ardour with which he now at last prepared for the contest: yet he could not altogether prevent the principal advantage which Cæsar meant to reap from these repeated professions of moderation and desire of peace; that of appearing, in the eyes of the people, not the

author of the war, but a person forced into these **extremities** by the violence and obstinacy of his enemies.

After the works at the mouth of the harbour of Brundisium had been continued three days, and were considerably advanced, the transports which had carried the first division of the army returned from Dyrrachium, and, as the passage at the entrance of the harbour was still open, the ships were admitted, and preparations made to embark the remainder. But the inhabitants of the town, being disaffected to Pompey, were likely to give intelligence of all his motions; and he himself made no doubt that, as soon as he should withdraw his guards, the people would throw open their gates, and expose him to be attacked in his rear, and possibly endanger the loss of such part of his army as might be overtaken on shore. To provide against this event, and to retard the entrance of Cæsar into the town, he built up the gates with masonry, or solid stone and mortar, and traversed the streets with walls and large ditches, replenished with sharp stakes, which were masked or hid with a slight covering of brushwood and earth.

When the troops began to move towards the harbour, the rear-guard still endeavoured to present the usual appearance on the ramparts, by occupying every post with archers, slingers, and other light infantry. These being to remain in their post, while the main body was embarking, had orders, at a signal given, to abandon the walls, and to repair on board the transports which were ready to receive them.

Measures to evacuate the town being thus begun in the night, and Cæsar, having immediate intelligence of what was passing, brought forward his scaling-ladders, and, as soon as the ramparts appeared to be deserted, began to ascend them at once in several places, and effected one part of his purpose, by gaining the battlements without opposition: but when he was about to descend from thence into the streets, having notice of the snares and obstructions which were placed in his way, he was obliged to halt, or to advance with so much precaution, that the greater part of the enemy had time to put off from the mole, and got under sail. Only two transports, which struck and were aground on the banks that had been formed or begun at the mouth of the harbour, fell into his

hands. The remainder, with the greater part of the senate, attended by the officers of state and the ensigns of magistracy, proceeded in their passage to Epirus; thus leaving Cæsar in possession of Italy and of the seats of government, from which the world could scarcely disjoin, in their idea, the right to command in the empire.

Cæsar having, in this manner, surprised the republic, and in sixty days obliged all his opponents to evacuate Italy, and to leave him sole master even of the forces which began to be mustered against himself, it is probable, notwithstanding the question he states relating to the expedience of following his enemy into Epirus, that he had already taken his resolution to consider the reduction of Spain, next to that of Italy, as the object of greatest importance. In that province, which was full of resources, a regular army of seven or eight legions had been some time on foot, with an evident purpose to keep him in awe. He was threatened, therefore, with the most immediate danger from thence. Some arrangements, too, were yet wanting for the security of Italy. The professions which he had made of pacific dispositions, and of zeal for the commonwealth, were to be confirmed by shewing a proper respect to the forms of the republic, and by affecting a concern to restore a government which he had actually overthrown.

For these reasons, this successful adventurer contented himself, for the present, with having ordered shipping to be provided at the port of Brundisium, that he might amuse the enemy with appearances of his intending to continue the war on that side, or that he might be actually ready to do so, when he had elsewhere accomplished the purpose on which he was bent. Notwithstanding his pacific declarations, and his ostentation of clemency on every occasion, the people still trembled when they saw almost every citizen of reputation and honour obliged to fly from the seats of government, and in their place collected, from different quarters of Italy, every bankrupt, every outlaw, and every person of infamous character.*

* Cicer. ad Att. lib. ix. ep. 19. Cave autem putes quemquam hominem in Italiam turpem esse, qui hinc absit. Vidi ipse Formis universos, &c.; et

These, being at variance with the laws of their country, had flocked to Cæsar, and were received by him under the denomination of the injured and the oppressed citizens, whose wrongs he was come to redress.

With this company still multiplying around him, having given orders to secure Brundisium from the sea, and having posted there, and at Sipontum and Tarentum, each a legion; and having ordered ships from every part of the coasts of Italy and Gaul, he set out for Spain, intending, while the troops, with whom he had over-run Italy, took some repose, and while those who were destined for the service in Spain were on the march, that he himself should visit the city, and observe the aspect of his party at Rome. His father-in-law, Calpurnius Piso, although, by his relation to Cæsar, hindered from following Pompey, yet would not countenance his son-in-law so far as to remain in the city to receive him. Marcus Lepidus, when prætor, was the officer of highest rank who remained in his place; and, beside the tribunes who had been the instruments in kindling this war, was the only magistrate who resigned himself entirely to the victor's disposal. Among the tribunes, Cæcilius Metellus, though disposed to have followed the senate, being detained in the city by the sacred duties of his function, had taken his resolution to employ the negative with which he was intrusted, in restraining the violations of law and government, which were to be expected in such a scene as was now to be opened in the capital.

Cicero, upon the commencement of hostilities, having still the ensigns of proconsul, was appointed to inspect the levies and other affairs of the republic on the coasts of Campania and Latium. Upon Pompey's retreat, he remained in this station, with a mind overwhelmed with perplexity and irresolution. He affected respect and gratitude to Pompey, though he surely owed him no obligation, bore him no real affection, and blamed him highly for his flight from Italy; but in the last, perhaps, he only meant to justify himself for not having immediately joined him in his retreat, and for not having em-

Cicer. ad Att. lib. ix. ep. 1. qui hic potest se gerere non perditæ vitæ mores ante facta ratio suscepti negotiî, socii, &c.

barked with more decision in the cause. He sincerely lamented the state of the republic, of which he now certainly despaired, and only wished to steer a course, the safest he could, for his own reputation and his person.

Cæsar, in the beginning of this contest, had contributed much to perplex the resolution of Cicero, who, ever after what he had suffered from the intrigues of party, generally saw so many objects in every question of state, that it was difficult for him to decide between them. He had been some time kept undetermined by means of a flattering correspondence, in which Cæsar affected to request his good offices towards preventing the present troubles. Being now in his way from Brundisium to Rome, he was made to expect a personal interview; at which, says Cicero to his friend Atticus, I shall study rather to appear an object of his respect than of his liking. He accordingly, on that occasion, resisted the flattery of Cæsar, and withstood his entreaties to attend a meeting of the senate, which been had ordered to assemble by a messenger dispatched from Formiæ. Cæsar appeared to be piqued at this refusal: "It will be supposed you condemn me," he said; "and others will be led by your example." Cicero replied, "That his case was different from that of others, who had less connexion with Pompey." "Come, then," continued Cæsar, "and treat of an accommodation with Pompey."—"Shall I be at liberty to do so in my own way?"—"Who will restrain you?"—"Shall I move the senate then, that the war shall not be carried into Spain nor into Greece? Shall I lament the treatment which Pompey has received?"—"That indeed," said Cæsar, "I shall not like to have said."—"I thought so," replied the other, "and chose to absent myself." At parting, Cæsar desired him to consider of the matter. "If you desert me," he said, "I must have recourse to other counsels, and know not what I may be forced to do."*

Upon the arrival of Cæsar in the suburbs of Rome, such of the senators as were in the city, or in the neighbourhood, assembled at his summons. He opened the meeting by enume-

* Cicer. ad Atticum, lib. ix. ep. 18.

rating the wrongs he himself had received, and by loading his opponents with the guilt of the present war. "He never had aspired," he said, "to unprecedented honours. The office of consul was now again open to him by the laws of the commonwealth; and the Roman people had dispensed with his personal attendance in suing for it. An act to this purpose," he said, "had been obtained in the fairest and most legal manner. Ten tribunes had concurred in proposing it. His enemies, particularly Cato himself, had been heard, at full length, against it, and had practised his usual artifice for disappointing the senate or the people, by prolonging the debates. Pompey himself was consul when this act was passed. If he disapproved of the act, why did he not oppose it then? If he approved of it, why rob him now of the privilege it bestowed? He reminded this meeting of the moderation with which he himself had offered to resign his command, while others were so tenacious of theirs; or while they imposed conditions on him, to which they themselves would not submit, and chose to throw the state into confusion, rather than abate the least of their own pretensions. He observed, that his enemies had made use of a false pretence to call off two legions from his army; that they had violated the sacred character of the tribunes, who were guilty of no offence, but that of protecting him against the oppression of the enemies; that they had rejected all offers of an accommodation, or even of a conference.

"He now exhorted the senate not to desert the commonwealth, nor to oppose such as, in concert with him, might endeavour to restore the government; but if they should shrink in this arduous task, he should not press it upon them. He knew how to act for himself. If his opinion were followed, deputies should be now sent from the senate to Pompey, with entreaties that he would spare the republic. He knew that Pompey had formerly objected to his having any such deputation sent to himself, considering such advances as a concession of right in him to whom they were made, or of fear in those who made them. These, he said, were the reflections of a narrow mind; for his own part, as

“ he wished to overcome his enemies in the field, so he wished
 “ to excel them in acts of generosity and candour.”

Such were the colours in which this profound and artful man endeavoured to disguise his cause: and while he took effectual measures to maintain it by force, employed likewise an insinuation and an eloquence not less dangerous than his sword. The proposals of a treaty were received in this meeting with joy; but no man was willing, after having assisted at such a meeting of the senate, to hazard his person in Pompey's camp: for while Cæsar, to reconcile all men to his cause, affected clemency even to those who were taken in arms against him, Pompey, supposing himself intrusted with the powers and severities of the law, had threatened to employ those powers and severities to the utmost extent against every person who staid behind him at Rome. *Proscription* and *massacre* of those who abandoned the commonwealth were the ordinary language at his quarters.* He proposed to operate in this case by fear alone, and had forgotten that legal government itself, on certain occasions, with all its authorities and powers, stands in need of insinuation and of popular arts.

Cæsar, in taking the opposite tone, and in affecting to commit his affairs to the issue of a fair negotiation and treaty, on which he by no means wished to enter, still relied for an evasion on the difficulties which were likely to occur in the conduct of any such business; and he presumed upon these evasions in making offers which he trusted that his enemies would not accept. His intention was to load his antagonist with the blame of a war which, it is probable, he had a long time been devising. If he had really meant to renew his former concerts with Pompey, he would have employed again the same concealed methods by which those concerts had been formerly obtained, and would not have intrusted the mediation betwixt them to the senate, a body which, however composed, had a natural claim to authority, and might have carried their negotiations further than either of the parties

* Cicero, ad Attic. lib. viii. ep. 11.—*Syllaturit* is the expression with which Cicero marks this conduct in another place.

approved. He had ever entertained a serious aversion to the name and pretensions of the senate. Being altogether indifferent to public interests of every sort, the mediocrity of parts, that must ever appear in the majority of such a body, was to him an object of contempt. He had espoused the cause of every faction, of every tumult, of every criminal against them; and, at one time, rather than be subject to their authority, had proposed that Pompey himself should transport his army from Asia, to usurp the government. Even the few senators, who, upon the present occasion, from indifference to public questions, or from a disposition to favour his cause, had remained in the city, became the objects of his disgust. Many of them, though willing to be his instruments, were not yet formed for his purpose. When he affected to treat them with respect, they received his addresses as matter of right to themselves; when he proposed any measure, they took the matter into consideration, and affected to deliberate of what was to be done. "He detests the senate," said Curio to Cicero, "now more than ever: he will leave them no authority. I meant to have held my commission by a fictitious decree of that body: but he said, I should hold it of him, and that every honour, and every power, should from henceforward be derived from himself."*

Cæsar, however, meant to make this remnant of a legal assembly the tools of every ungracious or improper measure he had occasion to adopt, and, in particular, to avail himself of their authority in seizing the public money. Pompey, before he left Rome, had been authorized to draw from the treasures of the commonwealth whatever money he wanted for the service. At his departure, he ordered the whole to be removed; and the consul Lentulus was about to execute this order, when a sudden alarm of Cæsar's approach obliged him to desist, and left him time only to carry away the keys of the public repositories. Cæsar now moved the senate that the doors should be opened; and that the public money should be issued from thence to defray the expense of the war.† To this motion the tribune Metellus Celer opposed his negative; and

* Cicer. ad Att. lib. x. ep. 4.

† Dio. Cassius, lib. xli. c. 17 and 18.

Cæsar, disdaining any longer to wear a mask, which subjected him to the observance of insignificant forms, proceeded to the treasury, and ordered the doors to be forced. The tribune had the boldness to place himself in the passage, and was about to reduce Cæsar to the disagreeable alternative of being disappointed of his purpose, or of incurring some measure of popular abhorrence, by violating the sacred person of a tribune, from a veneration to which, he himself professed to have undertaken the war. On this occasion, contrary to his usual character, he appeared to have lost his temper, and threatened Metellus with immediate death. "This," he said, "is easier for me to execute than to utter." It was thought, that if the tribune had persisted, not only this officer, but numbers of senators, and many of the more respectable citizens, whom he considered as enemies and promoters of the tribune's contumacy, would have been involved in a general massacre. "Think not," said Curio, in relating these particulars to Cicero, "that his clemency proceeds from temper, or is secured to you by any real disposition of his mind. It is a mere effect of his policy; he is naturally indifferent to blood, and, if he is provoked, will make it to run in the kennels."*

The tribune Metellus, however, when matters were coming to this extremity, suffered himself to be removed. The doors were forced open, all the money was taken from thence; even the sacred deposite was now carried off, though supposed to have remained from the time of the rebuilding of Rome after its destruction by the Gauls, and kept as a resource for the utmost exigency of the state, in case of similar invasion or danger. I have subdued the Gauls, said Cæsar; and there is no longer any need of such provision against them. He is said, on this occasion, to have carried off, in bars, 25,000lb.† of gold, 35,000lb.‡ of silver, and in coin, 40,000,000 Roman money.||

* Cicero, ad Atticum, lib. x. ep. 4.

According to Arbuthnot, chap. 18.

† L. 678,125 0 0

‡ 94,937 10 0

|| 322,916 13 4. Vid. Plin. lib. xxxiii. c. 3.

L. 1,095,982 3 4

After this act of violence, it appears that Cæsar distrusted the affections of the people. He had proposed to harangue them in a public audience, which had been appointed for that purpose; but apprehending that he might be exposed to insult from some one in the crowd, he declined that solemnity, even avoiding the public view altogether, and, having passed but a few days at Rome, set out for Spain, sullen and displeased. It was no longer a doubt that his victories led to the subversion of the republic, and of every species of civil government whatever.*

Marcus Æmilius Lepidus, who, as has been observed, was at this time prætor, and the officer of highest rank then at Rome, was left to govern in the city. Mark Antony had the command of Cæsar's forces in Italy; and by the use which he made of his power, treating persons of the most respectable condition with great insolence, and indulging himself in all the extravagance of debauch, for which his temperament appears to have been peculiarly fitted, increased the dismal apprehensions of the public. He is said to have travelled through Italy himself in an open litter, with Cithèridè, a celebrated actress, followed by seven other carriages replenished with female attendants, including Fulvia, the widow of the late famous Clodius, and now his wife, who, to enjoy her present husband's state, and partake with him in the licence of his military power, connived at his infidelities, and made a part in this scandalous train.† The whole, a lively display of the object for which the accomplices of Cataline, and many of the followers of Cæsar, wished to be masters of the republic, and a foretaste of the brutal caprice with which this overgrown community, so long a prey to outrageous faction, was now likely to be made the subject and the sport of a military usurpation.

Soon after hostilities had commenced, Cotta had been sent to command for the republic in Sardinia, and Cato to watch over its interests in Sicily. These islands appeared to Cæsar, when about to carry the war into Spain, of considerable importance; and he wished, if possible, to get the possession of

* Cic. ad Att. lib. x. ep. 4.

† Ibid. & xiii.

them, as well as to reduce Pompey's forces in every other part of the empire. Having stationed Dolabella, with C. Antonius, on the coast of Illyricum, he ordered Valerius, with a proper force, into Sardinia, and Curio, with three legions, to prevent the establishment of Cato in Sicily. The Sardinians, hearing that one of Cæsar's officers was appointed, in his name, to take possession of their island, declared for his interest, took arms against Cotta, and obliged him to fly into Africa, where he joined Varus, who had occupied that province in the name of the republic.

Cato, some time after his nomination to command in Sicily, and while there were any hopes of a negotiation, remained at Capua, then the quarters of Pompey, in order to give his assistance in forming an accommodation, the least ruinous that could be obtained for the commonwealth. But, on Pompey's retreat into Apulia, he went into Sicily, and, the province being unprovided with every mean of defence, gave orders to repair or to build ships in all the ports of the island, and in those of the neighbouring coast of Italy. He had likewise ordered all the towns to furnish their quota of troops; but had not been able to collect any considerable force, when Curio landed at Messina, with the two legions destined by Cæsar to take possession of the island. Sensible that any attempts to resist would only expose the lives of a few well-affected citizens or subjects, who might on this occasion be disposed to support him as an officer of the republic, he discontinued his military preparations, and withdrew from the island.

This officer had often disapproved of Pompey's conduct; and, on this occasion, particularly complained of the defenceless state in which he had suffered the republic to be surprised in all its possessions. Cæsar, who no doubt wished to have the suffrage of so respectable a person, and of his own enemy against Pompey, represents Cato as complaining that he was betrayed, that the senate had been deceived, and that the war itself was unnecessary.* The conduct of Pompey, not only as a citizen, but as an officer of state and as a soldier,

* Cæs. de Bell. Civ. lib. xxx.

has been censured in many parts of this memorable contest; and there can be no doubt that, in the outset, either from design to extort from the senate the more ample powers of dictator, or from too much confidence in himself, as he supposed, at the head of the republic, he suffered the state to be surprised or taken at a disadvantage on every quarter. Cæsar himself is said to have censured him for abandoning Italy; and it is probable would have respected him more, if, in executing this resolution, instead of passing into Macedonia, he had gone to the head of his army in Spain. His celebrated saying, in leaving Brundisium, when he was about to carry the war into that country, implied an opinion to this purpose. "We go," he said, "from this general, who has no army, to an army that has no general."

Cæsar's own distribution of his forces, as has been already mentioned, in assigning what appeared to have been the reasons of his conduct, had been made with the greatest ability. The disposition, indeed, on which Pompey relied was plausible; but that of Cæsar profound: and the more, that it gave him the appearance of a person acting without design, and suddenly forced to the measures he pursued. In talking of ordinary men, we may err in imputing too much to design and concert; but with respect to Cæsar, the mistake to be dreaded is that of not perceiving the whole extent of his foresight and plan. He at once armed himself with a military force, and artfully guarded the appearances under which he was to use it. When the senate passed their resolution against him, he seemed to be caught unprepared to resist; but the senate was still less prepared to attack. He had artfully avoided giving them any cause of suspicion, by any unnecessary assemblage of forces on the side of Italy, while he had sufficient strength to take the full benefit of the consternation into which they were to be thrown by his first alarm. Though long meditating the invasion of Rome with an army, he contrived an incident, in the flight of the tribunes, to make it appear the effect of a sudden provocation, and of his zeal in a popular cause. When we consider Mark Antony as the person who was to furnish this pretence of a tribune's flight from

violence, there is no doubt that Cæsar had his choice of the time at which the occasion should present itself.

At this conjuncture, the greater part of his army still remained beyond the Alps, but in the precise situation in which they were most likely to be wanted to encounter the first considerable difficulty that would probably arise in the war. This difficulty was to come from the veteran legions which had been levied for Pompey, and which were stationed under Afranius and Petreius in Spain. If these legions had attempted to pass the Pyrenees, the army of Cæsar was stationed in Gaul to intercept them, and he was accordingly secure of being able to finish the war in Italy, without any interruption from thence. When this service was effected, his army in Gaul remained in the most advantageous position, from which to enter upon what was likely to become the second object of his enterprise, the reduction of Spain.

The antagonists of Cæsar, without any apprehension from the measures he had taken, and perfectly secure until the moment that hostilities commenced, were completely surprised, overwhelmed, and routed in every quarter on which they attempted to make a defence. Armies indeed had been formed in Italy, according to the saying of Pompey, *at the stamp of his foot*; but they were armies that served the purpose of his enemies, not that of the republic, or his own; and, though raised to secure Italy against Cæsar, became in the reduction of Italy itself an accession to his force, and were ready to be sent in separate divisions to occupy different provinces of the empire in his name; insomuch that, while Cæsar himself, with the strength of the veteran legions with which he had conquered Gaul, hastened into Spain to reduce what was the most formidable part of his rival's power, his officers were detached with separate bodies of these newly-acquired troops, to the easier conquests of Sardinia, Sicily, and Africa.

Pompey, although he had never visited his government in person, nor sought for occasions of war, as Cæsar, in order to discipline his army or inure them to service, had done in Gaul, had nevertheless formed a great military establishment, consisting of seven Roman legions, with five thousand horse,

and eighty cohorts of provincial infantry, equal in number to eight legions more; and Cæsar had reason to believe that this great force, if the war could have been protracted in Italy, would have come upon his rear, cut off his resources in Gaul, or obliged him to defend himself on the north of the Alps. He, accordingly, instead of bringing into Italy the legions that lay in the low countries, or the interior parts of his province, had moved them only to the neighbourhood of Narbonne, to be near the confines of Spain, from which this storm was to be dreaded; and meant, if the success of his affairs in Italy should admit of it, that these legions should cross the Pyrenees, and fix the scene of the war amidst the possessions of his rival.

Spain had been formerly divided into two provinces, under two separate Roman governors; but the whole being united under Pompey, was committed by him to three lieutenants, Varro, Petreius, and Afranius. The first commanded from the river Guadiana westward to the extremities of Lusitania* and Gallicia; the second, from the Guadiana eastward to the mountains of Murcia; and the third, from thence to the Pyrenees.

Soon after the war broke out in Italy, Pompey sent Vibullius into Spain, with orders to these officers to assemble their forces, and to prepare for the defence of their province. Of the three, Varro affected indifference in the quarrel, or an equal regard to the opposite parties concerned in it. An accident, he said, had placed him under the command of Pompey; but he had an equal attachment to Cæsar. The other two, from regard to the commonwealth, or from fidelity to their commander-in-chief, engaged with more zeal in the cause. They determined, in concert with Vibullius, to leave Varro in the western province, while they themselves drew the principal part of their force towards the eastern frontier; and by occupying the passes of the mountains, or some advantageous post on the Ebro, endeavoured to defend the country intrusted to their care, until Pompey should either arrive in person to take the command on himself, or until, having

* Portugal.

rallied his forces in Macedonia, he should bring the scene of the war again into Italy. For this purpose, they took post at **Ilerda**,* a place of strength on the Segra, and about twenty miles above the confluence of this river with the Cineia; **Afranius** with three legions, **Petreibus** with two more, together with five thousand horse, and eighty cohorts of provincial infantry.

Such were the dispositions that were making in Spain, when **Cæsar**, having expelled his rival from Italy, took possession of Rome, and having passed a few days in that city, in the manner above related, set out for his army in the province of **Narbonne**.

Being to pass by **Marseilles**, he intended to take possession of that city; but the inhabitants were already disposed to favour his antagonists, and shut their gates against him. These ancient Greek colonists, after having long defended their settlement against the rude tribes in their neighbourhood, had placed themselves at last under the protection of the Romans; but with a reserve of all their own immunities, and an exemption from all the burdens of a Roman province. **Cæsar** proposed to have entered their city as a neutral place; and, to prevail on the people to receive him, cited the examples of Rome itself, and of all the other cities of Italy which had opened their gates, and given a passage to his army, without taking any part in the present disputes. To this proposal the citizens of **Marseilles** made answer, that, in every case where the Romans were divided among themselves, every ally in their situation must so far preserve their neutrality as not to receive the forces of either party within their walls; and that, in the present case particularly, they lay under such high obligations to the leaders of both parties, that they must carefully avoid giving offence to either.

It soon after appeared, however, that this plausible answer was intended merely to gain time. **Vibullius** had passed by **Marseilles** in his way to Spain, and had delivered to the people of that place a message from **Pompey**, with assurances of support; on which they fully relied. The receipt of this

* Now called **Lerida**.

message was followed by a resolution, to admit the officers and men of Pompey's party into their town, and to exclude his antagonists.

Domitius Ahenobarbus, after he had been dismissed from Corâinium, nowise affected by the ostentatious clemency of Cæsar, had, in pursuance of the senate's appointment to the government of Gaul, repaired to that province, raised some troops, with which he was expected to take possession of Marseilles, and actually, in a few days after this answer was given to Cæsar, entered the harbour of that place with seven ships, and some land-forces on board. Upon his arrival, the people of this republic called in to their assistance the force of some neighbouring cantons from the mountains; repaired their own fortifications; replenished their magazines; employed many hands in fabricating arms; and took every other precaution that was necessary, in case they should be attacked, to enable them to make a vigorous defence.

By this conduct, on the part of Marseilles, Cæsar being greatly provoked, invested the town with an army of three legions; and having ordered some ships to be built on the Rhône, in its neighbourhood, prepared to assail it at once by sea and land. He committed the attack by land to Trebonius; and that from the sea to Decimus Brutus. While he was making these preparations, a report prevailed that Pompey was passing the seas into Africa, and intended, with the troops which were in that province, and a body of Numidian cavalry, to reinforce, and to take the command of, his army in Spain. It is probable that Cæsar, in like circumstances, would have even taken a shorter road to the head of his army. He appears at least to have believed this report of his enemy, or to have thought it extremely probable, and to have been somewhat alarmed. As if the prospect of meeting with Pompey, having under his direction a well-appointed and regular force, had rendered him doubtful of the affections of his own men, he mentions an artifice practised by himself on this occasion, which may be considered as a specimen of his address, and of the influence which he employed with his army. He borrowed money from the officers, and gave it in gratuities to the

soldiers; thus taking a pledge for the fidelity of the one, and purchasing that of the others by his bounty.

While Cæsar was yet employed in opening the siege of Marseilles, he ordered Fabius, who commanded his forces at Narbonne, to advance into the Pyrenees; and, if the passes were open, or slightly guarded, to penetrate into Spain, and occupy some advantageous or leading position in the avenues to that country. This officer, accordingly, having forced the passes of the mountains, probably near to what is now called Urgel or Fort Louis, knowing that the enemy were posted on the Segra, to dispute his passage, appears to have taken his route by the right of this river, from near its source, to where the army of Afranius and Petreius were encamped at the town of Ilerda. He had by this mean frustrated their intention of disputing the passage of the Segra; and having his army on that side, could, at leisure, open his communication with the more fertile parts of Catalonia on the other, in order to receive his supplies and reinforcements from Gaul by the ordinary route. For this purpose, soon after his arrival, he constructed two bridges in the rear of his camp, at the distance of about four miles from each other, forming an immediate communication with Catalonia, for the supply of his army, and for the junction of reinforcements by the more frequented access from Gaul; but as the enemy also had a passage by the bridge of Ilerda, to intercept these supplies, it was necessary to cover every convoy and foraging party with numerous and powerful escorts. After he had been some time in this position, two entire legions, under the command of Plancus, had marched to cover his foragers, and were to be followed by a body of cavalry. After the infantry had passed, and the cavalry was entered on the bridge, it broke down, and deprived those who were already over of any communication with the camp. The timber and wreck of the bridge, floating by the town of Ilerda, gave the enemy intimation of what had happened, and suggested the design to scour the country on the left of the Segra, with a powerful detachment, in order to intercept any parties who might by this accident be cut off from the main body of their forces. For this purpose, Afranius marched with four legions, and might have taken or destroyed those

who remained under Plancus on the left of the river, if this officer had not retired to a height, on which he was able for some time to resist the superior numbers of his enemy. In the meanwhile, Fabius, suspecting the danger to which his detachment was exposed, dispatched two legions more by the other bridge to support the former. On the appearance of this reinforcement, Afranius, whose plan in the present campaign was altogether defensive, thought proper to retire, without hazarding an action, in which he might be exposed to a too hasty decision of the cause.

Two days after this adventure, or about the second of May, Caesar, with an escort of nine hundred horse, arrived, by the remaining bridge, in the camp of Fabius. Having examined the situation of both armies, and ordered the bridge which was broke down to be rebuilt, he proceeded, as usual, to act on the offensive, and to occupy the enemy's attention with successive operations against them, by which, in his usual way, he left them no leisure to form any designs of their own. It was his fortune, indeed, in this and other periods of the present war, to need a speedy decision, which made him take measures that forced his enemies to remain on the defensive, and inspired his men with a notion of their own superiority; an opinion which, after it has been some time entertained, seldom fails to verify itself.

In a few days after his arrival, he advanced with his army, in three divisions, to the foot of the hill on which the Spanish army was encamped; and while they continued to observe, and endeavoured to penetrate, his intentions, he began to break ground, and to make a lodgment for himself in that place. That his purpose might not be known, until the work was somewhat advanced, his army being formed in different lines, he kept the first and second under arms, and ordered the third, without raising a parapet, or planting their palisades, to sink a ditch fifteen feet wide, and of a sufficient length to cover his front. This being done, he retired, with his whole army, behind it, and ordered them to lie upon their arms all night. Under cover of this temporary intrenchment, he, on the following day, completed the usual fortifications of his camp, and brought forward the tents and baggage of the army,

which till then had remained under a proper guard on his former ground.

Being now in possession of a post within four hundred paces, or less than half a mile of the enemy's station, and having a view of the ground which lay between their camp and the town of Ilorda, extending about three hundred paces, and mostly plain, with a small swelling or height in the middle of it, he formed a project to seize this ground; and, by means of a post in that situation, knowing that the enemy had lodged their magazines and stores in Ilorda, proposed to cut off their communication with the town. In this view, having advanced three legions into a proper position, from which to execute his purpose, he ordered the front rank* from one of those legions to start from their colours, and with the utmost speed to gain the height which he intended to occupy. The sudden movement of this body explained his design to the enemy, and they instantly put all the piquets and extraordinary guards of their camp in motion to prevent its effects. Having a nearer way, and the advantage of the ground, they got a-head of Caesar's party; and being in possession of the height before them, repulsed and beat them back to their main body. Here too they pursued their advantage; and as they rushed with little regard to order, but with an appearance of undaunted courage, on the flanks as well as the front of the legions which Caesar had advanced, they put the whole in some degree of confusion, and forced them back from the plain to the heights in their rear.

While the leaders of the Spanish army probably committed an error in not redoubling their blow, or remained in suspense, Caesar issued from his camp with a fresh legion to support the flying division of his army, obliged the enemy to retire in their turn, and having overtaken them before they could reach their camp, obliged them to take refuge under the walls of the town.

The ground at the foot of these walls was steep, and the access to it was by lanes and narrow ways. Thither the troops, at whose head Caesar had renewed the action, flushed

* *Unius Legis Antesignanos.*—Caesar. de Bell. Civil. lib. i. c. 43.

with victory, had followed the enemy, and got into a situation in which they neither could gain any advantage, nor retire without loss. The parties, however, so situated, continued to skirmish during five hours, and being continually reinforced from their respective armies, a general engagement was likely to ensue on ground extremely unfavourable to Cæsar, but from which he could not retire without an appearance of defeat and absolute rout.

In order to extricate himself with the least possible shew of disgrace, he ordered a general charge; and having driven his antagonists before him to the foot of the wall, he sounded a retreat from thence, and brought off his men, before the enemy could rally in any considerable force, or return to the pursuit.

In this manner, Cæsar withdrew to his camp with considerable loss, and foiled in his design; but, on account of the last impression he made on the enemy, with some pretensions to a victory, of which to support the courage of his troops, he did not neglect to avail himself.

In a few days after this miscarriage, the army of Cæsar suffered a worse and more alarming disaster, in a circumstance to which their situation exposed them. The summer being far advanced, and the snow on the Pyrenees melting apace, all the rivers, which are supplied from thence, rose of a sudden to their greatest height. The Segra carried off both the bridges erected by Fabius, and baffled all the endeavours that were used to preserve or restore them. As often as any attempt was made for this purpose, the work was interrupted by the enemy from the opposite bank, or the materials were swept away by the flood. Neither the Segra nor the Cinca were passable, and the country between them, though, at that distance from their confluence, extending in breadth about thirty miles, being exhausted, could no longer furnish the necessary supply of provisions to Cæsar's camp.

About the time that the army began to feel their inconvenience, a convoy, which arrived from Gaul, consisting of many carriages, escorted by a large body of Gaulish horse, and accompanied with many officers and persons of distinction, who came to witness the glories of this campaign; the whole,

together with their attendants and equipage, amounting to about six thousand men, were attacked by Afranius, dispersed, and with great loss obliged to take refuge in the neighbouring mountains.

In consequence of this disappointment, or under the sense of present, and apprehension of future, scarcity, the modius* of corn sold in Cæsar's camp for fifty denarii, or at the rate of about thirty shillings a peck. All their attempts to procure a supply were frustrated by the difficulties of their situation, or by the vigilance of the enemy. As the height of the floods was a permanent effect of the season, in swelling every river which descends from mountains that retain their snow in the summer, Cæsar would have no immediate prospect of relief; and as the enemy were plentifully supplied from their magazines in the town of Ilerda, or had, by the bridge of that place, an open communication with the fertile country, on the left of the Segra, nature seemed to have decided the war in their favour. The Spanish army, accordingly, triumphed in their good fortune, sending exaggerated accounts of their advantage to all parts of Spain, to Italy, and to Macedonia. Many persons, who had hitherto hesitated in the choice of their party, were now determined. Varro began to exert himself in his province, and levied two entire new legions in the name of Pompey. Many hastened from Italy into Macedonia, to be the carriers of such agreeable tidings, or to have the merit of declaring themselves of the party of the republic, while the issue of the war yet remained in any degree of suspense.

The triumphs, however, which anticipate events are often deceitful; and, by the overweening security and confidence which they inspire, give an able enemy some advantage, in surmounting his difficulties, or facilitate the changes of fortune in his favour. Afranius and Petreius, while they trusted to physical circumstances, and the ordinary course of the seasons, were not sufficiently upon their guard against the superior resources of so able an adversary. They suffered him to build, unobserved, a number of boats, upon a construction

* Little more than a peck.

which he observes was learned in Britain; having a keel in the ordinary form, and some timbers of strength on the sides; but, instead of plank, finished between these timbers with basket-work, and covered with hides. These vessels being of easy carriage, were transported by land about twenty miles above Cæsar's camp, and, in a first embarkation, ferried over a party sufficient to make a lodgment on the opposite bank. Cæsar continued to reinforce this party, until, having an entire legion intrenched on that side, he ventured to employ his carpenters openly in constructing a bridge, which they began at once from both sides of the river. This work was completed in two days, and again gave him access to the left of the Segra, where, in his turn, he surprised some of the enemy's parties, and procured immediate relief by a supply of provisions to his own camp.

About the time that Cæsar had effected this change in the state of his army, he had news of a naval fight on the coast of Gaul, in which his fleet, under Decimus Brutus, had defeated that of the enemy, and given a speedy prospect of the redemption of Marseilles. This report, together with the disappointment he had recently given to the hopes of his enemies, had at once all the effects of victory, and made him appear more formidable than he was supposed to be, even before the distresses which he had lately experienced. His antagonists, from a state of sanguine expectation, sunk into a proportional degree of despondency, and became so much in awe of his superior ability that they abandoned the most fertile part of the country to his foragers, and never ventured, except in the night, to go abroad for the necessary supplies of their own camp. These events affected the natives in a still higher degree, and brought them from every quarter to make a tender of their services in supplying Cæsar with provisions, or in co-operating with his military plans.

In conjunction with the inhabitants, who were now become his allies, Cæsar again found himself in condition to act on the offensive, and to devise new alarms for the enemy. His first object was to render the passage of the river at all times practicable; and as he had failed in his purpose of separating the Spanish army from the town of Ilerda, he now proposed to

extend his command of the country, and to form a chain of posts, by which he might circumscribe the town itself, together with the enemy's camp, which depended upon it for subsistence.

The bridge which he had lately built was at too great a distance, and he experienced the insecurity of such communications over torrents which came with such force and so much inequality from the mountains. Instead, therefore, of attempting to erect any more bridges, he proposed to render the river fordable, by separating its course into many different channels; and for this purpose made a number of cuts, through the bank, of about thirty feet deep, passing over the plain, to receive as much of the waters of the Segra as might sufficiently drain the principal stream.

The enemy, as soon as they understood the purpose of these operations, were greatly alarmed. They foresaw that Cæsar, having the passage of the river secured, might command its opposite banks below, as well as above the town of Ilerda, block up the bridge of that place, and, with the aid of the country around him, which, since the late defection of its inhabitants, was ready to support him in all his designs, might have it in his power to prevent their own supplies, and distress them, in their turn, for want of provisions.

That they might not be exposed to incur so great a calamity, they resolved, while Cæsar's work was yet incomplete, to abandon their present station, and to retire beyond the Ebro, where the people, either from fear or affection, were still in their interest. They proceeded to the execution of this purpose with much seeming precaution and foresight. Having fixed upon a proper place at which to lay a bridge over the Ebro, they ordered all the boats, within a certain distance on that river, and on the Segra, to be collected together for that purpose. They placed a proper garrison in Ilerda, to check the motions of the enemy in their rear, or, if he attempted to reduce that place, to occupy his forces until they themselves should have affected their retreat, and made their arrangements in the new position they intended to take.

As their first movement in departing from their present encampment, and in passing through the town of Ilerda, in-

cumbered with all their baggage, was likely to detain them sometime in presence of the enemy, or expose them to the attacks of his cavalry and light troops, they projected no more, on the first day of their march, than to file off by the bridge; and they fixed on a post at which they might halt on the left of the Segra, and make the proper dispositions to execute the remainder of their plan. This post they sent two legions before them to occupy and to secure.

Having taken these preparatory steps, they decamped, defiled without molestation through the town of Ilerda, and came to the ground on which they had taken care to secure a proper lodgment; but here they halted only until the middle of the night, when they again were in motion. They had a plain of some miles before them, bounded by a ridge of hills, which they were to pass in their way to the Ebro. They might be exposed to Cæsar's light troops in crossing this plain; but, as soon as they reached the mountains, they could, by securing the passes in their rear, effectually prevent any further attack from the enemy. Thither they accordingly directed their march; but Cæsar, who had observed their intentions, and who had so far succeeded in his operations on the river as to be able to ford it with his horse, had sent the greater part of his cavalry, in the beginning of the night, with orders to hang upon the rear of the enemy, and by all possible means to retard their progress.

This service the cavalry performed with so much success that, at break of day, the Spanish army, in consequence of the frequent interruptions they had suffered, were still to be seen from Cæsar's camp. The cavalry, as often as the enemy got in motion, were observed to attack them; but when the enemy halted, appeared to stop or retire, and were pursued in their turn. The army of Cæsar, being spectators of this scene, became extremely impatient, and with the greatest ardour pressed to be led against the enemy. Even officers crowded to their general, and begged they might be allowed to try the ford; they observed of what consequence it was, that an enemy who had been driven with so much labour from one post, should not be suffered to retire in safety to another situation, from which they might renew the war.

Cæsar, affecting to be moved by these representations, and to be prevailed upon to do what it is probable he earnestly desired, instantly made his dispositions to pass the river. He selected the least firm and vigorous men of every cohort for the guard of the camp; placed lines of horse in the river, above and below the ford, to break the force of the stream, and to save those who might be overpowered by the strength of the current: in this manner he passed his infantry between the double lines of cavalry without the loss of a man. They had a circuit of six miles to make, in order to avoid the town of Ilerda; but, notwithstanding this delay, and the advantage which Afranius and Petreius had gained by beginning their march at midnight, and by their not being discovered until it was day, such were the interruptions given by the cavalry, and the speed with which the legions of Cæsar advanced, that they overtook the enemy's rear about three in the afternoon, and occasioned at once a general halt in every part of their column.

Petreius and Afranius, stunned by the unexpected arrival of Cæsar at the head of his whole army, formed on a rising ground to receive him; and both armies seemed to prepare for immediate action. But Cæsar, knowing the necessity which the enemy were under of continuing their retreat, and the prospect he had of increasing his advantage on the march, did not think it necessary to attack them when in order of battle; he took his ground, however, so near them,* that he could profit by every opportunity they gave him, and in every attempt they should make to change their situation, could push them into all the disorders of a general rout.

From this position of the two armies, the Spaniards having some time remained in order of battle, were tempted again to resume their march; but having soon experienced the inconvenience of being to retire with an enemy at their back, and being faint with hunger and the fatigue of so many tedious and fruitless operations, they determined to halt, and wait for the return of night. They had now no more than five miles

* The want of cannon or fire-arms enabled a superior army to remain almost in contact with that it intended to harraße.

to pass on the plain, and hoped, by a rapid motion in the night, to traverse this space before Cæsar could overtake them, or before he could oblige them to halt any where short of the mountains, where they looked for a perfect security.

Both parties appeared to be fixed on their ground for the night, when some prisoners, that were brought to Cæsar, gave information that the enemy were in motion, and must, in a little time, be so far advanced as to reach the hills before he could give them any effectual obstruction. On this sudden emergence, although his army was by no means ready to move, he ordered every trumpet to sound a march, as if he were actually in motion. This feint, however slight, had its effect; the enemy believed that they were to be instantly attacked, or closely pursued when disordered on their way, and incumbered with baggage; to avoid these disadvantages, they desisted from their intention, and gave the signal to halt.

Afranius and Petreius, thus baffled in the execution of the first part of their plan, which had been so reasonably formed, began to lose courage, and remained on this ground all night, and the following day, perplexed with irresolution and various counsels. So far, however, they determined, that before so vigilant an enemy it was safer to march by day than by night; and in this mind they remained yet a second night in the present position.

In this interval, Cæsar, having leisure to visit the country over which they were to pass, found it practicable to turn their flank and get to the hills before them. He, accordingly, moved in the night, and, at break of day, before the enemy judged it safe to decamp, he appeared at some distance on their right; but seeming to retire, and to leave them at liberty to continue their retreat. So long as his march had this appearance, they were pleased to think he had discontinued the pursuit, and applauded themselves for having patiently waited so joyful an event: but as soon as he had got a sufficient way to his left, he changed his direction, and pushed with all possible speed to arrive at the mountains. They were no longer at a loss to perceive his design, or the danger with which they themselves were threatened. And they instantly, without

striking their tents or packing their baggage, moved in the greatest haste to prevent him.

In this operation, Cæsar was now become certain of one or other of two great advantages; either that he should reach the pass of the mountains before the enemy, and so cut off their retreat; or, if they got there before him, that he should be left in possession of their camp and their baggage. He prevailed, however, in the trial of speed, got the first of these advantages by being before them at the ascent of the mountains, where he found a ledge or terrass that was sufficiently capacious to receive his army, and which gave him entire command of the pass.

Afranius, on seeing Cæsar in possession of this ground, sent a considerable party to try the ascent of the mountains at a different place, and to gain the summits behind him; in hopes, that, if this were practicable, he might follow with his whole army, and descend from thence to the Ebro. But the party he employed on this service was, in presence of both armies, surrounded by Cæsar's horse, and put to the sword. The rest of the army, without making any attempt to rescue their friends, beheld this scene with a kind of torpid dejection. They dropped their arms, and staggered in their ranks. The troops of Cæsar, who well understood these signs of dismay, became, to a degree of mutiny, impatient for action; and he himself was sensible that the enemy might in that moment be attacked with the greatest advantage; but, as he now thought himself sure of being able to reduce them without a blow, he was unwilling to furnish an opportunity, however unlikely to avail them, of making their escape by the chance of a battle. While he endeavoured, accordingly, to restrain the unseasonable ardour of his own men, the leaders of the Spanish army had time to retire with theirs, and led them back to the camp which they had left in the morning, and to the melancholy possession of tents and of baggage, which they had been willing to abandon, in order to effect their escape.

Cæsar having left proper guards to secure the passes of the mountains, returned on the track of the enemy, and took post,

as before, so near them, that they could not move without being exposed to his insults.

In this position of the two armies, the sentinels and advanced guards had an opportunity to talk together; they mutually regretted the unhappy quarrel in which they were engaged, and both officers and men, becoming by degrees more familiar, met between the lines, and even exchanged visits in their opposite camps. Officers of the Spanish army proceeded so far as to talk of an accommodation, and got over their scruples in treating without proper authority, by proposing to stipulate in the treaty of peace, which they were about to conclude, some honourable terms for their generals.

Cæsar was apprised of this correspondence, and, however irregular, connived at a circumstance which he hoped his superior popularity and the splendour of his fortune would turn to his own advantage. He flattered himself that, as he had been able to seduce the troops of Pompey in Italy, so he might now deprive his antagonists of the mighty army they had formed in this province against him.

The Spanish generals, being intent on a work they were executing to secure their access to water, remained for some time unapprised of the disorderly intercourse subsisting between the two armies; and Afranius, when he came to the knowledge of what was passing, seemed to observe it with some degree of indifference; but Petreius was greatly alarmed, ran with the officers and the guard, which usually attended his person, to the space between the lines, dispersed all those who were found in conference together, and put all the soldiers of Cæsar's army, who fell in his way, to the sword. From thence he went through the camp, and with tears exacted from every legion apart fresh oaths of fidelity to Pompey. He afterwards assembled the whole at the usual place of audience, before the general's tent; and, in a speech composed of insinuation mixed with reproach, endeavoured to confirm them in their duty; and, to the end that he might effectually cut off all hopes of conciliation, ordered all the soldiers of Cæsar's army that could be found within his intrenchments to be brought before him and slain.

Cæsar, at the same time, having many officers and men of the Spanish army in his camp, might have retaliated these acts of severity; but he chose rather to contrast the character of clemency he himself had assumed with the austere and merciless policy of his enemies; and for this purpose gave their freedom to such officers or men as chose to return to their own party, and rewarded with preferments and honours such of them as were inclined to remain in his service.

Afranius and **Petreibus**, by the timely discovery of these irregular practices, having escaped the disgrace of being delivered up to the enemy, to be treated at his discretion, or to be spared only as objects of pity, at the intercession of their own army, continued the operations in which they were engaged; but, by persevering in their plan of resistance, they only enabled their adversary to give still more evident proofs of his superior skill and address. They were sensible that their present post could not be long maintained; it had been taken, in their haste to reach the mountains, from necessity, as an immediate respite from the assaults of an enemy who annoyed their march; and, besides other inconveniences, had a difficult access to water; the brook or river from which they were to be supplied being exposed to the discharge of arrows, darts, and other missiles from the enemy. Their bread, which they had calculated to serve them on their route to the Ebro, was nearly exhausted, and they had no immediate prospect of supply. They entered therefore into anxious deliberation on the choice of some other retreat, by which they might soonest get beyond the reach of an enemy who pressed them with such unremitted alarms. They hesitated whether they should return to **Ilerda**, where they still had some magazines, or should attempt to reach **Tarraco*** in the opposite direction, though at the distance of about fifty miles. The length and difficulty of the way, in which they would be exposed to **Cæsar's** attacks, determined them against the last; and they chose the first, as promising the nearest and most immediate relief from their present distresses. They accordingly, without any precaution, decamped, and directed their march to **Ilerda**.

* **Tarragona**.

The Spanish infantry were now more exposed than they had been on any of their former marches; for their cavalry had been so often discomfited, and had lost courage so much, that they could not be kept to their place in the column, and were now actually received for safety into the centre of the infantry; the rear was therefore cruelly annoyed by Cæsar's horse, supported by the whole force of his legions. In ascending the heights, which were frequent in their way, they had the better of the enemy, by throwing their javelins and darts on those who attempted to pursue them from below; and with this superiority they made a stand on every ascent, to force their pursuers back to some distance; but, in descending the hills, the same advantage being taken against themselves, they generally ran in great disorder to the plains. And in this manner, the ground being uneven, their march consisted of alternatè stops and precipitate flights, extremely fatiguing, and likely to end in a general rout.

The leaders of the retiring army, to prevent this fatal consequence, thought proper again to form upon a rising ground, and attempted a stratagem to amuse the enemy, and to gain some advance on the march before him. For this purpose, affecting to make some permanent lodgment in the place where they halted, they threw up a breast-work, but neither pitched their tents nor unloaded their baggage, and were ready to depart the moment their pursuer gave them an opportunity, by quitting the order of march. Cæsar, trusting to the effects of his late attacks, and to the appearances which the enemy presented, had no suspicion of their purpose, gave orders to pitch, and even suffered his cavalry to go abroad in parties to forage. This was no sooner observed from the Spanish army, than they instantly resumed their march. It was then about noon, and they made some way undisturbed.

Cæsar seeing himself thus over-reached, instantly put his legions in motion, without striking their tents or packing their baggage, and, leaving orders for the cavalry to follow him as soon as they could be assembled, moved on with the foot as near as he could on the enemy's rear. He was in this situation when the cavalry rejoined him, and, by renewing with double ardour their former attacks, obliged the Spanish army

again, in a kind of despair, to suspend their march. In order to have some respite from the repeated charges of cavalry with which they were harrassed, they halted in a field, which they had no time to examine, and in which they were actually very much exposed.

In this situation, Cæsar had again a fair opportunity of proceeding to a general action, and, with little doubt of the event, of terminating the war by a battle ; but he persisted in his purpose of forcing these unfortunate legions to surrender, without any loss or hazard to himself. In this mind, he continued to observe them, with a degree of insulting indifference. They soon became sensible of the great disadvantage of the place in which they had halted, and endeavoured to change their position, without exposing themselves, if possible, to the enemy, who was so near as to be able to disturb them in every motion they openly attempted to make ; for this purpose, they broke ground for a new intrenchment in their rear, and, proposing to retire under cover of successive and contiguous intrenchments, as besiegers advance in the attack of a fortress, they passed from one fortified camp as soon as they had prepared another to receive them.*

In these slow and toilsome operations they persisted all the night and the following day, and may have become by their labours less exposed to the enemy ; but subject to a fresh inconveniency, till then unobserved, in the great distance to which they were removed from water.

As soon as this defect was perceived, which was probably not till after the soldier had consumed what he commonly

* Cæsar de Bell. Civil. lib. i. c. 81. Illi animadverso vitio castrorum, tota nocte munitiones proferunt, castraque castris *convertunt*. This passage is differently read in different editions ; for *convertunt* we have *conferunt*. And a very learned, as well as intelligent military commentator, supposing that Cæsar meant to say, that they joined their intrenchment close to his own, pretends to see in this some plausible means of retreat ; but as this exceeds the author's comprehension, he has preferred the first reading, and though the meaning of *convertunt* is not clear, he has ventured to give it the sense in the text.*

* Vid. *Memoirs, &c. et Antiquités Militaires, par Mons. Guicbard. Tome premier.*

carried in his flask, they discontinued their fatiguing operations; but no man ventured abroad for water, and they remained all night under dreadful apprehensions of what they might suffer from the want of this necessary of life. On the following day, the whole army turned out in array to the watering-place, and, at the hazard of a general action, proceeded to supply themselves from thence. They were thus suffered to obtain a temporary relief in this article; but none attempted to procure any food, and they soon after, in order to supply their own immediate wants, and to lessen their consumption of water and forage, killed all the beasts of burden in their camp. But while they endeavoured, by means of these pitiful expedients, to await the event of any change that might offer in their favour, Cæsar, with his usual boldness of enterprise, formed a design to cut off all their hopes at once by a line of circumvallation. In conducting or covering this work, his legions were commonly under arms; and the enemy, sensible of the extremity to which they were soon likely to be reduced, advancing in front of their own camp to interrupt him, by a sudden attack might have decided their fate in a battle upon equal terms. But courage does not arise from distress or the apprehension of suffering: the habit of acting upon the defensive had already impressed this army with a sense of inferiority, and their frequent miscarriages had made them distrust the conduct of their officers. Though now immersed in difficulties, from which nothing but victory could extricate them, and suffering insults which nothing but the blood of their enemies could avenge, they, without making any effort for either purpose, retired again within their intrenchment.

In that situation, however, their distresses were apace becoming insufferable. After four days had passed in their camp, without any supply of water, or provision of any sort, their leaders desired an interview with Cæsar; and, not to expose themselves in so humbling a state to the troops of either army, begged that their meeting might be held apart from both. The proposal of a conference was accepted; but Cæsar would not allow it to be held in any private place: he

insisted that Afranius and Petreius should meet him in the space between the two armies; and having previously demanded, as an acknowledgment of his victory, that the son of Afranius should be delivered up as an hostage, he came to the place of meeting, surrounded by multitudes, who crowded from both armies, in anxious expectation of the issue.

Afranius pleaded, in behalf of the troops he commanded, that they had done no more than their duty to the officer under whose auspices they had been levied, and no more than the service of the province in which they had been stationed required; but acknowledged the distresses to which they were now reduced, and implored the victor's clemency.

Cæsar, in return, upbraided the leaders of that army with their obstinate animosity to himself, and with their late cruelty to innocent men, who had committed no other offence than that of having embraced their fellow-citizens as friends, and that of being desirous to terminate this unnatural quarrel in an amicable manner. "That army," he said, "had been raised and kept on foot for the sole purpose of making war upon him. For this purpose numerous fleets had been equipped in times of profound peace, and seven entire legions, under able and experienced officers, had been kept in this peaceable province, where there was not the least pretence of a war; that every measure was concerted for his destruction; that, in order to raise one citizen to uncommon honours and powers, a new species of arrangement had taken place, by which a person remaining at the gates of Rome, even governing in the city and in every district of Italy, might likewise have the command in two warlike provinces, and be allowed a great military establishment in time of profound peace; that, on the contrary, in order to distress himself, the ordinary rules of the service had been set aside; and that to him alone had been denied, what had always been granted to every citizen who faithfully served the republic, the privilege of retiring, if not distinguished with honours, at least without being loaded with injuries and affronts; that he had borne these indignities, however, with patience, and mentioned them now, not as a prelude to any severities which he meant to inflict, nor as an excuse

“ for any singular advantage he meant to take of their present
“ distresses; that he demanded no more than peace; his an-
“ tagonists should go unhurt, provided they left the province,
“ and became bound not to serve his enemies for the future
“ against him; that no one should be forced to take any
“ active part on his side; that all who committed no injury
“ against him should be considered as friends; and that every
“ man now in his power should have his liberty, without being
“ subject to any other conditions than these.”

It is difficult to determine whether the sword or the tongue of this singular man were most dangerous to the state he attacked. It is probable that many of his present audience were as much convinced by his eloquence as they had been subdued by his military skill, and thought him a person no less forced to his present extremities by the wrongs he had suffered, than able to do himself justice by the force of his arms. His speech was received by the late partisans of his rival with evident signs of pleasure. To be discharged after a certain period of the most faithful services was all that a Roman soldier, in the ordinary times of the republic, could claim. To receive this favour at the hands of a victorious enemy, by whom they expected to be treated as captives, gave sudden and unexpected joy.

After the material articles were adjusted in this manner, some questions arose with respect to the time and place in which the vanquished army should be dismissed from their colours. Numbers of them, though Roman citizens, had been enlisted in Spain, and were natives or settlers in that province; others had been transported from Italy, and wished to return to their country. It was determined, therefore, that the first should be disbanded immediately; the others march to the Var, where they should be set free, and not be subject to be pressed into any service whatever. Cæsar undertook to supply them with provisions on their march. He ordered the effects of private persons, if found in his camp, to be restored to them. He paid his own soldiers a high price for what they were in this manner desired to restore. By this measure he gained several advantages; he lightened the baggage of his own army; made a gratification to his own

men, without the imputation of bribery; and he gained his late enemies by an act of generosity. The vanquished army accordingly came to Cæsar with all their complaints, and appealed to him even from their own officers. It was impossible for mankind to resist so much ability, insinuation, and courage.

About a third of the captive army were dismissed from their colours in Spain; the remainder passed the Pyrenees, preceded by one part of Cæsar's army, and followed by the other; who, being thus separated to the van and the rear, and always encamping close to their prisoners, led them, in terms of the capitulation, to the frontiers of Cisalpine Gaul.*

While the main body of Cæsar's army thus conducted the remains of the Spanish legions to the place of their destination, Varro yet remained in the western province of Spain; and Cæsar, in order either to effect a conjunction which had been concerted between them, or to force him to surrender, sent Quintus Cassius with two legions to that quarter, and himself followed with an escort of six hundred horse. Upon the report of his approach, the natives, as usual, having taken their resolution in favour of the successful party, declared for the victor. One of the legions of Varro, that lay at Gades,† advancing in form with their colours, came forward to Hispales to receive him, and made offer of their services. Varro himself agreed to make over the forces he commanded, both by sea and by land, and was received at Corduba. Here Cæsar held a general convention of the province; and having thanked the people for the favours they had shown to his cause, he remitted the contributions, and withdrew all the burdens which Varro, acting under the authority of Pompey, had imposed upon them. In this, as in other examples, he endeavoured to dispel the fears which his irruption into the province had occasioned, and secured the attachment of the people by a sense of the ease and the exemptions which his success had procured them. The fleets and armies which joined him, upon every conquest he made, enabled him to station troops for the security of his new acquisitions, without dividing the

* Cæs. de Bell. Civ. lib. i.

† Now Cadiz.

forces on which he was to rely for the further operations of the war. He accordingly, in the present instance, left, under the command of Quintus Cassius, five legions, consisting chiefly of the troops which had been levied by Varro; and he himself, embarking on board a fleet which had been fitted out for his enemies, went by sea to Tarraco, now Tarragona, and from that place by land to Narbonne and Marseilles.

CHAPTER XXVII.

The Siege of Marseilles continued.—Its surrender.—Cæsar named Dictator.—Return to Rome.—Mutiny at Placentia.—Cæsar, with Servilius Isauricus, Consul.—Forces and Disposition of Pompey.—Departure of Cæsar to Brundisium.—Transports the first Division of his Army to Acroceramus.—His Message to Pompey, and their respective Operations.—The Lines of Dyrrachium.—Cæsar baffled in his Attempt to invest Pompey.—Action and Defeat of Cæsar.—His Retreat.—March of both Armies into Thessaly.—Battle of Pharsalia.

THE city of Marseilles had not surrendered to the forces which Cæsar had left to besiege it, under the command of Trebonius and Decimus Brutus. The last of these officers, according to the disposition which had been made to block up the place by sea, as well as by land, was stationed under the island at the mouth of the bay. His squadron consisted of twelve ships, but so hastily built, that no more than thirty days elapsed from the felling of the timber to the launching of the vessels. They were manned, however, with the choice of Cæsar's legions; and, in order to frustrate any advantage which their antagonists might have in the construction or management of their ships, they were furnished with an apparatus to grapple, and could make fast their gunwales to those of the enemy, in order to decide the contest, as on solid ground, with their swords.

The Marseillans had equipped ten galleys, of which the greater number, though not all, were decked. These, under the command of Domitius, who had been named by the senate to succeed Cæsar in Gaul, were joined with the seven ships which this officer had brought into their harbour; and, being manned from the neighbouring coasts, came abroad into the bay, in order to force Brutus from his station, and to open their communication with the sea. In the beginning of the action, the Marseillans being superior to Cæsar's fleet in the number of their ships, and in the skill of their mariners, had a considerable advantage. But as soon as they suffered themselves to be entangled by the grapple, the Gaulish seamen, though of a very hardy race, could not withstand the arms and discipline of the legionary soldiers, and were defeated, with the loss of nine of their ships.

This was the victory already mentioned, and which contributed so much to the reputation of Cæsar's arms, while he lay before Ilerda; and which, joined to the other circumstances of his good fortune, procured him the alliance of so many nations in Spain.

While Brutus thus kept his station in the bay of Marseilles, Trebonius practised all the usual methods of attack to reduce the city. The place being covered on three sides by water, and on the fourth accessible only by an isthmus or neck of land, which was defended by walls and towers of a great height, he opened two separate attacks, probably on the right and the left of the isthmus, and, at each of these attacks, appears to have employed the sloping mound or terrace,* which, in the sieges of the ancients, where the defence depended on the height of the battlements, corresponded to the sap of the moderns, and was calculated to conduct the besiegers, by a gradual ascent, to the top, as the other conducts them to the foot of the walls. This work was supported on the sides chiefly with timber, and built up with fascines, hurdles, and earth, rising in the present case to an elevation of eighty feet, and in breadth, as was formerly observed in that employed against the Bituriges,† probably no less than three hundred

* Agger.

† Bourges.

and fifty feet, so as to receive a proper column of infantry in front, and to embrace a proper extent in the walls. The workmen employed in the front of this laborious approach were covered with skreens, mantlets, and penthouses, of great length; and such was the consumption of timber, in the construction of the whole, that the neighbouring country is said to have been cleared of its woods.

A mere trading city, long disused to war, or accustomed to rely on foreign aid for protection, we may suppose to have been ill provided for such an attack, either in the state of its arsenals, or in the spirit of its citizens. But this little republic, yet bearing the character of an independent state, and being in some measure accustomed to the presence of an enemy in the barbarous hordes of their neighbourhood, who still looked upon its wealth as a tempting prize, for the security of which it had been necessary to keep its walls in repair, and to replenish its arsenals, was by no means unprovided for its own defence; and the people, although long inured to peace, still kept in mind the duties which the necessities of war might oblige them to render to their country. They were now supported by the presence of a Roman proconsul, and had hopes of a speedy relief from Pompey himself, whom, in opposition to Cæsar, who was in rebellion against the legal government of his country, they considered as head of the commonwealth. They accordingly preseed in defence of their walls; and, by a continual discharge from the battlements, and by frequent sallies, in which they set fire to the works of the besiegers, greatly retarded the progress of the siege. They had engines of a peculiar force, from which they flung missiles of a monstrous size and weight, being beams twelve feet long, proportionally thick, and pointed with iron, forming a species of arrow, which none of the skreens or coverings, usually employed in making approaches, could resist; and Trebonius was accordingly obliged to proportion the strength of his timbers and penthouses, and the thickness of his parapets, fascines, and earth, on his terrace, to the weight of these enormous weapons.

While such efforts were made on both sides at this memorable siege, Pompey had detached Nasidius with sixteen gal-

leys from the coast of Macedonia, to endeavour the relief of Marseilles. This squadron had entered the straits of Messina by surprise, and, having cut out of the harbour a ship which belonged to Curio's fleet, proceeded on their destination to the coast of Gaul. Being arrived in the bay of Tauroentum, now La Ciotat, in the neighbourhood of Toulon, they sent intimation of their coming, in order to concert operations with those in the harbour of Marseilles.

The beseiged were greatly animated with these hopes of relief; and having already drawn from their docks as many ships as supplied the place of those they had lost in the late engagement, they now manned them with the choice of their citizens, and determined once more to try their fortune at sea. When this fleet was about to depart, numbers of women, and many citizens, who, on account of their age, could not take part in the service, crowded to the shore, and with tears exhorted the soldiers and mariners to be mindful of their own honour and the preservation of their country, on the eve of becoming a prey to their enemies. Multitudes of people, at the same time, drew forth in procession, and crowded to the temples with prayers and supplications for the success of this last effort they were to make in defence of their commonwealth.

This bustle in the streets of Marseilles, with the motion of the shipping in the harbour, being observed from the camp of Trebonius, which was situated upon a height, and which had a view into the town, gave sufficient intimation of what was intended; and Brutus was warned to be upon his guard: but the Marseillans, having found a favourable wind, had the good fortune to clear the bay, and, without any interruption from his squadron, joined Nasidius at Tauroentum. In consequence of this junction an action soon after ensued, in which the Marseillans made great efforts of valour, but were ill supported by Nasidius, who, unworthy of the command with which he had been intrusted, withdrew at the beginning of the action, and fled to the coast of Spain. The Marseillans, being left to sustain the contest alone, lost nine of their ships, of which five were sunk, and four were taken.

These tidings were received at Marseilles with inexpressible sorrow; but did not alter the resolution of the inhabit-

ants to persevere in their defence, and in the use of every possible method that could be employed to protract the siege, and to give Pompey time to devise more effectual means for their safety. They accordingly, with great vigour and success, counteracted the ordinary operations of the siege, burning and demolishing a considerable part of the works which were raised up against them, and obliging the besiegers frequently to renew their labours.

The first attack, against which the besieged were not able to find an adequate defence, came from a work which had not been a part in the original plan of the siege, but had been devised by the soldiers who had succeeded each other on the guard of the agger, or mound of approach, as a lodgment, or cover, to secure themselves from surprise. It was at first no more than a space of ten yards square, inclosed with a brick wall, five feet thick; but so situate, that if it were raised to a proper height, it might cope with the battlements, and greatly annoy the besieged. To give it this consequence, masons were employed to raise the wall, and great efforts of ingenuity were made to protect them in their work. A moveable pent-house, of great thickness in the roof, and skreened on the front and sides with net-work made of cables, or the strongest ropes, was raised on beams or rafters of a proportional strength, and contrived to be hoisted up by machinery, to keep pace with the building, and to cover the workmen as they rose on the successive courses of masonry which they laid. With these precautions, a tower was gradually raised on the foundation of the original brick wall, to the height of six stories; and being furnished with ports or embrasures on every floor, gave the besiegers, by means of their missiles, the command of all the space from thence to the ramparts. They accordingly, under the cover of engines, which were employed to make a continual discharge from this tower, filled up the ditch, and pushed up a gallery to the foot of the wall. In this position, notwithstanding all the efforts of the besieged, by a continual discharge of heavy stones from above, to destroy or overwhelm the supports of their gallery, they undermined the foundation of the rampart, and brought some part of it in ruin to the ground.

The inhabitants, greatly alarmed at the sight of a breach which might soon be enlarged to admit of being stormed, made some signals of truce, and sent to beseech Trebonius that he would suspend his operations, and wait for the arrival of Cæsar, in whose clemency they hoped to find some protection against the fury of troops who, it seems, had already threatened the inhabitants with a massacre.

Trebonius, accordingly, moved by these entreaties, and by the instructions he had received from Cæsar himself, not to deliver up the town, in case it fell into his hands, to the rage of the soldiers, suspended his operations, and supposing the petition of the inhabitants equal to an offer of surrender on their part, intrusted his works to slender guards, who, in their turn, relying on the submissive professions of the people, were proportionally remiss in their duty. The citizens, tempted by the opportunity which was thus offered them to strike an important blow, and to throw back to a great distance all the posts of the enemy, made a vigorous sally from the town, and being favoured by a high wind, which blew directly on the works of the besiegers, set the whole on fire, and reduced to ashes, in a few hours, what had been the labour of many months to erect.

As Trebonius had already exhausted the greater part of the materials which the country around him could furnish, it appeared difficult to resume the attack. But he himself, as well as the troops under his command, being greatly exasperated by the late breach of faith in the town, made every effort of ingenuity and courage to repair their losses. They substituted brick-work for timber, in supporting the sides and galleries of their terrace; and advanced with so rapid a progress in their new approach, that the besieged, now greatly spent with toil, and disappointed in their hopes of relief, were struck with fresh and more alarming apprehensions of what they might expect from the resentment of troops whom they had incensed with a recent and just provocation; and they returned to their suit for mercy, with more humble and more sincere intentions of submission.

While messages were passing to this effect, Domitius Ahenobarbus, sensible that he could no longer serve the cause of

his party at this place, embarked with his attendants and friends on board of three galleys, which still waited his orders in the harbour. Having the opportunity of a high and favourable wind, which made it unsafe for the squadron of Brutus to weigh, or to quit their anchors in pursuit of him, he endeavoured to escape from the bay. In this attempt, two of his vessels were taken, but the third, with himself on board, got off, and reserved him to take that share which yet remained for him in the growing misfortunes of his party, throughout this disastrous war.

Such was the state of affairs, when Cæsar arrived from Spain, and expecting, in the present contest for empire, to profit as much by the reputation of his clemency as by the terror of his arms, listened to the supplications of the people of Marseilles, and took possession of the town without any act of resentment or severity whatever. While he was yet at this place, he had accounts from Rome, that his party in the city had procured an act of the people to vest him with the power of dictator. The ceremony of his nomination had, in the absence of both consuls, been performed by Marcus Æmilius Lepidus, then prætor in office, who, though a person of mean capacity, was, by the chance of his situation, involved in many of the greatest affairs that followed; and, though but a single accomplice in the crimes of this guilty age, passed unhurt through all the scenes of its violence, to become almost the only example of an ignominy and disgrace, which so many others had merited no less than himself.

Cæsar, being thus raised, though by an irregular step, to a legal place in the commonwealth, hastened to Rome, in order to be invested, for the first time, with the ensigns and powers of dictator. In his way he was stopped at Placentia by some disorders, which threatened a mutiny among the troops who were assembled in that place. The legions, elated by victory, and filled with a sense of their own importance in a contest for the sovereignty of the empire, were become impatient of discipline, and in haste to avail themselves of that military government which they were employed to establish. In entering Italy, they treated Roman citizens as their subjects, and the country as their property. Being restrained, they resented

the severities which were practised against them, entered into cabals, and even talked of abandoning Cæsar, and of declaring for Pompey. Here, however, the usual courage and ability of this singular man supported him. He brought the mutinous troops, under arms, before him, put them in mind how much he had ever coveted, and been anxious to obtain, the affections of the soldiers; but assured them, that it was no part of his intention to earn those affections by making himself an accomplice in their crimes. "Shall we," he said, "who profess to be the deliverers of our country from oppression, become ourselves the greatest oppressors? Shall I, who am intrusted with the command of a Roman army, become the patron of licentiousness, and, in order to indulge for a moment the passions of my soldiers, suffer them to ruin their own fortunes forever? What should induce me?—the fear of violence to my person, or the danger to which my life may be exposed?—if my life were attacked, there are enow to defend it. But what is life, compared to the honour of a Roman officer, which I am concerned to maintain? There are persons who have said that they will desert my cause, and go over to Pompey. Let them. They shall soon have an opportunity to do so. If Pompey be my enemy, what is there I should more earnestly wish, than to find his cause intrusted to such hands as these? men who make war on their friends, and disobey their officers. He had been slow," he said, "in proceeding to the fatal extremes which were now become necessary. The guilty," he continued, "had been long known to him; but he had endeavoured to conceal their offences, in hopes that remorse and shame, or the fear of justice, would have made the actual application of punishment unnecessary; but that he must now, though with the greatest reluctance, proceed to the last of remedies."

In order that he might not involve the whole of those who were present in the same desperate cause, he affected, in this harangue, to treat the offence he was to punish as the crime of a few. They were now to be set apart, he said, and their punishment should purge the army, and retrieve its honour. In pursuance of this plan, he affected to believe that those of

the ninth legion were the principal authors of this mutiny. He ordered a few of them for immediate execution, and boldly dismissed the whole of the legion from his service. The remainder of the army, having thus obtained an implied exculpation, in token of their own innocence, vied with each other in applauding the justice of their general. Even the legion which was dismissed from the service, detesting, as a punishment on themselves, what they had threatened to execute as an act of resentment against their commander, beset him with humble and earnest entreaties, that he might be pleased to receive them again into his service. He affected great difficulty in granting this request; but, after much solicitation, suffered himself to be gained by their professions of penitence.*

With a considerable accession of authority, acquired by his success in quelling this mutiny, Cæsar proceeded to Rome, where he assumed the title and ensigns of dictator; being the first example of any person, since the abdication of Sylla, intrusted with this alarming power. It was said to be conferred upon him, however, merely in compliance with form; and that there might be a proper officer, in the absence of both the consuls, to preside at the elections. His own object, at the same time, being to gain to his party the authority of legal government, and, in his conduct, to give proofs of clemency and moderation, without any intention, for the present, to perpetuate, or even to exercise, any of the high powers of dictator, he proceeded to hold the elections, and was himself, together with Servilius Isauricus, chosen consul for the following year. In the interval that followed, before their installation, he continued to assemble the people in the character of dictator, and obtained some laws respecting the times, and the distracted state of the public affairs. Credit and trade were at an alarming stand; he procured an act to facilitate the recovery of debts, by delivering the effects of the debtor to be divided among his creditors, upon an estimate

* Dio. Cass. lib. xli. c. 27—35.—Appian. de Bello Civ. lib. ii. p. 547.—Sueton. in Cæs. c. 69.—Lucan. lib. v. 244.

of what the different subjects might have been sold for at the time that the war broke out.

Many being supposed to hoard great sums of money, as the only means of preserving it from the violence of the times, or being unwilling to lend on such securities as were then to be had, Cæsar procured another act, by which any person was forbid to have in his possession, at once, above sixty thousand Roman money.*

He obtained a general act of indemnity, from which Milo alone was excepted, restoring persons of every denomination, who, at the breaking out of the war, lay under the censure of the law, and were in exile for corrupt practices in the state; and, in pursuance of this measure, procured a pardon for all the disorders which had been committed in opposition to the late government, but for none of the irregular efforts that had been made in support of it. He opened the city at once to all the inhabitants of the cisalpine Gaul; and, by a single vote, gave them a title to be enrolled with the people of Rome, as members of the republic.† In these, and in other affairs of less moment, while his troops were in motion through Italy, he passed a few days in the city, and, being ready to depart, resigned the power of dictator. This resignation, made by a person possessed of a military force, and hitherto victorious, was considered as an evidence of his moderation, and served to dispel the fears of those who expected to see the immediate establishment of a military government. He was now about to assume the office of legal magistrate, and to appear in the character of Roman consul against those who, lately trusting to the name and authority of the republic, with which they were vested, had treated himself and his adherents as rebels; but who now, in their turn, were about to incur all the disadvantages of that imputation, which he was about to retort upon them; and with the additional charge of an attempt to dismember the empire, and to arm so many of the provinces against the sovereignty of the state.

* About 500*l*.

† *Dio. Cass. lib. xli. c. 36, 37, 38.—Cæs. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii.*

The competitors in this famous contest were arrived at, or but a little past, the prime of life: Pompey was fifty-seven, and Cæsar fifty. The first had been early distinguished as an officer, and for many years had enjoyed a degree of consideration, which far exceeded that of any other Roman citizen of the present or any former age. His reputation, however, in some measure, had sunk, and that of Cæsar had risen, on the first shocks of the present war; but the balance was not yet absolutely settled; and the minds of many were yet held in anxious suspense. The fortune of Cæsar, wherever he acted in person, had always prevailed; but where he himself was not present, his affairs wore a less promising aspect.

His forces under Curio had acquired an easy possession of Sicily; and this officer, encouraged by his first success, transported two legions into Africa, found Varus encamped near Utica, obliged him to retire into the town, and was preparing to besiege it, when he received intelligence that Juba, king of Numidia, was advancing to its relief with all the powers of his kingdom. This prince had been induced to take part in the war by his attachment to Pompey, and still more by his personal animosity to Curio, who, in his tribunate, had moved for an act to deprive him of his kingdom.

Curio, upon this intelligence, wisely withdrew from Utica, to a strong post in the neighbourhood, and sent orders into Sicily, to hasten the junction of the troops he had left behind him in that island. While he waited their coming, some pretended deserters from the Numidian army arrived in his camp, and being instructed to mislead him with false intelligence, reported that the king had been recalled to defend his own dominions; and that only Sabura, one of his generals, with a small division, was come to give what support he could to the party of Pompey in Africa.

Upon this information, Curio formed a design to intercept this division of the Numidians before they could be joined by Varus; and for this purpose, leaving a guard in his camp, he marched in the night to attack the enemy, where he was informed that they lay on the banks of the Bagrada. His cavalry being advanced, fell in first with the Numidian horse, whom they defeated. Encouraged by this advantage, he himself

hastened his march, to complete the victory; Sabura, by whose art the last intelligence had been conveyed to him, likewise, after a little resistance, fled before him. And by these artifices, Curio was gradually insnared into the midst of Juba's forces, was surrounded, and attacked on every side. He attempted, in vain, to take refuge on a height which he had in his view, and in so doing, with the greater part of his army, was put to the sword. The few who escaped, together with those who had been left in the camp, endeavoured to find a passage into Sicily, and, being disappointed, surrendered themselves to Varus, by whom they were treated with clemency; but being observed, and distinguished by Juba, from whom they had escaped, and who himself arrived at Utica on the following day, were claimed as his captives, and put to death.

About the same time, Dolabella, to whom Cæsar had given the command both of his sea and land forces on the coast of Illyricum, was, by Marcus Octavius and Scribonius Libo, expelled from thence; and Caius Antonius, attempting to support Dolabella, was shut up in a small island on the same coast, and, with his party, made prisoners.*

The principal storm, however, with which the new government was threatened, appeared on the side of Macedonia. In this country, Pompey himself was now at the head of a great force. He had transported five legions from Italy; and, since the middle of March, when his last division sailed from Brundisium, he had been in the quiet possession of Greece, Macedonia, and all the eastern and more wealthy and populous parts of the empire. He had sent his father-in-law, Cornelius Scipio Metellus, into the provinces of Asia and Syria, to collect the forces and the revenues of those opulent countries; and dispatched his own son Cneius with instructions to assemble all the shipping that could be found on the coast. He likewise sent general orders to all the Roman officers, in different parts of the East, and to the allies or dependants of the Roman people, to join him with every power they could raise. Seven thousand citizens of rank had followed him from Italy.† Numbers of veterans, who had been settled in Thes-

* Dio. Cass. lib. xli. c. 41 & 42.

† Plutarch. in Pompeio.

saly, repaired to his standard. He was joined by one legion from Sicily, by another from Crete, and two from Asia. He had two legions under Scipio in Syria, had assembled three thousand archers, and as many slingers; had hired, in the neighbourhood of Macedonia, two thousand foot and seven thousand cavalry. Dejotarus sent him six hundred horse; Ariobarzanes five hundred; Cotus, a Thracian prince, five hundred; the Macedonians furnished two hundred; five hundred, being the remains of Gabinus's army, had joined him; his son brought eight hundred from his own estates; Tarcundarius three hundred; Antiochus Commagenes two hundred: amounting to fifty-five thousand legionary troops, eight thousand irregular infantry, and ten thousand six hundred horse. In all seventy-three thousand six hundred effective men.*

He had likewise assembled a numerous fleet: one squadron from Egypt, of which he gave the command to his son Cæsius; another from Asia, under Lelius and Triarius; one from Syria, under Caius Cassius; that of Rhodes, under Caius Marcellus and Coponius; that of Achaia and Liburnia, under Scribonius Libo and M. Octavius: the whole amounting to above eight hundred galleys, of which Bibulus had the chief command, with orders to guard the passage from Italy to Greece, and to obstruct all the communications the enemy might attempt by the Ionian sea.

Pompey had likewise formed large magazines of corn from Thessaly, Asia, Egypt, Crete, and Cyrene. The principal resort of his land forces was at Berrhæa, on the fertile plains between the Axios and Haliacmon, that run into the bay of Thermæ. The Roman senate was represented at Thessalonica by two hundred of that body, who, together with the two consuls, held their assemblies, and assumed all the functions of the Roman state. The Roman people were likewise represented by the concourse of respectable citizens, who repaired to the army, or to this place.† But though so many members of the government, thus violently expelled from Rome, considered themselves as the real constituents of the commonwealth, they suffered the usual time of elections to

* *Cæsar. de Belle Civile*, lib. iii.

† *Dio. Cass. lib. xli. c. 43.*

elapse, and did not attempt to preserve in their retreat a succession of the usual officers, in opposition to the elections that were made at Rome. Claudius Marcellus and L. Cornelius Lentulus, at the expiration of their year in office, took the several commands allotted to them, as usual, under the title of proconsul.

The general had been extremely active in forming, as well as in assembling, this powerful armament. He intended, early in the spring, to take possession of Dyrrachium, Apollonia, and the other towns on the coast, probably with a view to fall upon Italy, with a weight which now appeared sufficient to ensure the high reputation, as a commander, which his successes, on other occasions, had procured him.

Cæsar, on his part, had drawn all his army to the coast in the neighbourhood of Brundisium; but it was not likely that he would attempt to pass a sea which was commanded by the enemy's fleet, or venture upon a coast where he had not a single port, and in the face of a superior army, now completely formed and appointed, under the command of an officer, whom no man was ever supposed to surpass. The formality of entering on the office of consul, to which Cæsar had been elected, it was supposed, might detain him at Rome till after the first of January; and Pompey, accordingly, made no haste in taking his intended stations on the coast of Epirus, from which he might either act on the defensive, or invade Italy, as the occasion required.*

It was difficult, however, to foresee what such an enemy as Cæsar might attempt. Having staid no more than eleven days at Rome, while he acted in the character of dictator, and obtained his election as consul, without waiting for his admission into office (a formality which his antagonists vainly supposed was to detain him), he set out in December for Brundisium. At this place, twelve legions and all his cavalry were already, by his order, assembled. He found the numbers of his army considerably impaired by disease; being come from the more healthy climates of Spain and Gaul, to pass the sickly season of Autumn in Apulia. In any other hands than his

* Appian. de Bello Civile, lib. ii.

own, an army so reduced would have scarcely been fit for the defence of Italy against such forces as were assembled to invade it; and his march to Brundisium would have appeared altogether a defensive measure, or intended to counteract the operations of his enemy from beyond the seas. The season too appeared extremely unfavourable to any hostile attempts on Greece. But these were, in fact, encouragements to Cæsar, as they were likely to put the enemy off his guard, and instead of a commanding invasion of Italy, to lie under the disadvantage of a defensive war in his own quarters.

No more transports were collected in the harbour of Brundisium than were sufficient to receive about twenty thousand foot and six hundred horse. Cæsar, nevertheless, immediately on his arrival, informed the troops of his intentions to embark, and of his resolution to fix the scene of the war in Greece. He cautioned them not to occupy transports with unnecessary baggage and horses, and exhorted them to rely on the consequences of victory, and on his own generosity, for a full reparation of any loss they might sustain by leaving their effects behind them. He embarked seven legions in the

first division, and, with these, he himself sailed, on U. C. 705. the fourth of February. He turned from the usual course, and, steering unobserved to the right, arrived next day, where the enemy, if they had really been apprised of his embarkation, were least likely to expect him, on what was reputed a very dangerous part of the coast, under a high and rocky promontory, that was called the Acroceraunus.

As soon as the fleet had come to an anchor, Cæsar, having Vibullius Rufus, one of Pompey's officers, who was taken in Spain, till now detained as a prisoner, dismissed him with a message to his general, in the following terms: "That both parties had already carried their obstinacy too far, and might learn, from experience, to distrust their fortunes; that the one had been expelled from Italy, had lost Sicily, Sardinia and Spain, with one hundred and thirty cohorts (or thirteen legions);* that the other had sustained the loss of an army in Africa, cut off with its general,† and had suf-

* The armies of Afranius, Petreius, and Varro, &c.

† The army of Curio and C. Antonius.

“ fered no less by the disasters of his party in Illyricum; that
 “ their mutual disappointments might instruct them how little
 “ they could rely on the events of war; that it was time to
 “ consult their own safety, and to spare the republic; that it
 “ was prudent to treat of peace, while the fortunes and the
 “ hopes of both were nearly equal: if that time were allowed
 “ to elapse, and either should obtain a distinguished advantage,
 “ who could answer, that the victor would be equally
 “ tractable as both were at present?

“ But since all former endeavours to procure a conference,
 “ or to bring on a treaty, between the leaders themselves, had
 “ failed, he proposed, that all their differences should now be
 “ referred to the senate and people of Rome; that, in the
 “ mean time, each of them should solemnly swear, at the head
 “ of their respective armies, that, in three days, they should
 “ disband all their forces, in order that, being disarmed, they
 “ might severally be under a necessity to submit to the legal
 “ government of their country; that he himself, to remove
 “ all difficulties, that might be suggested on the part of Pompey,
 “ should begin with dismissing all the troops that were
 “ under his own command, whether in garrison or in the
 “ field.”*

It appears that Cæsar, if these declarations had been accepted, might have been somewhat embarrassed for evasions; but, equally bold in all his measures, he risked this event, or rather foresaw it could not happen; as he was sure that this offer of peace, like the former, would be rejected; and the rather, that it would be considered as an effect of his weakness, and of the danger into which he had fallen by his supposed rash debarkation with so small a force. At any rate, there is no doubt that his message was intended, in the usual strain of his policy, to amuse his enemy, or to remove the blame of the war from himself. As he usually accompanied such overtures of peace with the most rapid movements and the boldest resolutions, the moment Vibullius set out, he disembarked his troops, and in the night dispatched the transports on their return to Brundisium, to bring the remainder of his army.

* Cæs. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii.

His landing on the coast was the first intimation received by the enemy of his intention to pass a sea which they supposed sufficiently guarded by their fleets, or of his daring to carry the war into a country in which they thought themselves secure by the superiority of their numbers, and of their other resources. Bibulus, upon this alarm, put to sea, and came in time to intercept about thirty of the empty transports on their return to Italy. These he burned; and, sensible of his own remissness in suffering so great a body of the enemy to pass, he distributed his ships along the coast, and determined, for the future, to keep the sea in the face of every difficulty, and under every distress.

In the meantime, Cæsar marched directly to Oricum, where Lucius Torquatus, on the part of Pompey, was posted, with orders to maintain his position to the last extremity. But Cæsar, as soon as he appeared in the character of Roman consul, preceded by the ensigns of office, prevailed on the garrison to desert their commander, and to surrender the place. Without stopping here, he proceeded to Apollonia, was received in the same manner by the inhabitants, in opposition to the officer who commanded for Pompey. In consequence of these examples, he was acknowledged by all the towns of Epirus, and continued his march with the greatest dispatch towards Dyrrachium, where Pompey had collected his military stores, and formed his principal magazines. By his unexpected arrival he had hopes of being able to surprise that important place, and to make himself master of it, before a sufficient force could be assembled to resist him.

Pompey, in execution of the plan he had formed, was on his march from Macedonia towards the coast of Epirus, when he was met by Vibullius, and received from him the first intelligence of Cæsar's landing. He was not amused with the message which this officer brought him, nor did he attempt to retort the artifice, by affecting to be deceived. He even expressed himself in terms harsh and impolitic, that "he neither chose to return to his country, nor to hold his life by the concession of Cæsar;" and, without returning any answer, detached some parties towards the coast, where the enemy was landed, with orders to lay waste the country, break down bridges, de-

stroy the woods, and block up the high-ways with the timber they felled.* He sent expresses to Scipio, with an account of Cæsar's arrival in Epirus, and with orders to hasten his passage into Europe, with all the forces he had been able to assemble in Asia. He himself advanced with great diligence; and being informed, on the march, that Oricum and Apollonia had already fallen into the enemy's hands, he hastened to save his magazines and stores at Dyrrachium, and, without stopping night or day, marched in such disorder, that many deserted, as from a cause already ruined or desperate. He arrived, however, in time to prevent the designs of Cæsar on Dyrrachium; encamped under the walls, sent a squadron of ships immediately to retake or block up the harbour at Oricum, and ordered such a disposition of the fleet as was most likely to prevent the passage of a second embarkation from Italy.

Cæsar, finding himself prevented at Dyrrachium, halted on the Apsus; and, in order to cover Epirus, and wait for the second division of his troops from Italy, prepared to intrench himself on the banks of that river. Having accordingly secured the main body of his army in this post, he himself returned with a single legion to receive the submission of the towns in his rear, and to provide for the supply of his camp.

In the mean time, Bibulus, on the part of Pompey, blocked up the harbour at Oricum, and obstructed the passage from Italy with his fleet.

Calenus, on the part of Cæsar, who had orders to lose no opportunity of transporting his army from Brundisium, actually embarked and put to sea; but being met by a packet from Cæsar, with intelligence of the dispositions which had been made by the enemy to intercept him, he returned, suffering one of the vessels that had accompanied his fleet to keep on her way, in order to carry an account of his motions; but she was taken by the enemy and destroyed.

Bibulus, who commanded the fleet which lay before Oricum, being precluded from the land by the parties which Cæsar had posted along the shore, forced to bring his daily supplies of wood, water, and other necessaries, at a great disadvantage,

* Appian. lib. ii.

from Corcyra, and reduced to great distress, endeavoured, under pretence of a negotiation, to obtain a cessation of arms. But Cæsar, who came in person to Oricum, on hearing of this proposition, supposing that the design of Bibulus was to find an opportunity, under cover of the truce, to procure some supply of provisions and water, rejected the offer, and returned to his camp on the Apsus.

Pompey had advanced from Dyrrachium, and took post on the opposite bank of that river. Dion Cassius and Appian agree that he made some attempt to pass the Apsus, and to force Cæsar in this post; but that he was prevented by the breaking of a bridge, or by the difficulties of a ford. According to Cæsar's own account, the armies continued to observe each other, and the troops, separated only by a narrow river, had frequent conferences from the opposite banks. It was understood that, in these interviews, no hostilities should be offered. Of the two parties, that of Cæsar was the more engaging to soldiers. Notwithstanding his own affectation of regard to the civil constitution of the republic, his military retainers still hoped to remain in possession of the government. He therefore encouraged the communication of his men with those of the opposite party. On this occasion, Vatinius, by his direction, went forward to the bank of the river, and, raising his voice, complained of the harsh treatment lately offered to Cæsar, in the contempt shown to all his overtures and advances to peace. May not one citizen, he said, send a message to another, when he means only to prevent the shedding of innocent blood? He proceeded to lament the fate of so many brave men as were likely to perish in this quarrel; and was listened to with profound silence by many of both armies, who crowded to the place.

These remonstrances, on the part of Cæsar, delivered by an officer of high rank, and appearing to make so deep an impression on both armies, when reported at Pompey's quarters, appeared of too serious a nature to be slighted. An answer, therefore, was given, by the direction of Pompey, that on the following day A. Varro should be sent to any place that should be agreed upon as safe, between the two armies, and there receive whatever propositions should be made to him. The

parties accordingly met at a place appointed, and multitudes from both armies crowded around them. Pompey, considering the whole as an artifice to gain time, or to find an opportunity to debauch his men, probably gave instructions to break up the conference, in a way that for the future should keep the troops at a greater distance from each other. Soon after the officers met, some darts, probably by his directions, were thrown from the crowd. Both sides being alarmed by this circumstance, they instantly parted, and withdrew under a shower of missiles, in which numbers were wounded.

The fate of the war seemed to depend on the vigilance of the fleet, and on the difficulties with which Cæsar had to contend in bringing any reinforcements or supplies from Italy. Bibulus, from the effect of fatigue, was taken dangerously ill; but could not, upon any account, be persuaded to leave his station, and died on shipboard. There being nobody appointed to succeed him in the command at sea, the leader of each of the separate squadrons acted for himself, without any concert. Scribonius Libo, with fifty galleys, set sail from the coast of Epirus, steered towards Brundisium, where he surprised and burnt some trading vessels, one in particular laden with corn for Cæsar's camp. Encouraged by these successes, he anchored under the island which covered the mouth of the harbour: from thence he kept the town in continual alarm, landed, in the night, parties of archers and slingers, with which he dispersed or carried off the patrols which the enemy employed on the shore; and thus, master of the port of Brundisium, expected fully to obstruct that outlet from Italy, and to awe the neighbouring coast. To this purpose, he wrote to Pompey, that the other divisions of the fleet might go into harbour; that his squadron alone, in the post he had taken, was sufficient to cut off from Cæsar all reinforcements and further supplies. But in this he presumed too much on the first effects of his own operations. Antony, who commanded the troops of Cæsar in the town of Brundisium, by placing numerous guards at every landing-place on the contiguous shore, effectually excluded the squadron of Libo from any supply of wood or water, of which his ships, for want of stowage, could not have, at any one time, a considerable stock; and

he reduced them to such distress for want of these articles, that they were obliged to abandon their station, and to leave the harbour again open to the sea.

In the mean time, pressing orders arrived from Cæsar, to hasten the embarkation of the troops. Dion Cassius and Appian relate that he himself, being impatient of delay, embarked alone in disguise on board of a barge, with intention to pass to Brundisium; that, after he had been some time at sea, the weather became so bad, as to determine the master of the vessel to put back; but that, being prevailed upon by the entreaties of Cæsar, he continued to struggle with the storm for many hours. They further relate, that, the mariners being likely to faint, the passenger at last discovered himself, and encouraged them to persist, by telling them that they carried Cæsar and his fortunes; that, nevertheless, he was forced to give way, and afterwards intrusted his orders to a messenger; but that he returned to the camp before it was known that he had been absent. He himself says, that, some months being past, and the winter far advanced, he suspected that some opportunities of effecting the passage of his second division had been lost; that he was become highly impatient, and wrote to hasten the embarkation; informing his officers, that they might run ashore any-where between Oricum and Apollonia; as the enemy's fleet, having no harbour in those parts, were frequently obliged, by stress of weather, to depart from the coast.

Upon these orders, the troops with great ardour began to embark. They consisted of four legions and eight hundred horse, under the command of Mark Antony and Calenus. The wind being at south, and no enemy appearing in the channel, they set sail, and steered for the coast of Epirus, but were driven to the northward; and on the second day passed Apollonia, but were discovered by the enemy from Dyrrachium. As they were far to the leeward of that part of the coast on which Cæsar had instructed them to land, and as it was vain for them with this wind to attempt getting to the southward, they chose to give way at once, and steer for some convenient harbour, northward of all Pompey's stations. But, in following this course, as they passed by Dyrrachium, they were instantly

chased by Quintus Coponius, who commanded Pompey's squadron at that place, chiefly consisting of Rhodian galleys. The wind at first being moderate, Coponius expected easily to weather the head-lands that were to leeward of his post; and, though the gale increased after he set sail, he still continued to struggle against it. As soon as Antony observed this enemy, he crowded sail, and made for the nearest harbour; being in the bay of Nympheus, about three miles beyond Lissus,* on the coast of Dalmatia. This bay opened to the south, and was very accessible, though not secure with the present wind. He chose, however, to risk the loss of some ships, rather than fall into the enemy's hands; and made directly for this place. Soon after he entered the harbour the wind shifted to the south-west, from which his ships were now sufficiently covered, and he debarked without any loss. At the same time the wind, in consequence of this change, blowing more directly on the land, and more violently, bore hard on Coponius, forced him upon the shore, where the greater part of his galleys, being sixteen in number, were stranded and wrecked.

Such of Antony's transports as got safe into the bay of Nympheus, landed three veteran legions, with one of the new levies, and eight hundred horse. Two of his transports, one with two hundred and thirty of the new raised troops; the other, with somewhat less than two hundred veterans, being heavy sailors, fell astern; and it being night before they arrived, mistook their way, and, instead of the bay of Nympheus, came to an anchor before Lissus. Ottacilius Crassus, who was stationed by Pompey with a body of horse in that place to observe the coast, manned some small boats, surrounded these transports, and offered the troops who were on board favourable terms if they would agree to surrender. Upon this summons the new levies accordingly struck; but the veterans ran their vessels ashore, and, having landed, fought their way, with the loss of a few men, to Nympheus, where they joined the main body of their army that was landed with Antony.

* Cæs. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii. c. 26.

The colony at Lissus had been settled by Cæsar, as a part of the province of Illyricum, and now appeared to favour his cause: Ottacilius, therefore, thought proper to withdraw with his garrison; and Antony having stationed some of the transports at this place to enable Cæsar to embark his army for Italy, if, as was reported, Pompey should attempt to remove the scene of the war into that country; and having sent the remainder back for the troops which were still left at Brundisium, he dispatched messengers to Cæsar with the particulars of his voyage, and an account of the place at which he had landed.

The fleet, with this division of the army under Antony, had been seen on the coast, from the stations both of Pompey and of Cæsar, steering to the northward; but it was not known for some days what was become of them. Upon the arrival of the intelligence, that they had effected a landing to the northward, both parties determined to move to that quarter. Pompey decamped in the night, and knowing the route which Antony was likely to take, placed himself in his way, giving orders that the army, without lighting fires or sounding their trumpets, should remain in profound silence. Antony, however, having intelligence of this disposition of the enemy, did not advance. Cæsar, in the mean time, to favour his junction, was obliged to make a considerable circuit, ascended on the banks of the Apsus to a ford at which he passed; from thence continued his march to the northward, and seemed to advance on Pompey's right, while Antony remained in his front. In this situation, Pompey, apprehending that he might be attacked on different sides at once by Cæsar and by Antony, thought proper to quit his station; and leaving their armies to join, fell back to Asparagium, a strong post about a day's march from Dyrrachium.

Cæsar having obtained this great reinforcement, was no longer so anxious as he had hitherto been for the preservation of his possessions upon the coast. His enemies, by the superiority of their fleets, could prevent his receiving any regular supply of provisions from the sea. It was necessary for him, therefore, in order that he might have some other resource, and be in condition to act on the offensive, to extend his quar-

ters by land, and to cover some tract of country, from which he could subsist his army. For this purpose, he removed from Oricum the legion that was stationed at that place; taking such precautions as were necessary to secure his shipping in the port from any surprise by sea. For this purpose, he drew the greater part of the vessels on shore, sunk one in the mouth of the harbour, and placed another at anchor near it, mounted with a considerable tower, and manned with a proper force. Being thus secured on the coast, he sent numerous detachments in different directions: L. Cassius Longinus, with a legion of new levies, into Thessaly; C. Calvisius Sabinus, with five cohorts and a party of horse, into Ætolia; Cn. Domitius Calvinus, with two legions, the eleventh and twelfth, into Macedonia: giving strict charge to each of these officers, that they should collect all the forage and provisions which those or the neighbouring countries could furnish.

As Pompey had relied much on the authority of government, with which he was vested at the beginning of the war, and which he believed gave his party a dispensation from the exercise of those popular arts, with which Cæsar thought proper to recommend his cause, he threatened to punish the refractory more than he encouraged or rewarded the dutiful; and he often, therefore, extorted services from the provinces, neglecting the necessary attention to conciliate their affections; and such were the effects of this conduct, that the detachments which now appeared, on the part of Cæsar, were every-where favourably received. Sabinus made himself master of Ætolia. Longinus found the people of Thessaly divided, and was joined by one of the parties. Calvisius, upon his arrival in Macedonia, had deputations from many towns and districts of the province, with assurances of favour and submission; and by these means the possessions of Cæsar, even in those countries on which his antagonists had chiefly depended, began to be equal to theirs.

It was thought an unpardonable error in Pompey, thus to suffer his quarters to be over-run by an enemy who had but recently acquired a footing on the coast, and whose army was, in number of cavalry and light infantry, as well as of regular foot, greatly inferior to his own. Pompey, however, know-

ing the interest which Cæsar had in bringing the contest to a speedy decision, did not choose to divide his forces, and he relied, for the security of the southern and inland provinces, on the legions which were soon expected to land from Asia, on the eastern shores of Macedonia or Thessaly.

Scipio, being the father-in-law of Pompey, had been employed in assembling the forces of Asia, and had, by severe exactions, availed himself of the resources of that opulent province. He was still occupied in this service at Ephesus, when he received from Pompey an account of Cæsar's arrival in Epirus, and an order without delay to transport his army into Europe. He accordingly, soon after the arrival of Cæsar's detachments at their several places of destination, debarked in the bay of Thermé, or of Thessalonica, and penetrated into Macedonia, directing his march towards the quarters of the two legions which Cæsar had sent thither, under the command of Domitius Calvinus, and gave a general alarm on his route; but being arrived within about twenty miles of Domitius, he turned on a sudden into Thessaly, as thinking Longinus, who was stationed in that country with one legion of raw troops, might be made an easier prey.

To lighten his march, he left his baggage under a guard of eight cohorts, commanded by Favonius, on the Haliacmon, a river which separates Macedonia from Thessaly, and proceeded with great dispatch towards the quarters of Longinus. This officer, greatly alarmed at his sudden approach, and mistaking, at the same time, for an enemy, a body of Thracian horse which were coming to his own assistance, hastily withdrew by the mountains, and continued his retreat to Ambracia. Scipio was about to pursue Longinus on the route he had taken, when he was recalled by earnest representations from Favonius, the officer he had left to guard his baggage; informing him, that his post was in the utmost danger of being forced by Calvinus, who was on his march through Macedonia for that purpose. Scipio accordingly returned, with all possible dispatch, to the Haliacmon, and arrived at the post of Favonius, after the dust which arose from the march of the enemy had appeared on the plain; and thus

came barely in time to sustain his party, and to rescue his baggage.

The armies continued to occupy the opposite banks of the Haliacmon; and as Scipio, by the flight of Longinus, was become master of all Thessaly, Calvinus continued in possession of Macedonia, and from thence secured a considerable source of supply to Cæsar's army.

It would have been of great moment to Pompey's affairs, and not inconsistent with the dilatory plan he had formed for the conduct of the war, to have risked an action between these separate bodies on the Haliacmon, rather than to have suffered his enemy to retain the command of so many posts of consequence; and Scipio accordingly passed the river, with a view to bring on an engagement; but, after some stay on the plain, finding no opportunity to attack the enemy with any hopes of success, he repassed the river, and having occupied his former station, there passed some partial encounters between such as were advanced on the different sides, but without any considerable event.

While so many large bodies, detached from the principal armies, were thus contending in Thessaly for the possession of the country, Pompey remained to cover the ground, which was of greater importance to him, in the neighbourhood of the sea, and the port of Dyrrachium. Having, at the distance of about a day's march in his rear, this town and harbour as a place of arms, at which he had deposited his magazines and stores, and from which he received his ordinary supply of provisions, he had taken his measures to protract the war; and trusting to his own superior resources, both by sea and by land, did not doubt that by waiting until the countries which Cæsar had occupied should be exhausted, he might force him to retire from the contest without the risk of a battle. To hasten this event; he endeavoured every-where to straiten his quarters in the country, and to block up or destroy all the harbours he had on the coast.

Cnæus, the eldest of Pompey's sons, commanding the Egyptian fleet, in execution of this plan, which had been laid to harass the enemy, without exposing their cause to a general hazard, attacked Cæsar's principal naval station at Oricum,

raised the vessel that had been sunk at the mouth of the harbour, forced the armed galley that was stationed before it, and carried off or destroyed all the ships that were laid up in the port. From thence he proceeded to Lissus, and burnt thirty transports, which Antony had left in the harbour; but, having made an attempt on the town, was repulsed with loss.

Cæsar, on the opposite part, sensible of the interest which he had in bringing the war to a speedy decision, advanced upon Pompey, forced a place of some strength, that covered his front, and encamped in his presence. The day after he arrived in this position, either to bring on a general action, or to gain the reputation of having braved his antagonist, he formed his army on the plain between the two camps; but, as Pompey continued firm or unmoved by this insult, and as the recent losses which Cæsar had sustained in his shipping, and on the coast, rendered his prospect of future supplies or reinforcements every day less secure, he projected a movement, by which he proposed either to force an engagement, or to preclude the enemy from all his resources in the town and harbour of Dyrrachium.

For this purpose, and that Pompey might the less suspect any important design, he decamped in the day, when, having a large circuit to make, he at first took a route which led away from Dyrrachium, and was thought to retire, for want of provisions; but, having wheeled in the night, he directed his march, with the utmost speed, to the town. Pompey, having intelligence of the change which Cæsar had made in his route during the night, perceived his design, and, having a nearer way to Dyrrachium, still expected, by a rapid march, to arrive before him. But Cæsar, having prevailed on his men, notwithstanding the great fatigues of the preceding day, to continue their march, with little interruption, all night, although he could not enter the town, which was fortified against him, was in possession of the only avenue which led to it, when the van of Pompey's army appeared on the hills.

Pompey, thus shut out from Dyrrachium, where he had placed his magazines and stores, and from the only harbour he had on the coast, had recourse to the Petra, a small promontory, which covered a little creek or bay, not far from

the town, and there endeavoured to supply the loss of the principal harbour, by bringing ships of burden to unload, and by procuring supplies in boats from his magazines and stores in the town; and in this manner was still in condition to avoid any immediate risk of his fortunes by the chance of a battle.

Cæsar, on the other hand, being disappointed in the design he had formed to exclude the enemy altogether from their magazines in the town of Dyrrachium, and seeing no likelihood of being able to bring the war to a speedy decision, his own communication with Italy being entirely cut off, and the fleets he had ordered from thence, from Sicily, and from Gaul, having met with unexpected delays, sent an officer, named L. Canuleius, into Epirus, with a commission to draw into magazines all the corn that could be found in that or the neighbouring districts, and to secure them at proper places for the use of his army. This, however, in a country that was mountainous and barren, itself commonly supplied with corn from abroad, and lately on purpose laid waste by the enemy, was not likely to furnish him with any considerable supply, or to enable him for any time to support a dilatory war. His genius was therefore at work, by some speedier course, to harass his enemy, or to hasten the contest to an end.

In these circumstances, however, he did not neglect his usual artifices to amuse and distract his antagonists with great professions of moderation, and with overtures of peace. On hearing of Scipio's arrival in Europe, affecting to have despaired of obtaining a treaty by any further direct applications to Pompey himself, and willing to appeal to the reason of the father-in-law against the obstinacy of the son, he sent Clodius, a supposed common friend, with letters and instructions, to inform Scipio of the great pains he had taken to obtain an equitable accommodation; "all which, he presumed, had hitherto failed, through the unhappy timidity of those he intrusted with his messages; who, being persons of inferior rank under Pompey, had not the courage to deliver them properly to their general. But subjoined that, through the mediation of Scipio, who could deliver himself with so much freedom, who could advise with so

“ much authority, and who, being at the head of a great army
 “ attached to his own person, could even enforce what was just,
 “ he might expect a different issue to propositions so fair and
 “ reasonable. And that, in this event, Scipio would have
 “ the honour of being the restorer of tranquillity and good
 “ order to Italy, of peace to the provinces, and of prosperity
 “ to the whole empire.” Clodius was received with respect;
 but, on delivering his message, it appears that all further communication was refused him, as a person who come to insult or amuse with false pretensions. Cæsar, indeed, was himself, as usual, so far from trusting to the effect of these propositions, or so far from remitting his own operations in order to confirm his pacific professions, that he even redoubled his efforts in that very quarter which was intrusted to Scipio; and, as he had already possessed himself of Epirus, Acarnania, and Ætolia, he carried his views still farther on that side, and sent Fusius Calenus to be joined by Longinus and Sabinus, and to endeavour, by the isthmus of Corinth, to penetrate into Achaia.

He himself, at the same time, engaged in a project, which, to those who do not recollect the amazing works which were frequently executed by Roman armies, particularly by that of Cæsar himself, will appear so vast, and even romantic, as to exceed belief: this project was no less than to invest Pompey in his camp, though at the head of an army superior to his own, and oblige him to recede from the coast, or submit to be invested with lines, and completely shut out from the country. For this purpose, he occupied several hills in the neighbourhood of Pompey's station, strengthened them with forts, joined those forts by lines of communication across the valleys, and soon appeared to have projected a complete chain of redoubts, and a line of circumvallation.

Pompey, to counteract this daring project, took possession of some heights in his turn, fortified and joined them in the same manner, and while the one endeavoured to contract, the other endeavoured to enlarge, the compass of his works. The archers and slingers on both sides, as in the operations of a siege, were employed to annoy the workmen. The armies lay under arms, and fought in detail for the possession of ad-

vantageous grounds. When forced from one height, which they attempted to occupy, they seized upon another that was contiguous, and still continued their line, though obliged to change its direction.

In these operations, a campaign, which was opened in January with the landing of Cæsar on the coast of Epirus, already drew on to the middle of summer, and both parties had undergone great labour, and were exposed to peculiar distress. Cæsar's army, already inured at the blockade of Alesia, and the sieges of Marseillès and of Avaricum, to toils like those in which they were now engaged, flattered themselves with a like glorious issue to their present labours. They were in want of bread, and obliged to substitute in its place a kind of root boiled up with milk; but were comforted under this hardship with the prospect of fields which were replenished with ripening corn, and which gave the hopes of a plentiful harvest. They not only continued their countervallations with incredible toil, but turned or interrupted all the rivulets or springs that formerly watered the grounds on which the enemy were now encamped.

Pompey's army, on their part, were less inured to such toilsome operations. They had plenty of bread, which came to them with every wind, from the different coasts that were still in their possession; but were in great distress for want of water and forage: many of their horses had died: the men, too long confined to the same ground, and to the same air, which was infected with filth, and the exhalation of putrid carcasses, being reduced to the use of bad water, were become extremely sickly.

Pompey, nevertheless, held his enemy at some disadvantage by the superiority of his numbers, and by the extent of line which he obliged him to form and to defend; and it appears that he availed himself of these advantages, with all those abilities of a great officer, which he was justly supposed to possess. He not only forced Cæsar, without hazarding a general action, to recede from many of the heights which he attempted to occupy, and obliged him, with great labour, to widen the compass of his lines, but likewise alarmed him by various attacks on the works which he had already completed;

in some places forced open the bars which the enemy had placed in his way, and recovered his own communication anew with the country before him: but, as Cæsar could present his whole army, in many places, to cover the works he was executing, it was impossible, without risking a general action (which Pompey avoided), entirely to stop his progress.

In the course of these operations, it appears, from the text of Cæsar's Commentaries, though incomplete, that the armies changed the ground of their principal encampments, as well as the disposition of some separate posts, and mutually harassed each other with frequent surprises and alarms. And Cæsar mentions no less than six capital actions, which happened in one day, at the lines of circumvallation, or under the walls of Dyrrachium; and in most of them it is probable that Pompey had the advantage; as he acted on the string, or smaller circumference, while his antagonists moved on the bow, or the wider circle.

Pompey completed his own line of circumvallation to a circuit of fifteen miles; having a chain of four-and-twenty redoubts on the different hills, over which it was carried. By this work he obliged Cæsar to recede half a mile beyond him, and to extend his compass to above seventeen miles in circumference.

The extremities of both their works terminated on the shore; and Cæsar, having no boats nor ships to oppose to the numerous craft of his enemy, ought, perhaps, by the consideration of this very circumstance, to have been diverted at first from his project. But, as he sought merely for occasions of action, he was contented with the hopes of finding them, even under such disadvantages. While he was obliged to remain, with the strength of his army, at that end of his line which was nearest the town of Dyrrachium, in order to prevent the access of Pompey to his magazines, he proposed to fortify the other extremity of it with double works, and had already thrown up, at the distance of two hundred yards from each other, two intrenchments, consisting of a parapet, ten feet high, and of a ditch, fifteen feet wide; one facing the lines of Pompey, the other turned to the field, in order to guard against any surprise from parties, which, coming by water,

night land in his rear. He was likewise about to join these intrenchments by a traverse or flank, to cover him from the sea.

Before this traverse was finished, Pompey made a disposition to force his way at the opening it was intended to close, and of consequence to take his enemy in the rear, over the whole extent of his lines. For this purpose, he brought, in the night, six entire legions, or sixty cohorts, to that part of his own works which faced this place. He embarked a numerous body of archers, slingers, and other light troops, having their helmets and shields fortified, as it seems was the custom, with basket-work, to break the force of the stones which were likely to shower from the enemy's parapets, and furnished with great quantities of fascines and other materials, proper to fill up the ditch. This embarkation was effected in the night: and the officer who commanded it had orders to land part of the troops in the rear of both Cæsar's intrenchments, and another part in the space betwixt the two lines between them, where the work was still incomplete. These separate divisions were to be supported by the whole force of the legions in front, who were to take advantage of any effect which the missiles from their boats might produce on the flank or the rear of the enemy.

These attacks were accordingly made at the dawn of day, in three different places at once, and had all the consequences of a complete surprise. They fell, with the greatest effect, upon the station of the ninth legion, of which the piquets and other guards being instantly routed, the whole legion was put under arms to support them, but, soon infected with the panic, was carried off in the flight. Antony, who occupied the nearest station on the heights, appearing in that instant with twelve cohorts, and a better countenance, stopped, for a while, the pursuit of the enemy, and furnished a retreat to the troops who were routed.

The alarm was conveyed to Cæsar himself, by fires lighted on all the hills; and he hastened to the ground with as many cohorts as could be spared from the posts in his way: but he came too late: Pompey had already forced the intrenchments, had burst from his confinement, and was beginning to encamp

in a new position, where, without losing his communication with the sea, he rendered abortive, for a long time, Cæsar's purpose of excluding him from the supplies of necessities or conveniences which were to be derived from the land; and was now in a posture to command a free access to water and forage, for the want of which he had been chiefly distressed in his late situation.

Thus Cæsar, far from reaping the fruits which he expected from the labour of so many months, began to incur the censure of a visionary projector, who presumed to practise, on the ablest captain of the age, the arts with which he had succeeded against ignorant barbarians, or, at most, against generals of mean capacity.

These circumstances, however, probably, made not any impression on Cæsar himself, nor greatly altered the confidence of his army: he presented himself again before the enemy in their new position, and pitched his camp in their presence; still determined to act on the offensive, even in the sequel of attempts in which he had failed. An action, accordingly, followed, of which the result is evident, although it is difficult, from the imperfect text of his Commentaries, to ascertain the detail. It appears that both armies had changed the ground which they had taken immediately after the last action; that, in this remove, Pompey had taken possession of the camp which Cæsar had left; and, as his army, being more numerous, occupied more ground than that of Cæsar had done, he made a second intrenchment, quite round that which had been formerly occupied by Cæsar. This camp was covered by a wood on one side, and by a river, at the distance of four hundred paces, on the other.

While Pompey lay in this position, he had thrown up a line of communication from the flank of his camp to the river, in order to cover his access to water. But, after he had taken this precaution, he thought proper to change his ground, and had moved about the distance of half a mile, on his march to occupy a new situation, when, for some purpose that is not explained, he thought proper to send back a legion, or large detachment of his army, to resume the possession of the ground he had so recently left.

Cæsar, on his part, being occupied in fortifying a camp in the last situation he had taken, and observing this returning detachment from Pompey, thought it gave him a favourable opportunity, by cutting it off, to recover part of the credit he had lost in the late action. While, to amuse the enemy, he ordered his men to continue the work in which they were engaged, he himself marched, with twenty-three cohorts, in two divisions, under cover of the wood; came to the ground unobserved; and, with the division which was led by himself, mixed, with the enemy, who had already taken possession of the exterior lines, and drove them from thence to the interior intrenchment, with great slaughter. The other division being, in the mean time, to attack the same works at a different place, mistook the line of communication, which covered the access from the camp to the river, for the main intrenchment of the camp itself, and, before they perceived their mistake, had run along this line to a great distance, in search of an entrance; when observing, at last, that the line, along which they ran, was not defended, the infantry went over it first, and were followed by all the cavalry: but, the time which they had lost by their former mistake gave Pompey an opportunity to come to the relief of his detachment. As soon as he appeared, Cæsar's cavalry, finding themselves entangled between the line of communication, the intrenchment of the camp, and the river, began to retire with great precipitation, and were followed by the foot, who fell into great confusion. That part of Pompey's detachment, which, in the beginning of the action, had been defeated by Cæsar, seeing themselves likely to be supported, rallied in the rear-gate of the camp; and the party which Cæsar himself commanded against them, observing the precipitant retreat of the other division, saw dangers and difficulties accumulating on every side. Imagining that they were about to be surrounded, or shut up within the enemy's works, they betook them to flight, crowded back to the ditch, and, in attempting to repass it, were killed in such heaps, or were trodden under foot in such numbers, that the slain filled up the ditch, and made a passage for those who followed.

In this state of general confusion and terror, the presence and authority of Cæsar, which, on other occasions, used to be

of so great effect, were entirely disregarded. The bearer of a standard, upon Cæsar's catching it, and endeavouring to stop him, quitted his hold, and continued to run without it: a rider, whose horse he had seized by the bridle, dismounted, and ran off on foot. The rout was complete; but the ditches and works, amongst which the action began, as they embarrassed the flight of the one party, so they retarded the pursuit of the other; and Pompey, who did not expect such a victory, remained in suspense. He mistook the flight of Cæsar for a feint, to draw him into some ambuscade. In this he was governed, probably, by the high estimation for discipline and valour to which Cæsar's army was so justly entitled; but which no troops can uniformly support at all times: and, if it be true, as is probable, that the flight of an army, in actual rout, may be always distinguished from a concerted retreat, he on this day committed an unpardonable error; and Cæsar, who may be inclined to exaggerate the oversights, though not the advantages, of his enemy, owns that he himself lost about a thousand men, with above thirty standards or colours, and owed the preservation of his army to the excessive caution or incapacity of his enemy. He himself acted, indeed, like a person defeated; instantly abandoned all his famous lines of Dyrrachium, and all his outposts; and, to make head against the victor, brought all the scattered parts of his army together.

Pompey, in the mean time, lost the opportunity, or was not sensible of his good fortune till after the time for improving it was past. But this victory, although it had not been perceived in the moment at which a signal advantage might have been made of it, was presently afterwards greatly exaggerated. Pompey had, from his own army, the usual salutations of triumph, or received the title of imperator, which he continued in the usual form to assume, and sent his accounts of the action, by expresses, to every part of the empire; but had the moderation, however, to abstain from the practice which was common in the case of victories obtained over foreign enemies, that of binding his fasces and his dispatches with laurel.

Cæsar, by carrying the war into Macedonia, had put himself in a very arduous situation. He had passed over a sea, on which the enemy were masters, and had invaded a country, of

which they were in possession, with forces greatly superior to his own: but this daring adventure, which, even in its first successes, excited astonishment, now exposed him to censure; and his attempt to invest so great an officer as Pompey, at the head of an army superior to his own, appeared altogether wild and extravagant. The merit of all his former campaigns, as is common upon reverses of fortune, began to be questioned by those, who, after the event, can instruct and correct every general; and the glory he had gained in the former part of the war was entirely obscured. He was even said to have gained the Spanish army by corruption, and to have purchased with money the surrender which he pretended to have forced by his address and his sword. People returned to their first apprehensions, that Pompey was the greatest general which any age or nation had ever produced; that he had effectually put an end to the present contest, and had left nothing for his party to do, but to reap the advantage of a victory he had obtained for them.

Some time before this event, and while the minds of men were yet in suspense, Cato, in one of the councils, which had been summoned by Pompey, observed that Cæsar had acquired much popular favour by his ostentation of mercy, and by the hopes of protection which he held out to every man who did not actually take arms against him; while Pompey and his followers, by publishing threats against all who did not actually espouse their cause, had rendered the army of the republic an object of terror. He therefore moved, that a proclamation should be issued, containing assurances, that every town, not actually in arms, should be protected; and that no blood should be shed, but in the field of battle. A resolution to this purpose had been, accordingly, published at that time;* but, in the present exultation of victory, was forgotten. The times were said to require exemplary justice, and to justify executions and forfeitures, not only of those who were actually in arms against their country, but of those, likewise, who had betrayed its cause by a mean and profligate neutrality. The favourites of Pompey already, in imagina-

* Plutarch. in Vita Pompeii, p. 494.

tion, sated their revenge, and gratified their avarice, at the expense of the opposite party and of its abettors.* Every one considered the use which he himself was to make of the victory; not how it might be secured or rendered complete.

The shock which Cæsar had received in so critical a time and situation, was, not without reason, supposed to be decisive; he had abandoned his lines, and called in all his outposts. His army appeared to sink under the weight of their misfortunes. Inferior to the enemy in numbers, greatly reduced by their losses, and fallen in their own estimation, they were not soon likely to recover the courage required to contend for the field again with so renowned and so superior an adversary.

Cæsar, however, was not overwhelmed by these appearances: he knew what was the force of an army which had been taught, by the experience of many years, to repose the utmost confidence in themselves and in their general, and which was not likely to sink, without hopes of recovery, under any single event. He considered their apparent dejection as a symptom of indignation, and of rage, more than of fear or debasement; and, instead of blame or reproach, soothed them with consolation, and with the apologies which he industriously framed for their late miscarriage. He bade them recollect their former actions, and not be dismayed by a single accident, which befel them in the midst of a career sustained with a spirit so much superior to that of any enemy they had ever encountered: "If fortune has crossed us for once," he said, "we must retrieve our losses by diligence and resolution. Difficulties only excite the brave, and awaken their ardour: you have formerly experienced difficulties; and every soldier who was with me at Gergovia will remember the effects of perseverance and courage."

He was sensible, however, that some particular officers had set a shameful example; and he supposed that, by singling out these for punishment, he might seem to exculpate the soldiers, and reinstate them in their own esteem. For this reason he dismissed, with infamy, some bearers of standards,

* Cæsar. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii. c. 88.

who, he alleged, had misled the troops, whose object it is never to part from their colours. By these means the sullen dejection of the legions was changed into rage, and an ardent impatience to retrieve their honour.* They did not presume to importune their general to intrust them so soon again with his fortunes; but they imposed voluntary tasks, by way of penance, on themselves, saying, they deserved no better. Many of the superior officers gave it as their opinion to Cæsar, that, whatever resolution he might have taken for the future plan of the war, so favourable a disposition in the army, and so fair an opportunity of yet ending the contest with honour, on the very ground on which they had incurred their disgrace, should not be neglected, nor suffered to escape. Cæsar, however, could not be persuaded to stake his fortunes on the effect of a feverish ardour, which still had some mixture of consternation or dismay, nor to rely on a fury which had more of despair than of rational confidence, against the impetuosity of a superior enemy, recently flushed with victory. Nor was he safe to remain in his present situation, without any posts in his rear to secure his communication with the country, and without any immediate prospect of supply for the subsistence of his army. For these reasons, he determined, without loss of time, to decamp, and to remove to some distance from the enemy.† In the first night after this resolution was taken, and as soon as it was dark, the sick and wounded, with all the baggage, under the escort of a legion, were sent off, with orders that they should not halt till they reached Apollonia; being a march of about thirty miles. At three in the morning, the main body of the army, observing a profound silence, turned out of the camp, by different gates, and took the same route. Two legions yet remained for the rear-guard. These, after a proper interval, being ready to depart, sounded the usual march, to make the enemy believe the van of the army was then only beginning to move; and the whole being thus already on their way, and without any incumbrance, they soon gained a considerable distance from those who were likely to pursue them.

* Cæs. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii.

† Ibid.

Pompey, as soon as he was apprised of this retreat, drew forth his army, and followed with great expedition. After marching a few miles, he overtook, with his cavalry, the rear of Cæsar's army, at the passage of the river Genusus; but, being received by the horse, interlined with infantry, made little impression, and saw them effect the passage of the river without any considerable loss.

Cæsar, having thus completed an ordinary march, took possession of the lines which he had formerly occupied at Asparagium; but, not intending to remain in that station, gave orders to the legions only to rest on their arms: and, in order to deceive the enemy, sent forth his cavalry by the front gate in their sight, as if with intention to forage; but with orders to wheel under cover of some rising ground, and to re-enter the camp again on a different side, and to take post in the rear of the infantry, then about to resume the march. Pompey, supposing that the enemy's cavalry were actually foraging, or from every appearance convinced that Cæsar had determined to halt for the night, and that the business of the day was over, followed his example, pitched in the same lines, which he likewise had formerly occupied at this place, and suffered his men to stray in search of forage and wood; many, also, who, in the hurry with which they decamped in the morning, had not time to make up their package, were now allowed to lay down their arms, and return to Dyrrachium, in search of the effects they had left.

Cæsar, who waited only until the measures he had taken should so far mislead the enemy, again put his army in motion about noon, and, without interruption, on the same day completed a second march of eight miles; while Pompey's army, having already laid aside their arms, and encamped, were not in condition to follow. Cæsar, having gained so much ground ahead of the enemy, continued his retreat during some of the subsequent days in the same order, having his baggage advanced some hours before him: and Pompey, having fallen so far behind by the delay of the first day, and having harassed his army in attempting to regain what he lost; on the fourth day, entirely discontinued the pursuit.

This respite gave to both parties some leisure to deliberate on the plan of their next operations. Cæsar continued his march to Apollonia, that he might lodge his sick and wounded, pay off the arrears of his army, and make a proper disposition for the security of the places he held on the coast: and having already one cohort at Lissus, placing three at Oricum, and four at Apollonia, he proceeded on his route from thence to the southward. He proposed, without delay, to penetrate into Thessaly, and to occupy, for the subsistence of his army, as much as he could of that fertile country. He flattered himself, that if Pompey should follow him thither, or remove to a distance from his own magazines, and his supplies by sea, the war might be continued between them upon equal terms. If he attempted to retake Oricum, and the towns on the coast, he must expose Scipio and the body under his command, in the eastern parts of Macedonia, to be separately attacked; or, if he wished to preserve Scipio and his army, he would be obliged to quit his design upon Oricum, in order to support them. If he should pass into Italy, it was proposed to follow him by the coasts of Dalmatia. And this last alternative of carrying the war into Italy, from the difficulties, the delays, and the discredit to which it might have exposed Cæsar's cause, appears to have been the preferable choice for Pompey. It was, accordingly, debated in council, whether, being master of the sea, and having abundance of shipping, he should not transport his army, regain the seats of government, and strip his antagonist of that authority which he derived from thence? or, whether he should not stay to finish the remains of the war in Macedonia? The advantages likely to result from his return to Rome with the ensigns of triumph, after he had left it with some degree of disgrace, were obvious. But the war appeared so near to its end, that it was reckoned improper to leave any part of it unfinished. It was argued, that, by quitting the present seat of the war, Cæsar would be left to recover his forces in a country yet full of resources, and would only exchange the western part of the empire for the east, from whence Sylla had been able, and from whence Pompey himself was now about, to recover the city and the possession of Italy.

But, what weighed most of all in these deliberations, was the safety of Scipio, which required the presence of Pompey in Macedonia. If the last should remove his army from thence, the former, with the forces recently arrived from Asia, would fall a sacrifice to the enemy.

Upon these motives, Pompey, as well as Cæsar, having their several detachments, or separate bodies, to be sustained or rescued from the dangers with which they were threatened, determined to march into Thessaly, concerting their respective movements, so as to protect their own parties, or to cut off those of the enemy. Cæsar, by his march to Apollonia, had been turned from his way; and, having the discredit of a defeat, or being supposed on his flight, was harassed or ill received by the country as he passed. The messengers, whom he had dispatched to Domitius, were intercepted; and this officer, while both armies were advancing, having made some movements in Macedonia, in quest of provisions, and having, with the two legions he commanded, fallen into Pompey's route, narrowly escaped, and only by a few hours, being surprised and taken.

Cæsar, having arrived in time to rescue Domitius, and being joined by him as he passed the mountains into Thessaly, continued his march to Gomphi. The people of this place having refused to open their gates, he scaled the walls, gave the town to be pillaged; and intending, by this example, to deter others from retarding his march by fruitless resistance, he put all the inhabitants to the sword. When he arrived at Metropolis, the people, terrified by the fate of Gomphi, received him as a friend; and Cæsar, to contrast this with the former example, gave them his protection. From hence to Larissa, where Scipio, having fallen back from the Haliacmon, then lay with a considerable army, the country was open, and Cæsar, or his parties, where every-where permitted to advance without opposition. Having passed all the lesser rivers which fall into the Penius, he took post on the Enipeus, which runs through the district of Pharsalia. Here he commanded extensive plains, covered with forage and with ripening corn; had a very fertile country to a great distance in his

rear; and being joined not only by Domitius, but probably, likewise, by the legion which Longinus commanded in Ætolia, in all amounting to ten legions, he was in condition to renew his offensive operations.

Pompey, at the same time, directed his motions likewise towards the same quarter; but although he had the more direct route, and was every-where received as victor in the late action, was still on his march. Scipio had advanced from Larissa to receive him; and being joined, they took post together on a height near the village of Pharsalus, and in sight of Cæsar's station, at the distance of no more than thirty stadia, or about three miles.* The armies being some time fixed in this position, Cæsar drew forth, in the front of his intrenchment, to provoke his antagonist. It was evidently not the interest of Pompey to give an enemy, whom he had brought into considerable straits, an opportunity of relief by the chance of a battle. But, as this was a defiance, and had some effect on the minds of the soldiers, it was proper to return it; and both sides, during many days, continued to turn out in the front of their respective lines. Cæsar advanced, on each successive day, still nearer to Pompey's ground; but there were some difficulties in the way of his farther approach, in which he was unwilling to engage himself in the presence of an enemy; nor was Pompey inclined to quit the eminence on which he had hitherto formed his line of battle.

The summer being far spent, and much of the forage and corn of the neighbouring plains being consumed, Cæsar began again to suffer for want of provisions, and having no hopes of bringing the enemy to a battle on this ground, he determined to change it, for some situation in which he could more easily subsist his own army, or, by moving about, harass the enemy with continual marches, and oblige them, perhaps, to give him an opportunity to fight them on equal terms. Having resolved on this plan, and having appointed a day on which the army should move, the tents being already struck, and the signal to march given, while the van was passing through the rear-gate of the camp, it was observed that Pom-

* Appian. de Bello Civ. lib. ii.

pey's army, being formed according to their daily practice, had advanced farther than usual in the front of their lines. Cæsar immediately gave orders to halt, saying to those who were near him, "the time we have so earnestly wished for is come: now let it be seen how we are to acquit ourselves." He immediately ordered, as a signal of battle, a purple ensign to be hoisted on a lance, at the place where his own tent had been recently struck.* Appian says that, He likewise ordered the pales to be drawn, and the breast-work to be levelled in the front of his camp, or towards the enemy, that his army might not hope for a retreat, nor have any intrenchments within which to retire.†

It was evidently Pompey's interest to avoid a battle, and to wait for the effect of the distresses to which Cæsar's army must have been exposed on the approach of winter. But this is the most difficult part in war; requiring great ability in the general, together with unalterable courage and discipline in the troops. A commander may be qualified to fight a battle, but not dexterously to avoid an antagonist who presses upon him: an army may have that species of courage which impels them in action, but not that degree of steadiness or constancy which is required to support them long unemployed in the presence of an enemy. In whatever degree Pompey himself was qualified for the part which the service required of him, he was attended by numbers of senators and persons of high rank, who, thinking themselves in a civil or political capacity, equal with their general, bore the continuance of their military subordination with pain. They said, he was like Agamemnon among the kings, and protracted a war that might have been ended in a day, merely to enjoy his command. Nursed in luxury, and averse to business, petulant in safety, useless in danger, impatient to be at their villas in the country, and their amusements in the town, and anticipating the honours and succession to office, which they imagined due to their rank and their merits in the present service, they railed at the conduct of their leader, affected courage by urging him to fight, whilst, in reality, they only wished to terminate the sus-

* Plutarch. in Vita Pompei.

† Appian. de Bello Civ. lib. ii.

pense and anxiety of a campaign, which they had not the resolution to endure. Many of the allies, then also present in the army, who were princes of high state in their own dominions, were impatient of so much delay; and the troops, of every denomination, led by the example of their superiors, were loud in their censures of a caution which they thought themselves in condition to dispense with.

Pompey, thus urged by the clamours of his army, felt himself under a necessity of coming to a speedy decision, and had prepared for action on the morning of that very day on which Cæsar was about to decamp. Although he was sensible, that, in this conjuncture, it was not his interest to hazard a battle, it is probable that he did not think the risk was great. He too, as well as others of his party, had become elated and confident upon his late success.* His numbers greatly surpassed those of Cæsar, especially in horse, archers, and slingers; and he trusted that, by this part of his army, he should prevail on the wings, and carry his attack to the flank, and even to the rear of the enemy. Having the Enipeus, a small river with steep banks, on his right, which sufficiently covered one of his flanks,† he drew all the cavalry, amounting to seven thousand, with the archers and slingers, to his left, expecting that the event of the battle would be determined on this wing. He himself, therefore, took post to second the operations of the cavalry, still keeping under his immediate view the two famous legions which he had called off from Cæsar at the beginning of the war. Scipio was posted in the centre, with the legions from Syria, having the great body of the infantry divided on his right and his left. The right of the whole was covered by a Cilician legion, and the remains of the Spanish army which had joined Pompey under Afranius. The whole amounted to one hundred cohorts, or about forty-five thousand foot, drawn up in a line of ten men deep.‡

Cæsar, observing this disposition, formed his army in three divisions: the left was commanded by Antony, the right by

* Cicer. ad Familiar. lib. vii. ep. iiii. † Appian. de Bello. Civ. lib. iii.

‡ Frontinus, de Stratagematis. *N. B.* This is the only instance in which the depth of the Roman column or line is mentioned.

Sylla, and the centre by Cn. Domitius. The tenth legion was posted on the right, and the ninth on the left of the whole. He had eighty cohorts in the field; but these so incomplete, as not to exceed above twenty-two thousand men. He saw the disparity of his cavalry and irregulars on the right, having no more than a thousand horse to oppose seven thousand of the enemy. But, in order to reinforce and support them, he draughted a cohort from each of the legions on the right, to form a reserve, which he placed in the rear of his cavalry, with orders to sustain them, or to repel the enemy's horse, when they should attempt, as he expected, to turn his flank. This body formed a fourth division of his army, not placed in the same line with the other divisions, but facing obliquely to the right, in order to receive the cavalry that was destined to turn upon that side, and, instead of a flank, to present them with a front which they did not expect. He passed along the lines of his right, and earnestly entreated them not to engage till they got the signal from himself. He reminded them of his continual attention to the welfare of his men, desiring them to recollect with what solicitude he had endeavoured to bring on a treaty, in order to save both armies to the republic; and how far he had always been from any disposition wantonly to shed the soldier's blood. He was answered with shouts, that expressed an impatience to begin the action. Pompey had directed the cavalry and archers, assembled on his left, to begin the attack; and instructed them, as soon as they had driven Cæsar's horse from the plain, to fall upon the flank, and the rear of his infantry.

These dispositions being completed, a solemn pause, and an interval of silence, ensued. The same arms, and the same appearances, presented themselves on the opposite sides. When the trumpets gave the signal to advance, the sounds were the same; many are said to have shed tears.* Being so near, that they had only space enough in which to acquire that rapid motion with, which they commonly shocked, Cæsar's army began to rush forward, while Pompey's, agreeably to orders he had given them, remained in their places, ex-

* Dio. Cassius, lib. xli. c. 58.

pecting that the enemy, if they were made to run a double space in coming to the shock, would be disordered, or out of breath. But the veterans, in Cæsar's line, suspecting the intention of this unusual method of receiving an enemy, made a full stop; and, having drawn breath, came forward again with the usual rapidity. They were received with perfect order, but not with that resistance and equal force which motion alone could give. The action became general, near about the same time, over the whole front. Pompey's horse, as was expected, in the first charge, put Cæsar's cavalry to rout, and, together with the archers and slingers, were hastening to turn the flank of the enemy: but, as soon as they opened their view to the rear, being surprised at the sight of a regular body of infantry, which was drawn up in firm order to oppose them, and the confusion into which they were thrown by the push and wheel they had made disqualifying them to meet such an enemy, they instantly gave way, and, although no one was in condition to pursue, fled to the heights. The archers and slingers, being thus deserted by the horse, were put to the sword: and Pompey's left, on which he expected the enemy could not resist him, being flanked by the cohorts who had defeated his cavalry, began to give way. Cæsar, in order to increase the impression he had made, brought forward fresh troops to the front of his own line; and, while his reserve turned upon the flank, made a general charge, which the enemy no longer endeavoured to withstand.

Pompey, on seeing the flight of his cavalry, an event he so little expected, either thought himself betrayed, or despairing of the day, put spurs to his horse, and returned into camp. As he entered the prætorian gate, he called to the guards to stand to their arms, and to provide for the worst. "I go the rounds," he said, "and visit the posts." It is likely that surprise and mortification had unsettled his mind. He retired to his tent in the greatest dejection, and yet he awaited the issue.* His army, in the mean time, being routed, fled in confusion through the lanes of their own encampment. It was noon; and the victors, as well as the vanquished, were


* Cass. de Bello Civile, lib. iii. c. 94.


greatly fatigued: but Cæsar seldom left any refuge to a flying enemy, not even behind their intrenchments. He ordered Pompey's lines to be stormed; met with some little resistance from the guards that were placed on the parapet; but soon prevailed. The rout and the carnage continued through the streets and the alleys of the camp, to the rear-gate and passages through which the vanquished were crowding to recover the fields, and from which, without any attempt to rally, they continued their flight to the neighbouring hills.

When Pompey's army drew forth to battle, their tents were left standing, as in full confidence of victory; and the plate, furniture, and equipage of the officers were still displayed, as if intended for show. Notwithstanding this circumstance, Cæsar had authority enough to restrain his troops* from plunder, and continued the pursuit. Seeing crowds of the vanquished had occupied a hill in the rear of their late station, he made haste to surround them, and to cut off their farther retreat. But they themselves, having observed that the place was destitute of water, abandoned it before they could be prevented, and continued their flight. Cæsar, having ordered part of the army to keep possession of the enemy's camp, another part to return to their own, he himself, with four legions, endeavoured to intercept those who continued to flee in their way to Larissa. He had the advantage of the ground; so that, after a hasty march of six miles, he got before them; and, having thrown himself in their way, obliged them to halt. They took possession of a height over a stream of water, from which they hoped to be supplied. Night was fast approaching, and the pursuers were spent with fatigue; but Cæsar yet prevailed on his men to throw up some works, to prevent the access of the enemy to the brooks; when, overwhelmed with toil and distress, these remains of the vanquished army, offered to capitulate; and while the treaty was under deliberation, many among them, who were senators and persons of rank, withdrew in the night, or made their escape; the rest surrendered at discretion.

* The spoils of an enemy were commonly secured by the Romans in a regular manner, to be equally divided.







distinction, who had been formerly prisoners, and a clemency which was no longer necessary, were death. Some, in a manner to be afterwards ere spared at the intercession of their friends, to ar permitted that each should save one of the pri- The private men took oaths of fidelity to the vic- were enlisted in his army. Cæsar, having ordered his men, as had been on service all the night, to be from his camp, he himself continued his march, with body, the same day, to Larissa.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

Narrative Loss on the different Sides in the late Action.—Pompey's Flight.—His Death.—Arrival of Cæsar at Alexandria.—Cato, with the Fleet and Remains of the Army from Pharsalia, steers for Africa.—State of Italy, and of the Republican Party.—Adventures of Cæsar in Egypt.—Victory over Pharnaces.—Arrival in Italy.—Mutiny of the Legions.—Cæsar passed into Africa.—His Operations and Action with the Horse and Irregulars of the Enemy.—Post at Rusquina.—Siege of Uzita.—Battle of Thapsus.—Death of Cato.

IN the famous battle of Pharsalia, Cæsar lost no more, by his own account, than two hundred men, among whom were thirty centurions, officers of distinguished merit. There were killed of the enemy fifteen thousand, taken twenty-four thousand, with a hundred and eighty stand of colours, and nineteen Roman eagles or legionary standards; and on this occasion were cut off a number of senators and many of the equestrian order,† the flower of the Roman nobility, in whose fall the sinking fortunes of Rome were now deprived of their most likely support.

* Dio. Cass. lib. xli. c. 62.

† Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. ii.



Persons of distinction, who had been formerly prisoners, and experienced a clemency which was no longer necessary, were now put to death. Some, in a manner to be afterwards quoted, were spared at the intercession of their friends, to whom Cæsar permitted that each should save one of the prisoners.* The private men took oaths of fidelity to the victor, and were enlisted in his army. Cæsar, having ordered such of his men, as had been on service all the night, to be relieved from his camp, he himself continued his march, with a fresh body, the same day, to Larissa.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

Comparative Loss on the different Sides in the late Action.—Pompey's Flight.—His Death.—Arrival of Cæsar at Alexandria.—Cato, with the Fleet and Remains of the Army from Pharsalia, steers for Africa.—State of Italy, and of the Republican Party.—Adventures of Cæsar in Egypt.—Victory over Pharnaces.—Arrival in Italy.—Mutiny of the Legions.—Cæsar passed into Africa.—His Operations and Action with the Horse and Irregulars of the Enemy.—Post at Rusfina.—Siege of Uzita.—Battle of Thapsus.—Death of Cato.

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* Dio. Cass. lib. xli. c. 62.

† Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. ii.

Pompey, when he was told that Cæsar's troops had already forced his intrenchments, changed his dress, mounted on horseback, and, having passed through the rear-gate of the camp, made his escape to Larissa. On the road he fell in with about thirty horsemen of his own army, who joined him. At the gates of Larissa he received what he wanted for his journey, but declined entering the town, saying, that he would do nothing to make a breach betwixt the inhabitants of that place and the victor.* From thence he passed by the valley of Tempé to the coast, where he rested only one night, in a fisherman's cottage. Next morning he put off from the shore in a small boat, with a few of his attendants, and, coming in sight of a trading vessel, made signals, and was taken on board. In this ship he steered for the bay of Strymon, came to an anchor before Amphipolis, and, probably, to conceal his further intentions, issued a proclamation, addressed to all the districts of Macedonia, and requiring new levies to be made, and all the youth of the province to assemble. But having received some supplies of money, he remained only one night at this place. His wife Cornelia, and Sextus, the youngest of his sons, being at Mitylené, in the island of Lesbos, thither he proposed to sail, and, without having settled his plan any further, was anxious to save this part of his family from falling† into the hands of his enemies. Having taken them on board, and being joined by some galleys of the fleet, after a delay of some days, occasioned by contrary winds, he set sail, continued his voyage to the coast of Cilicia, and from thence to Cyprus. He meant to have landed in Syria; but, being informed that the people of Antioch, upon the news of his defeat, had published a resolution to admit none of his party, he dropped that intention, and contented himself with what aids and reinforcements he obtained on the coasts of Cilicia and Cyprus. There he seized the money which was to be found in the coffers of the farmers of the revenue; and having borrowed, or otherwise procured, considerable sums, armed two thousand men, and, having shipping sufficient to transport them, continued his voyage to Egypt.

* Dio. Cass. lib. xlii. c. 2.

† Cæsar.—Appian.—Plutarch.

The late king, Ptolemy Auletes, had been indebted for his restoration to the Romans, and the patronage of Pompey; and the kingdom being now on a respectable footing, having a considerable military force in the field, this Roman leader, though of the vanquished party, flattered himself that, in the gratitude of the Egyptian court, he might find some means to reinstate his affairs.

On the death of that Ptolemy, who had been restored to his throne by Gabinius, two factions had arisen in Egypt. The king, leaving four children, Ptolemy the elder, Cleopatra, Arsinoë, and Ptolemy the younger, had by his will bequeathed his crown to Ptolemy, the eldest of his sons, together with Cleopatra the eldest daughter. This brother and sister being by the laws permitted, and by the father's will destined, to marry, were, in the capacity of husband and wife, associated on the throne: but the council of the young king, not satisfied with a mere participation of sovereignty, proposed to set aside the will, by excluding Cleopatra. In execution of this design, having obliged her to leave the kingdom, and to fly for protection into Syria, they had taken post with a great army at Pelusium, to prevent her return; she being said to have assembled a numerous force in Asia, for that purpose.* Pompey, observing the ensigns of a royal army upon the shore, concluded that the king was present, came to an anchor, and sent a message to announce his arrival, and his desire to join his forces with those of Egypt.

The council of Ptolemy consisted of three persons: Achilles, who commanded the army; Photinus, an eunuch, who had charge of the finances; and Theodotus of Samos, who was the preceptor, or literary tutor, of the young king. These counsellors, knowing that the Romans had been named executors of the late king's will,† and in this capacity might restore Cleopatra to her share in the throne, and that Pompey, in name of the republic, might assume the supreme direction in Egypt, were greatly alarmed upon receiving his message, and came to a resolution to have him destroyed. By this atrocious action, they expected at once to rid themselves

* *Cæsar, de Bell. Civ. lib. iii.*

† *Cæsar, ibid.*

of a dangerous intruder, and to merit the favour of a rival, who, by this decisive stroke, was to become sovereign of the empire, and fully able to reward those who should take a seasonable part in his quarrel.

With this intention, Achilles, with a few of his attendants, came on board in a small boat, and delivered a message from Ptolemy, inviting Pompey to land. In the mean time, some Egyptian galleys, with an intention to secure him, drew near to his ship; and the whole army, with the king at their head, were drawn out on the shore, with great ostentation of pomp, to receive him. The diminutive size of the boat, and the mean appearance of the equipage which came on this errand, seemed disproportioned to the rank of Pompey; and, although Achilles made an apology, alleging, that deeper vessels could not go near enough to land on that shallow part of the coast, Pompey's friends endeavoured to dissuade him from accepting of an invitation so improperly delivered; but he answered, by quoting two lines from Sophocles, which imply that, *whoever visits a king, though he arrive a free man, must become a slave*. Two of his servants went before him into the boat, to receive their master; and with this attendance he put off from the ship. His wife Cornelia, and Sextus, the youngest of his sons, with some other friends, remained upon deck, sufficiently humbled by the preceding strokes of fortune, anxious for the future, and trembling under the expectations of a scene which was in acting before them.

Soon after the barge had left the ship, Pompey, looking behind him, observed, among the Egyptian soldiers, a person whose countenance he recollected, and said to him, surely, fellow-soldier, you and I have somewhere served together. While he turned to speak these words, Achilles beckoned to the other soldiers, who, understanding the signal to put the Roman general to death, pierced him with their swords. Pompey was so much prepared for this event, that he perceived the whole of his situation at once, and sunk, without making any struggle, or uttering a word.* This was done in the presence of the king of Egypt and of his army, who

* App. de Bell. Civ. lib. ii.—Plut. in Pomp.—Livii Epitome, lib. cxii.

were ranged on a kind of amphitheatre, formed by the shore. The vessel in which the unhappy Cornelia with her family was left, and the little squadron which attended it, as if they had received a signal to depart, cut their cables and fled.

Thus died Pompey, who, for above thirty years, enjoyed the reputation of the first captain of his age. The title of *Great*, originally no more than a mere expression of regard from Sylla, continued, in the manner of the Romans, to be given him as a name of distinction, or a memorial of the occasion on which he received it. He attained to more consideration, and enjoyed it longer, than any other Roman citizen; and was supplanted at last, because, for many years of his life, he thought himself too high to be rivalled, and too secure to be shaken in his place. His last defeat, and the total ruin which ensued upon it, was the consequence of an overweening confidence, which left him altogether unprepared for the first untoward event. The impression of his character, even after that event, was still so strong in the minds of his enemies, that even Cæsar himself overlooked all the other remains of the vanquished party, to strike at their head, and seemed to think his victory still incomplete, while such a person was yet alive, to renew the conflict.

The accounts which Cæsar received at Larissa made him believe that Pompey must have passed into Asia; and he, accordingly, on the third day after the battle of Pharsalia, set out in pursuit of him, with a body of horse, ordering a legion to follow. In passing the Hellespont, he was saluted by some galleys, which guarded the straits, under Lucius Cassius.* These surrendered themselves, and, with their leader, made offer of their service to the victor. From thence he continued his march by the coast of Ionia, receiving the submission of the towns in his way: and, being come into Asia, he had intelligence of Pompey's operations in Cyprus, of his departure from thence, and of his continuing to steer for the coasts of Egypt. In order to be in condition to follow him thither, he put into the island of Rhodes, where he provided trans-

* This person is sometimes taken, but erroneously, for Caius Cassius, destined to act an important part in the sequel of this history.

ports sufficient to embark the legion which he had ordered to follow him from Thessaly, and another from Achaia, with eight hundred horse. To these he joined a convoy of ten armed galleys of this island, and some Asiatic ships.*

With this force, Cæsar set sail for Alexandria, and arrived, after a passage of three days.† Here he learned the catastrophe of Pompey's life; and had presented to him, by the courtiers of Ptolemy, who were impatient to recommend their two services, the head of the deceased, severed from the body, with his seal, which was known throughout the empire, being that with which his signature was usually put to all letters, acts, and public writings: but Cæsar, either really was, on this occasion, or affected to be, seized with a momentary compunction; he is said to have turned away from the sight, and to have wept.‡ This able actor probably had tears, as well as words, at command; and could sanctify, under the most specious appearances, the evils which his ambition had produced. From this event, however, which he thus affected to bewail, and no sooner, he became secure, and seems to have dated the termination of the war. He accordingly landed, without precaution; and, being detained at first by the usual periodical winds of the season, became entangled in difficulties, or engaged in pleasures, which occasioned a very unaccountable stay, suspended the expectations of the whole empire, and gave to those of the opposite party leisure to rally their forces, or to consult their own safety in different ways.

In this interval, Cato, who, upon the march of Pompey into Thessaly, had been left to command on the coast of Epirus, and whose quarters, after the battle of Pharsalia, became a place of retreat to many who escaped from the field, or who, at the time of the action, had been detached on different services, assembling great part of the fleet at Corcyra; and, with his sea and land-forces united, still preserving the aspect of a vigorous party, was joined by Cicero, Cnæus the eldest son

* Czs. de Bell. Civ. lib. iii.

† App. de Bell. Civ. lib. ii. The two legions which he led in this service amounted only to three thousand two hundred men; so much had the army in general suffered in their late campaigns.

‡ App. *ibid.*

of Pompey, Afranius, Labienus, and other persons of distinction. Among these, Cicero, as being the first in rank, was offered the command; and, having declined it, narrowly escaped with his life from the fury of young Pompey, who considered his refusal as a desertion of the cause, and as an act of perfidy to his father, whose fate was yet unknown.* But Cicero, being protected by Cato and others, who were present, escaped into Italy; and, declining the command of an army, reserved, for scenes, in which he was better qualified to act, talents which had, on former occasions, procured him so much consideration with his fellow-citizens. It appeared that Cato had even disapproved of Cicero's having at all appeared in arms, or having joined either party in this war, and that he wished him to have devoted his life and his abilities entirely to those duties, of a civil nature, which he was better qualified to render to his country in the senate, and in the popular assemblies, than in the field.

It is probable that Cato had already taken his own resolution not to submit to Cæsar, nor to survive the fall of the commonwealth; but he treated with great candour such as chose to make their peace, and to retire from the storm which had overwhelmed the republic. Having staid a sufficient time at Corcyra, to receive on board such of the vanquished army as chose to take refuge in the fleet, and having, afterwards, for the same purpose, put into Patræ, near the entrance of the gulf of Corinth, he still gave every one his option to continue in arms, or to retire. He seems to have supposed that Pompey was gone into Egypt, and he determined to follow him; hoping, that after the junction of this great reinforcement, he might, either there, or in the province of Africa, renew the war with advantage. Being, in pursuance of this design, arrived in the African seas, but west of the frontier of Egypt, he met the unhappy Cornelia, with the young Sextus Pompeius, who had recently beheld the death of the husband and the father, near the shore of Pelusium. The account which he received of this event determined him not to continue his voyage any farther to the eastward; but to return

* Plut. in Vita Ciceronis.—Dio. Cass. lib. xlii. c. 10—12.

towards the Roman province of Africa, where the friends of the republic, under Varus, in consequence of the defeat of Curio, and the alliance of Juba, still kept the ascendant, and had lately received an accession of strength by the junction of Scipio, and of Labienus, who had escaped from Pharsalia. But the periodical winds, which, about the same time, began to detain Cæsar at Alexandria, made it impossible, or at least dangerous, for him to continue his voyage along a coast, that was covered, to a great extent, by the famous shoals and sand-banks of the Syrtes. For these, perhaps, and other reasons which are not mentioned, Cato landed at Berenicé; and from thence conducting his army, then consisting of ten thousand men, in small divisions, through the deserts of Barca, and round the bay of the Syrtes; and having, during thirty days, encountered with many difficulties from the depth of the sands and the scarcity of water, he at last effected his march to the frontier of the Roman province.*

Cæsar, at the time when he passed with his army into Macedonia, had left Italy and the western provinces in a state not likely, in his absence, to create any trouble. But the uncertain, and even unfavourable, aspect of his affairs, for some time after his landing in Epirus, had encouraged those who disapproved of his usurpation to question the validity of his acts, and to disregard his arrangements. The army in Spain having mutinied, deserted from Q. Cassius, and put themselves under the command of M. Marcellus Eserninus, who, however, did not openly declare himself for either party till after the event in Pharsalia was finally decided in favour of Cæsar.

At Rome, it is probable that, upon the late remove of the senate and consuls, few citizens of any note had remained, besides those who were inclined to Cæsar's party, or, at least, such as were indifferent to either; and that some persons, even of the last description, thought they had an interest in his success, as being their only safety against the menacing declarations of his adversary, who, in all his proclamations, treated neutrality between the parties as treason to the com-

* Strabo, lib. xvii. p. 836.

monwealth. But the uncertain condition of Cæsar's fortunes, while the event of the war remained in suspense, and still more after his defeat at Dyrrachium, encouraged or tempted numbers, even in the city of Rome, to declare for Pompey. Marcus Cælius, who, in the preceding year, had, upon disgust, or hopes of promoting his own fortune, gone with Antony and Curio to join Cæsar, and who was now, by the influence of the prevailing party, elected one of the prætors, being moved by a fresh disgust taken to the party he had joined, or by its apparent decline in the field, openly declared himself against Cæsar's measures, offered protection to debtors against the execution of his laws relating to bankrupts, drove his own colleague Trebonius by force from the prætor's tribunal, and gave such an alarm, as that such of the senate as were then at Rome thought themselves under the necessity of giving the acting consul, Isauricus, the usual charge, to guard the commonwealth, as in times of extreme danger. Upon this decree, the consul took arms to preserve the peace; and Cælius was obliged to leave the city. About the same time, Milo, who still lay under sentence of banishment, ventured, at the head of an armed force, to land on the coast of Campania, and attempted to make himself master of Capua. While he was engaged in this enterprise, he was joined by Cælius; but both were soon after surrounded, and cut off, by the forces which Cæsar had left for the protection of Italy.*

These disturbances, and every appearance of opposition to the party of Cæsar, were again easily suppressed, upon the news of his victory in Pharsalia. The populace, who generally range themselves on the victorious side, and who are equally outrageous in every cause they espouse, celebrated this occasion, by pulling down the statues of Pompey and of Sylla. There was either no regular senate, and no assembly of the people, to resist the torrent with which fortune now ran on the side of military government, or the names of Senate and People were, without debate or difference of opinion, put to decrees, by which the supreme power of life and death, over the supposed adherents of the vanquished party, was commit-

* Liv. Epitome, lib. cxi.—Dio. Cass. lib. xlii. c. 22. 26.

ted to the victor. By these decrees, the power of making war or peace, and of naming commanders and governors in all the provinces, was committed to Cæsar alone. He was, by a new and unheard-of resolution, which laid that foundation of imperial sovereignty which we shall find so often repeated, made consul for five years, dictator for twelve months, and vested with the sacred character of tribune for life. He alone was appointed to preside in all public assemblies, except those of the tribes, in which the other tribunes bore an equal part with himself.

When these decrees were presented to Cæsar, then in Egypt, he assumed the ensigns and power of dictator, and appointed Antony, then stationed in Italy, general of the horse, or second in command to himself in the empire. The reputation of Cæsar's clemency had encouraged many, who had recently opposed him, to lay down their arms, and to return to their habitations, trusting to this character of the victor, or to other considerations specially applicable to themselves. Cicero, in particular, returned into Italy, and, in the neighbourhood of Brundisium, waited for Cæsar's arrival. Caius Cassius, whom we must always distinguish from his namesakes Quintus and Lucius, and who commanded the fleet which had been assembled for Pompey, from the coasts of Syria and Cilicia, having sailed to Sicily, while the army yet lay in Pharsalia, surprised and burnt the shipping, amounting to thirty-five vessels, of which twenty were decked, which Cæsar had assembled at Messina, and was about to have forced that town to surrender, when he was informed of the defeat of his party in Thessaly, desisted from his enterprise, and set sail for the coast of Asia. Here he waited for Cæsar at the mouth of the Cydnus, without being determined, whether he should attempt to destroy or submit to the victor. From the correspondence of Cassius with Cicero it appears that, like this distinguished senator, he was about to withdraw from the ruins of a party which he could no longer support. Cicero, nevertheless, afterwards ascribes to him a design of killing Cæsar at this place, if the prey had not escaped him by going to a different side of the river from where he was expected to land. Upon this disappointment,

Cassius made his submission, and delivered up his fleet.* Quintus Cicero went to Asia, to make his peace with Cæsar; and many, expecting him in Italy, resorted thither on the same errand. In this number, it was reported, though without foundation, that Cato and L. Metellus meant to present themselves, as persons who had done no wrong, and who came openly to resume their station in the commonwealth. Upon this report, Cæsar apprehending the difficulties that might arise to himself from the presence of such men; that they might greatly embarrass his government, by opposing it; or that, in order to rid himself of such troublesome guests, they might reduce him to the necessity of pulling off the mask of moderation and clemency, which he had hitherto assumed; chose rather to prevent their coming than to contend with them after they were come; and sent positive orders to Antony, to forbid Cato, Metellus, or any other person, to whom he had not given express permission, to set their foot in Italy.†

Such was the state of affairs at the end of the year of Rome 705, and at the beginning of the following year, which is dated in the dictatorship of Caius Cæsar. U. C. 706. While he himself still remained in Egypt, the government of Italy continued in the hands of Antony. There was no longer any apparent difference of opinion at Rome. All orders of men vied, in demonstrations of joy, for the success of the victor, and for the ascendant which his party had gained. Many still probably hoped to have the form of the republic preserved, while no more than the administration of it should pass from the ruined party to those who were now in power: but, in the first steps of the present government, they found themselves disappointed. The usual election of magistrates, which, even in the height of the war, had never been omitted, now, at the end of it, and when no enemy any-where appeared to disturb the ordinary course of affairs, were all of them, except that of the tribunes, entirely suspended or laid aside. All government centered in the person of Antony; and the administration, of course, was altogether military.

* Cæsar, de Bello Civil. lib. iii. † Cæsar, de Bello Civil. lib. iii. ep. 6 & 7.

He himself, immersed in debauch, passed the greatest part of his time in the company of buffoons and prostitutes; frequently shifted the scene of his frolics from the town to the country, and travelled through Italy with a field-equipage, and a numerous train of carriages, for the accommodation of his female attendants. In these processions, he himself is said to have sometimes appeared in a chariot drawn by lions;* and, in the midst of such petulant affectations, as he was ungracious and arrogant to citizens of the highest rank, so he was indulgent to the troops under his command, and deaf to all the complaints which were made of their violence or rapine. Being equally apt to indulge disorder and license in others, as he was to set the example in his own practice, his retainers frequently alarmed the city with outrages, whether of rape, robbery, or murder, and stunned the pacific inhabitants of Italy with terror, in apprehension that, upon the arrival of Cæsar, the number of such disorderly masters, destined to sport on the ruins of the commonwealth, was to be still further increased.

The worst men, as usual, were the most forward in paying their court to the prevalent party: and, among these, the nearest relations became spies or informers against one another. Fears or complaints uttered in private were reported as crimes. A general silence and distrust ensued, and all parties wished or dreaded the arrival of Cæsar, according as they expected to lose or to gain by the suppression of former establishments. In this interval of gloomy suspense, men discovered their sad apprehensions, by propagating the fiction of strange and supposed ominous appearances, or by magnifying things natural into prodigies and alarming presages.†

Meanwhile, the daily expectation of Cæsar's arrival, for some time suspended all the usual operations in the city, and suppressed the hopes and designs of his opponents in all parts of the empire: but his unexpected stay at Alexandria, and the unfavourable reports of his situation, which were sometimes brought from thence, began to turn the tide of popularity at Rome, and encouraged the remains of the late republi-

* Plut. in Vita Antonii, p. 74, 75.

† Dio. Cass. lib. xlii. c. 26.

can party, now forced to take refuge in Africa, again to lift up its head.*

Dolabella, a young man of patrician extraction, observing the road which others had taken, by becoming tribunes of the people, to arrive at power in the commonwealth, procured for himself, in imitation of Clodius, an adoption into a plebeian family, to the end that he might be legally qualified to hold this office; and having, accordingly, succeeded in this design, he proceeded to revive the wild projects by which the worst of his predecessors had endeavoured to debauch the lower ranks of the people. Among these, he proposed a reduction of house-rents, and even an abolition of debts. Being opposed by Tribellius, one of his colleagues, their several retainers, as usual, exhibited a scene of violence in the streets; and, although the senate passed a decree to suspend every question or subject of debate until the arrival of Cæsar, these tribunes continued to assemble the people, kept them in a ferment by opposite motions, and filled the public places with tumult and bloodshed.† And, to finish an interlude so congenial to the piece, Mark Antony, now representing the person of his absent commander, under pretence that such disorders could not be restrained without a military force, took possession of the city with an army; and, while he sometimes favoured one party, and sometimes the other, continued to govern the whole at discretion.‡

The troops, about the same time, became mutinous in their quarters; and these disorders rose or fell according to the reports that were propagated from Asia or Egypt relating to the state of Cæsar's affairs. The spirits and hopes of the late republican party, which yet had some footing in Africa and Spain, likewise fluctuated in the same manner. It is highly probable, that, if Cæsar had pressed on the other remains of those who opposed him, with the same ardour with which he pursued their unfortunate leader, or if he could have returned to the capital immediately on the death of his rival, that party

* Cæsar, ad Attic. lib. xi. ep. 16.

† Eight hundred citizens were killed in these frays.

‡ Dio. Cass. lib. xlii. c. 29.

never would have attempted, or would not have been able, to renew the contest: but the leisure which he left them, and the dubious aspect of his own affairs for some time in Egypt, encouraged and enabled them to recover a strength, with which they were yet in condition to dispute the dominion to which he aspired.

Cato, who, with the remains of the republican army and fleet from Epirus, had arrived on the coast of Africa, being informed that Varus still held the Roman province on this continent in the name of the republic; that Scipio was there, and that the king of Numidia persevered in the alliance he had formed against Cæsar, determined to join them. At his arrival, Scipio and Varus being on bad terms, the command of the army was, by the general voice, made over to him. But, as at Rome, all the gradations, whether civil or military, were blended together, and Scipio was of consular rank, while Cato had been no more than prætor, he rejected such a trespass on the order which was established, and made a part in a system which they all exposed their lives to preserve. His acceptance, indeed, might have tended more to increase than appease animosities. Neither Pompey nor Scipio ever considered him as their personal friend: his services, they knew were, intended to the republic, not to themselves, and would turn against them, whenever they came to make that use of their advantages to which it is likely they were both inclined. Pompey was, accordingly, ever suspicious of Cato; and, in the last part of the campaign in Thessaly, left him behind on the coast. Scipio adopted the same conduct with respect to this partisan of the commonwealth, and joined to the motives of distrust, which actuated Pompey, a jealousy, excited by the preference which the army had recently given him. In order that this supposed rival might not interfere in his counsels, he assigned or suffered him to take a separate station at Utica, where, though in appearance retired, he continued to be the principal support of the cause. The inhabitants of this place were obnoxious to the successors of Pompey. Having formerly received Curio, with the forces of Cæsar, and ever favoured his interest, they were now, by the opposite party, doomed to destruction, and saved only at the intercession of Cato, who,

in this extremity of political evils, ever set himself against every measure that tended to increase the sufferings of mankind by unnecessary acts of revenge or cruelty.

The spirit of the republic thus apparently reviving in Africa, and the party being in condition to receive all those who fled to them for protection, with the alliance of Juba, the most powerful prince of that continent, they soon became formidable both by sea and by land; and if they could have resolved to invade Italy, were probably in condition, while Cæsar was absent, to have regained the capital of the empire. Young Pompey, in this state of affairs, having passed into Spain, was favourably received by his father's adherents or clients in that province, and, profiting by the misconduct of Quintus Cassius on the part of his enemies, was likely to assemble a considerable force.

Gabinus, who commanded for Cæsar on the coast of Illyricum, attempting to penetrate by land into Macedonia, was cut off by Octavius, who had assembled a remnant of Pompey's army on the confines of that kingdom. Domitius Calvinus, whom Cæsar had appointed to command in Bithynia, had received a defeat from Pharnaces the son of Mithridates; and, in general, the state of his affairs in other parts of the empire was such, while he himself continued unheard-of in Egypt, as to raise a suspicion of some misfortune, supposed to be the only way of accounting for so long a stay in that country, and for the seeming neglect of all the advantages he had gained by a conduct hitherto, in every instance, so decisive and rapid. Pompey, it was said, had fallen by treachery in Egypt; and so might Cæsar. It was now the middle of June; and there was no intimation received in Italy of the time at which he might be expected to return. He had written no letters since the middle of December; nor had any one come from his quarters at Alexandria since the middle of March.*

The imperfect accounts which remain of what passed in Egypt, during this interval, are as follows: Cæsar, at his arrival, had found Ptolemy, the young king, and Arsinoë, one of his sisters, under the direction and in the keeping of Ganimel.

* Cicer. ad Att. lib. xi. ep. 16 & 17.

des and Pothinus, two eunuchs, who had the care of their education. From his manner of receiving the present of Pompey's head, these officers conjectured that they had gained nothing by the murder of one of the rivals, who were engaged in this contest for the Roman empire; and that this action, although it freed Cæsar of an enemy whom he respected and feared, was not to be publicly avowed or rewarded by him. They dreaded, therefore, the interposition of this dangerous man in their affairs, even more than they had dreaded the usurpation of Pompey.

The troops now in Egypt were the remains of that army with which Gabinius had restored the late king Ptolemy Auletes; and which were left to secure his establishment. They were recruited by deserters from the Roman provinces, and by banditti from Syria and Cilicia. They retained the form of the Roman legion; but had precluded themselves from any prospect of return to the Roman service by mutiny, in which they had murdered two Romans of high rank, the sons of Bibulus, then proconsul of Syria. Numbers of the men were married, and had families in Egypt: they held the lives and properties of the people at discretion; and were in the habit of disposing of the offices at court, and even of the crown itself, at their pleasure. A party of this insolent rabble, then in garrison at Alexandria, and in the character of guards to the person of the present king, took offence at the parade with which Cæsar landed, and were offended with the number and show of his lictors, by which he seemed to encroach on the majesty of their sovereign, and to threaten them with all the severities of a Roman discipline, which they had violated. Frequent tumults arose on this account; and numbers of Cæsar's attendants were murdered in the streets. The westerly winds were then set in; and he, finding himself detained in a place where he was exposed to so much insult, ordered a reinforcement of troops from Asia, and had called upon Mithridates of Pergamus, in particular, to bring all the forces he could assemble, in that quarter, to his relief. At the same time, the party of Cleopatra, the exiled sister of Ptolemy, applied to Cæsar for protection: she herself, being still in Syria, ventured to pass into Egypt, came to Alexan-

dria by sea, and is said to have been carried into the presence of Cæsar, wrapped up in a package of carpet.

In this manner, it is pretended, Cæsar became first acquainted with the person of this celebrated woman, then in the bloom of youth, and possessed of those allurements by which she made different conquerors of the world, in their turns, for a while, renounce the pursuits of ambition for those of pleasure. She is supposed at this time to have become the mistress of Cæsar, and to have made him, though turned of fifty years, to forget the empire, the republic, the factions at Rome, and all the armies which, in Africa and Spain, were assembling against him. Under the dominion of his passion for this celebrated woman, he took a resolution to carry into execution the destination which had been made by the late king; and, in the quality of Roman consul, and representative of the Roman people, to whom this office had been intrusted by the will, he commanded both parties to lay down their arms, and to submit their claims to his own arbitration.

Pothinus, fearing the total exclusion of the young king, his pupil, in favour of Cleopatra, called Achilles, with the army, to Alexandria, in order to defeat Cæsar's purpose, and in order to oblige him to leave the kingdom. This army consisted of twenty thousand men, inured to bloodshed and violence, though long divested of the order and discipline of Roman troops. Cæsar, hearing of their approach, though not in a condition to meet them in the field, without regard to their threats, seized and fortified a quarter of the town, in which he proposed to defend himself. The young Ptolemy, being in his power, was prevailed on to dispatch two persons of distinction with a message to Achilles, signifying the king's pleasure, that he should not advance; but the bearers of this message, as being supposed to betray the interest of their master, in whose name they appeared, were, by the orders of Achilles, seized and slain. Cæsar, however, being still in possession of Ptolemy's person, represented Achilles as a rebel and an outlaw, and still, in name of the king, issued repeated orders and proclamations against him.

Achillas being arrived at Alexandria, entered the city, and endeavoured to force Cæsar's quarters; but being repulsed,

took possession of that part of the town which was open to him, and blocked up the remainder, both by sea and by land. The city being thus divided, the Egyptians and Romans fought in the streets, and from the houses which they severally occupied. Cæsar, as he despaired of being able to receive any succours by land, endeavoured to keep open his communication by sea, and sent pressing orders to Syria, Cilicia, Rhodes, and Crete, for reinforcements of men and of ships. Having early discovered that Pothmus, who was still in his power, corresponded with the enemy, he ordered him to be put to death; continued to strengthen his division of the town by additional barriers; and, in order to prevent surprise, demolished and cleared away many of the buildings adjoining to his works. Achilles, unacquainted with such an antagonist as Cæsar, finding so much unexpected resistance, sent for reinforcements, and a supply of stores and warlike engines, from every part of the kingdom. He traversed, with breastworks, the streets leading to Cæsar's quarters, and, demolishing the houses in his way, effected a chain of works parallel to those of Cæsar, having a parapet and covered way, with frequent elevations and towers. He exhorted the Egyptians to exert themselves for the independency of their kingdom; observing, "that the Romans were gradually assuming the sovereignty of Egypt; that Gabinius had come as an auxiliary, but acted as a master; that Pompey, on being defeated in Thessaly, came into Egypt,* as to a property which he had a right to employ in repairing his ruined fortunes; that Pompey had fallen in vain, if Cæsar were tamely suffered to succeed him; that, if this intruder were allowed to keep possession of the city until his succours should arrive from Asia, all Egypt, for the future, must expect to be enslaved by the Romans."

The danger to which Cæsar was exposed arose no less from the remains of the republican party, now assembling against him in Africa, than it did from the force with which he was actually assailed in Egypt. If Scipio had been apprised of his condition in this country, he might, in a few days, have

* Hirtius, de Bello Alexandrino.

transported a body of troops by sea to Alexandria, and, in conjunction with the Egyptians, who would now have accepted of any assistance against Cæsar, have possibly recovered the fall of their party at Pharsalia; but the best opportunities are sometimes lost, because it is not supposed that an enemy could be so ill-advised, or so rash, as to furnish them.

The scene in Egypt was frequently changing, by the intrigues and the treachery of different parties in the court. Ganimedes, who had the charge of the young princess Arsinoë, being hitherto, as well as the young king, lodged in the quarters of Cæsar, found means to make his escape, together with his ward; and, finding the troops disposed to lay hold of Arsinoë, as a branch of the royal family, employed assassins to put Achilles to death, and, in name of the princess, took on himself the command of the army. His abilities as an officer, which were very considerable, and his bounty, secured to him the affection of the soldiers. He continued the attack on Cæsar's quarters, in all the ways which were already begun by his predecessor. The town being furnished with water by subterraneous passages from the neighbouring heights, he uncovered the conduits which led to Cæsar's division of the town; and, to render the water unserviceable, forced into the reservoirs great quantities of brine from the sea. The loss, however, was soon made up from wells, in which, at a moderate depth, the besieged found a tolerable supply of water.

While Cæsar thus counteracted the arts which were employed to distress him, the eighteenth legion, with a considerable supply of provisions, military stores, and engines of war, being arrived on the coast, but unable to reach Alexandria on account of the winds, he thought proper himself to embark, and put to sea, in order to cover this reinforcement, while they made for the port. On this occasion, he was attacked by the Egyptian fleet; but gained a victory; destroyed a great part of the enemy's ships, and brought his own reinforcement safe into harbour. The Egyptians, with great ardour, set to work in all the docks on the Nile, to repair the loss they had now sustained; and were soon masters of a fleet, consisting of twenty-two vessels of four tiers of oars, five of five tiers, and

many of smaller dimensions. Cæsar had, to oppose them, nine galleys from Rhodes, eight from Pontus, five from Lycia, and twelve from the coast of Asia. Five were of five tiers of oars, and ten of four tiers. The remainder were of smaller dimensions, and most of them open, or without any deck. With these forces, having once more engaged off the mouth of the harbour, the Egyptians were again defeated, with the loss of one galley of five tiers of oars, another of two tiers taken, and three sunk. The remainder retired under cover of the mole, and of the towers of the Pharos.

Soon after this action at sea, Cæsar attacked the Pharos, and forced the enemy to fly from thence: most of them swimming across the harbour, many were killed, and six hundred taken. He forced them, at the same time, to abandon the tower, which commanded the entrance of the mole on that side. As he pursued them in their flight, and as the mole itself became crowded with his soldiers, who advanced to push the attack, or who came unarmed from the ships, and all the stations around, to witness the scene, the Egyptians, seeing these crowds, laid hold of the opportunity, mounted the mole, threw those who were upon it into confusion, forced them over the quay into the water, or into their boats. Cæsar himself, endeavouring to escape in this manner, and finding that the boat, into which he had stepped, being aground and overloaded, could not be got off, he threw himself into the water, and swam to a ship. In this tumult, he lost four hundred men of the legions, and an equal number of the fleet. The Egyptians recovered all the ground they had lost, got possession again of the tower at the head of the mole, and of the island which secured their ships.

In such operations, with various events, the parties in Egypt passed the winter and spring. Cæsar still retained the person of Ptolemy in his possession, and made use of his name to countenance his own cause, or to discredit that of his enemies: but the king, being extremely averse to have this use made of his authority, and desirous to recover his liberty, entered into a concert with some officers of his army, to find a pretence for his release. In pursuit of their design, they conveyed secret intimation to Cæsar's quarters, that the

troops were greatly disgusted with Ganimedes; and that, if Ptolemy should make his appearance in person, they would certainly submit to his orders, and commit the whole settlement of the kingdom to the arbitration of Cæsar. The king was instructed to affect a great dislike to this proposal, and with tears entreated that he might be allowed to remain in the palace. Cæsar, either being deceived by these professions, or believing the name of the king to be no longer of much consequence, consented to let him depart; but this artful boy, as soon as he was at liberty, laid aside his disguise, laughed at the supposed credulity of those he had deceived, and urged the attack on the Roman quarters with great animosity.

While affairs at Alexandria were in this situation, accounts were brought that Mithridates of Pergamus, whom Cæsar had commissioned to procure succours from Asia, was actually arrived at Pelusium with a considerable force; that he had reduced that place, and only waited for instructions from Cæsar, how to proceed. These accounts were brought to both parties about the same time, and both of consequence determined to put their forces in motion. Ptolemy, leaving a proper guard on his works, embarked his army on the Nile; having a considerable navigation to make, by the different branches of that river. Cæsar, at the same time, put his army on board in the harbour, and, having an open course by the coast, outstripped the king, and arrived at Pelusium before him. There, being joined by Mithridates, he was in condition to take the field, and to contend with all the forces of Egypt. Ptolemy, to prevent the return of Cæsar by land to Alexandria, had taken a strong post on one of the branches of the Nile; but here, after a few skirmishes, he was attacked, defeated, and driven from his station. Endeavouring to make his escape by water, the barge* which carried him being overloaded, it sunk, and he himself, with all his attendants, were drowned.

Immediately after this action, in which the Egyptian army was routed and dispersed, Cæsar, escorted by a small party of horse, returned to Alexandria, and, having received the

* Hirt. de Bello Alex.

submission of the inhabitants, made such arrangements as he thought proper in the succession to the kingdom. He placed Cleopatra on the throne, in conjunction with her younger brother; and, to remove any further occasion of disturbance to this settlement, he ordered her sister Arsinoë to be transported to Rome. He left great part of the army, to support this new establishment in Egypt, and he himself, after this singular episode, in the midst of the conquest of the Roman empire, marched with the sixth legion, by land, into Syria. At Antioch he received such reports of the state of affairs as required his presence in different quarters. Nine months were elapsed, since any orders or directions had been received from him. During this time, the factions of the city, the relaxation of discipline in the army, and the threats of invasion from Africa, had placed his affairs in such a state of hazard, as to urge his immediate appearance in Italy and at Rome; but he thought it of consequence to his authority to leave no enemy behind him in the field,* nor to suffer the remains of disorder in any of the provinces through which he was to pass. Pharnaces, the son of Mithridates, to whom Pompey had assigned the kingdom of the Bosphorus, imagining that the civil wars, in which the Romans were engaged, made a favourable opportunity for the recovery of his father's dominions, had passed with an army into Pontus, and from thence invaded the lesser Armenia and Cappadocia, which had been separately allotted by the Romans to two of their dependent allies, Dejotarus and Ariobarzanes. At the instance of these princes, Domitius Calvinus, who had been commissioned by Cæsar, after the battle of Pharsalia, with three legions, to receive the submission of the Asiatic provinces, which had been till then in the interest of Pompey, dispatched to Pharnaces a messenger, requiring him instantly to withdraw his troops from Armenia and Cappadocia; and, in order to give the more weight to this message, he himself at the same time took the field with one Roman legion, joined by two legions which had been formed by Dejotarus in the Roman manner, and two hundred Asiatic horse. He at the

* Hirt. de Bello Alex.

same time ordered Publius Sextius and C. Prætorius to bring up a legion which had been lately raised in Pontus, and Q. Patisius to join him with some light troops from Cilicia.

These forces being assembled at Camana in Cappadocia, the messenger, who had been sent to Pharnaces, returned with an answer, that the king was willing to evacuate Cappadocia; but that, having a just claim to Armenia, in right of his father, he would keep possession of that province until the arrival of Cæsar, to whose decision he was willing to submit his pretensions. Domitius, not being satisfied with this answer, put his army in motion towards Armenia. While he advanced, Pharnaces endeavoured to amuse him with negotiations, and to put him off his guard, by permitting the country to receive him, with all the appearances of peace and security. When he arrived at Nicopolis, the capital of Armenia, the order of Cæsar, to march into Egypt, was delivered to him; but, being unwilling to quit the prey which seemed to be already in his power, risked a battle with the forces of Pharnaces, was defeated, and, with the remains of his army, was obliged to fly by the route of the mountains which separated Armenia from the Roman province.

Elated with this victory, Pharnaces, at the time of Cæsar's departure from Egypt, had returned into Pontus, had taken possession of the principal towns, and, with great severity, exercised the sovereignty of the kingdom. Meantime, Cæsar, being arrived at Antioch, dispatched Trebonius from thence with an account of his own operations, and, with instructions to those who were intrusted with his affairs in Italy,* proceeded himself by sea to Tarsus, where he received, as has been mentioned, the submission of Caius Cassius, who waited for his coming, and who, according to the account of Cicero, till then was undetermined, whether he should make his peace with the victor, or attempt to assassinate him. At Tarsus, he held a convention of the principal inhabitants of Cilicia, and from thence marched into Cappadocia, stopped at Comana, to make the necessary arrangements in that

* Cicer. ad Attic. lib. xi. ep. 23.

province, and continued his route to the frontiers of Galatia and Pontus.

Hither Dejotarus, who had espoused the cause of Pompey, had fought under his banners in Pharsalia, and who, by the gift of that unfortunate leader, still retained the sovereignty of Galatia, came to make his submission. He laid down his diadem, and the ensigns of royalty; and, presenting himself "in the habit of a suppliant, pleaded, "That, in the late war, "the eastern part of the empire being subject to Pompey, the "princes of that quarter had not been free to choose their party; "that he was himself not qualified to decide in a question on "which the Roman people was divided; that he thought it "his duty to follow the Roman standard, wherever it was "erected, without considering by whom it was carried." Cæsar, rejecting the plea of ignorance or incapacity, insisted, "That any prince in alliance with the Romans could not be "ignorant who were consuls in the year that succeeded the "consulate of Lentulus and Marcellus, and who were actually in the administration of the state at Rome; that they "could not be ignorant who was at the head of the republic, "and in possession of the capital, and of the seat of empire; "and who, of consequence, was vested with the authority of "the commonwealth. But that he, as a private man, and in "consideration of this prince's age, his character, and the intercession of his friends, was willing to forgive the part "which he had taken against himself." He desired him, therefore, to resume the crown and other ensigns of royalty, and to keep possession of his kingdom, reserving the discussion of the title, by which he held any particular territory, to a future day.

Being joined by a legion which Dejotarus had lately formed in the Roman manner, Cæsar's force now consisted of this, together with the remains of the two legions which had escaped with Domitius from Nicopolis, and of the sixth, which had accompanied himself from Egypt, now reduced by the sword, and by the fatigues of service, to no more than a thousand men. With this army he advanced towards Pontus. Upon his approach, Pharnaces sent forward a messenger, to present him, in honour of his late victories, with a crown of

gold, and made offers of submission, expecting to appease him, or to occupy the time with delays, until Cæsar should be obliged, by the necessity of his affairs, to give his presence elsewhere. "Come not against me," he said, "as an enemy: I never took part with Pompey, nor declared war against Cæsar. Let me not be treated with more severity than Dejotarus, who did both." Cæsar replied, That he would listen to Pharnaces when he had acted up to his professions; that he had forgiven Dejotarus, and many others, with pleasure, the injury done to himself; but that he could not so easily overlook the insults which had been offered to the Roman state; and that he did not pardon wrongs done in the provinces of the Roman empire, even by those of his own party. "Your not having journeyed with Pompey," he said, "has saved you from being a partner in his defeat, but was not the cause of my victory." With this reply to the messages of Pharnaces, Cæsar demanded the instant surrender of Pontus, and full reparation of all the damages sustained by any Roman citizens settled in that kingdom. Pharnaces professed an intention to comply with these demands; but, under various pretences, delayed the performance of what he promised to do. He had fixed on a hill in the neighbourhood of Zeicla, a place become famous by the victory which his father Mithridates had there obtained over a Roman army under the command of Triarius; and there, in order to secure himself, repaired his father's lines, and seemed to be determined to maintain this post.

Cæsar, having lain, for some days, within five miles of the enemy, advanced to an eminence, separated from the camp of Pharnaces only by a narrow valley, sunk between steep banks. He came upon this ground in the night, and began to intrench himself as usual, having a party under arms, to cover the workmen. As, at break of day, the greater part of his army appeared to be at work, this seemed to be a favourable opportunity to attack them; and Pharnaces began to form for this purpose. Cæsar, imagining that he only meant to give an alarm, and to interrupt his workmen, even after he was in motion, did not order the legions to desist from their work, nor to arm: but, seeing him descend into the valley, and at-

tempt to pass it in the face of his advanced guard, he sounded to arms, and was scarcely formed, when the enemy had passed both banks of the ravine, or gulley, to attack him.

The troops of Pharnaces began the action with an ardour that was suited to the boldness with which they had advanced; and Cæsar's contempt of their designs had nearly exposed him to a defeat. But the action, which was doubtful every-where else, was decided by the veterans of the sixth legion, before whom the enemy first began to give way, hurried with precipitation down the declivity, and fell into a general rout. Pharnaces fled with a few attendants, and narrowly escaped being taken.* This victory gave Cæsar an opportunity to compare his own glories with those of Sylla, of Lucullus, and of Pompey; and was on this account, probably, regarded by him with "singular pleasure. "How cheap is fame," he said, "when obtained by fighting against such an enemy!"† And, in the triumphs which he afterwards led in the sequel of these wars, the trophies of this particular victory were distinguished by "labels, containing the words, "I came, I saw, I vanquished."‡

From the peculiar ostentation of the ease with which this victory was obtained, while it was considered by Cæsar as a measure of his own superiority to Sylla and Pompey, we may suspect that vanity, not less than dominion, was the spring of that emulation from which he had raised such a flame in the empire.|| Having, by this defeat, extinguished all the hopes and pretensions of Pharnaces, he restored Domitius Calvinus to his command in that quarter, and to a general inspection of affairs in Asia. This province, which had furnished a principal supply to the public revenue of the state, as well as to the private fortune of Roman adventurers, was now made to pay large contributions, in name of arrears of what had been promised to Pompey, or of forfeiture for offences committed against the victorious party.

* Hirtius de Bello Alex.—Velleius.—Florus,—I. iv. Epitome, &c.

† Appian. de Bello. Civil. lib. ii. p. 185.

‡ The famous words, *Veni, vidi, vici*. || Sueton. in Vit. Cæsaris, c. 37.

Cæsar, having issued his orders for the contributions thus to be levied in Asia, set out on his way, by Galatia and Bithynia, towards Greece: he landed at Tarentum, having been near two years absent from Italy. Many citizens of Rome had waited near twelve months at Brundisium, in anxious expectation of his coming, and under great uncertainty of the reception they were to meet with. Cicero, being of this number, set out for Tarentum, as soon as he heard of Cæsar's arrival, and met him on the road. When he presented himself, Cæsar alighted from his carriage, received him with marks of respect, and continued to walk and to discourse with him aside for some time. There is no particular account of what passed between them in this conversation. On the part of Cicero, probably, were stated the reasons which he assigns, in a letter to Atticus, for his own conduct before the battle of Pharsalia; bearing, that he had been averse to the war; that he thought the republic had nothing to gain by the victory of either party; and that he joined Pompey, more influenced by the opinion of others than decided in his own.* Under these impressions, though courted by Cæsar, who wished to have the credit of his name in support of the measures now to be taken at Rome, he chose to withdraw to a life of retirement, and devoted his time to literary amusements and studies. At this time, he probably composed most of his writings on the subject of eloquence, as he did, some time afterwards, those which are termed his philosophical works.†

Cæsar arrived at Rome in the end of the year seven hundred and six of the Roman æra, in which he had been named a second time dictator. This year, as has been U. C. 706 related, he had passed chiefly in Egypt. Being elected, together with M. Æmilius, consul for the following year, he applied himself, for a little time, in the quality of civil magistrate, to the affairs of state; endeavoured to restore the tranquillity of the city, which had been disturbed in his absence, and to wipe away the reproach which the levities of Antony had brought on his party. He stifled the unreasonable hopes of a general abolition of debts, with which Dolabella had flattered the more profligate part of the community. He told the people, on

* Cicer. ad Att. lib. xi. ep. 12.

† Cicer. ad Attic. lib. xv. ep. 13.

this occasion, that he himself was a debtor; that he had expended his fortune in the public service, and was still obliged to borrow money for the same purpose. With respect to the general policy of the city, and the case of insolvent debtors, he revived the laws which he himself had procured, about two years before, in his way from Spain to Epirus. But, while he appeared to be intent on these particulars, his thoughts were chiefly occupied in preparing to meet the war which the remains of the ancient senate and of the republican party were resuming against him in Africa.

This province, in which Varus, supported by the king of Numidia, had been hitherto able to keep his station as an officer of the commonwealth, was now become the sole or the principal refuge of those who made any efforts to preserve or to restore their freedom. Three hundred citizens, many of them senators, and emigrants from Italy, as well as settlers in that province, had assembled at Utica, and, considering every other part of the empire as under the rod of a violent usurpation, stated themselves as the only legal remains of the Roman republic; held their meetings under the denominations of senate and people; authorized the levies that were made in the province, and contributed largely to supply the expense of the war. Many officers of name and of rank, Labienus, Afranius and Petreius, as well as Scipio and Cato, with all the remains they had saved from the wreck at Pharsalia, were now ready to renew the conflict on this favourable ground. The name of Scipio was reckoned ominous of success in Africa, and that of Cato, even if the origin or occasion of the present contest were otherwise unknown, would be held a sufficient mark by which to distinguish the side of justice and the cause of the republic.

These representatives of the republic, having a considerable force at sea, and having access to all the ports, not only of Africa, but likewise of Sicily, Sardinia, and Spain, had furnished themselves in abundance with all the resources of war.* They had mustered ten legions, which, according to the establishment of that time, may have amounted to fifty

* Dio. Cass. lib. lxii. c. 5.

thousand Roman foot. They had twenty thousand African horse, a great body of archers and slingers, with a hundred and twenty elephants. They expected to be joined by the king of Numidia, who, to the established character of his countrymen for stratagem and valour, joined the glory of his late victory over Curio, and was supposed to muster, at this time, besides numerous bodies of horse, of archers, of slingers, with a great troop of elephants, thirty thousand foot, armed and marshalled, for the most part, in the manner of the Roman legion.*

The army already in Africa, as well as the remains of the sea and land forces of Pompey, who were lately arrived from Macedonia, were willing, as has been mentioned, to have placed Cato at their head. But the established order of the commonwealth, for which all the party contended, requiring that Scipio, who was of consular rank, should have the preference, Cato, who had no more than the rank of prætor, and who could not be accessory to the infringement of any established or constitutional form, declined the command. By this circumstance we are deprived of an opportunity to judge how far the military abilities of this eminent personage kept pace with his integrity, judgment, and courage, in civil and political affairs.†

Scipio, who was now the officer of highest rank opposed to Cæsar, and who had the supreme command of all the forces which appeared for the republic, whilst the coasts of Italy were exposed to his attempts, (and the condition of Cæsar himself, if his situation at Alexandria had been known, gave sufficient opportunities for enterprise) nevertheless took all his measures for a defensive war.

Such was the state of affairs in Africa, when Cæsar, who, with all his military character and authority, frequently experienced the difficulty of commanding mere soldiers of fortune, who had been taught to divest themselves of civil principle, or regard to public duty, was likely to perish in a mutiny of

* App. de Bello Civ. lib. ii.—Hirt. de Bell. African.

† Guichard does not scruple to say, that, even in his separation from the main army, his military abilities greatly outshone those who were at the head of it. Vide *Memoirs d'Antiquités Militaires*.

his own army, and to end his career by the swords which he himself had whetted against the republic.

The legions which, after the defeat of Pompey had been ordered into Italy, becoming insolent in the possession of a military power which they saw was to be formed on the ruins of the commonwealth, and feeling their own importance, especially in the long absence of their leader in Egypt, would not be commanded by subordinate officers; nor did they, on the return of Cæsar himself, discontinue the habits of disorder and license in which they had for some time been indulged. Being stationed in the neighbourhood of Capua, whence it was expected they should embark for Africa, they decamped without orders, and marched towards Rome; paid no regard to the authority of Sallust, who, in the rank of prætor, with which he had been vested by Cæsar, endeavoured to stop them, killed many officers and persons of rank, who ventured to obstruct their march, and threw the city itself into great consternation. On the approach of this formidable body, Cæsar is said to have wavered in his resolution. He had some troops attending his person, and there was a legion which Antony had stationed in the city on occasion of the late commotions. With these he at first proposed to meet and resist the mutiny; but he recollected that even these troops might be infected with the same spirit of disobedience, and that, if he were not able to command by his authority, and were forced to draw the sword in one part of his army against the other, the whole foundations of the power he had erected must fail. While he was agitated by these reflections, he sent an officer, with orders, to inquire, for what purpose the mutinous legions advanced? This officer was told, "that they would explain themselves to Cæsar." Having this answer, and expecting their arrival at the gates, Cæsar, in order that they might appear to do, by his permission, what they were likely to do without it, sent them another message, informing them that they had his leave to enter the city with their arms. They, accordingly, came in a body, and took possession of the field of Mars; where Cæsar, contrary to the advice of his friends, had gone to receive them in person. Being raised on a conspicuous place, they crowded around

him; and, from many different quarters at once, complained of the scanty rewards they had received,* enumerated their services, and the hardships they had suffered, and, with one voice, demanded their instant discharge. Cæsar, knowing that they only meant to extort some concessions, which they hoped the consideration of the war, which was still impending in Africa, would oblige him to make; that they were far from wishing to be dismissed, or to resign those arms to which they owed their own consequence, and on which they grounded their present presumption, affected to comply with their request, owned that their demand was highly reasonable; adding, that the service for which they had been hitherto retained was now at an end, and that he was sensible they were worn out, and unfit to contend with new fatigues. In concluding a speech which he made to this purpose, he addressed them as a mere assembly of people, with the appellation of *quirites*, or fellow-citizens; and observed, how proper it was that those who had served out their legal time should receive the accustomed dismissal. In speaking these words, he was interrupted by a general cry, that they were not *quirites*, or citizens, but soldiers, in condition to dispose of the empire. It is alleged, that the name of Roman citizens, though the most respectable form of address in the political assemblies at Rome, carried contempt to these military adventurers, and insinuated a state of degradation from that in which they affected to stand. An officer, who was prepared for the occasion, or who wished to improve this sentiment in favour of Cæsar, desired to be heard; made an apology for what was past, and offered to pledge himself for the duty and future obedience of the troops. He was answered by Cæsar, that the services of this army were now of little moment to him; that, as they desired their dismissal, while, by their own confession, they were yet in condition to serve, he had taken his resolution, and should instantly dismiss them, with the usual rewards. "No man," he said, "shall complain that in time of need I employed him, and now, at my ease, forget the reward that is due to him. Such as con-

* Dio. Cassius, c. 51—55.

"time in the service until the public tranquillity be fully restored shall have settlements in land; such as have received promises of money, at any time during the war, shall be paid now, or in a little time hereafter, with interest." He concluded, however, with saying, "that, as he asked no man to remain in the service, so he should not reject the duty of those who were willing to abide by their colours; that he was sensible how much he owed this indulgence to their present requests, and to their merit on former occasions." The whole, with one voice, desired to be comprehended in this act of indulgence, and went headlong into all the extremes of submission, as they had lately gone into every excess of disorder and insolence. Cæsar was thus again in full possession of his power; but he did not venture to punish the authors of the mutiny: it was safer, and perhaps more effectual, to reward such as were conspicuous in any particular merit; he therefore selected a few, to be distinguished by immediate effects of his bounty, and put the remainder in motion towards Africa, where they might have an opportunity of earning future rewards and the pardon of past offences, and where they might spend against enemies that fury which, at every interval of leisure to recollect their own pretensions and their importance, they were so likely to turn against their leader.*

The year was now, according to the vulgar computation at Rome, and in consequence of the usual intercalations being neglected, nominally advanced to the middle of December, but was in reality little past the autumnal equinox,† or was in the end of September, when Cæsar, having made the proper arrangements in the city, and, in the manner related, appeased the mutiny which threatened to overturn his power, was again in motion to carry the war into Africa. The season, which was thought unfit for operations at sea, and which had actually forced his antagonist's ships into port, gave him the opportunity he wished for, to effect the passage of his army into that province. He knew that the enemy's fleet could not continue to cruize, for any time, to observe his motions; and that, with

* Dio. Cass. lib. xlii. c. 51—55.

† Plut. in Vita Cæsaris, p. 154.

the advantage of a favourable wind, he might easily escape them. He had chosen the same opportunity, and in the same season, two years before, to transport his army into Macedonia against Pompey, who, trusting to the numbers and vigilance of his fleet, suffered himself to be surprised, and to be dispossessed of a country which he occupied with so superior a force.

Cæsar, having gained so much on that occasion, by the rapidity of his motions, now made war with many accumulated advantages of reputation and power, which increased his boldness, and facilitated his success. Having ordered troops and shipping from different quarters of Italy to assemble at Lilybæum, from which place he had the shortest passage to Africa, he himself arrived there on what was nominally the seventeenth of December, though in reality but a few days after the autumnal equinox; and, although he found no more of his army arrived than one legion, or five thousand men, of the new levies, and six hundred horse, he ordered these, notwithstanding, to embark on board such ships as were then in the harbour; and, if the wind had served, would have instantly sailed, even with this small force, trusting that he might be able to surprise some port on the opposite shore, and prepare a safe landing-place for the troops he had destined to follow. But, while he continued windbound at Lilybæum, he was joined successively by a number of legions, which he ordered to embark as fast as they arrived; and, that they might be clear of the harbour, and ready to put to sea with the first fair wind, sent the transports with their complement of troops on board, to lie under an island, a little way advanced from the main land.

Being in this state of readiness, with six legions, or about thirty thousand foot, together with two thousand horse; and the wind coming fair on the twenty-eighth of December, or, as it is computed, on the twelfth of October, he himself went on board, and, leaving orders for the troops that were still in motion towards Lilybæum to follow him without delay, he set sail for the nearest land in Africa. Not knowing of any port, to which he might safely repair, he could not, as usual, assign a place of general rendezvous in case of separation,

and only gave orders to the fleet to keep close together; deferring the choice of a landing-place till after he should have observed the coast, and seen in what part of it the enemy were least guarded against a descent. But, soon after he got to sea, a storm arose, which dispersed the fleet: he himself, with the ships which still kept him company, after being tossed four days in a passage of no more than twenty leagues, got under the land near the promontory of Mercury, and from thence, to avoid the forces of the enemy, which were stationed at Utica, and round the bay of Carthage, steered to the southward.

The coast of Africa, from this cape or promontory to the bottom of the great Syrtes, over three degrees of latitude, or about two hundred miles, extends directly to the south. It abounds with considerable towns, which, on account of their commerce, were anciently called the *Emporiæ*; and by their wealth, tempting the rapacity both of the Numidians and of the Carthaginians, were long a subject of contention between these powers. Adrumetum lay on one side of a spacious bay, bounded by the head of Clupea on the north, and that of Vada on the south. The southern coast of this bay contained, besides Adrumetum, the following sea-ports: Ruspina, Leptis, and Thapsus: the bay itself extending from the first of these places to the last, about thirty-six miles. Scipio had secured Adrumetum and Thapsus, being the extremities of the line, in which the others were included, with considerable forces. In order to render the province unfit for the reception of an enemy, he had laid waste the country, and had collected all the provisions and forage into these and other places of strength, for the use of his own army.

Considius, an officer of the republican army, being stationed at Adrumetum with two legions, and Virgilius, with a proper force at Thapsus, the intermediate ports of Ruspina and Leptis, as well as many of the inland towns, were intrusted to the keeping of their own inhabitants. But these, on account of the general devastations lately committed by order of Scipio, were extremely disaffected to his party, and inclined to favour any enemy against him.

Cato, as has been mentioned, was stationed at Utica, as the last retreat of the Roman senate, the centre of all their resources, and the seat of their councils.

Scipio had collected the main body of his army near to the same place, supposed to be the principal object of any attempt that might be made from Italy.

Labienus and Petreius had separate bodies, at proper stations, to guard the inlets of the coast, round the bay of Carthage; and were so posted, that they could easily join, and cross over a neck of land to the bay of Adrumetum, upon any alarm of an enemy from that side.

Varus, having the command of the fleet, had kept the sea during summer and the approach of autumn, but had now withdrawn to Utica, and laid up his ships for the stormy season.

Cæsar, however, according to his custom of taking opportunities when his enemies were likely to be off their guard, venturing to sea, even in this season, seems to have had no information to direct him on his approach to the coast, besides the general report that the enemy were strongest and most to be avoided in the bay of Carthage. In this belief he passed the head-lands of Clupea and Neapolis, and stood in to the bay of Adrumetum. Being seen from the shore, he was followed by Cn. Piso from Clupea, with three thousand Numidian horse, and was to be opposed at Adrumetum by Considius, with a force greatly superior to what he could land from the few ships that were now in his company. But so little had he attended to the superior strength of the enemy, or so much was he determined to brave it, that he went on shore near Adrumetum on the nominal first of January, or about the middle of October, with no more than N. C. 6. three thousand foot and an hundred and fifty horse. This hazardous step his high reputation seemed to require or to justify. The enemy might not be apprised of his present weakness; it being occasioned by the accidental separation of his fleet. They were likely to be awed by his name, and to hesitate in their deliberations against him long enough to give time for the junction of the remainder of his army. In this confidence, he supported the courage of his own people, by

proceeding against the enemy with his usual rapidity and decision.

The garrison of Adrumetum, upon this sudden appearance of a force which came to attack them, were thrown into some confusion, and Considius, not perceiving he had to do with an enemy so inferior in point of numbers, and instead of taking measures to crush him before he should receive any reinforcement, thought of nothing but how to secure himself from surprise; shut his gates, manned his walls, and placed all the troops under his command at their posts of alarm. Cæsar, to confirm him in this disposition, sent him a menacing summons to surrender at discretion; and afterwards, at the suggestion of Plancus, who had been in habits of intimacy with Considius, endeavoured to corrupt or to gain him by a more insinuating message; but this officer, being more a man of integrity than he had shewn himself a skilful warrior, ordered the bearer of the message to be put to death, and sent the letter unopened to Scipio.

Cæsar, being thus disappointed of any return to his message, and suspecting that his attempt to corrupt the commander of the forces at Adrumetum might betray his own weakness, after only one night's stay in this dangerous situation, determined, on the day after he landed, to remove to some place of greater security. With this view he moved to the southward, and though harassed in his rear by the enemy's horse, continued his march without any considerable interruption or loss. As he advanced to Ruspina, a deputation from the inhabitants of that place came forward to meet him, with offers of every accommodation it was in their power to supply, and of an immediate reception into their town. He accordingly encamped one night under their walls; but, being inclined to see more of the coast, and not being in condition to divide his little force, he proceeded with the whole to Leptis. Here he was received with equal favour; and, having entered the town, took measures to protect the inhabitants from the licentiousness of his own people. The harbour was convenient for the reception of his transports; and a few of them, accordingly, having some cohorts of foot and troops of horse on board,

it being now the third day after he himself had debarked, appeared in the offing, and made their way to the port.

By this arrival, Cæsar was alarmed with an account that numbers of the fleet, after they had parted company, appeared to be steering for Utica; a course by which they must either run into the hands of the enemy, or lose much time before they could correct their mistake, or recover their way to the southward. In a state of anxious suspense, occasioned by these circumstances, he seems to have deliberated, whether it were not proper for him to reembark; and, in consequence of his doubts, probably, though under pretence of the want of forage, he still kept his cavalry on board, and with great difficulty continued to supply them with fresh water from the land. But, as soon as he determined to keep his footing in Africa, he landed his cavalry, and took the necessary measures to procure supplies of provisions by sea. He sent back the empty transports, to receive such part of his army as might be arrived at Lillybæum, after his own departure, and ordered ten galleys from the harbour at Leptis to cruize for the missing ships of the embarkation which was still at sea. At the same time, he dispatched expresses to Sardinia and other maritime provinces, with orders to hasten the reinforcements of troops or the supplies of provisions which were expected from thence; and having intelligence that the enemy had some magazines in the island of Cercina, near the coast of Africa, he sent thither Crispus Sallustius, the celebrated historian, now acting under him in a military rank, to endeavour to secure those magazines for the use of his army.

Cæsar, being determined to keep both the ports of Ruspina and Leptis, which the enemy seemed to have abandoned to him, he was now, by the recent junction of so many cohorts, in condition to garrison Leptis, while himself, with the principal force of his little army, returned to Ruspina, from which to observe the motions of his enemy. This place being unprovided of necessaries for the support of his troops, he determined to try what provisions could be found in the neighbourhood until the arrival of his transports, or until he should be enabled to penetrate further into the country: For this purpose, he advanced with the whole of his little army to

forage, followed by all the carriages that could be collected together, and had them loaded with corn, wood, and other necessaries, to form some species of magazine for the troops he intended to place in the town. As soon as he had effected this service, it appeared that he had taken the resolution to go in person in search of the transports, on board of which the greater part of his army was dispersed: and, with this view, having destined ten cohorts to remain at Ruspina, he himself, with seven others, which made the whole of his strength on the present occasion, went down to the harbour, which was about two miles from the town, and embarked in the night.

The troops which were to be left at Ruspina, being so few, without the leader, in whom their confidence was chiefly reposed, surrounded with numerous armies, who were likely to assemble against them, were aware of their danger. They had now been three days on shore, and the enemy had full time to be apprised of their situation and of their weakness. The presence of their general had hitherto supported their courage; and they relied on his abilities to repair the effects, whether of mistake or temerity; but in his absence they lost all hopes, and expected to become an easy prey to their enemies.

Cæsar, however, fully determined to put to sea, having passed the night on board, still continued at anchor; when, at break of day, being about to weigh, some vessels came in sight, and were known to be a part of the fleet which he so anxiously looked for. These were soon followed by other ships, which appeared successively, and brought him the greater part of the six legions with which he had originally sailed from Lilybæum. Being thus prevented in his intended excursion, he returned to Ruspina, in a kind of triumph, and took post between the town and the shore.

In the mean time, it appears, Labienus and Petreius, commanding the cavalry and light troops of Scipio's army, in the angle that is formed by the promontory of Clupea, between the bays of Carthage and Adrumetum, having intelligence that Cæsar was landed, with the utmost diligence assembled their forces, and marched towards the coast from which they had received the alarm.

Cæsar had taken a defensive station behind the town of Ruspina, the place which he chose for the resort and safe reception of his convoys and reinforcements by sea; but he was far from limiting his plan of operations to the defence of this place. On the fourth or fifth day after his landing, although, by his own account, he had yet no intelligence of the enemy's motions, he thought proper to continue the alarm he had given, and marched from Ruspina with a body of thirty cohorts, or about fifteen thousand foot, and four hundred horse, to penetrate into the country, to observe its nature, or to extend the source of his own supplies. After he had begun his march for this purpose, and was about three miles from his camp, the parties advanced fell back on the main body, and informed him that they had been in sight of an enemy. Soon after this report, clouds of dust began to rise from the plain, and, about noon, an army appeared in order of battle. To observe them more nearly, Cæsar, after he had made the signal for the cohorts to form, and to be covered with their helmets, advanced with a small party of horse. He saw bodies of cavalry in every part of the field; and, from the imperfect view which could be had of them, as the air was clouded with dust, he supposed their line to consist entirely of horse. He thought himself secure against such an enemy, provided he could sufficiently extend his front or cover his flanks; for this purpose he divided his small body of cavalry to the right and the left; and, that he might not be outlined, diminished the depth to increase the length of his ordinary column. In making this disposition, however, he had mistaken the enemy's force; it did not consist, as his imperfect view led him to believe, entirely of cavalry, but of troops of horse interspersed at intervals with bodies of foot; and he had not seen considerable detachments, which were sent, under cover of the hills, to turn his flanks, and fall upon his rear.

Under these disadvantages on the part of Cæsar, the action began in front, by a scattered charge of the Numidian horse, who, advancing in squadrons, at full gallop, from the intervals at which they were placed among the infantry, threw their javelins and darts, and presently retired to their former situation. In this retreat, under cover of the infantry, whose

intervals they occupied, they instantly rallied, and prepared to repeat the charge.

While Cæsar's infantry was occupied in front with this unexpected mode of attack, his horse were defeated on the wings; and the enemy, in consequence of the disposition they had made, being already on his right and his left, even began to close on his rear, and, by the superiority of their numbers, were every-where enabled to continue the impression they made; his men, to shun the arrows and darts of the enemy, giving way, were pressed from the flanks to the centre; so that they were forced into a kind of circle, or formless crowd, without any distinction of front or rear, and were galled with a continual discharge of missiles, which did great execution.*

This renowned commander, who so far had suffered himself to be surprised and over-reached, in a most difficult situation, took the benefit of that confidence which his knowledge and presence of mind ever procured him from his troops. Recollecting that the enemy must have weakened their line in every part, by attempting to stretch it over so great a circumference, he prevailed on his legions again to extend their ranks, ordered the cohorts to face alternately to the right and the left, and, making a front in both directions, charged the enemy on the opposite sides, and drove them, in both ways, to a distance from the line of his march. Without attempting, however, to improve his advantage, or to urge the pursuit, he took the opportunity of the enemy's flight to effect his own retreat, and fell back to the camp behind Ruspina, from which he had moved in the morning.

The speedy march of Labienus and Petreius, from a distance which could not be less than eighty or a hundred miles, accomplished by the fourth or fifth day after the arrival of Cæsar, and their disposition, on the day of battle, to avail themselves of their numbers and manner of fighting, was able and spirited. But the event is sufficient to shew that the use of mere missile weapons, in the open plain, against troops who are armed and disciplined for close fight, although it may

* Cæsar's copis in orbem compulsis, intra cancellos omnes coniecti pugnare cogeantur.

harass and distress an enemy, cannot, against resolute men, have any decisive effect.

In about three days after this encounter, Cæsar had intelligence that Scipio himself was advancing with the whole force of his infantry, consisting of eight legions, or about forty thousand men, and four thousand regular horse: an army which he was not in condition to oppose in the field, and which obliged him, contrary to his usual practice, to adopt a plan of defence. Ruspina lay along the coast, and at the distance of two miles from the shore. As his army lay behind the town, covering part of the space between it and the sea with the fortifications of his camp, he threw up an intrenchment from his camp on one side, and from the end of the town on the other, quite to the shore; so that, by means of the town in front, the fortifications of his camp and these lines in flank, the whole space between Ruspina and the sea was inclosed with his works. The harbour, too, was thus secured from any attempts of the enemy. And, in order to man and defend these fortifications, he landed his engines from the galleys, and brought the mariners to serve them on shore.

The choice of this situation, cooped up in a narrow place, without any secure communication with the country, in case the enemy had seized their advantage, or in case the reinforcements, which he himself had expected from the sea, had by any accident been long delayed, might have exposed this invader of Africa to the greatest calamities. He himself would not have neglected to hem in an enemy, so posted, with a line of circumvallation; but the undertaking was too vast for those who were opposed to him; and he was suffered in safety to wait the arrival of his reinforcements, and to collect some immediate supply of provisions from the neighbouring country, as well as to receive convoys which he had ordered from every maritime province.

While Cæsar remained in this position, Scipio arrived at Adrumetum, and, having halted there a few days, joined Labienus and Petreius in the station they had chosen, about three miles from the town of Ruspina. Their cavalry immediately over-ran the country, and interrupted the supplies which Cæsar had derived from thence. The space he had

inclosed within his intrenchments, being about six square miles, was soon exhausted even of forage or pasture, and his horses were reduced to feed on sea-weed, which was washed or steeped in fresh water, in order to purge it as much as possible of its salt.

To encourage the hopes which Scipio entertained from all these circumstances, the king of Numidia, with a powerful army, was on the march, and likely to join him before Cæsar could receive any considerable addition to his present force; but, whatever might have been the consequence of this junction, if it had really taken place, it was delayed for some time by one of those strokes of fortune, to which human foresight cannot extend. Publius Sittius, a Roman citizen, who had been an accomplice with Cataline in his designs against the republic, and who, on this account, had fled beyond reach of the Roman power, had assembled a band of warriors or lawless banditti, at the head of which he made himself of importance on the coasts of Africa, and was admitted successively to join the forces of different princes in that quarter. Being now in the service of Bogud, king of Mauritania, and being disposed to court the favour of Cæsar, or hoping to make his peace at Rome by means of a person so likely to be at the head of the Roman state, he persuaded the king of Mauritania to take advantage of Juba's absence, and, with such troops as he had then on foot, to invade the kingdom of Numidia. Juba, being about to join Scipio near Ruspina, when the news of this invasion of his own country overtook him, found himself obliged not only to return on his march, but to call off from his allies great part of the Numidian light troops, who were already in their camp.

Scipio, though thus disappointed of the great accession of force which he expected to receive by the junction of Juba, and though even somewhat reduced in his former numbers, still continued to act on the offensive; and, in order to brave his enemy, or, as usual, to derive some species of triumph from the supposed offers of battle, repeatedly drew forth his army on the plain between the two camps. In repeating these operations, he advanced still nearer and nearer to Cæsar's intrenchments, and seemed to threaten his camp with an attack.

In return to this insult, or to take off its effects, Cæsar, knowing the strength of his own works, affected to hear of the enemy's approach with indifference; and, without stirring from his tent, in which he was employed in dictating letters, gave orders for the ordinary guards, which lay without the intrenchments, not to be discomposed, but, as soon as the enemy approached them, deliberately to retire behind the parapet; and Scipio, upon this reception, when seemingly most bent on assaulting the lines, being satisfied with the supposed display of his prowess, returned to his camp.

During this suspension of any serious operation, and while Juba was still detained in Numidia by the diversion which Sitius had occasioned in his kingdom, Cæsar had frequent deserters from the African army, and received deputations from different parts of the country, with professions of attachment to himself as the relation of Marius, whose memory was still entire and popular in that province. Among these advances, which were made to him by the natives of the country, he had a message from the inhabitants of Acilla, a place situate about ten miles from the coast, and equally distant from Adrumetum and from Ruspina, offering to come under his protection, and inviting him to take possession of their town. The people of this place, like those of most other towns in the province, were extremely disaffected to Scipio, on account of the severities which he exercised in the devastation of their country on the approach of Cæsar; and, as they dreaded a continuation or repetition of the same measures, they were desirous to put themselves in a posture of defence against him. Cæsar accepted of their offer, and sent a detachment of his army, who, turning round the enemy's flank, after a long night's march, entered the town without opposition. Considius, having intelligence of what was in agitation at Acilla, sent a detachment at the same time from Adrumetum, to secure the place; but, coming too late, and finding the enemy already in possession of the town, he brought forward more forces on the following day, and endeavoured, but in vain, to dislodge them.

While Cæsar was thus endeavouring to extend his quarters in Africa, and to enlarge the means of subsisting his army,

Crispus Sallustius succeeded in the design upon which he had been sent to the island of Cercina, and was able to furnish a considerable supply of provisions from thence. There arrived, at the same time, from Allienus, the officer stationed at Lillybæum to forward the embarkations, a large convoy and fleet of transports, having on board two entire legions, the thirteenth and fourteenth, together with eight hundred Gaulish cavalry, a thousand archers and slingers, with a large supply of provisions. As soon as these troops were landed, the transports were sent back to Lillybæum, in order to receive the remainder of the army, which was still expected to arrive at that place. These supplies and reinforcements at once relieved Cæsar's army from the distress they were suffering; and, by so great an accession of strength, amounting to twelve thousand men, put him in condition to break from the confinement under which he had for some time remained, and to act on the offensive.

The first object that presented itself, in pursuit of this plan, was the possession of some rising grounds in the neighbourhood of Ruspina, which Scipio had neglected to occupy, and from which he could seize his opportunity to annoy the enemy. To gain this point, he decamped after it was dark, on the supposed twenty-sixth of January, or tenth of November, and, turning by the shore round the town of Ruspina, arrived in the night on the ground which he intended to occupy. This was part of a ridge, which runs parallel to the coast, at a few miles distance from the shore, and which, on the north of Ruspina, turns in the form of an amphitheatre round a plain of about fifteen miles extent. Near the middle of this plain stood the town of Uzita, on the brink of a deep marshy tract, which is formed by the water of some rivulets that fall from the mountains, and having no determinate channel spread upon the plain in that place. Scipio had posted a garrison in the town, and had occupied the ridge on one side of the amphitheatre beyond the marsh, but had neglected the heights, of which Cæsar now took possession. It seems that, on these heights, there remained a number of towers, or a species of forts constructed by the natives in the course of their own wars. In these Cæsar was furnished with a number of sepa-

rate lodgments, which he joined by lines, in order to continue his communication with the camp he had left, and with the port of Ruspina.

He had, in one night, made a considerable progress in these works; but, being observed at the break of day, Scipio, in order to interrupt him, advanced on the plain, and formed in order of battle, about a mile in the front of his own encampment. Cæsar, notwithstanding this movement of the enemy, did not at first think it necessary to discontinue the works he had begun; but Scipio, seeming to come forward with intention to attack him, while so great a part of his army was at work, he ordered the whole under arms, still keeping the advantage of his ground on the heights. Some parties of cavalry and light troops came near enough to skirmish between the two armies; and Labienus being advanced on the right, beyond the main body of Scipio's forces, Cæsar sent a detachment round a village to attack him, and obliged him to retire in disorder, after having narrowly escaped being entirely cut off. This flight of Labienus spread so great an alarm over Scipio's army, that the whole, with precipitation, withdrew to their own camp. Cæsar also returned to his post, and, without any further interruption, proceeded in the operations he had planned. As soon as these were completed, on the following day, he again formed in order of battle, to return the defiance which the enemy so often had given him, while he lay in the lines of Ruspina; and, observing that Scipio remained in his camp, he marched on to the town of Uzita, which lay between the two armies. Scipio, being alarmed for the safety of this place, at which he had deposited some part of his magazines, advanced to sustain the troops he had posted in the town; and Cæsar, believing that an action was likely to follow, made a halt, with the town of Uzita before his centre, having both his wings extended beyond it to the right and the left. Scipio, not to extend his front beyond the walls of the town, drew up his army in four lines, consisting of many separate bodies, interspersed with elephants; but, as Cæsar declined to attack the garrison, supported as it was by Scipio's army, Scipio was unwilling to expose any part of his line by advancing beyond

the town; and both armies, having remained in this posture till sun-set, returned at night to their respective camps.

Cæsar, still persisting in his design to oblige the enemy to hazard a battle in defence of Uzita, projected double lines of approach from his present camp to the town. As the place was accessible to the enemy, and, when their army should be drawn up in order of battle, might be made a part of their line, it was impossible for Cæsar to invest the town, or even to approach the walls, without hazard of being attacked on his flanks from the field, as well as in the centre from the town itself. In order, therefore, to cover the approach which he intended to make to the walls, he carried on, from his camp on the hills, two intrenchments, on the right and the left, inclosing a space of sufficient breadth to embrace the town. Between these parallel lines his troops advanced to the walls with perfect security, or under cover from any attacks that might be made on their flanks. As soon as this lane was effected to within the necessary distance of the walls, he threw up in front a breast-work opposite to the ramparts of the town, and from thence began to construct the works that were usually employed in the reduction of fortified places.

During the dependence of this siege, both parties received great reinforcements. Scipio was joined by the king of Numidia, who, having repelled the enemy who attempted to invade his own kingdom, now came with three bodies of regular infantry, formed in the manner of the Roman legion, eight hundred heavy armed or bridled cavalry, with a great multitude of light or irregular troops. Cæsar's army, on the appearance of this new enemy, were much discouraged; but, on seeing that Scipio, even after he was joined by the king of Numidia, still remained on the defensive, they resumed their former confidence, and were themselves soon after reinforced by the arrival of two more legions, the ninth and the tenth, who, on their first approach to the coast, mistook for an enemy some galleys which Cæsar had stationed off the harbour of Thapsus, and, under this mistake, stood off again to sea, where they suffered many days from sickness, want of provisions, and of water.

These legions having been the principal authors of the late mutiny in Italy, are said to have now come without orders, intending to evince their zeal, and to court their general's favour, at a time when their service might be not only acceptable, but necessary to his safety. The principal historian of this war,* however, relates only, that Cæsar, having observed tribunes and centurions of these legions to have occupied entire transports with their own equipage, to the exclusion of the troops which were then so much wanted for the service, took this opportunity to execute a piece of justice, which he had thought proper to remit, or to defer on a former occasion; that, in this mind, he dismissed several officers of these legions from the service, with the following terms of reproach: "For you, who have incited the troops of the Roman people to mutiny against the republic, who have plundered the allies, and been useless to the state; who, in place of soldiers, have filled transports with your servants and horses; who, without courage in the field, or modesty in your quarters, have been more formidable to your country than to her enemies; I judge you unworthy of any trust in the service of the republic, and therefore order you forthwith to be gone from the province, and to keep at a distance from all the stations of the Roman army."

The other incidents, which are dated by historians after the commencement of the siege of Uzita, do not serve to make us acquainted with its progress, or with the detail of its operations. The season, we are told, was stormy, and Cæsar's army, in order to crowd the more easily on board of the transports, had left great part of their equipage behind them in Sicily, and were now without any covering, besides their shields, exposed to heavy rains and hail, accompanied with thunder and fire, which, to their great amazement, instead of the ordinary flashes of lightning, became, in some degree, stationary, or, for a sensible time, continued to flame on the points of their spears.† While this storm continued, the

* Hirtius.

† This circumstance of the flaming points is cited by a modern officer, to discredit the narration: but is in reality a strong confirmation. It is an appearance now understood among the phenomena of lightning or electricity.

ground upon which they lay was overflowed with water, or washed with continual torrents from the hills. Cæsar, nevertheless, persisted in the attack of Uzita, and seemed still to flatter himself that the defence of this place would lay the enemy under some disadvantage, which might furnish him with an opportunity to decide the war. The armies were, accordingly, often drawn out in order of battle, and were present at partial engagements of their cavalry or irregular troops, but without any general action.

In the midst of the great expectations which must have attended the operations of this siege, Cæsar had one of the many occasions, on which he was ever so ready to commit his genius, his reputation, and his life, in acts of seeming temerity, which persons of inferior ability may admire, but never can safely repeat. Varus, with a fleet of fifty galleys, had surprised and burnt the greater part of his shipping at Leptis, and was in chase of Aquila, an officer of Cæsar's marine, who, with an inferior squadron, was flying before him to the southward. Cæsar apprehended that the enemy, in consequence of this advantage, if not speedily checked, must soon become masters of the sea, so as to cut off all his supplies and reinforcements from the coast. He knew that reputation gained or lost, on small occasions, often decides of the greatest affairs; and that adverse circumstances, which, if suffered to accumulate, may obscure the brightest fortune, can, if seasonably encountered, by daring efforts of resolution and courage, be actually turned to advantage. He instantly, therefore, went in person to Leptis, and from thence put off in a barge: having overtaken his own squadron, which was flying before the enemy, he ordered them to change their course, and to steer directly against their pursuers. Varus was struck with this unaccountable change in the conduct of his enemy, and, supposing them to have come in sight of some powerful support, discontinued the chase, put about, and, crowding sail, steered for the port he had left. Cæsar, in his turn, gave chase, overtook some of the heaviest sailors,

but could not then be known any otherwise, than as a fact. Voyez *Melange de Remarques*, surtout sur César, par le General de W. à Varsovie.

that fell astern, and forced the remainder to take refuge in the harbour of Adrumetum. Here he presented himself with an air of defiance; and having effected this apparent change in the state of his affairs at sea, with peremptory orders to his fleet not to resign the advantage which they had gained by this flight of the enemy, he returned to the attack of Uzita. In such actions the fortunate often succeed, because the attempt appears to be incredible; and men of great ability may no doubt venture into the midst of difficulties, with which persons of inferior capacity are by no means fit to contend.

Cæsar, notwithstanding that by this stroke of address, or of fortune, he preserved his communication with the sea, and received considerable supplies from thence, as well as from the country around him, in which he was favoured by the natives; yet, being greatly circumscribed by the superiority of the enemy's light troops, he suffered considerably in his camp from scarcity of provisions; and being, in his present operations against Uzita, to fight with a numerous army in detail, behind the walls of a fortified town, without being able to engage them upon equal terms in any decisive action, he took his resolution to discontinue the siege, and remove to a more advantageous station, or proceed to some enterprise, in which he was more likely to succeed. He accordingly decamped in the night, set fire to the wood and straw that was amassed upon the ground, left the lanes he had fortified with so much labour, and, marching by the shore, placed his baggage between the main column of his army and the sea, and thus covered it from the enemy, who he expected were to follow him by the ridge of hills which overlooked the line of his march.

The retreat of Cæsar was sufficient to confirm the leaders of the republican party in the hopes they had formed, of being able to wear him out by a dilatory war. They followed him, accordingly, by the heights, and having observed that he stopped at Agar, a town which he held by the affections of the natives, they took post on three several heights, at the distance of about six miles from his camp. In this position, they were not able to hinder him from making, in the contigu-

ous villages and fields, a considerable acquisition of provisions and forage, which greatly relieved his army; but, to prevent his farther excursions into the country, and to secure its produce to their own use, they had sent two legions, under the command of Caius Mutius Reginus, with orders to take possession of the town of Zeta, which lay about twenty miles from Agar, and on the right, at some distance beyond their present camp. Cæsar had intelligence from the natives, that these troops, now posted at Zeta, were frequently employed abroad in collecting provisions and forage, and that they might easily be cut off, and the town be surprised. He accordingly formed a design for this purpose; and, with a view to the execution of it, removed from the plain of Agar, and fortified a strong camp on a height nearer to the enemy. Here, leaving a sufficient guard for his lines, he put the remainder of the army in motion in the night, passed by the enemy's stations, and surprised the town of Zeta, which he entered by break of day, while the greater part of the garrison had left the place in perfect security, and were scattered in foraging parties over the neighbouring country. Having placed a sufficient detachment to secure this new acquisition, he set out upon his return, and, having no hopes of being able to pass the enemy unobserved, made a disposition to force his way through any impediment they might oppose to his march. The night could no longer be of any advantage to him; he set out, therefore, by day, leading the governor of Zeta, with P. Atrius, who belonged to the association of Utica, his prisoners, together with some part of Juba's equipage, and a train of camels, loaded with plunder, which he had taken in the place he had recently surprised.

The enemy were by this time apprised of his motions. Scipio was come out of his lines; and, not far from Cæsar's route, had posted himself in order of battle. Labienus and Afranius, with a great power of cavalry and light infantry, had taken possession of some heights under which he was to pass, and were preparing to attack him on his flanks, and on his rear. Cæsar was aware of these difficulties; it was, nevertheless, necessary to encounter them. He trusted that the head of his column might force its way; and he placed his

whole cavalry to cover the rear of his march. When he came abreast of the enemy, being assailed, as usual, by the African cavalry, with peculiar efforts of agility and cunning, he made a halt; and in order, by some great exertion, if possible, to clear his way, and procure to his own people some respite in pursuing the remainder of their march undisturbed, he ordered the legions to lay down the loads which they usually carried, and to charge the enemy. They accordingly put all the Africans to flight; but no sooner resumed their march, than they were again attacked, and repeatedly forced to renew the same operations. They had already been detained four hours in passing over a hundred paces, or less than half a quarter of a mile, from the place at which they were first attacked. The sun was setting, and the enemy were in hopes of being able to oblige them to halt, for the night, on a field which was destitute of water. Scipio, for this purpose, still kept the position which he had taken in the morning, and from thence observed, and occasionally supported, the operations of the light troops.

Cæsar perceived the danger to which he must be exposed, if he should halt on this ground, and saw the necessity of continuing his march: but observing that, as often as the cavalry in his rear was engaged, whether they repulsed or gave way to the enemy, he was obliged to halt, in order to support them, or give time to recover their station, he thought proper to change his disposition, brought forward the horse to the head of his column, and substituted a chosen body of foot in the rear, who, notwithstanding an incessant discharge from the enemy, continued to move, and enabled him, though slowly, to effect his retreat with a regular and uninterrupted pace. In this manner, extricating himself from the great danger to which he had been exposed, he regained his camp near Agar, with a very inconsiderable loss.

Having thus got possession of Zeta, a post on the flank or rear of his enemy, Cæsar formed successive designs on Vacca, Sarsura, and Tysdra, places similarly situated round the scene of the war. His design on the first of these places was prevented by the Numidians, who, having intelligence of his coming, entered before him, and reduced the town to ashes.

Both armies being in motion for some days, he forced Sarsura; but, advancing to Tysdra, with the same intention, he thought proper, upon observing the strength of the place, not to make any attempt against it; and, on the fourth day, having returned to his station near Agar, the enemy likewise resumed their former position.

While Cæsar remained at this post, he received a reinforcement of four thousand men, consisting chiefly of the sick, who had been left behind the army in Italy, and who, now in health, rejoined their legions, together with a body of four hundred horse, and a thousand archers and slingers. With this accession of strength, he formed a design on Tegea, which was occupied by a detachment of the enemy, supported by the whole of their army: Being encamped at the distance of a few miles behind the town, and having advanced on the plain, in hopes to force or surprise the place, he was observed by Labienus and Scipio, who came forward, at the same time, about four miles beyond their own station, in order to sustain their detachment. These, consisting of four hundred horse, divided themselves on the right and the left of the town; and the main armies being formed in order of battle, with this post between them, Cæsar gave orders that the party of horse, which ventured to shew themselves without the walls of Tegea, should be attacked. The events which followed this first encounter brought into action several detached bodies, both of horse and foot, which were sent from the different sides to sustain the parties engaged, but did not lead to any general or decisive action; and both armies retired at night to their respective lines.

In many of these partial engagements which happened in this campaign, Cæsar's cavalry gave way to that of the Africans. In one of their flights, Cæsar met an officer, who was running away with his party, and, affecting to believe him under a mistake, took hold of his bridle, "you are wrong," he said; "for here is the way to the enemy." Even the legions stood greatly in awe of the Numidian irregulars, by whom they were, on many occasions, surprised with some new-feat of agility or cunning; and they were considerably intimidated by the number and formidable appearance of the

elephants, which they knew not how to withstand. To fortify the minds of his men, and to prepare them to meet such antagonists, Cæsar had a number of elephants brought to his camp, armed and harnessed like those of the enemy. He exercised his horses in presence of these animals, taught his men in what places to strike where the beast was vulnerable, and how to elude his fury. He likewise made some change in the usual exercise of the legion itself, such as might the better qualify his men to baffle or repel the artful and desultory attacks of the Numidians; and, as he frequently employed his regular troops in foraging parties, he inured them by degrees to depart from their usual forms, without losing their courage, and to recover from any casual disorder into which they might be thrown. To shew his own confidence in the superiority of his men, he frequently made an offer of battle on equal ground; and, in the manner that was, in their turns, common to both parties, drew a species of triumph from his enemy's declining to fight.

In these operations, the campaign drew on to the middle of February, and had lasted about five months. During this time, Cæsar had surmounted very great difficulties, arising from the dispersion of his fleet, the uncertainty of his communication with Italy, and the scarcity of provisions in a country laid waste or possessed by his enemies. He was now become master of many towns on the coast, and of a considerable extent of territory; but, from the many objects which required his attention in different parts of the empire, he remained under great disadvantage in supporting a dilatory war, in which it appeared that Scipio and Labienus were resolved to persist. In order, if possible, to break their measures, he formed a design upon Thapsus, their principal garrison and sea-port on the southern boundary of the province. With this view he decamped in the night from his station near Agar, and, directing his march to the southward, arrived before Thapsus on the following day. As he had formerly, in order to secure his convoys against any attempts from this place, blocked up the harbour with his ships, he now seized all the avenues which led to the town, and invested it completely from the land.

Scipio and Juba, greatly interested to preserve a place of so much consequence to themselves, put their armies in motion, and, to counteract that of Cæsar, followed him by the route of the hills. Seeing him invest Thapsus, they took their first posts on two separate heights, about eight miles from the town. Cæsar, with his usual industry and dispatch, executed lines both of circumvallation and of countervallation. By these lines, which were in the form of a crescent, terminating at both ends on the shore, he embraced the town, and proposed to encamp his army between them. Scipio was sufficiently acquainted with the ground, to know that there was near the harbour a narrow channel, or salt-pit, separated from the sea by a second beach or sand-bank, which it was possible the enemy might not have observed, and by which he might still have an entry to the town, or be able to throw in his succours. He therefore advanced with his whole army; and, while he made a feint to interrupt Cæsar in the works he was carrying on, sent a party to occupy the sand-bank, or to throw themselves into the town of Thapsus, by that communication. Cæsar, however, had already taken possession of this passage, and shut it up with three several intrenchments, or redoubts, so placed as to secure it at once against any sallies from the garrison, as well as attacks from the field.

The combined army, on being thus disappointed of any communication with the town of Thapsus, remained all the day under arms, and gave the enemy an opportunity, which he often affected to desire, of terminating the war by a battle. But Cæsar, either because he had not sufficiently fortified his intrenchments to secure his rear from the town, or because he would not choose that moment to fight, when the enemy was best prepared to receive him, made no advances to engage on that day.

Scipio, remaining on the same ground all night, took his resolution to encamp, and, at break of day, appeared to be forming the usual intrenchments. Cæsar had then, probably, completed his own works; and, thinking the opportunity fair, or being determined not to suffer the enemy to effect a lodgment in his presence, he made the usual signal to prepare for action; and, leaving a proper force to man his own intrench-

ments against the town, drew out the remainder of his army to the field, ordered part of his fleet to get under sail, to turn a head-land in the rear of the enemy, and, as soon as the action began in front, to alarm them with shouts, or a feint to land and attack their rear. Having made these dispositions, he put his army in motion, and being come near enough to distinguish the posture of the enemy, observed that their main body was already in order of battle, with the elephants disposed on the wings; and that numerous parties were still at work on the lines, within which they meant to encamp. He halted, and made a disposition suitable to that of the enemy. His centre consisted of five legions, his wings each of four; the tenth and second legions composed the right wing; the eighth and ninth composed the left. Five cohorts, together with the cavalry, were selected, to support the archers and slingers that were to begin the attack by galling the enemy's elephants. Cæsar himself went round every division on foot, exhorted the veterans to be mindful of the high reputation which they had to support, and recommended to the new levies to take example from those who were already possessed of so much glory, and who were, by long experience, instructed in the arts to be practised in a day of battle.

While Cæsar was thus employed, the legions of Scipio appeared to reel. They at one time retired behind their imperfect works, again changed their purpose, and came back to their ground. Many of Cæsar's officers, and many of the veteran soldiers, well acquainted with this sign of distraction and irresolution, called aloud for the signal of battle: but he himself, possibly to whet their ardour, as well as to keep them in breath, again and again halted the whole line.

In this situation of the two armies, Cæsar is said to have been seized with a fit of the epilepsy, to which he was subject; a disease which, although it seems to attack the seats of understanding and of sense, or suspends, for a time, the exercise of every faculty, in the most alarming manner, does not appear, if this report may be credited, to effect any lasting diminution of the rational powers, nor, in the interval of fits, to be inconsistent with their highest measures and their ablest exertions. The tale, however, is not consistent with the nar-

ration of Hirtius. This historian, although he allows that the troops, in the last part of their motion to engage, acted without any orders, and, while Cæsar wished them to advance more deliberately, that they forced a trumpet on the right to sound the usual charge, and that the whole line, without any other signal, overwhelming by force all the officers who ventured to restrain them, continued to rush on the enemy; yet, he observes that Cæsar, instead of being out of condition to act, took his resolution to excite an ardour which he could not control; and, in order that he might bring his whole army at once with united force into action, commanded all his trumpets to sound, and himself, mounting on horseback, rode up with the foremost ranks. The battle began on the right, where the enemy's elephants, being galled with a shower of arrows and stones, reeled back on the troops that were posted to sustain them, trod part of the infantry under foot, and broke over the unfinished intrenchments in their rear.

The left of Scipio's army being thus routed, the main body soon after gave way; and the whole fled to the camp which they had formerly occupied; but, in their flight, being thrown into confusion, and separated from their officers, they arrived at the place to which they fled, without any person of rank to rally or command them. In this state of consternation they threw down their arms, and attempted to take refuge in the camp of their Numidian ally. But this being already in possession of the enemy, they continued their flight to the nearest heights; and, having already thrown away their arms, awaited their fate in a state of helpless despair. When they saw the troops that pursued them advance, they made signs of submission, and saluted the victors with a shout; but in vain. They were instantly attacked by the victorious army of Cæsar, who, though affecting clemency on former occasions, now seemed to be actuated with a paroxysm of rage and thirst of blood: contrary to the orders and entreaties of their general, they put the whole of this unarmed and defenceless multitude to the sword. They are said, on this occasion, to have seized the opportunity of satiating their revenge on some of their own officers, who had offended them. One was actually murdered; another, being wounded, fled to Cæsar for protection;

and many persons of distinction, senators and Roman knights, though of Cæsar's party in this contest, observing their danger, thought proper to withdraw to some place of concealment, till the present fury of the troops should abate.

In the beginning of this memorable action, the garrison of Thapsus had sallied, but were repulsed with loss. When the contest was over, Cæsar, to induce the town to surrender, displayed the trophies of victory he had gained; but had no answer. On the following day, he drew up his army under the walls of the town; and, having made a speech to the legions, in which he thanked them for their good behaviour, without any reproach for the disorder and cruelty of the preceding day, he declared what were to be the rewards which he intended, at a proper time, for the veterans; and, by some immediate mark of his favour, distinguished a few who had signalized themselves. He appointed Caius Rubellius, with three legions, to continue the siege of Thapsus, and Cn. Domitius, with two others, to reduce Tysdra; and, having sent forward M. Messala, with a body of horse, on the road to Utica, he himself followed with the remainder of the army.*

At Utica were assembled, from every part of the empire, all who were obnoxious to Cæsar, or who, from a zeal for the republic, had refused to submit to his power. On the third day after the battle of Thapsus, towards night, a person who had escaped from the field coming to Utica, this unhappy convention of citizens was struck with the greatest alarm. Under the effects of their consternation, they met in the streets, ran to the gates, and again returned to their habitations. They crowded together in the public places, and separated by turns, and passed the night in extreme perplexity. Cato represented to them that the accounts they received might be exaggerated, and endeavoured to compose their fears. As soon as it was day he called them together, and laid before them a state of the place, of the works, military stores, provisions, arms, and numbers of men; and, having commended the zeal which they had hitherto shown in defence of the republic, exhorted them now to make the

* Hist. de Bello Afric.

proper use of the means they still had of defending themselves, or at least of making their peace in a body: declared, that if they were inclined to submit to the victor, he should impute their conduct to necessity; but, if they were determined to resist, he should reserve his sword for the last stake of the republic, and share with them in the consequences of a resolution which he should love and admire. He contended that they were now to consider themselves as assembled, not in Utica, but in Rome; "that the force of the republic was yet very great, and might still, as on former occasions, rise again from its ruins; that the forces of Cæsar must still be distracted or separated, to make head against enemies who were appearing in different parts of the empire; that in Spain his own army had deserted from him, and the whole province had declared for the sons of Pompey; that Rome, the head of the commonwealth, was yet erect, and would not bend under the yoke of a tyrant; that his enemies were multiplying, while he seemed to destroy them; that his own example should instruct them; or rather, that the courage which he exerted in the paths of guilt and of infamy should animate those who were either about to die with honour, or to secure for their country blessings in which they themselves were to share." At this assembly a resolution was accordingly taken to defend the city of Utica; and numbers of slaves, who were set free by their masters for this purpose, were armed and enrolled. But it soon appeared that the assembly consisted of persons unable to persist in this resolution, and who were preparing separately to merit the favour of the conqueror by an entire and early submission. They soon made a general profession of this design; expressed their veneration of Cato; but confessed that they were not qualified to act with him in so anxious a scene; assured him, that, if they were permitted to send a message to Cæsar, the first object of it should be to intercede for his safety; and that, if they could not obtain it, they should accept of no quarter for themselves. Cato no longer opposed their intentions; but said that he himself must not be included in their treaty; that he knew not of any right Cæsar had to dispose of his person; that what had hitherto happened in

the war only served to convict Cæsar of designs which were often imputed to him, and which he always denied. He will now, at least, own, he said, that his opponents were not mistaken in the suspicions they suggested against him.

While matters were in this state, a party of Scipio's horse, which had escaped from the field of battle, appeared at the gates of the town, and were, with difficulty, by Cato's entreaties, diverted from a frantic resolution, of putting every Roman citizen, who offered to submit to Cæsar, as well as the inhabitants of the place, to the sword. Being dissuaded from this act of violence, and furnished with some money for their immediate subsistence, they continued their retreat. Most of the senators, who were present, took shipping, and escaped. Lucius Cæsar undertook to carry to his kinsman a petition from such of the Roman citizens as remained; and said to Cato, at parting, that he would gladly fall at the victor's feet to make *his* peace. To which Cato answered, "If I were disposed to make my peace with Cæsar, I should repair to him in person; but I have done him no wrong; I am not an object of his pardon; and shall not request what it were insolence in him to offer me as a favour." He, however, on this occasion, observed to his own son, that it would not become him to leave his father. "At a fit time," he said, you will put yourself on the victor's mercy; but do not take part in public affairs: the times do not afford a station in which it would be proper for you to act." And why," said the young man, "will you not take the benefit of the victor's clemency for yourself, as well as for me?" I was born to freedom," he said, "and cannot, in my old age, be reconciled to servitude. For you these times were destined; and it may become you to submit to your fate." Having passed the day in aiding his friends to procure the means of their escape, he went to the bath, and supped as usual, without any marks of dejection or affectation of ease, and, being retired to his chamber, after some time, which he employed in reading, he killed himself. His attendants, upon hearing a noise which alarmed them, burst open the door, and would have dressed the wound; but he tore it up with his own

hands, and expired in making this effort.* Every one, through the day, had been anxious to know what was the design which Cato covered under the appearance of so much concern for others, and of so little care for himself. On the first report of his death, multitudes crowded to the door of his quarters, and gave the most unfeigned demonstrations of dejection and sorrow. The colony of Utica, though originally hostile to his cause, and still in the interest of Cæsar, ordered a public funeral, and erected his statue in the place of interment.

Cato died in the vigour of life, under fifty. He was naturally warm and affectionate in his temper; and, according to his poetic encomiast,† comprehensive, impartial, and a citizen of the world. But his country, his friend, and those who were placed within his reach, formed that world to him, in which he was to take an effective part. He professed to believe, with the sect whose tenets he embraced, that it might or might not, in particular circumstances, be expedient for a man to preserve or lay down his life; but that, while he kept it, the only good or evil incident to him consisted in the part which he took, as a friend or an enemy to those with whom he was connected. He had long foreseen the dangers to which the republic was exposed, and determined to live only while he could counteract the designs that were formed against it.‡ The leader of the successful party thought proper to apologize for himself, by decrying the virtues of Cato; but the bulk of mankind, in his own and the subsequent ages, were equally pleased to extol them: and he has given the rare example of a merit which received its praise even amidst the adulation that was paid to his enemies,|| and was thought, by the impartial, equally above the reach of commendation or of censure.§

* Dio. Cass.—Appian.—Plutarch.—Hirtius, de Bello Africano.


† Non sibi, sed toto genitum, se credere mundo.


‡ Sed vere laudari ille vir non potest, nisi hæc ornata sunt; quod ille ea, quæ nunc sunt, et futura viderit, et ne fierent contenderit, et facta ne videret, vitam reliquerit. Cicer. ad Att. lib. xii. ep. 4.

|| See the writings of Virgil and Horace.

§ Cujus gloriæ neque profuit quisquam laudando, nec vituperando quisquam nocuit, quum utrumque summis præditi fecerint ingeniis. Frag. Livii, ex Hieronym. Prolog. lib. xi. in Oseam.

THE STATE
of the
Campaign
in
AFRICA.





CHAPTER XXIX.

Arrival of Cæsar at Utica.—Wreck of the republican Party.—Servility of the Roman People.—Magnificence and Administration of Cæsar.—His last Campaign in Spain.—Death of the elder of Pompey's Sons.—Cæsar's Return, Triumphs, Honours, and Policy in the State.—Spirit of the Times.—Source of the Conspiracy against Cæsar.—Its Progress.—Death of Cæsar.

WHEN Cæsar was informed, on his march from Thapsus, that, of all the principal men of the opposite party, Cato alone remained at Utica to receive him, he was at a loss to interpret his conduct, and possibly might have found it difficult to determine how he should deal with an antagonist, whom he neither could reconcile to his usurpation, nor treat as a criminal. The character of generosity towards his enemies, which Cæsar had assumed, laid him under some obligation, in point of consistency, to treat the person of Cato with respect; and the opportunity he would have had, in that instance, of exercising his clemency with so much lustre, could not have escaped him. In the busiest scene of his life he had not any party object, nor any party quarrel to maintain: he had repeatedly sacrificed personal animosity to ambition; and, when he took the field against the republic, he had few private resentments to gratify. He knew that an affectation of reluctance in shedding the blood of Roman citizens, the reverse of what remained so much an object of horror in the memory of Sylla, was the likeliest means to palliate the effects of this destructive war, and to reconcile the people to his usurpation. In the bulk of his fellow-citizens he had found either a mere rubbish, to be removed from the way of his ambition, or tools with which he might work in removing it: they were either the dupes of his policy, or open to the imputations of sinister designs or unreasonable obstinacy, which he cast on his opponents. In Cato, perhaps, alone, he found a measure of estimation, which, with all his abilities and prosperous fortune, he could not pretend to slight,

and a penetration which, without any management for his person, had ever treated his intrigues as a system of villany devised for the ruin of the commonwealth. Cato, therefore, alone, of all his antagonists, he possibly hated beyond the possibility of reconciliation.*

Cæsar was, in reality, according to the representation of his friend Curio, neither sanguinary nor scrupulous of blood, but in the highest degree indifferent to both, and ever ready to do whatever was most likely to promote his own designs. As he had already sufficiently provided for the reputation of clemency, he now made a freer use of his sword; and, in proportion as he approached to the end of the war, or saw the means of extirpating those who were most likely to withstand his pretensions, he dipped his hands, with less scruple, in the blood of his enemies. As he pursued Pompey into Egypt, under a decided impression that the death of this rival was material to the establishment of his power in Italy, so it is likely that he now hastened to Utica, as a place at which he might crush the remains of a republican spirit in the empire. On hearing of the death of Cato, however, he made use of an expression, which served either to discover the resolution he had taken with respect to him, or to preserve the aspect of generosity at no expense. "I must be allowed," he said, "to envy this man the splendour of his death, as he has refused me the honour of preserving his life." Having passed through Uzita and Adrumetum, which surrendered to him on his march, and being met by numbers who came to make their submission, he arrived at Utica in the evening, and continued all night without the gates.

Marcus Messala had already taken possession of the town. Cæsar himself entered on the following day; and, having ordered the people to attend him, made a speech, in which he thanked the colony of Utica for their faithful attachment to his cause; but spoke of the Roman citizens,† who had been assembled at this place, and contributed to support the war

* Et cuncta terrarum subacta prætor atrocem animum Catonis.

† Those who were with Cato assumed the character of Roman senate at Utica.

against him, in terms which sufficiently shewed that he was no longer to court the reputation of mercy. Appian says, that as many of them as fell into his hands were, by his order, put to death. Hirtius relates, that he only confiscated their effects, and that this sentence was afterwards changed into a limited fine, amounting in all to two hundred thousand sester-tia, or about a million and a half sterling, to be paid in three years, at six separate payments.

From this general wreck of the republican party in Africa, the leaders continued their flight, in different directions. Many, who surrendered themselves, were spared; but most of those who, in their attempts to escape, fell into the enemy's hands, either killed themselves or, by Cæsar's order, were put to death.* Afranius and Faustus Sylla, having joined a party of cavalry that fled by Utica from the field of battle, were intercepted by Silius, and, defending themselves, with the loss of many of their party, were taken. In a few days after this event, these prisoners, under pretence of a riot in the camp, were put to death.

Scipio, with Damasippus, Torquatus, and Plætorius Rustianus, endeavoured to escape by sea into Spain. After being tossed some days with contrary winds, they ventured to put into Hippo, on the coast of Numidia, where they met with a squadron of Cæsar's fleet, commanded by Silius. Their vessel being boarded, they were asked, with impatience, where is the general? Scipio himself made answer, *the general is well*; and, in uttering these words, stabbed himself, and went headlong into the sea.

Juba, with Petreius, having escaped from the field of battle at Thapsus, lay concealed by day, and continued their flight, in the night, towards Zama; a place which, at the breaking out of the war, the king of Numidia had fortified, and made the residence of his women, and the repository of his treasure and most valuable effects. He knew that, if he should be taken captive by a Roman general, the consequence was being led in triumph, and, possibly, afterwards put to death. He

* Dio. Cass. lib. xliii. c. 12.—Appian. de Bello Civil. lib. ii.—Florus, Eutropius, Hirtius.

had, therefore, provided this retreat, in case of an unfortunate issue to the war; intending it merely as a place at which he might die in state. With this intention he had raised, near to the royal palace, a pile of wood, on which he meant to consume whatever could mark or adorn the victor's triumph; and it was his purpose, while he set these materials, and with them the whole city, on fire, to commit himself and his women to the flames.

The inhabitants of Zama had some intimation of this design, and, upon the approach of the king, unwilling to have the exit of a vanquished prince celebrated in their city by such an offering, shut their gates, and refused him admittance. They likewise had the humanity to refuse delivering the women into his hands, under an apprehension that he meant they should be a sacrifice to his jealousy, or be involved in his ruin.

Juba, finding himself thus disobeyed, even by his own subjects, retired to one of his country seats; and, having ordered a splendid entertainment, at the close of it he and Petreius fell together by their own swords. The kingdom of Numidia was converted into a Roman province, and the government of it was committed to Sallust the historian. The son of the king, yet an infant, was reserved to make a part in the procession of the victor's triumph.* The furniture and ornaments of his palaces, being sold, produced a considerable sum of money. Great contributions were raised, at the same time, in those parts of Africa which had been already reduced to the condition of a Roman province. The inhabitants of Thapsus were made to pay fifty thousand Roman sesteria;† those of Adrumetum, eighty thousand; those of Leptis and Tysdra paid the quotas exacted from them in corn and oil.

Cæsar having, in this manner, closed a scene, in which he had destroyed fifty thousand of his opponents, who might be supposed to be the most obstinate adherents of the republican party, and having joined to the empire a territory which, by the report afterwards made in the assembly of the people, was fitted to yield an annual tribute of three hundred thousand

* Plut. in Cæs.

† About 400,000 £.

medimni of grain, and three hundred thousand weight of oil,* he embarked at Utica, on the fifteenth of June, and, in three days after his departure from thence, arrived in the island of Sardinia; a part of his dominions, said Cicero, as a taunt to this upstart sovereign, which he had not hitherto seen. Before his departure from Africa, he had made the necessary arrangements respecting the army; and, although he had recently availed himself of the services of the legions who had mutinied in Italy, and seemed to have forgotten their offence, yet he took the benefit of the present prosperous state of his affairs to indulge his resentment; and, that they might not communicate with other factious spirits in the empire, have leisure to over-rate their own services, or to set an example to the rest of the army, of exorbitant demands, he ordered them to be broke and disbanded in Africa. The remainder of the troops, who had given him the victory in that country, he ordered, after receiving the necessary refreshments, to proceed in the voyage to Spain, where he still had, from the sons and adherents of Pompey, some resistance to apprehend.

Leaving the army, therefore, to pursue this course, Cæsar himself took shipping again in the island of Sardinia, on the twenty-ninth of June; and, being some time detained by contrary winds, arrived at Rome on the twenty-sixth of the following month;† having, since the time of his departure from Italy, on the expedition to Africa, in which he had so many difficulties to surmount, spent no more than six months.

The news of Cæsar's victory had been some time received. The principal supports of the republic had fallen at Thapsus and at Pharsalia; and, as the sons of Pompey, though favourably received by their late father's adherents in Spain, were not yet supposed to be in condition to resist the victor, the revolution in his favour seemed to be complete, and every part of the Roman empire subjected to his power. Nothing now remained, but that he should take possession of that sovereignty to which he aspired, and in which, it soon after appeared, that to him there was a charm, even in the flattery of the obsequious, as well as in the possession of power.

* Plut. in Cæs.

† Hirtius, de Bell. Afr. c. 86.

Whatever distress the surviving members of the commonwealth may have suffered on the loss of their relations and friends, who had fallen in the late bloody contentions, or whatever mortification they may have felt on the loss of their own political importance, as partners in the empire of the world, no symptoms of aversion, or unwilling submission, appeared on the part of the people: all orders of men hastened to pay their court to the victor, and, by their servile adulations, to anticipate the state of degradation into which they were themselves soon to be reduced.

In the name of the senate and people, a continual thanksgiving of forty days was decreed for the late victory at Thapsus. The power of dictator was conferred on Cæsar for ten years, and that of censor, which gave the supreme disposal of honours and rank in the commonwealth, and which, on account of the abuse to which it was subject, had been some time discontinued, was now, under a new title, that of inspector of manners,* restored in his person. At the same time, the nomination of some of the officers of state, formerly elected by the people, was committed to him. He was, in the exercise of these powers, to be preceded by seventy-two lictors, triple the number even of those who used to attend the dictators, and he was to enjoy, for life, many of the inferior prerogatives, which, under the republic, served to distinguish the first officers of state; such as that of giving the signals for the horses to start, or for the other sports to begin at the games of the circus; and that of delivering his opinion before any one else in the senate. It was likewise ordered that he should have in that assembly a gilded chair of state, placed next to that of the consul; and, as if it were intended to join ridicule with these extraordinary honours, it was decreed that, as the conqueror of Gaul, in his triumphs he should be drawn by white horses, to put him on a foot of equality with Camillus, to whom this distinction had been given, as the restorer of his country from its destruction by the ancestors of that nation; that the name of Catulus should be erased from the capitol, and his own be inserted, as the person who

* *Præfectus Morum.*

had rebuilt that temple and citadel of Rome; that a car, like that of Jupiter, should be placed for him in the same temple, and near to the statue of the god himself; and that his own statue, with the title of a demi-god, should be erected on a globe representing the earth.

It is said that Cæsar refused many of the honours which were decreed to him; but, in these, which he no doubt encouraged, or favourably received, he sufficiently betrayed a vanity which but rarely accompanies such a distinguished superiority of understanding and vigour of mind. Though, in respect to the ability with which he rendered men subservient to his purpose, in respect to the choice of means for the attainment of his end, in respect to the plan and execution of his designs, he was far above even those who are eminent in the history of mankind, yet, in respect to the end which he pursued, in respect to the passions he had to gratify, he was one merely of the vulgar, and condescended to be vain of titles and honours which he himself had extorted by force, and which he has shared with persons of the meanest capacity. Insensible to the honour of being deemed the equal in rank to Cato and Catulus, to Hortensius and Cicero, and the equal in reputation to Sylla, to Fabius, and to the Scipios, he preferred being a superior among profligate men, the leader among soldiers of fortune, and to procure by force, from his fellow-citizens, a deference which his wonderful abilities must of themselves have made unavoidable, and still more if he had possessed the magnanimity to despise it.

Cæsar, soon after the distinctions now mentioned were bestowed upon him, addressed himself to the Roman senate and people, in a speech which, being supposed to proceed from a master, was full of condescension and lenity, but, from a fellow-citizen, was marked with insult and contumely. A speech delivered on so remarkable an occasion was likely to be in substance preserved; and, under the government of his successors, by whom he was ever styled the *divine* Julius,* or numbered with the gods, it was not likely to get abroad, but with a view to do him honour. "Let no man," he said,

* Divus Julius.

“ imagine, that, under the favour of my exalted situation, I
 “ am now to indulge myself in acts, or even in expressions,
 “ of severity ; or that I am to follow the example of Marius,
 “ of Cinna, of Sylla, or of most others, who, having subdued
 “ their enemies, dropped, in the height of their fortune, that
 “ character of moderation under which they had formerly
 “ enticed men to their party. I have appeared all along in
 “ my genuine character; and now, in the height of my power,
 “ have no change to make in my conduct.* The more my
 “ fortunes advance, the more I will endeavour to use them
 “ properly. My sole object, while I endeavoured to rise above
 “ my enemies, was to secure for myself a situation in which I
 “ might exercise virtue with dignity and safety; and I shall
 “ not now imitate the examples which I myself have so often
 “ condemned, nor sully the splendour of my victories by an
 “ illiberal use of my power.

“ As the favours of fortune are won by vigour, so they are
 “ preserved by moderation, and should be most carefully pre-
 “ served by those who enjoy the greatest share of them. I
 “ covet sincere affection and genuine praise; not the adula-
 “ tion that springs from fear, and is the disguise of hatred.
 “ These are my serious thoughts, confirmed on reflection;
 “ and you shall find me governed by them in all the actions
 “ of my life. I do not mean to be your lord or your tyrant,
 “ but your chief and your leader. When the state has occa-
 “ sion for my authority, you shall find in me a dictator and a
 “ consul; but, on ordinary occasions, no more than a private
 “ man.†

“ I have spared many, who were repeatedly in arms against
 “ me: I have shut my ears to informations of the hidden de-
 “ signs of others ; and have destroyed all letters and papers
 “ which could lead to a detection of my secret enemies. To
 “ most of you I can have no resentment; and I do not incline
 “ to raise prosecutions even against those who may think
 “ they have incurred my displeasure. Live, therefore, with
 “ me, from this time forward, in confidence, as children with
 “ their father. I reserve to myself the power of punishing

* Dio. Cass. lib. xliii. c. 15, &c.

† Dio. Cass. lib. xliii. c. 15, &c.

“ the guilty, as far as justice requires; but will protect the innocent, and reward the deserving.

“ Let not these appearances of military force alarm you. The troops which are quartered in the city, and which attend my person, are destined to defend, not to oppress, the citizens; and these troops, I trust, know, upon every occasion, the limits of their duty.

“ Uncommon taxes have lately been levied in the provinces and in Italy, but not for my private use. I have, in reality, expended my own fortune, and contracted immoderate debts in the public service; and, while I myself have borne so great a part of the burden, am likewise made to bear the blame of what others have imposed.” He concluded with assurances, that the arrears which were due to the legions, and the other debts of the public,* should be paid with the least possible inconvenience to the people.

In this speech was conveyed, not the indignant and menacing spirit of Sylla, who despised the very power of which he was himself possessed, but the conscious state and reflecting condescension of a prince, who admired, and wished to recommend, his own greatness. The Roman people, in former instances of usurpation, had experienced sanguinary and violent treatment; and they now seemed to bear with indifference the entire suppression of their political rights, when executed by hands that refrained from proscriptions and murders. But, as Cæsar seemed to think his present elevation the highest object of human wishes, there were some who, although now silent, thought their own present subjection the lowest state of degradation and misery. “ What should I do in such times?” says Cicero to his correspondent. “ Books cannot always amuse me. I go into any company, affect to be noisy, and laugh, to conceal my sorrow.”†

The populace were gratified with shows, processions, and feasts, and with the bounties which they received in money.

* Dio. Cass. lib. xliii. c. 15, &c.

† Cic. ad Familiar. lib. ix. ep. 26.—*Miraristam exhibitam esse servitutum nostram. Quid ergo faciam?—ibi loquor quod in solum ut dicitur, et gemitum in risus maximos transfero.*

Cæsar had four separate triumphs in one month. The first for his conquest of Gaul; at which Vercingetorix, the prince of the Arverni, by a custom cruel and odious in all its parts, was led in chains, and afterwards put to death. The second for his victory in Egypt; at which Arsinoë, the sister of the queen, was exhibited in fetters, and, by her youth and beauty, excited a general compassion, which preserved her life. A third for the defeat of Pharnaces; where the trophies, as has already been mentioned, were marked with the words, *I came, I saw, I vanquished*. The last for the overthrow of the king of Numidia; in which the infant son of that prince was carried in procession. This captive, having received a literary education at Rome, became afterwards, according to Plutarch, an historian of eminence.*

Although triumphs were not to be obtained for the defeat of fellow-citizens, and nothing in these processions had a reference to Pompey, yet the effigies of many considerable senators, who had fallen in the civil war, were carried before the victor's chariot.

In these processions, Cæsar is said to have carried to the treasury, in all, sixty thousand talents in money,† and two thousand eight hundred and twenty-two chaplets or crowns of gold, weighing twenty thousand four hundred and fourteen pounds.‡ He at the same time distributed, to each private man of the army, five thousand denarii or drachmas, about one hundred and sixty-one pounds sterling; to each centurion, double: to the tribune, quadruple: to the people, an Attic mina of an hundred drachmas, or about three pounds four shillings and seven-pence a man.||

The soldiers, who walked in these processions, in chanting their ballads and lampoons, took the usual petulant liberties with their leader; alluded to the disorders of his youth, and to the crimes of his age; and shewed that they were not deceived by the professions which he made of a zeal for the liberties of the people. "If you observe the laws," they

* Plut. in Cæs.—Dio Cass.

† About 10,000,000 L.

‡ The Roman pondo consisted of ten ounces, about 800,000 l.

|| Appian.—J. e. on.

said, "you shall be punished; but, if you boldly transgress them all, a crown is your reward." These appearances of freedom in the troops, perhaps, flattered the people with some image of the ancient familiarity of ranks which subsisted in times of the republic: but the license of mere soldiers of fortune brings too often the reverse of freedom to the people; and, in whatever degree the inhabitants of Rome were qualified to judge of their own situation, it is likely that the pageants, which now entertained them, were part of the means which Cæsar employed to reconcile them to his usurpation, and to divert their thoughts from the subversion of every privilege they had derived from their ancestors. Further to secure these effects, he continued to multiply shows and public diversions. He himself, at the close of his triumphs, walked in procession, to celebrate the opening of magnificent edifices he had built, and, in his return at night from this ceremony, attended by multitudes of the people, was lighted by torches borne on elephants.* At the same time he erected theatres, and exhibited dramatic performances, in different parts of the city, and amply indulged the taste of the populace for entertainments of every sort. He introduced, not only gladiators to fight in single combat, but parties on foot and on horseback, to engage, in considerable numbers, on opposite sides, and, in respect to the actual effusion of blood, to furnish no mean representation of war. Among these, he shewed the manner of fighting from elephants, having forty of these animals properly mounted, and the manner likewise of fighting at sea, having vessels on a piece of water which was formed for the purpose. In most of these battles, the parties engaged, being captives or malefactors otherwise condemned to die, but now armed against one another, with promise of life to the victor, gave a serious exhibition of the utmost efforts they could make for mutual destruction.

Among the other articles of show and expense, which composed the magnificence of these entertainments, are mentioned the blinds or awnings of silk, a material then of the highest price, which were spread over the public theatres, to

* Dio. Cass.—Suetonius.

shade the spectators from the sun, and to enable them, undisturbed, from under these delicate coverings, to enjoy the sights of bloodshed and horror which were presented before them. Two human sacrifices, we are told, were at the same time offered up in the field of Mars, by priests specially named for this service. Of this shocking exhibition, the historian does not explain the occasion.* The whole was attended by a feast, to which the people were invited, and at which twenty thousand benches or couches were placed for these numerous guests.† So great was the concourse from the country, to this entertainment, that multitudes lay in the streets, or lodged in booths erected for the occasion. Many were trampled under foot, and killed in the crowds. Among those who perished in this manner, two Roman senators are mentioned.

This method of gaining the people, by flattering their disposition to dissipation and idleness, was already familiar at Rome. It had been employed under the republic in procuring favour, and in purchasing votes by those who aspired to the offices of state. It was now extended by Cæsar, to effect the revolution he had in view, and to reconcile the populace of Rome, who had for some time governed the empire, to the loss of their political consequence, in being deprived of a power which they were indeed, for a considerable period, unworthy to hold. It is probable that the arms of Cæsar were not more successful in subduing those who opposed him in the field, than these popular arts were in gaining the consent of his subjects to the dominion he was about to assume.

From this time forward, this successful adventurer took upon himself all the functions of government, and, while he suffered the forms of a senate and popular assemblies to remain, availed himself of their name and authority, without consulting with either, affixing, without their knowledge, and without scruple, the superscription of particular senators to the decrees or edicts which he sent abroad into the provinces.‡

* Dio. Cass. lib. xliii. c. 24.

† Plut. in Cæs.

‡ It is well known that the *Senatus Consulta* bore the names of the senators by whom they were proposed.

“My name,” says Cicero, “is often prefixed to public deeds which are sent abroad, as having been moved or drawn up by me, and which come back from Armenia or Syria, as mine, before I have ever heard of them at Rome. Do not imagine I am in jest; for I have letters from persons, whose names I never heard of before, thanking me for the honour I have done them in bestowing the title of king.”*

Equally absolute in the city as in the provinces, Cæsar placed whomever he thought proper on the rolls of the senate; and, without regard to birth, declared some to be of patrician rank. He recalled some who had been driven into exile for illegal practices, and reinstated in their ranks many whom the censors had degraded.† In all the elections, he named half the magistrates, or, in a mandate, addressed to the tribes, took upon himself to direct the people, whom they were to choose.‡ In the exercise of so much power, he became reserved and difficult of access, familiar only with persons whom he himself had raised, and who had talents amusing or serviceable, without any pretensions to alarm his jealousy.¶ Nevertheless, if the Romans could have overlooked what was offensive in his manner, or illegal in the powers which he had thus usurped, many of his acts were in themselves, as might have been expected from so able a personage, worthy of a great prince, and tending to reform abuses, as well as to facilitate the summary proceedings of the despotical power he had assumed.

* Ante audio Senatûs Consultum in Armeniam et Syriam esse perlatum, quod in meam sententiam factum esse dicatur, quam omnino mentionem ullam de ea re esse factam. Atque hoc nolim me jocare putes, nam mihi scito jam, a regibus ultimis allatas esse literas, quibus mihi gratias agant, quod se mea sententia reges appellaverim; quos ego non modo reges appellatos, sed omnino nato nesciebam. Cicero, ad Familiares, lib. ix. ep. 15.

† At this time, he with much difficulty was persuaded, at the intercession of the senate, to permit the return of Caius Marcellus, who, at Athens, on his way into Italy, was, upon motives which have not been explained, assassinated by one of his own attendants. This Marcellus was consul, U. C. 703.

‡ The words of Cæsar's mandate were, “Cæsar dictator tribui, &c. &c. commendo vobis illum, &c. &c. ut vestro suffragio suam dignitatem teneat.” Sueton. in Cæsa.

¶ Cicer. ad Familiares. lib. iv. ep. 9. Ib. lib. vi. ep. 14.

Among the first acts of this reign, the law of Sylla, by which the children of the proscribed had been excluded from holding any office in the state, was repealed. The judiciary law, which had undergone so many alterations, and which, in its latest form, admitted some of the inferior class of the people* on the roll of the judges or jurymen, was now reformed, so as to limit the exercise of the judicature to the senators and knights. A scrutiny was made into the titles of those who had been in the practice to receive corn at the public granaries; and their numbers were greatly reduced.† Of the companies which had been multiplied for factious purposes, many were abolished, and the original corporations of the city alone were permitted to remain. Many punishments, for the better restraining of crimes, were increased. To the ordinary punishment of murder was joined the confiscation of the whole estate of the murderer; to that of some other crimes, the confiscation of one half. The kalendar was reformed upon the principles established by the Egyptian astronomers, The reckoning by lunar months, and the use of irregular intercalations, which had been frequently made for party and political purposes, had so deranged the terms, that the festivals to be observed by reapers did not happen in summer, or those of the vintage in autumn. To restore them, therefore, to their proper dates in the kalendar, no less than an intercalation of sixty-seven days, or above two months, was required. This intercalation was made in the present year, between the months of November and December, so that the name of December was transferred from the time of the autumnal equinox, to that, where it still remains, of the winter solstice.

Under the government of Cæsar, from whom little severity of manners was to be expected, sumptuary laws were framed

* The Tribuni Aerarii.

† The leaders of faction, under the republic, and no one probably more than Cæsar himself, in order to increase the numbers of their partisans, had augmented this list, and it was undoubtedly become a great abuse. Dion Cassius says, it was at this time reduced by Cæsar to one-half. Suetonius specifies the numbers from three hundred and twenty thousand to one hundred and fifty thousand. Plutarch and Appian state the reduction, so as to be understood of the numbers of the whole people, in comparing the muster taken before the civil war with the one now made.

to restrain the expense of the table; and he himself expressed great zeal to correct the abuse which prevailed in this article. Being sensible that Italy was greatly depopulated by the distractions of the commonwealth, and by the devastations of the late civil war, he took measures to restore the numbers of the people, both by detaining the natives of Italy at home, and by inviting foreigners to settle. He gave premiums to those who had families; as if any premium could compensate the want of that domestic security and freedom which render the establishment of a family the principal charm of human life. This charm, indeed, his project of dominion was likely to mar; and the natural substitutes with him were pains and restraints; and, of this kind, he ordered that no citizen above twenty, nor under ten, except belonging to the army, should remain out of Italy above three years at a time; and that the sons of senators, except in the family or retinue of public officers, should not go abroad: that all landholders in Italy should employ no less than one-third freemen on their lands; that all practitioners of liberal arts, particularly foreign physicians settling at Rome, should be admitted on the rolls of the people; and at the same time he extended the privilege of Romans to whole cities and provinces, in different parts of the empire;* by these means seeming to increase the number of citizens, or at least the number of those who were to bear this title. Sensible that he himself had become dangerous to the republic, by having his power as a provincial officer improperly prolonged, he took measures to prevent a similar danger to the government, of which he himself had now acquired the possession, limiting the duration of command in the provinces, if with the title of *proprætor*, to one year, or with that of *proconsul*, to two years; a regulation, in which he shewed how well he understood the nature of the ladder by which he himself had mounted to his present elevation, and how much he desired to withhold the use of it from any one else, who might be disposed to tread in his steps, or to dispute his own continuance in the height he had gained.

* Dio. Cass.—Sueton.—Appian.

While this successful adventurer, on a supposition that all government had devolved on himself, was providing for the security of his power, and on a supposition that he had no enemy left in the field, or that the remains of the adverse party in the provinces might be extinguished by his officers, was betaking himself to civil affairs and to popular arts, he had reports from Spain, which convinced him that his own presence might still be necessary to repress a party which began in that country to resume its vigour under the sons of Pompey. He had sent Didius, with the fleet and army, from Sardinia, to secure the possession of Spain; but this service was found to be more difficult than was at first apprehended. He himself had, in appearance, upon the defeat of Afranius and Petreius, reduced this province; but many humours had broke out in it, while he was afterwards so much occupied in other parts of the empire. Even the troops of that country, which had joined his standard, mutinied, or, during the uncertain state of his fortunes in Thessaly and Egypt, became refractory to the orders of his officers, and though, upon the death of Cassius Longinus, and the succession of Trebonius, their discipline was in appearance restored; yet, consciousness of the heinous offence they had committed against the victor made them doubt of his forgiveness; and, joined with the inclination and respect which they yet entertained for the family of his rival, determined them to take part against him. They had opened a secret correspondence with Scipio, while he was yet at the head of a powerful army in Africa, and encouraged him to send a proper officer into Spain, to take the command of such forces as could be raised in the province.

The person sent for this purpose was the eldest of the two sons of Pompey, who, in his way, put into the island of Majorca, and was there detained by sickness, or remained some time in expectation that he might prevail on the natives to espouse his cause. The troops on the continent of Spain, in the mean time, even before the young Pompey arrived to take the command of them, had declared themselves openly against Cæsar, and erased his name from their bucklers. They obliged his lieutenant Trebonius to fly from their quarters,

and owned T. Quintus Scapula and Q. Apronius for their generals.

In this posture of affairs, young Pompey arrived in Spain, put himself at the head of this army, and either received or forced the submission of the principal towns. He was likewise strengthened by the accession of all the Roman settlers in the province, who retained any zeal for the republic, and by the remains of former armies who had been levied by his father, especially such of that army which had served under Afranius on the Segra as were left in Spain, and by many officers of rank, who, having escaped from Thessaly or Africa upon the late calamities of their party, had taken refuge in this country. Among these, Labienus and Varus, with as many as could be saved from the massacre at Thapsus, were assembling anew under the memorable, though unfortunate, standard of Pompey. The two brothers, Cnæus and Sextus, were joined together; and, supported by the name of their father, which was still in high veneration, had assembled thirteen legions. Among these were two legions of native Spaniards, who had deserted from Trebonius; one that was raised from the Roman colonists in Spain; and a fourth, which had arrived from Africa with the elder of the two brothers.*

Q. Fabius Maximus and Q. Pedius or Didius,† the officers of Cæsar, being unable to contend for possession of the province, remained on the defensive, and, by the reports which they made to their commander, represented the necessity of his own presence for its entire recovery.

The continuance of the dictatorial power in Cæsar's person had superseded the usual succession in the offices of state. Lepidus still remained in his station of general of horse; and, with a council of six or nine præfects, being left to command at Rome, Cæsar himself set out in the autumn for Spain. He ordered troops from Italy, to reinforce those already employed in his service, and, in twenty-seven days after his departure from Rome, arrived at Saguntum.‡

* Hirtius, de Bell. Hisp.

† Dio. Cass. ibid. c. 31.

‡ App. de Bell. Civil. lib. ii. or, as Strabo writes, at Obulio, lib. iii. p. 160.

Upon the news of Cæsar's approach, Cnæus Pompeius had assembled all his force on the Bætis, now the Guadalquivir, posted his brother Sextus, with a proper garrison, at Corduba, and himself endeavoured to reduce Ulia, a town which still held out against him in that neighbourhood. Cæsar's first object, upon his arrival in Spain, was to preserve this place from falling into the enemy's hands. For this purpose, he detached eleven cohorts, under the command of L. Julius Paciaæcus, with orders, if possible, to throw themselves into the town. The night, in which they marched for this purpose, being stormy and dark, they passed the first posts of the enemy unnoticed. But, approaching the walls, they were challenged by the sentries there placed by the besiegers; and the officer, who led the van of Cæsar's reinforcement, having answered, in a low voice, that they were a detachment ordered by Pompey to the foot of the wall, in search of some entry, by which, under the cover of the night, they might surprise the garrison, they were suffered to pass; and, presenting themselves at one of the gates, upon a signal that had been agreed upon, they were admitted into the town.

While Cæsar thus reinforced the garrison of Ulia, he himself, to make a diversion in their favour, marched up to Corduba, cut off a party that had been sent from thence to observe his motions, and threatened the town with a siege. Sextus, who was in the place, being alarmed, sent pressing representations to his brother, who, accordingly, abandoned his lines before Ulia, and marched to his relief. Both armies encamped on the Guadalquivir,* The parties that were sent forward from each, to scour the country, or to cover their respective quarters, were engaged in daily skirmishes. But the two brothers, being in possession of the principal stations, and in condition to protract the war, continued to act on the defensive. Cæsar, on his part, made some movements, in order to disconcert them, and to find, if possible, an opportunity of coming to action; but the country being hilly, and the towns generally built upon heights, every-where furnished strong posts for the enemy, and prevented his making any

* The Bætis.

progress. The winter at the same time approaching, exposed his army to considerable hardships, from a season which even there had severities, and from the scarcity of provisions. Under these disadvantages he undertook the siege of Allegua, and on the twentieth of February, after an obstinate resistance, obliged that town to surrender.* U. C. 708.

Our accounts of these operations, which are ascribed to Hirtius, and which, with his other performances, are annexed to Cæsar's Commentaries, being less perfect than other parts of the same collection, all we can distinctly learn from them is, that after a variety of different movements, which gave rise to frequent skirmishes, the armies, in the month of March, came to encamp in the plain of Munda, about five miles from each other; that Cæsar was about to leave his station, when, in the morning of his intended departure, he had intelligence that the enemy had been under arms from the middle of the preceding night, and were meditating some attempt on his camp. This intelligence was followed by the sudden appearance of their army on some elevated grounds near the town of Munda; but, as they still shewed no disposition on their part to enter the plain, Cæsar, after some hesitation, advanced to attack them on the heights.

In the army of Pompey, together with the flower of a warlike people, the natives of Spain, were assembled many veterans of the Roman legions, inured to blood; many Roman citizens of rank, now pushed to despair, or warned, by the fate of their party at Thapsus, not to expect safety from the mercy of a victorious enemy, and not to have any hopes but in their swords. Under these impressions, they waited for Cæsar's approach with a proper countenance, and, on the first onset, repulsed and put to flight the troops by whom they were attacked. In this extremity, Cæsar ran into the ranks of his own men; said, *they were delivering him over to boys*; laid hold of a sword and a shield, and, calling out that *this then should be the last day of his life, and of their services*, took a place in the ranks, as a mere legionary soldier. In this manner he renewed the action; and, being reduced to the

* Hirtius, de Bell. Hisp.

necessity of animating his men with the example of his own personal valour, committed his fortune and his life to the decision of a contest, in which he acted as a legionary soldier, and in which his ability as an officer could no longer have any share: but, while the event was still in suspense, Bogud, an African, commanding a body of horse in the service of Cæsar, having made an attempt to pierce into Pompey's camp, drew Labienus from his post in the field to cover it. This error,* committed by a veteran officer in the heat of action, turned the fortune of the day against himself. The troops, who till then valiantly sustained Cæsar's attack, believing that Labienus deserted them, instantly fled in disorder. The slaughter from thenceforward turned, as usual, entirely against those who fled. Thirty thousand fell upon the field, and among them three thousand Roman citizens of high condition, with Labienus and Attius Varus at their head. Seventeen officers of rank were taken, with thirteen Roman eagles or legionary standards.

Cæsar acknowledged that, having on other occasions fought for victory, he had now been obliged to fight for his life. He had a thousand men killed, and five hundred wounded, before the enemy gave way. Part of the vanquished army retired into the town of Munda, part into the camp, and, in their respective posts, prepared to defend themselves to the last extremity. Cæsar, on the approach of night, took possession of all the avenues by which either might escape; and it is said that the troops he employed in this service, instead of traverses of earth or stone to obstruct the highways, raised up mounds from the bodies of the dead.

Early in the morning of the following day, Cæsar, having left the town of Munda in this manner blocked up or invested, set out for Corduba, which Sextus, the younger of the two Pompeys, upon the news of the battle, had already abandoned.

Cnæus, on seeing the rout of his own army, fled, with a small party of horse, on the road to Carteia.† Here he had

* It is obvious that he ought to have left the camp and all its contents to their fate, until the principal event was decided.

† Now Gibraltar.

collected most of his shipping and naval stores; but the news of his defeat having arrived before him, the people were divided in their inclinations. Part had already sent a deputation, with an offer of their services, to Cæsar; part still adhered to the family of Pompey; and from these opposite dispositions had proceeded to actual violence and bloodshed in the streets. Cnæus himself was wounded in one of their scuffles, and, expecting no safety in a place in which so many of the inhabitants had declared against him, took ship, and put to sea with thirty galleys. He was pursued by Didius, who commanded Cæsar's squadron at Gades; and being obliged in a few days to stop for a supply of water, of which he had been ill provided at his sudden departure from Carteia, he was overtaken, most of his ships destroyed, and he himself obliged to seek for safety on shore. Soon after his landing, he dismissed his attendants, or was deserted by them; and, encountering a party of the enemy, though weakened by his wounds and loss of blood, he continued with great valour to defend himself, until he was overpowered and slain. His head, according to the barbarous custom of the times, was sent to the conqueror, and exposed at Hispalis.

In the preceding operations of the war, every circumstance contributed to the fall of the republic, and to the success of Cæsar. In the very outset of the contest, half the nobility, ruined by prodigality and extravagance, had been desirous of anarchy and confusion. Citizens high in civil rank, and with fortunes entire, were generally glad to forego their political importance in exchange for ease and safety, under which to enjoy the pleasure of their villas or country retreats. Even the arms which should have protected the commonwealth were in the hands of mere soldiers of fortune, who were inclined to favour that side from which they looked for the establishment of military government; they fought to procure great power and estates for themselves, not to preserve laws which gave the security of property and the superiority of wealth to others. Many of the senators, indeed, perceived the impending ruin, and were prevailed upon to make some efforts for the preservation of the state; but, on most occasions, too hastily despaired of the cause. It was not thought

honourable or safe for a citizen to survive his freedom. Upon this principle, the friends of the republic, in considerable numbers, while they escaped from their enemies, perished by their own hands.

Soon after the action at Munda, Scapula, one of the officers lately at the head of the republican party in Spain, turned the practice of suicide into a kind of farce. Having retired to Corduba from the field of battle, he ordered a magnificent pile of wood to be raised and covered with carpets; and, having given an elegant entertainment, and distributed his money among his attendants and servants, mounted to the top of this fabric, and, while one servant pierced the master with his sword, another set fire to the pile. Thus the victories of Cæsar were completed even by his enemies; and, while he made a fresh step to dominion at every encounter, they who opposed him went headlong, and abandoned their country to its ruin.

The province of Spain, under a proper conduct of its force and resources, if it had not been able to stop at once the career of Cæsar's victories, was surely sufficient to have given him more trouble than any other part of the empire. Its natives, brave, and addicted to war, were inferior to the Romans only in policy and discipline. They had been averse to the party of Cæsar, and would not, even in its highest prosperity, prefer it to the cause they had originally espoused. Being mixed with the remains of Roman armies which had been broken and dispersed in the field, they still maintained every place of defence against the conqueror; and, within the walls of cities to which they retired, defended themselves to the last extremity.

Cæsar, having been employed part of the spring, and the following summer, in subduing this scattered enemy, prepared to leave the province. He assembled the principal inhabitants at Hispalis; and, having upbraided them with their animosity to himself and to the Roman people, he put them in mind of his early connexion with their country, as quæstor and as prætor, and of his repeated good offices in the qualities of senator and magistrate: having made a proper establishment for the government of the province, he set out for

Italy,* and arrived at Rome in October.† There, although it was contrary to the practice of former ages to admit of triumphs where the vanquished were fellow-citizens, he took a triumph for his late victory at Munda; and, the more to amuse the people, who, whatever be the occasion, are captivated with such exhibitions, he appointed separate processions, on the same account, to Q. Fabius Maximus, and to Didius, who had acted under him in that service.

These triumphs, over the supposed last defenders of the public liberty, and over the perishing remains of the family of Pompey, so long respected at Rome, instead of the festivity which they were intended to inspire, were attended with many signs of dejection. But none took upon him to censure, or was qualified to stem, the torrent of servility, by which all orders of men were carried. The same succession of games and entertainments were ordered as in the former year. The senate and people, indeed, had no longer any concessions to be added to those already made to the conqueror, and it was difficult to refine on the language of adulation, which they had so amply employed in former decrees; but something to distinguish the present situation of affairs, to shew the ardour of some to pay their court, and to disguise the discontent and the sorrow of others, was thought necessary on the present occasion. A thanksgiving was appointed, and ordered to continue for fifty days. The anniversary of the twentieth of April, the day on which the news of the victory at Munda was received at Rome, was ordered to be for ever celebrated with games of the circus.‡ Even they who felt a secret indignation at the elevation of a single person to act as lord of the commonwealth, concurred, in appearance, with these resolutions in honour of Cæsar.¶ They flattered themselves that they were hastening his ruin; that, in such draughts, the full

* Antony had set out from Rome, to meet Cæsar; but, to the great surprise and alarm of every body, returned unexpectedly to Rome. Cicero ad Att. xii. 18.

It was known afterwards, that Antony returned under the surprise of an order given by Cæsar, to oblige him to pay for houses, &c. bought at Pompey's sale. Cicero Phil. ii. 29. Ibid. xxxi. 29.

† Velleius Paterculus.

‡ Dio. Cassius.

¶ Plutarch. in Cæsar.

cup was most likely to nauseate; and provocation, when carried to extreme, might possibly excite revenge in the spirits of free men, if any yet remained.

In the concessions which were made to Cæsar, whether suggested by his friends or by his enemies, there was no attempt to preserve any appearance of the republic, or to veil the present usurpation. The senate, in presenting their several decrees, waited upon Cæsar in a body, as subjects to acknowledge their sovereign; were received by him on his chair of state, and, in all the form of a royal ceremony, stretching forth his hand to each as they approached. While he carried the external show of his elevation to this height, Pontius Aquila, one of the tribunes, being seated in the exercise of his office, had suffered him, in one of his processions, to pass, without rising from his place. This he greatly resented. "Must I," he said to those who attended him, "re-sign the government to this tribune?" and for some days, in granting requests or petitions, he still affected to guard his answers ironically, by saying, "Provided that Pontius Aquila will permit."* The consulate was offered to him for ten years; but he declined it; as he destined this, with other titles of distinction, for the gratification of those who had served him in the war. He had assumed the title of consul in his late triumph, but immediately after resigned it to Q. Fabius Maximus.

Such, from henceforward, was to be the manner of conferring honours under the monarchy of Rome. Hitherto, for some time back, families became noble in consequence of having had an ancestor admitted into the senate, or in consequence of his having borne any of the higher offices of state, such as that of consul or prætor: and the descendants, instead of titles, recited the names of a father and grandfather who had been in these offices, and, in place of ensigns armorial, erected in their halls the effigies or images of such ancestors. Cæsar, that he might have more frequent opportunities to gratify his retainers, paid no regard to the customary establishments of the senate; increased its numbers at

* Sueton in Cæs. c. 78.

pleasure, inserting in the rolls such persons as were agreeable to himself, amounting in all to about nine hundred. For the same purpose, he augmented the number of prætors to fourteen, and that of quæstors to forty; and even, without requiring that his friends should pass through these inferior offices, rewarded them, at pleasure, with the titular honours of consular, prætorian, patrician, &c.;* and extended his munificence likewise to the provinces, by admitting aliens separately, or in collective bodies, to the privilege or appellation of Roman citizens.

In the midst of examples which seemed to throw a ridicule on the ancient forms of the republic, as well as to substitute a military government in their stead, Cæsar was pleased to name himself, together with Mark Antony, as consuls for the following year. This compliment paid to the civil establishment, by condescending to bear the name of legal office, though very illegally assumed, flattered the citizens with hopes that he meant to govern under some form of a republic.† Nothing, however, followed, to gratify these hopes: the state which he affected, his dress, his laurel wreath, the very colour and height of his buskins, which was noticed, the seal which he chose to make use of, being the impression of a Venus armed, in ostentation of his supposed celestial extraction; the numerous guards and retinue, exceeding two thousand men, with which he was constantly attended;‡ the satisfaction with which he seemed to receive the forced servility of those whom his sword had subdued, betrayed a mind which, though possessed of real superiority, had not sufficient elevation to disdain the false appearance of greatness.

On the last day of the year, Q. Fabius Maximus, who had been a few months consul, died before he had vacated the office; and, about noon of the same day, Cæsar, who had assembled the tribes, ordered them to take the form of the centuries, and to elect Caninius consul for the remainder of the year, which was only part of a day. Plutarch says that Cicero exhorted the people to be speedy in paying their court to this new consul; “for this magistrate,” he said, “may be out

* Dio. Cass. lib. xlii. c. 47. † Appian. ‡ Cicer. ad Att. lib. xiii. ep. 52.

"of office before we can reach him." And Cicero himself, referring to this farcical election, writes in a letter to one of his friends, "We have had a consulate, during which no one either ate or drank, and yet nothing extraordinary happened; for so great was the vigilance of this magistrate, that he never slept all the time he was in office. You may laugh at these things," he says; "but if you were here, you would cry."*

On the following day, Cæsar, with all the powers and ensigns of dictator, took possession of the consulate, in conjunction with Antony. He intended, after having held U. C. 709. this title for a few days in his own person, to resign it in favour of Dolabella, though a young man, still far short of the legal age. The execution of this intention, however, was some time delayed, at the request of Mark Antony, who, being jealous of Dolabella, endeavoured to obstruct his preferment.

Cæsar, now uniting in his own person all the powers of the state, whether of legislation or magistracy, passed the winter in forming projects to embellish the capital and aggrandise the empire; and, among regulations for the better government of the city, besides the sumptuary laws formerly mentioned, and now revived, respecting expense of the table, we read of his prohibiting the use of litters, of purple, and of pearls, except to persons of a certain rank, and to them only at great festivals, and on remarkable occasions. For the better execution of his regulations respecting the table, he appointed inspectors, with orders to seize all illicit articles of provision; and, if any thing of this sort were known to escape in the markets, he sent officers to seize them from the very tables on which they were served. And, to check the luxury of the times in other articles, he imposed duties on the importation of foreign commodities.

Under the ordinary pretence, that the laws were become too voluminous, he ordered them to be digested into a code,

* Cicer. ad Familiar. lib. vii. ep. 30. Ita Caninio consule scito, neminem prandisse. Nihil tamen eo consulatu mali factum est. Fuit enim mirifica vigilantia qui toto suo consulatu somnum non viderit. Hæc tibi ridicula videntur: non enim ades. Quæ si videris lachrymas non teneres.

with a view to simplify and to reduce them into a narrower compass; in this measure attempting a reformation which mankind, in certain situations, generally wish for, but which no individual can accomplish without the exercise, and the strongest temptations to extend and to perpetuate, in himself, the possession of absolute power.

In the same spirit of despotic government, with which Cæsar abridged the laws, he acted at once as legislator and judge. As an instance of his severity in the latter capacity, it is mentioned that he annulled a marriage, because it had been contracted no more than two days after the woman had parted from a former husband; and, what is more characteristic of his dangerous usurpations, that citizens were degraded, or senators expelled, at his discretion.

His mind, at the same time, entertained projects of great variety and extent. To drain the Pomptine or great marshes, which rendered the air so unhealthy, and so much land unserviceable, in the neighbourhood of Rome; to cut across the isthmus of Corinth, to erect moles, and form harbours on the coast of Italy; to make highways across the Appennines; to build a new theatre that should surpass that of Pompey; to erect public libraries, and make a navigable canal from the Anio and the Tiber to the sea at Teracina; to build a magnificent temple to Mars. These projects are justly mentioned as meritorious in the sovereign of a great empire; and it must be confessed that the love of dominion would be but a wretched passion, if there were not something of this sort to be done after the toils of ambition were over.

The measure which, of all others, contributed most to the honour of Cæsar, did we suppose him entitled to punish those who opposed him, was the general indemnity which he granted. Some he even employed in the administration of government, and promoted in the state. He placed Caius Cassius and Marcus Brutus, in particular, for this year, on the list of prætors, and intrusted them with the higher jurisdiction of the city. To the widows of many, who died in the field against himself, he restored their portions, and to the children gave part of their patrimony.* He replaced the statues of

* Sueton.—Dio. lib. xliii.

Sylla and of Pompey, which the populace, in flattery to himself, had thrown down ; “ and by this mean,” says Cicero, “ he the more firmly established his own.”

It appeared, on many occasions, that Cæsar meant to contrast his own conduct with that of Sylla ;* his own clemency with the bloody executions performed by the other. The comparison, no doubt, is obvious, or must occur to every person who reads their story. Sylla had been excited, by extreme provocations, to turn his arms against a party in possession of the capital, and he drew his sword to punish injuries done no less to the republic, and to its most respectable members, than to himself. While he was master of the state, he acted like a person who did not care how odious he rendered despotical power ; for he did not mean to retain it. But he mixed with the resentment of a personal enemy the high views of a noble citizen, who proposed to reform the state by clearing it of many corrupted and dangerous subjects. When he had accomplished this purpose, he disdained the pageantry of high station, was above receiving the adulation which proceeds from servility, or wishing to enjoy a continual precedence in the management of affairs, which requires no extraordinary compass of mind. Embarked by fortune on a tempestuous sea, when he had conducted the vessel into port, he quitted the helm ; and, after having been master, was not afraid to place himself among his countrymen as a fellow-citizen ; and in this state of equality his greatness of mind secured to him a distinction which no degree of precedency, and no measure of prerogative, could have bestowed.

To this character, that of Cæsar, in many particulars, may be fairly considered as a contrast. He himself had stirred up the disorders which produced the civil war in which he engaged. He had no injuries, either public or private, to resent ; his affected clemency, in sparing a few captives, in the beginning or in the course of his operations, was belied by the

* Quoniam reliqui crudelitate odium effugere non potuerunt neque victoriam diutius tenere, præter unum L. Syllam quem imitaturus non sum. Hæc nova sit ratio vincendi, ut misericordia et liberalitate nos muniamus. Cicero. ad Att. lib. ix. ep. 7.

wantonness with which he entered on a war, in which the blood of many thousands of his fellow-citizens was to be unnecessarily shed.* If he had been reluctant in the shedding of blood, his mercy would have appeared in avoiding so destructive a contest, not in ostentatiously sparing a few of the many whose lives his lust of dominion had wantonly brought into hazard. His clemency should have appeared at the Rubicon, not at Corfinium; in leaving his country to enjoy its liberties, not merely in sparing those whom no man in his senses would destroy, a people who were willing to submit, and whom he desired to govern.

Cæsar used to ridicule the resignation of Sylla as an act of imbecility;† and he himself, indeed, even after all occasion of great exertion was over, seemed to enjoy that pre-eminence which the other disdained. The degree of vanity which he is said to have indulged, in accepting the frivolous honours which were now conferred upon him by acts of the senate, is indeed scarcely to be credited. Among these have already been mentioned a decree, that he should have precedence of all magistrates, and the privilege of being always dressed in the triumphal robes; of having a gilded chair of state, and a place of distinction at all the public games; that he should be

* It is said that 400,000 Romans perished in this contest.—If the author has been formerly censured for giving to Sylla too much credit for his resignation, in this comparison with Cæsar the meaning cannot be misunderstood. The steps of Sylla, in wading (as the poet expresses himself*) through slaughter, were horrid: but his resignation shewed that they were not made to come at a throne, and may have been made in execution of public justice. But Cæsar had no pretence to justice; and for his clemency—there is a degree of idiotism, in applying the term to him after his massacre in Gaul, for the subjugation of an innocent people; or rather for the nurture of an army in blood, that he might employ them afterwards in terrifying and enslaving his own country.

* ... nor circumscrib'd alone
Their growing virtues, but their crimes confin'd;
Forbad to wade through slaughter to a throne,
And shut the gates of mercy on mankind.

GRAY'S Elegy, in a Country Church-yard.

† Syllam nescisse literas qui dictaturam deposuerit. Sueton. in Jul. Cæs. lib. lxxvii

allowed to deposit a suit of armour in the temple of Jupiter Feretrius, an honour appropriated to those who, like Romulus, had killed, with their own hands, a leader of the enemy; that his lictors should have their fasces always bound with laurel; that he himself, in coming from the Latin festivals, should enter the city on horseback; that he should have the title of father of his country, and be so designed on the coins; that the anniversary of his birth-day should be kept as a festival; that statues should be erected to him in all the towns of Italy, and in the temples of the city; that the statues, without any consideration of his title to these honours, should be adorned with the civic and obsidionary crowns; the first a badge worn only by those who had saved a fellow-citizen in battle, the second by those who had delivered the city itself from a siege.*

The senate and people observing that these distinctions were agreeable to Cæsar, subjoined, that his robe should be cut in imitation of that of the ancient kings of Rome; that he should have an escort of knights and senators; that it should be permitted to swear by his destiny; that all his decrees, without exception, should be ratified; that, at the end of five years, a festival should be held in honour of him, as of a person of divine extraction; that an additional college of priests should be established, to perform the rites which were instituted for that occasion; that, in all gladiatorial sports, whether at Rome or in the provincial towns, one day should be dedicated to him; that a crown of gold, set with gems, like those of the gods, should be carried before him into the circus, attended with a thensus, or car, like that on which the idols of the gods were carried in procession; that he should have the title of Julian Jove, have a temple erected for himself, in conjunction with the goddess of clemency; and, to complete the ridicule of these institutions, that Mark Antony should be appointed the priest of this sacred fane.†

From these particulars, which, to characterize the ambition of the person to whom they refer, and the manners of the age, are selected from those mentioned by the original historian,‡

* Dio. Cass. lib. xlv. c. 4.

† Ibid. c. 6.

‡ Ibid.

it was no longer to be doubted that Cæsar wished to establish a monarchy on the ruins of the republic. He himself is said to have betrayed an arrogance unworthy of a great mind; and to have been so unguarded in his expressions, as to say, that the republic was but a name; that his words should be carefully observed; for that he meant every word should have the force of a law.

To so much affectation of a kingly state, joined to the possession of absolute power, nothing was wanting but the title of king. This Cæsar himself evidently appeared to have the vanity to desire. His retainers and flatterers, on different occasions, endeavoured to surprise the people into a concession of royalty; but, notwithstanding the powers of sovereignty, which he exercised without control, and the honours of divinity, which were decreed to him by general consent, his influence was not sufficient to reconcile the Roman people to the name of king. One of his emissaries, willing to suggest the propriety of bestowing this title, or to insinuate Cæsar's purpose of assuming it, had bound the head of one of his statues with a royal fillet. Marullus and Cæsetius, two of the tribunes in office, affecting great zeal for the honour of Cæsar, as well as for the majesty of the Roman state, made inquiry after the author of an insinuation so derogatory to both; and, receiving information of the guilty person, in order to check such attempts for the future, sent him to prison. This officious interposition of the tribunes, though pretending to vindicate Cæsar himself from so odious an imputation, he received with marks of displeasure; and hearing these officers extolled, under the appellation of *Bruti*, as the champions of the public freedom, "brutes indeed," he said they were; but took no further notice of the matter.

Soon after this incident, some one, or a few in the assembly of the people, saluted him with the title of king. But, on hearing, instead of acclamations, a general murmur of dislike, he silenced this unseasonable piece of flattery, saying, that his name was *Cæsar*, and not *king*. Here, too, the tribunes again interposed, and raised prosecutions against the authors of such treasonable expressions. But, in this instance, Cæsar lost his patience, and complained, in the senate, that

factionous men, under the pretence of discharging the public office of magistracy, propagated insinuations injurious to his character, and tending to alarm the people with false apprehensions. Such offences, he said, merit capital punishment; but he should be satisfied with degradation from their office. This sentence, accordingly, the senate made haste to pronounce; and from thenceforward it was not doubted that Cæsar, though indirectly, aspired to the title, as well as the power, of a monarch.

This opinion was still further confirmed, when, on the sixteenth of February,* at the *Lupercalia* (a festival which, being continued down from barbarous ages, served as a monument of primæval rudeness, rather than simplicity), the same piece of flattery, in making tender of a crown, was renewed by Mark Antony, then in the office of consul, and the chief confidant of Cæsar.

It was the custom, in this festival of the *Lupercalia*, for the first officers of state, and the first of the nobles, to present themselves naked in the streets, carrying thongs of undressed hide, with which they ran through the crowd, and struck at those who happened to be placed within their reach. The stroke was thought a remedy, in particular, for barrenness in women; and numbers of this sex, accordingly, crowded in the way to receive it.

In the ceremony now to be performed, Mark Antony bore his part as consul; and Cæsar sat on his gilded chair of state, in his triumphal robes, to behold the spectacle. Antony stopped before him, and presented him with a royal crown, saying, "this crown the Roman people confer upon Cæsar, by my hands." A few of the spectators seemed to applaud; but Cæsar, perceiving that the people in general, by their silence, gave signs of displeasure, pushed away the crown with his hand; and, upon this action, received from the people, by an universal shout of applause, an unquestionable explanation of their former silence.

To try the effect of a moderation which was so much applauded, Antony threw himself upon the ground, at Cæsar's

* Cicer. Philip. ii. c. 34.

feet, repeated his offer of the crown, and hoped that the people might join him in pressing the acceptance of what was so modestly refused; but in this with no better success than in the former attempt.

That the merit of this refusal, however, might not be forgotten, or that the offer might be held equal to the actual investiture of the crown, an entry was made in the *fasti*, or public records, by the directions of Antony, bearing, "that the consul having, by the order of the Roman people, presented a crown, and offered to confer the majesty of king on Caius Julius Cæsar, perpetual dictator, he had declined to receive it."*

The Roman republic had, for some time, subsisted in a very disorderly state. Citizens having dominion over many other nations, scarcely admitted any species of government among themselves. The inhabitants of Rome, assuming the prerogatives of a collective body, of which the members now not only extended over all Italy, but were dispersed throughout the empire, generally assembled in tumults, whose proceedings, at every convulsion, nothing but force could regulate or control. Accordingly, the immediate prospect was that of a government of force, either in the hands of a multitude that could not be resisted, or in the hands of those by whom such disorders had been suppressed. All who wished to preserve the republic endeavoured to extend the ordinary prerogatives of the senate, and to prevent, as much as possible, these ill constituted assemblies of the people from deliberating on matters of state; and it might, no doubt, have been still better for the empire, if the spirit of legal monarchy could at once have been infused into every part of the commonwealth, or if, without further pangs or convulsions, the authority of a prince, tempered with that of a senate, had been firmly established. But men do not at once change their habits and opinions, nor yield their own pretensions upon speculative notions of what is suited to the state of their age or country. Cæsar aspired to dominion, in order to gratify his personal vanity, not to correct the political errors of the times; and his contemporaries,

* Cicer. Philip. ii. c. 34.

born to the rights of citizens, still contended for personal independence and equal pretension to power, however impossible it might be, for the future, to preserve any species of republic among such a people, or at the head of such an empire.

Ever since the expulsion of Tarquin, the name of king had been odious at Rome. The most popular citizens, as soon as they became suspected of aspiring to kingly power, became objects of aversion, and were marked out as a butt to the detestation of their country. Thus fell Manlius Capitolinus, the Gracchi, Apuleius, and others who were loaded with this imputation.

The Romans, accustomed to see vanquished kings the sport of popular insolence, led in triumph, put to death, or, if suffered to live, made to languish in obscurity and neglect—accustomed to see kings, who were their own allies, submitting their causes to the judgment of the Roman people, or even in the streets of Rome suing for favour, considered monarchy itself as an appurtenance of servility and barbarism; and the project, to give a king to the Romans, as an attempt to degrade them into barbarians and slaves.

The maxim, which forbids assassination, even of usurpers, in every case whatever, is the result of prudent reflection, and has a tendency to allay the jealousy, and to mitigate the cruelty, of persons, who, by violent measures, which laws cannot restrain, may have incurred the resentment of mankind. Even tyrants, it is supposed, are cruel from fear, and become merciful in proportion as they believe themselves safe: it were unwise, therefore, to entertain any maxim which would keep the powerful in a continual state of distrust and alarm, or ever ready to stain the sword, which they wield, with blood. This prudential morality, however, was entirely unknown in the ancient republics, or could not be observed, without surrendering the freedom for which their citizens were taught to contend. Amongst them, the people were obliged to consider, not what was safe, but what was necessary; and could not always defend themselves against usurpations, neither by legal forms, nor by open war. It was thought allowable, therefore, to employ artifice, surprise, and secret conspiracy, against an usurper; and this was so much the case at Rome,

that no names were held in greater veneration than those of citizens who had assassinated persons suspected of views dangerous to the commonwealth, or who, by any means whatever, rendered abortive the project of adventurers who attempted to arm any party against the legal constitution of their country.

Cæsar, having attempted to join the title of king with the powers of perpetual dictator, had reason to distrust a people who were actuated by such apprehensions. He was, to an uncommon degree, the object of private as well as of public resentment, having usurped the government over those whom he had cruelly injured; over the fathers, the brothers, and sons, of those who had fallen by his sword. He, accordingly, for some time, took the precaution to have a military guard attending his person; but, grown familiar with those he had offended, inured to adulation, and secure in his own personal courage, he dropped this precaution, and began to reign with the confidence of a lawful monarch. Although he had incurred so much resentment, he disdained to stand in awe of it, and ventured to join the confidence of innocence with the highest measures of guilt. This conduct, indeed, was uncommon, and the effect of a daring courage, though scarcely consistent with the penetration and masterly skill with which he had hitherto conducted his affairs. It may serve to confirm what has already been observed, that, amongst the many accomplishments which Cæsar possessed, and together with the abilities which rendered him superior to every direct opposition, he was actuated by a vanity which bordered on weakness. Misled, perhaps, by this passion, he persisted in his emulation to the glory of Sylla, and would shew to the world that he who had not resigned his power could walk the streets of Rome, unattended, with as much safety as the other, who had had the magnanimity to restore the constitution of his country: joined to this weakness, he had too mean an opinion of those who composed the commonwealth, greatly sunk, indeed, in their political character, but not fallen into that state of personal weakness which his security and contempt of their resentment, seemed to imply.

Still many citizens of noble extraction were found, who thought that their former condition, as members of the republic, might be recovered. Some had been stunned with their fall, but not quite overwhelmed; others, who, on specious pretences, had even assisted in obtaining the victories of Cæsar, detested the monarchy to which those victories led. In the first period of the civil war many imagined that the contest was to end in substituting one party for another, not in the entire subversion of the republican government; and they were inclined, as soon as fortune should declare in favour of either party, though adverse, to be reconciled with those that prevailed.* But, when it evidently appeared that Cæsar, by suppressing the last remains of opposition to himself, in every part of the empire, meant to establish a monarchy in his own person, a secret indignation filled the breasts of all those who, upon a foot of family consequence, or personal ability, had any pretensions to political importance. To such persons the dominion of an equal appeared insufferable. Many of them, in conferring the extravagant honours which had been decreed to Cæsar, affected servility as the mask of a sullen displeasure, which, conscious of a tendency to betray itself, took the disguise of an opposite extreme.

The question, respecting the expedience of monarchical government, did not enter into the deliberations of any one. If it had been urged that a king was necessary, it would have been asked, who gave the right to Cæsar? If the people in general were corrupt, did the bankrupts, and outlaws, and soldiers of fortune, who formed the court of Cæsar, deserve a better name? If the great, the able, and experienced citizens, who were qualified to support the republic, were now no more, by whose sword had they perished? or if the republic, by the disorders which prevailed in it, was ripe for destruction, who had been, through life, the most distinguished promoter of those disorders? If the corrupt arts, the treasons, the murders, encouraged or even executed by Cæsar, had made a change of government necessary, the first act of that new government, for the instruction of mankind, ought to

* Cicero, ad Familiares.

have been to punish the author of so many disorders and crimes, not to reward him with a crown.

Many of Cæsar's officers, and the nearest to his person, were as much in this mind as any other citizens; and, on this supposition, so familiar was the thought of proceeding to the last extremities against him, that, when Antony came to meet Cæsar, on his return from Spain, Trebonius ventured to sound his inclinations respecting a design on Cæsar's life, as a person under whom the republic was no longer safe.* Although Antony did not adopt the measure, he did not betray Trebonius, nor did he appear to be surprised at the proposal. It was afterwards suggested that Antony should be invited to a share in the conspiracy which soon after broke out; and the proposal was dropped only on account of the refusal which he had already given to Trebonius: so readily was it believed that every noble Roman would rather share in the government of his country, as an independent citizen, than as a retainer to the most successful usurper.

It is well known that a conspiracy accordingly was, at this time, forming against the life of Cæsar, although the first steps and the consultations of the parties are no-where minutely recorded. The principal authors of it were Caius Cassius and Marcus Brutus, the prætors in the city; Decimus Brutus and Trebonius, who had both served in high ranks under Cæsar himself, and of whom the first was destined by him to the command in Cisalpine Gaul, and to the consulate in the following year.

Of these, Caius Cassius was early noted for a high and impetuous spirit. It is observed that, being a boy when Sylla was at the height of his power, he struck the son of the dictator, for having said that his father was the master of the Roman people. The tutor of young Sylla having carried a complaint to Pompey, the boys were called, and questioned on the subject of their quarrel: "do but repeat your words again," said Cassius, "and in this presence I will strike you." He had distinguished himself in Syria by collecting the remains of the unfortunate army of Crassus, with which he repelled

* Cicero. Philip. ii. c. 14.

the attempt of the Parthians to invade that province. He followed Pompey in the civil war, and commanded a squadron of the fleet on the coast of Sicily at the time of the battle of Pharsalia. From thence he sailed for the coast of Asia, and waited for the victor, when he was expected to arrive from Alexandria, professing his intention to drop all further opposition against him; but, with a secret design, according to Cicero, to have put Cæsar to death, if he had not debarked on a different side of the Cydnus from that on which Cassius had taken his station to receive him.*

Marcus Brutus was the nephew of Cato, by his sister Servilia; and so much a favourite of Cæsar, who was said to have an intrigue with his mother, that he was by some supposed to be his son. The father of Brutus, in the civil wars of Sylla, had been on the side of Marius, and having fallen into Pompey's hands, was by him put to death. The son retained so much resentment on this account, that he never accosted or saluted Pompey till after the civil war broke out; when, thinking it necessary to sacrifice all private considerations to the public cause, he joined him in Macedonia, and was received with great marks of distinction. This young man, either on account of his uncle Cato, or on account of the expectations generally entertained of himself, was, by all parties, held in high consideration. Being taken prisoner at the battle of Pharsalia, he was not only spared by the victor, but sent into the province of Cisalpine Gaul with the title of governor; where, during the war in Africa, against Scipio and the king of Numidia, he remained, perhaps, rather under safe custody than high in the confidence of Cæsar. He was in this year, together with Caius Cassius, who had married his sister, promoted to the dignity of prætor; and, though of less standing than Cassius, had the precedence, by a supposed partiality of the person who now disposed of all preferments and honours in the commonwealth. This circumstance was supposed, at the time that Brutus and Cassius were actually framing their conspiracy, to have occasioned a breach between

* Cicer. Philip. ii. c. 11.

them, and possibly helped to blind those who ought to have kept a watchful eye on their motions.

Cassius is reputed to have been the prime mover in the design against Cæsar's life; and to have been the author of anonymous calls to vindicate the freedom of Rome, which were posted up, or dropped in public places; and which, from the prevailing spirit of discontent, found a ready acceptance. Labels were hung upon the statues of the ancient Brutus, and billets were dropped, in the night, upon the judgment-seat of the prætor of this name, exciting him to imitate his ancestors, by restoring the republic; "you sleep; you are not Brutus:" and on the statues of his supposed ancestor, the elder Brutus, was written, "would you were alive!" These expressions of a secret disaffection, and prognostics of some violent design, either escaped the attention of Cæsar, or were despised by him; but were easily understood by persons who looked for a deliverance from the indignities to which they felt themselves exposed. While Cassius and Marcus Brutus entered into a formal concert on this subject, numbers pined under the want of that consideration to which they thought themselves born; many were provoked by particular instances of vanity or arrogance in the present dictator;* and, upon the least hint of a design against him, were ready to join. "I am sorry you should be ill at so critical a time," said Brutus to Legarius. "I am not ill," said the other, "if you have any intentions worthy of yourself."†

* Cæsar had, about this time, a visit from the queen of Egypt, who lived with him at his gardens on the Tiber (Cicer. ad Attic. lib. xiv.) Many, who overlooked his usurpation, and the violence he did to the constitution of his country, were scandalized at the intimacy in which he lived with a strange woman. Being accustomed to the distinctions of a court, and considering Cæsar as the monarch, she treated the citizens, who were still admitted to him on a foot of equality, as dependents and subjects. He himself, with all his state, was polite. As an apology for having made Cicero wait too long in his anti-chamber, he accosted him, with saying, "how can I hope to be tolerated, when even Marcus Tullius Cicero is made to wait? If any one could forgive it, he would; but the world must detest me." Cleopatra, it is probable, made no such apology when she gave cause to complain of her arrogance.

† Sueton. in Cæsare.

. Great numbers daily acceded to the plot ; of whom the following, besides Brutus and Cassius, are the principal names upon record : Cæcilius and Bucolianus, two brothers, Rubrius Rex, Q. Legarius, M. Spurius, Servilius Galba, Sextius Naso, Pontius Aquila. These had ever been on the side of the senate, or, in the last conflict, adherents of Pompey. The following had acted in the war under Cæsar himself : Decimus Brutus, C. Casca, Trebonius, Tullius Cimber, Minucius, and Basilus :* they are said, in all, to have amounted to sixty.† Cicero was known to detest the usurpation of Cæsar ; to mourn over the fall of the commonwealth, over the humiliation of the senate, and the diminution of his own political importance ; but he was not consulted in this design. The authors of it relied on his support, in case they should be successful ; but they knew too well his ingenuity, in suggesting scruples and difficulties, to bring him into their previous deliberations on so arduous an enterprise.

The conspirators, in forming their project, generally sounded the minds of persons before they made any formal or direct proposal. Thus, Brutus being in company with Statilius, Favonius, and Labio, proposed, among other problematical questions, some doubts concerning the expediency of assassinating tyrants. Favonius observed that such actions led to civil war, and that this was worse than mere usurpation. Statilius said that no wise man would engage in so hazardous an enterprise to restore the government of knaves and fools, then calling themselves the republic of Rome. Labio contended warmly with both ; and Brutus, changing the subject, thought no more of Statilius or Favonius, but in private communicated the design to Labio, by whom it was immediately embraced.

As so many were concerned, and as they remained some time undetermined in the choice of a time and place for the execution of their purpose, it is singular that the conspiracy should have come to such a height undiscovered. But Cæsar did not encourage informers : his great courage preserved him from the jealousies by which others, in less dangerous

* Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. ii.

† Sueton. Cæsare.

situations, are guided. He trusted to his popularity, to his munificence, to the professions of submission which were made to him, and to the interest which he supposed many to have in the preservation of his life. He had not only dismissed the guards, which, at his return to Rome, had attended him, and was commonly preceded only by his lictors and the usual retinue of his civil rank, but had suffered the veterans to disperse on the lands which had been assigned to them, and unfurnished Italy of troops, having transported the greater part of the enemy into Macedonia, reserving only a small body, under Lepidus, in the suburbs of Rome. His own mind, though pleased with the appearances, as well as the reality, of greatness, it is probable, was well nigh satiated with the pageantry of state. His thoughts became vacant and languid in the possession of a station, to which he had struggled through so much blood; and his active spirit still urged him to extensive projects of conquest.* He, accordingly, planned a series of wars, which were not likely to end but with his life. He was to begin with revenging the death of Crassus, and reducing the Parthians. He was next to pass by Hyrcania and the coasts of the Caspian sea into Scythia; from thence, by the shores of the Euxine sea, into Sarmacia, Dacia, or by the Danube into Germany; and from thence, by his own late acquisitions in Gaul, to return into Italy:† for this purpose, he had already sent forward into Macedonia seventeen legions and ten thousand horse.‡

As this sovereign of the empire, whatever may have been the extent of his projects, was likely to be employed some time in the execution of them, he thought proper to anticipate the election of magistrates at Rome, and to arrange, before his departure, the whole succession to office for some years. Dion Cassius says that his arrangement was made for three years; Appian, for five years. It is certain that he fixed the succession to office for at least two subsequent years. Hirtius and Pansa were destined to the consulate in the first; Deci-

* Dio. Cass.—Appian.—Plutarch.

† Plutarch. in *Cæsar*.

‡ Appian. de Bell. Civil. lib. ii.

mus Brutus and Plancus in the second.* He continued to increase the number of magistrates, that he might have the more opportunities to gratify his retainers and friends. The quæstors, as has been mentioned, he augmented to forty, the ædiles to six, the prætors now to sixteen. Among the latter he named Ventidius, a native of Picenum, who had been taken and led in triumph, while the people of that district, with the other Italians, in support of their claim to be inrolled as citizens, were at war with Rome. Ventidius had subsisted by letting mules and carriages. In the pursuit of this business he had followed the army of Cæsar into Gaul; and, becoming known to the general, was gradually trusted and advanced by him. His career of preferment continued up to the dignity of consul, and he himself, as has been formerly observed, came at last to lead, in the capacity of a victorious general, a procession of the same kind with that in which he had made his first entry at Rome as a captive.

This arrangement, in which Cæsar, by anticipating the nomination of magistrates, precluded the citizens from the usual exercise of their rights of election, made the subversion of the republic more felt than any of the former acts of his power, and gave the leaders of the conspiracy a great advantage against him. The prospects of his approaching departure from Rome, which was fixed for the month of March, urged the speedy execution of their purpose. The report of a response or prediction, which some of the flatterers of Cæsar had procured from the college of augurs, bearing, that the Parthians were not to be subdued but by a king,† appeared to be the prelude of a fresh motion to vest him, in his intended expedition to the East, with the title, and with the ensigns of royalty, to be borne, if not in the city, at least in the provinces,‡ in order to qualify him, in terms of the supposed prophecy, to become the conqueror of Parthia.

A meeting of the senate being already summoned, for the ides, or fifteenth, of March, the proposal to bestow on Cæsar the title of king, as a qualification for his intended enterprise,

* Cicero, ad Attic. lib. xiv. ep. 6.

† Dio. Cass. lib. xlv. c. 15.

‡ Zonaras, lib. x. c. 14.

was expected to be the principal business of the assembly. This circumstance determined the conspirators in the choice of a place for the execution of their design. They had formerly deliberated, whether to pitch upon the Campus Martius, and to strike their blow in the presence of the Roman people assembled, or in the entry to the theatre, or in a street, through which Cæsar often passed in the way to his own house.* But this meeting of the senate seemed now to present the most convenient place, and the most favourable opportunity. The presence of the senate, it was supposed, would render the action of the conspirators sufficiently awful and solemn; the common cause would be instantly acknowledged by all the members of that body; and the execution, the moment it was done, would be justified under their authority. Although some might be disposed to resist, they were not likely to be armed; and the affair might be ended by the death of Cæsar alone, or without any effusion of blood beyond that which was originally intended.

It was at first proposed that Antony, being likely to carry on the same military usurpations which Cæsar had begun, should be taken off at the same time; but this was over-ruled. It was supposed that Antony, and every other senator or citizen, would readily embrace the state of independence and personal consideration which was to be offered to them; or, if they should not embrace it, they would not be of sufficient numbers or credit to distress the republic, or to overset that balance of parties in which the freedom of the whole consisted. It was supposed that, the moment Cæsar fell, there would not be any one left to covet or to support an usurpation which had been so fatal to him. "If we do any thing more than is necessary to set the Romans at liberty," said Marcus Brutus, "we shall be thought to act from private resentment, and to intend restoring the party of Pompey, not the republic."

The intended assembly of the senate was to be held in one of the compartments of Pompey's theatre, fitted up for this purpose. It was determined by the conspirators, that they

* Sueton. in Cæsare.

should repair to this meeting, as usual, either separately, or together, in the retinue of the consuls and prætors; and that, being armed with concealed weapons, they should proceed to the execution of their purpose, as soon as Cæsar had taken his seat. To guard against any disturbance or tumult that might arise to frustrate their intentions, Decimus Brutus, who was master of a troop of gladiators, undertook to have this troop, under pretence of exhibiting some combats on that day to the people, posted in the theatre, and ready, at his command, for any service.*

During the interval of suspense which preceded the meeting of the senate, although in public Marcus Brutus seemed to perform all the duties of his station with an unaltered countenance, at home he was less guarded, and frequently appeared to have something uncommon on his mind. His wife Porcia suspected that some arduous design, respecting the state, was in agitation; and, when she questioned him, was confirmed in this apprehension, by his eluding her inquiries. Thinking herself, by her extraction and by her alliance, entitled to confidence, she bore this appearance of distrust with impatience; and, under the idea that the secret, which was withheld from her, must be such as, upon any suspicion, might occasion the torture to be employed, to force a confession, and supposing that she herself was distrusted more on account of the weakness than of the indiscretion of her sex, she determined to make a trial of her own strength, before she desired to have the secret communicated to her. For this purpose, she gave herself a wound in the thigh, and, while it festered, and produced acute pain and fever, she endeavoured to preserve her usual countenance, without any sign of suffering or distress. Being satisfied with this trial of her own strength, she told her husband the particulars, and, with some degree of triumph, added, "*Now you may trust me; I am the wife of Brutus, and the daughter of Cato; keep me no longer in doubt or suspense upon any subject, in which I too must be so deeply concerned.*" The circumstance of her wound, the pretensions which she otherwise

* Dio. Cass. lib. xliv. c. 15.

had to confidence, drew the secret from her husband, and, undoubtedly, from thenceforward, by the passions which were likely to agitate the mind of a tender and affectionate woman, exposed the design to additional hazard of a discovery and of a failure.

But, the morning of the ides of March, the day on which this conspiracy was to be executed, arrived, and there was yet no suspicion. The conspirators had been already together at the house of one of the prætors. Cassius was to present his son that morning to the people, with the ceremony usual in assuming the habit of manhood; and he was, upon this account, to be attended by his friends into the place of assembly. He was afterwards, together with Brutus, in their quality of magistrates, employed, as usual, in giving judgment on the causes that were brought before them. As they sat in the prætor's chair, they received intimation that Cæsar, having been indisposed over-night, was not to be abroad; and that he had commissioned Antony, in his name, to adjourn the senate to another day. Upon this report, they suspected a discovery; and, while they were deliberating what should be done, Popilius Lænas, a senator whom they had not intrusted with their design, whispered them, as he passed, "I pray that God may prosper what you have in view. Above all things dispatch." Their suspicions of a discovery being thus still further confirmed, the intention soon after appeared to be public. An acquaintance told Casca, "You have concealed this business from me; but Brutus has told me of it." They were struck with surprise; but Brutus presently recollected that he had mentioned to this person no more than Casca's intention of standing for ædile; and that the words which he spoke probably referred only to that business; they accordingly determined to wait the issue of these alarms.*

In the mean time, Cæsar, at the persuasion of Decimus Brutus, though once determined to remain at home, had changed his mind, and was already in the street, being carried to the senate in his litter. Soon after he had left his own

* Appian. de Bell. Civil. lib. ii.

house, a slave came thither in haste, desired protection, and said he had a secret of the greatest moment to impart. He had, probably, overheard the conspirators, or had observed that they were armed; but, not being aware how pressing the time was, suffered himself to be detained till Cæsar's return. Others, probably, had observed circumstances which led to a discovery of the plot, and Cæsar had a billet, to this effect, given to him, as he passed in the street. He was entreated, by the person who gave it, instantly to read it; and he endeavoured to do so; but was prevented by the multitudes who crowded around him with numberless applications; and he still carried this paper in his hand, when he entered the senate.

Brutus and most of the conspirators had taken their places a little while before the arrival of Cæsar, and continued to be alarmed by many circumstances which tended to shake their resolution. Porcia, in the same moments, being in great agitation, exposed herself to public notice. She listened with anxiety to every noise in the streets; she dispatched, without any pretence of business, continual messages towards the place where the senate was assembled; she asked every person, who came from that quarter, if they observed what her husband was doing. Her spirit at last sunk under the effect of such violent emotions; she fainted away, and was carried for dead into her own apartment. A message came to Brutus, in the senate, with this account. He was much affected; but kept his place.* Popilius Lænas, who a little before seemed, from the expression he had dropped, to have got notice of their design, appeared to be in earnest conversation with Cæsar, as he alighted from his carriage. This left the conspirators no longer in doubt that they were discovered; and they made signs to each other, that it would be better to die by their own hands than to fall into the power of their enemy. But they saw of a sudden the countenance of Lænas change into a smile, and perceived that his conversation with Cæsar could not relate to such a business as theirs.

* Plut. in Bruto.

Cæsar's chair of state had been placed near to the pedestal of Pompey's statue. Numbers of the conspirators had seated themselves around it. Trebonius, under pretence of business, had taken Antony aside, at the entrance of the theatre. Cimber, who, with others of the conspirators, met Cæsar in the portico, presented him with a petition, in favour of his brother, who had been excepted from the late indemnity; and, in urging the prayer of this petition, attended the dictator to his place. Having there received a denial from Cæsar, uttered with some expressions of impatience, at being so much importuned, he took hold of his robe, as if still further to press the entreaty. *Nay*, said Cæsar, *this is violence*. While he spoke these words, Cimber flung back the gown from his shoulders; and, this being the signal agreed upon, called out to strike. Casca aimed the first blow. Cæsar started from his place, and, in the first moment of surprise, pushed Cimber with one arm, and laid hold of Casca with the other. But he soon perceived that resistance was vain; and, while the swords of the conspirators clashed, in their way to his body, he wrapped himself up in his gown, and fell without any further convulsion or struggle. It was observed, in the superstition of the times, that, in falling, the blood which sprang from his wounds sprinkled the pedestal of Pompey's statue. And thus, having employed the greatest abilities to subdue his fellow-citizens, with whom it would have been a much greater honour to have been able to live on terms of equality, he fell, in the height of his security, a sacrifice to their just indignation; a striking example of what the arrogant have to fear in trifling with the feelings of men whom they ought to respect, and at the same time a lesson of jealousy and of cruelty to tyrants, or a warning, which they are but too willing to take in the exercise of their power, not to spare those whom they may have insulted by their vile usurpations.

When the body lay breathless on the ground, Cassius called out, there lies the most worthless of men.* Brutus called upon the senate to judge of the transaction which had passed before them, and, having addressed himself to Cicero by


* Cic: ad Famil. lib. xii. ep. 1. Nequissimum occisum esse.


name,* was proceeding to state the motives of those who were concerned in it, when the members, who had for a moment stood in silent amazement, rose of a sudden, and began to separate in great consternation. All those who had come to the senate in the retinue of Cæsar, his lictors, the ordinary officers of state, citizens and foreigners, with many servants and dependents of every sort, had been instantly seized with a panic; and, as if the swords of the conspirators were drawn against themselves, had already rushed into the streets, and carried terror and confusion wherever they went. The senators themselves now followed. No man had presence of mind to give any account of what had happened, but repeated the cry that was usual on great alarms, for all persons to withdraw, and to shut up their habitations and shops. This cry was communicated from one to another in the streets. The people, imagining that a general massacre was somewhere begun, shut up and barred all their doors, as in the dead of night; and every one prepared to defend his own habitation.

Antony, upon the first alarm, had changed his dress, and retired to a place of safety. He believed that the conspirators must have intended to take his life, together with that of Cæsar; and he fled, in the apprehension of being instantly pursued. Lepidus repaired to the suburbs, where the *legion* he commanded was quartered; and, uncertain whether Cæsar's death was an act of the senate, or of a private party, waited for an explanation, or an order, from the surviving consul, to determine in what manner he himself should proceed.† In these circumstances, a general pause, or an interval of suspense and silence, took place in every part of the city.


* Philippica ii. c. 12.

† Appian. de Bell. Civ. lib. ii.














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